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The abbreviations of books, periodicals, reference works, Internet publications, 
secondary and primary works in this thesis follow established usage. Commentaries 
on Romans are cited by author only (e.g. Jewett, 171). The Loeb’s Classics have been 
used as the primary source of Graeco-Roman sources at or near the first century. They 
are cited by author, book, and reference from the Loeb Series.
Shorter Synopsis
OBLIGATION AS ETHICS:
THE POWER OF ROMAN 6<|)£iAii AS THE KEY TO CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION IN ROMANS 14:1-15:13
One weakness in some contemporary New Testament studies involves examining a 
word meaning without considering the depth of its meaning in light of historical, 
social, and customary first-century usage. The challenge comes in reading a word in 
contemporary twenty-first-century language, but understanding its full meaning from 
the first-century culture. New Testament studies of Paul in his Epistle to the Romans 
tend to focus on his theology as a theological treatise or to focus on certain social 
theories that limit the scope of cultural underpinnings in the Greek text. Obligation as 
ethics, the power of o<j)£iAp (obligation) as the key to conflict resolution, aims to 
examine Romans 14:1-15:13 in its historical-sociological context with an emphasis 
on Roman law.
Rome was a peculiar society where its inhabitants were required to fulfil obligations 
and duties as a vital part of daily living. Therefore, obligation in Roman society filters 
through Roman law, character, customs, and a path of duty in daily life. Obligation in 
the Christian community required rethinking the customary standards in obligation to 
Jesus Christ. Roman law influenced custom, determined a course of social 
interactions, and reinforced behaviour patterns. It was founded on Roman law and its 
legal basis set forth a map, a plan, a nexus of social ties in relationships, and clear 
expectations in daily social practice. Roman law itself was structured in a framework 
of Graeco-Roman virtues and vices which influenced the character and societal 
customs (;mores) of its citizens and non-citizens.
The construct of virtue, as practiced in the first century, accentuated a long history of 
aristocratic rules and defined social roles that solidified a Roman social hierarchy that 
polarized two social classes: the strong and the weak. The strong were the aristocratic 
superiors based on rank, status, wealth, and prestige. The weak were social inferiors 
who, according to Roman law and the mores, were obligated to submit to the power 
of the strong. Roman obligation, a critical tool for Roman social practice, order, 
harmony, and conflict resolution, served in society as a lubricant to order society and 
to relieve social tensions.
The textual evidence of Romans 14:1-15:13, and the context underpinning it, indicate 
that the social distinctions of ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak’ were reflected in the early 
church in Rome. Their tendency, based upon Roman law and social custom, was to 
relate as the superior strong and the inferior weak with the weak obliged to submit. 
However, Paul plunders this concept and makes use of the conventional tool of 
Roman obligation in a new way. His countercultural solution aimed to resolve the 
tension that threatened to split the church.
x
SECTION ONE:
OBLIGATION IN ROMAN SOCIETY
l
Introduction
In this thesis it is proposed to argue that the main concern of Paul in Romans 14:1-15:13 is 
the resolution of conflict between the strong and the weak. In the past, research on this 
passage has been done largely by reconstructing the Sitz im Leben in Rome’s Christian 
community in light of ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak’ problem discussed in I Corinthians 8:1-11. 
Neither passage has been read in light of the important nexus between Roman law and life. 
The focus of this thesis will be on Paul’s letter to the Romans interpreted in the light of this 
crucial nexus.
J. A. Crook, the late Professor Emeritus of Ancient History at the University of 
Cambridge, in his ground-breaking book Law and Life o f Rome 90 BC - AD 212, asserts that 
Roman law and social connections were intertwined; specifically, that Roman law with its 
legal code embraced all aspects of Roman social relationships undergirded by specifying 
legal and social obligation.1 Crook’s study casts important light on the social connections 
between the strong and the weak in Roman society and law’s “reflection of society” in the 
first and second centuries.2 His important work can throw new light on New Testament 
studies and represents a challenge to scholarly interpretations of Romans 14:1-15:13. New 
Testament scholars suggest a key to interpretation in Romans 14:1-15:13, especially Romans
1 J. A. Crook, Law and Life ofRome, 90 BC - AD 212: Aspects o f  Greek and Roman Life (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1967), 1-15. His work signifies a major paradigm shift in Roman studies. Bruce 
Winter asserts Crook’s decades long plea for incorporating “Roman legal history into the wider discipline of  
history” [Bruce Winter, Roman Wives, Roman Widows: The Appearance o f New Women and the Pauline 
Communities (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 3]. He cites K. Hopwood’s Festschrift essay for Crook where 
Hopwood acknowledges this shift, “The [Roman] laws passed are an invaluable source for the ideology o f their 
period; they may or may not tell us what people were doing; instead they tell us what the ruling groups wanted 
people to be doing and what they wanted them not to be doing” [K. Hopwood, “Aspects of Violent Crime in the 
Roman Empire,” in Thinking Like a Lawyer: Essays on Legal and General History for John Crook on His 
Eightieth Birthday (ed. P. McKechnie; Mnemosyne Supplements ccxxxi; Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 63-80, cit. 65.
2 Crook, Law and Life, 7-8. Crook says Roman society was “enmeshed” in a complex set o f legal rules. He also 
notes that “it is likely that more Romans knew about their legal institutions than Englishmen do theirs” (7-8), i.e. 
a set of obligations involved “social relationships” (p. 13).
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15:1, are an obligation of indebtedness, a moral obligation, or a general social obligation.3 
Crook’s important book suggests the influence of legal and social obligation as vital to 
interpretation. It will be suggested that Paul uses this social obligation in Romans 14:1-15:13 
as a legal binding requirement on internal relationships in the church. Crook’s work provides 
an interpretive cultural insight on Roman law that Paul understood and invokes as a means of 
conflict resolution. Therefore, this thesis aims to explore the power of (obligation)
which Paul invokes in Romans 15:1 as the key to resolving conflict between the strong and 
the weak in Romans 14:1-15:13. Roman law spans several hundred years, thus narrowly 
defining the function of Roman law near the time of Paul’s writing his letter to the Romans 
and during the reign of Nero can best be handled by looking at Roman law in the first century 
with a special emphasis given to what Crook refers to as the connection of law and society in 
the “grand theme of Roman law,” that is, law “designed to bring out their social 
relationships.”4
Of course, New Testament studies have recognised obligations in the first century 
between masters-slaves, patrons-ffeedmen, patrons-clients, and the emperor to the people.5 
Law prescribed that masters and slaves ought to share obligations, the slave ought to be 
obedient to his or her master and the slave owners “under strong obligation to provide their 
slaves with the basic needs of life - food, clothing and shelter...”6 Patrons and freedmen 
related to each other on the basis of social relations and a system of honour, with the 
freedmen somewhat “handicapped by obligations towards his patron and by disabilities in
3 Moo, Romans, 812 n. 8; Cranfield, Romans, 2:730 n. 1; Jewett, Romans, 876.
4 Crook, Law and Life, 13. David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source o f Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 3-26. Bederman argues two keys: (1) From Roman law it can be seen “that custom is, indeed, a 
positive source of obligation” (20); (2) “All law begins with custom,” so much so that “one can conclude that a 
proof in practice in Roman law depended upon a showing of its longevity, consistency, and widespread [social] 
observance” (3,19).
5 Jeffers, The Greco-Roman World o f the New Testament (Downers Grove, 111.: Intervarsity, 1999), 180-196; 
Richard Horsley, ed., Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society (Harrisburg, Penn.: 
Trinity Press, 1997), 1-126.
6 Keith Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 81.
3
society.”7 Patrons and clients ought to be bound together by dutifulness, rights and duties,
and, according to Tacitus in the days of Nero, “held by the bond of servitude,” which was
another way of supplying obligations to social and legal relationships.8 The emperor and the
people both had obligations in Roman society, exemplified in the title pater patriae. Cooley
describes the title, “The title pater patriae evoked the connotations of the father figure in
Roman society, reflecting not only the affection and responsibility a father feels towards his
children..., but also the obedience required by law from the children to their father.. .”9
George Mousourakis, a teacher of legal history and comparative law at Niigata University in
Japan and at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, describes such obedience as “extreme
formalism, indeed ritualism” adding,
.. .formalism denotes not only the need for compliance with the forms or rules of 
procedure characteristic of any legal system, it also emphasizes form in very part of 
the legal system: the casting of all acts in an unchangeable form where successful 
completion depends on strict adherence to a set ritual engaging certain words and 
gestures.10
The Roman legal system produced a class of codes or a “social compact,” that is, social 
obligations as to what persons were to do or not to do in a given set of circumstances.11 
Social obligations required adherence to a set of legal rules and customs encompassing duties 
such as obeying authority, maintaining loyalty, sustaining bonds and conventions within 
families, in business and in relationships, and maintaining good order based on one’s social 
position in society.12 Obedience and obligation formed synonymous meaning in the context 
of Roman law as ordinary citizens related in daily life to the emperor and Roman power.
J. A. Crook’s revolutionary thesis on Law and Life o f Rome and his Festschrift
7 A. M. Duff, Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1958), 89, 95.
8 Crook, Law and Life, 51-55; Tacitus, Annals 13.26-7.
9 Alison Cooley, Res Gestae Divi Augusti: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 274.
10 George Mousourakis, A Legal History o f Rome (London: Routledge, 2007), 21.
11 Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London: John Murray, 1897), 15, 307-9.
12 E. A. Judge, The Social Pattern o f  Early Christian Groups (London: Tyndale, 1960), 72-77. He discusses 
obligation under the chapter heading “Ideas of Social Obligation.”
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represent clear evidence of both a paradigm shift in how Roman law and life connected as 
well as laying invaluable groundwork for law as a reflection, influence and dynamic in its 
social context.13 Having said that, H. F. Jolowicz, the late Regius Professor of Civil Law in 
the University of Oxford, states, “The influences which were at work in the development of 
the law during the principate were largely the same as those which had been active during the 
later republic.”14 He continues, “Already then Rome had come into touch with the older and 
more developed Hellenistic East; already her lawyers had taken some doctrines from Greek 
philosophy and her law had received many additions from Greek sources.”15 Jolowicz’s 
statements are vital to this thesis due to the mix of Latin, Greek, Roman legal and Greek 
philosophical ideas used to explain Roman obligation and its ethics. Likewise, in dating 
particular laws of obligation, essential to understanding it is the personal nature of Roman 
law. Andrew Riggsby, in Roman Law and the Legal World o f the Romans, states this 
succinctly, “Roman law was not thought of as the law of a particular area, but law for Roman 
people, wherever they happened to be.”16 He adds that while most users of the law were not 
legal professionals, socially, law defined a “package of legal rights and obligations” that 
required applications and responses to “real world situations that might eventually arise.”17 
Simply, legal and social obligation “governed the relations between persons and persons."18
In this introductory chapter it is proposed to outline recent discussion emphasizing 
scholarly work done in clarification of three key issues required to assist in interpreting 
Romans 14:1-15:13. They are: (1) the Sitz im Leben, at the time of Paul’s writing the Epistle 
to the Romans; (2) the background of I Corinthians 8-11:1 in Paul’s thought bearing in mind
13 Crook, Law and Life, 7.
14 H. F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study o f Roman Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1932), 419.
15 Jolowicz, Historical Introduction, 419.
16 Andrew M. Riggsby, Roman Law and the Legal World o f the Romans (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 103.
17 Riggsby, Roman Law, 5,23-28.
18 D. J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law o f Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
6.
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that he wrote Romans from Roman Corinth; (3) Paul’s proposed method in Romans 15:1 for 
resolving the conflict between the strong and the weak; and (4) the method of study.
1. Historical Setting: Sitz im Leben 
The search for the Sitz im Leben is critical to Romans 14:1-15:13. It requires the exploration 
of the general historical and cultural issues. Generally, New Testament studies have given 
low priority to certain aspects of Roman background. There is a dearth of general articles on 
the Sitz im Leben germane to this dissertation. Reasoner, in his widely influential monograph 
is an example of the tendency within scholarly circles to focus upon one narrowly focused 
question: Who were the strong and the weak?
In a monograph on the passage, Mark Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak: Romans 
14:1-15:13 in Context provides a helpful summary of scholarship exploring who are the 
strong and the weak.19
i. A Literary construct
The first category that Reasoner mentions is that “the weak are a literary construct based on 
situation in Corinth.”20 Robert J. Karris supports this view that Paul created a hypothetical 
situation in the letter to the Romans (14:1-15:13) based upon his dealings over the ritual 
observance of food laws and things sacrificed to idols in Corinth.21 Karris argues that there is 
no Roman Sitz im Leben, but rather an actual situation in Corinth which Paul wishes to avoid 
in the church at Rome. In this thesis I will endeavour to show that Karris is unconvincing 
considering the complex nature of the letter to the Romans with its subversive underpinning 
of Roman background and the detail in Romans 14:1-15:13, which implies Paul’s prior 
knowledge of their actual circumstances. This knowledge was most likely delivered by
19 Mark Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak: Romans 14:1-15:13 in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 1-23.
20 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 5.
21 Robert J. Karris, “The Occasion of Romans: A Response to Prof. Donfried,” in The Romans Debate: Revised 
and Expanded (ed. Karl P. Donfried; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991), 125-127. See also Donfried, “False 
Presuppositions in the Study of Romans,” 65-84, and “Two Roman Congregations: Romans 14:1-15:13,” 203- 
15.
Priscilla and Aquila, fellow tentmakers who were expelled from Rome by Claudius and 
migrated to Corinth where Paul visited with them (Acts 18:2). While questions arise about 
the authenticity of Romans 16, the names mentioned there produce data asserting the reality 
of people in actual circumstances.22
ii. Gentile Christians
Second, the ‘strong’ are thought to be Gentile believers and the ‘weak’ are also Gentile 
believers motivated by pagan concerns.23 Two possible pagan concerns are suggested. 
Schlatter wrote that abstaining from meat to eat vegetables is a human attempt at “self- 
sanctification,”24 which aimed to bring the mind and body under control. According to 
Stanley Stowers, abstinence based on external food laws caused the Gentile Christians to 
refuse to eat meat offered in pagan ritual.25 He epitomizes this position by viewing the 
divisions of the strong and of the weak as correlating to the mature and immature Gentiles in 
the church with the mature required to welcome the immature on the basis of the “principle of 
adaptability.”26 He places emphasis on behaviour as it related to pagan ritual observance, 
concluding “the strong and the weak (or mature or wise and so on) are not groups or parties 
or theological positions, as New Testament scholars have thought, but dispositions of 
character.”27 However, one must question such a conclusion given references to the 
importance of the social status of the strong and the weak in Romans 14:1-15:13 (Romans 
14:1-2; 15:1) along with the numerous references to Jew-Gentile issues in Romans as a
22 Christopher Bryan, A Preface to Romans (Oxford: Oxford: University Press, 2000), 215-6.
23 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 16.
24 Adolf Schlatter, Romans: The Righteousness o f God (trans. by S. S. Schatzmann, Peabody, Mass.: 
Hendrickson, 1995), 253.
25 Stanley K. Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews and Gentiles (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994), 319,321.
26 Stowers, A Rereading o f Romans, 319, 321.
27 Stowers, A Rereading o f Romans, 320-21.
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whole.28 This thesis will seek to clarify the importance of social status in interpretation of the
letter to the Romans.
iii. Jewish and Gentile Christians
Third, the “weak” are Jewish and Gentile believers.”29 Wedderbum holds that both the 
Jewish laws and Roman pagan ritual laws on food and days of ceremony had been 
intermingled.30 He comments, “...the Roman church was originally strongly Judaizing in 
character, and the form of Christianity which was originally established in that city was one 
which combined belief in Christ with adherence to the Jewish law.”31 Furthermore he 
highlights the influence of the Edict of Claudius in AD 49 with the expulsion of the Jews 
from Rome and its influence upon the meat market as a factor which Paul addresses in 
Romans 14:1-15:13, yet he is not fully convinced that the weak were Jews only because of 
his belief in Judaism’s influence on both Jews and Gentiles in the origin of Christianity in 
Rome.32
Ziesler agrees with Wedderbum, but for different reasons.33 He views the Roman 
situation as similar to that in Corinth, yet he views the focus as meat sacrificed to an idol in 
Romans 14 versus meat as an attachment to pagan cults as a primary difference.34 He does 
see the “weak” in Romans as a “term imported from the Corinthian dispute.”35 These two 
scholars intermingle both Jews and Gentiles in each of the strong and the weak categories. 
The strong were unconcerned about Jewish ritual observance and the weak very concerned 
about such observance.36 One understands that the influence of the Claudian Edict was a
28Cf. Rom 1:4-5,16; 2:17-29; 3:9-20; 3:21-31; 4:1-25; 5:12-21; 9:1-33; 10:1-21; 11:1-10; 12:19-29; 13:9; 14:1- 
12; 15:1-13.
29 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 17.
30 A. J. M. Wedderbum, The Reasons for Romans (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1980), 64.
31 Wedderbum, The Reasons for Romans, 64.
32 Wedderbum, The Reasons for Romans, 64-5.
33 John Ziesler, Paul’s Letter to the Romans (TPINew Testament Commentaries’, London: SCM: 1989), 325-27.
34 Ziesler, Paul’s Letter, 325.
35 Ziesler, Paul’s Letter, 326.
36 Ziesler, Paul’s Letter, 326.
significant factor that contributed to the Sitz im Leben along with Judaism’s influence as part 
of conflicts in early Christianity.
Barrett takes an agnostic position.37 He cites the complexity of the Roman situation 
affirming the strong and the weak in their respective theological positions and their relative 
duties but concludes that “whatever their views were, and what were the origin and ground of 
their divergence, is obscure.”38 He understands the strong to be strong in the faith based upon 
their clear concept and practice of faith.39 The “weak” refers to those who practise “numerous 
abstentions,” which “attests to a failure to grasp the fundamental principle, which page after 
page of this epistle emphasizes, that men are reconciled to God not by vegetarianism, or 
teetotalism, but by faith alone ...”40 Barrett’s assertion of ritual observance appears 
reasonable in the context of Romans 14:1-15:13, but he falls short when Romans is exegeted 
in light of more definitive conclusions drawn from the wider Roman context. This thesis will 
explore Roman law as a key element in the wider Roman context,
iv. Weak as non-believing Jews
Reasoner’s fourth category views the weak as non-believing Jews who are “practising Jews 
outside of the church.”41 Mark Nanos is representative of scholars who takes this reading of 
Romans.42 He suggests critically that scholars often engage in retrojection, which he calls 
“Luther’s trap,”43 that is, the categorization of the strong and the weak on the basis of ritual 
observance while the strong and the weak both ignore the Biblical command not to judge 
(Romans 14:1). He further comments, “Luther recognized that Paul was clearly instructing 
the ‘strong’ not to judge the ‘opinion or conviction’ of the ‘weak’; however, Luther tripped
37 C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (London: A & C Black, 1957), 255-61.
38 Barrett, 256.
39 Barrett, 256-57.
40 Barrett, 256-57.
41 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 19.
42 Mark Nanos, The Mystery o f Romans: The Jewish Context o f Paul’s Letter (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 
1996), 92.
43 Nanos, The Mystery o f Romans, 92.
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into the very trap by judging them and then read this judgment as Paul’s.”44 Nanos concludes, 
therefore, the ‘strong’ are Christians because of their faith in Jesus and the ‘weak’ are weak 
in faith because they do not believe in Jesus (“non-Christian Jews”).45 By approaching 
Romans from a Jewish context, he asserts that the ‘strong,’ in a sense, bear witness to the 
‘weak’ about Jesus the Lord, Saviour, and Messiah of Israel.46
v. The Weak as Jewish Christians; The Strong are free
Fifth, another emerges: the weak are Jewish believers; the strong are the ones who serve 
Christ free from any necessity of Jewish ritual observances. The weak are those who maintain 
a need for Christians to practise ritual Jewish observances. Most scholars recognise the 
question of the strong and the weak as a problem of identification. For example, Cranfield 
notes that the “division between the weak and the strong was also, to a large extent at any 
rate, a division between Jewish and Gentile Christians.”47 Drawing his conclusion, he places 
special emphasis on the cohesion of Romans 15:7-13 with the rest of Romans 14:1-15:6 
along with Paul’s use of “common” (k o i v o <;, 4:14) and clean (also “pure,”
Ka0apo<;,14:21).48
Dunn believes that the discussions at Rome over food laws and holy days “were two 
of the most sensitive issues which could confront this still essentially Jewish movement 
[Christianity] as it began to develop its own distinctive character and identity.”49 He 
addresses the importance of social relationships and the tension between those who viewed 
the Gospel as essentially Jewish (‘the weak’) and those who “shared Paul’s understanding of
44 Nanos, The Mystery o f Romans, 92.
45 Nanos, The Mystery o f Romans, 154-55.
46 Nanos, The Mystery o f Romans, 154-7. Nanos believes that the strong Christians were to win the weak, non- 
Christian Jews “to faith in Jesus as the promised Christ” (p. 157).
47 C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans IX-XVI: ICC 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1979), 2:695.
48 Cranfield, 2:695.
49 James D. G. Dunn, Romans 9-16: WBC 38B (Dallas: Word, 1988), 810.
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a Gospel which transcended Jewish particularity (‘the strong’).”50 Fitzmyer essentially agrees 
with Dunn for the same reasons (Romans 14:14,21).51
Stuhlmacher believes the “Adherents of a free-Pauline and of a legal-ascetic 
perspective were opposing one another.”52 He sees the tension between the ‘strong’ and the 
‘weak’ as this: “how ritually thinking and living Jewish Christians could live together (and 
maintain table fellowship) with Gentile Christians who knew and observed no such 
regulations, a question which was still extremely pressing in Paul’s day.”53 Moo views the 
influence of the Mosaic law as crucial in the discussion given “the problem of the 
relationship between Jew and Gentile, law and Gospel, OT and NT, that is basic to 
Romans.”54 Thomas Schreiner agrees adding, “the relationship between the Jews and the 
Gentiles in God’s saving purposes has dominated the entire letter.”55 Schreiner cites the main 
issues as table fellowship and the tension between the “strong” Gentiles and the “weak” Jews, 
understanding that much of Romans 14:1-15:6 “centred on the relationship between Jewish 
and Gentile Christians.”56 Internal evidence in Romans 14:1-15:13 favours the strong and the 
weak as corresponding to Gentiles and Jews, respectively. Most scholars approach this issue 
of ethnicity in Romans in order to resolve the issue of the strong and the weak,
vi. Social stratification
Reasoner himself opens the door to another way to look at the strong and the weak. While he 
believes that the strong are Gentiles and the weak are Jews, he goes beyond mere ethnicity to 
the impact of distinctive social classes.57 His ‘classes’ add a feature salient to the debate:
50 Dunn, 795.
51 Joseph A. Fitzmyer. Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (The Anchor Bible; New 
York: Doubleday, 1993), 687-88.
52 Peter Stuhlmacher, Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Commentary (trans. Scott Hafemann; Louisville: John 
Knox, 1994), 220.
53 Stuhlmacher, 220.
54 Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 832.
55 Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans: Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 1998), 704.
56 Schreiner, 708-9.
57 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 45-63.
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“While the question of the ‘weak’ behaviour does appear to contain Jewish influences, the 
investigations generally do not give an account of the plethora of forces at work in the 
Empire’s capital that could give rise to ‘weak’ behaviour described in Romans.”58 He 
discusses the believers’ “occasion,” i.e. the Sitz im Leben in the church, as conflict 
surrounding food laws and Sabbath days with another description of the strong and the 
weak.59 He identifies the strong and the weak in the context of Roman social status.60 He 
carefully isolates the ideology of Roman strength and social power by using such terms as 
potens, inferiores, infirmus, auctoritas, and collegia.61
Of special importance is Reasoner’s observation that the strong/weak terminology in 
the literary sources is “simply a reflection of the Roman social ideology that was preoccupied 
with one’s place within a social hierarchy.”62 He highlights the influence of Roman social 
status as an interpretative key to Romans 14:1-15:13, that is, “status” as it refers to “one’s 
place on the vertical axis of social power,”63 concluding that “Paul’s use of comparable 
Greek terms in his letter to Romans is not done out of ignorance of their situation.”64 
Reasoner refers to the strong/weak terms which Paul uses to “fit the Roman tendency to 
define social hierarchies within various levels of early imperial society and differentiate 
positions in hierarchy on the basis of status.”65 Elite Romans often displayed power publicly 
to validate their personal worth in the social strata.66
While one is indebted to Reasoner’s poignant identification of the Roman Sitz im 
Leben, it will be argued that important cultural mores rest at the heart of Roman social 
relations that he has overlooked. These mores lie beyond mere ethnicity and social
58 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 22.
59 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 1-23; Schreiner, 703-10.
60 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 45.
61 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 46-50,63.
62 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 55.
63 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 63.
64 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 63
65 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 45.
66 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 48.
12
classification. He fails to give weight to these mores as the ‘precedent’ for resolution. 
Specifically, he has skimmed the surface of the Roman law of obligation in its cultural 
context as an intense social practice commanding fierce legal power.
The six categories of ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak’ also beg the question of the 
resolution between the two groups at Rome. This thesis will explore an interpretive key to 
resolution between the two groups. Were there, however, any precedents to the resolution 
between the two groups?
2. The Precedent o f I  Corinthians 8-11:1 as an Interpretive Key?
The background of I Corinthians 8-10 highlights another central issue upon which scholars 
focus when resolving the situation which gives rise to Romans 14:1-15:13. Reasoner 
observes that most see the importance of Paul’s ‘occasion’ in I Corinthians 8-10,67 i.e.,
Paul’s apostolic paradosis is seen as essential to the resolution of the problem reflected in 
Romans 14:1-15:13.68
Scholars note the interpretive difficulties but all refer to I Corinthians 8-10 as a key to 
the interpretive challenge of Romans 14:1-15:13. Cranfield finds Romans 14:1-15:13 difficult 
to interpret because “it is extremely difficult to decide with certainty what the problem is with 
which Paul is concerned,’69 but invokes the Corinthian discussion.70 He rejects the idea that 
Romans 14:1-15:13 is about food offered to idols but notes “an impressive number of 
contacts”71 between Romans 14:1-15:13 and I Corinthians 8-10. Kasemann notes that in 
Romans 14:1-15:13, Paul’s “earlier experiences come to expression here.”72 Morris notes, 
“But he [Paul] was writing from Corinth where he would certainly be mindful of local
67 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 25.
68 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 25-44.
69 Cranfield, 2:690.
70 Cranfield, 2:690-2,700.
71 Cranfield, 2:691.
72 Ernst Kasemann, Commentary on Romans (trans. and ed. Geoffrey Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1980), 364.
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problems.”73 He explains, “And the Corinthian dilemma shows us the kind of thing that could 
arise in the Roman world of the day.”74
Dunn cites the issue of the ritual observance “of dietary traditions and special (feast) 
days,”75 suggesting that each observance was “no slight or casual one.”76 He views the issue 
as more than a discussion about diet and feast days, “though the restriction caused by such 
beliefs on wider social relationships did cause Paul concern elsewhere (I Cor. 10:23-30).”77 
Stuhlmacher argues, “The problem complex which we catch sight of in Romans 14 is
7Rtherefore analogous to the situation in Galatia and Corinth.” Schreiner states succinctly: 
“Significant contact between I Cor. 8-10 and Rom. 14-15 cannot be denied.”79
Many scholars, upon examination of I Corinthians 8-10 and Romans 14:1-15:13, 
recognize that there are both similarities and differences between the situations in Corinth 
and in Rome. Reasoner discusses parallels and differences from I Corinthians 8-10 to 
Romans 14:1-15:13.80 He evaluates numerous verbal pairs as scriptural parallels.81 Moo also 
outlines “the impressive number of verbal and conceptual parallels”82 in I Corinthians 8-10 
and Romans 14:1-15:13. Karris’s essay, “Romans 14:1-15:13 and the Occasion of Romans” 
focuses upon the similarities in the two texts. He locates fifteen parallels to accentuate his 
literary construct thesis, adding, “These parallels clearly indicate to what great extent Romans 
14:1-15:13 repeats, rephrases, echoes the arguments of I Corinthians 8; 9; 10:23-11.”84 His 
parallels demonstrate that Paul understood the dynamics of paganism and ritualism that 
influence culture. He makes the astute observation, “Upon closer inspection, however, it must
73 Leon Morris, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 479.
74 Morris, 479.
75 Dunn, 810.
76 Dunn, 811.
77 Dunn, 811.
78 Stuhlmacher, 221.
79 Schreiner, 705.
80 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 25-37.
81 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 27.
82 Moo, 827.
83 Karris, “Occasion,” 65-79.
84 Karris, “Occasion,” 75.
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be noted that the parallels between Rom 14:1-15:13 and I Cor 8-11:1 do not seem to account 
for all the elements within Rom. 14:13-23.”85
The parallels highlight the need to summarize some of the differences between 
Romans 14:1-15:13 and I Corinthians 8-10. Three become apparent. (1) Paul’s appeal to 
conscience in the variety of situations in Corinth (I Corinthians 10:25-27). (2) Also, Paul’s 
use o f ‘idols’ in I Corinthians 8:1 does not appear in Romans 14:1-15:13. (3) Paul makes no 
mention of ‘the strong’ in I Corinthians, but appeals to them in Romans (15:1). Reasoner 
mentions a fourth difference, that the verb TTapaAappavopai is not found in I Corinthians 8- 
11:1.86 He says, “The key imperative in Rom 14:1-15:13 is formed from the word 
TTpOCTAappavopai.87Cranfield agrees, calling TTpoaAappdvEaOs (Rom 14:1) the 
“fundamental imperative of the passage.”88 Kasemann comments, “TTpocrAappdvopai is the 
apostle’s constantly repeated answer to both sides of the problem.”89 Does the context, 
however, demonstrate the apostle’s answer to resolve conflict between ‘the strong’ and ‘the 
weak’ given both Paul’s apparent priority for unified relationships and the underlying legal 
expectation for relationships in Roman social society?
Conduct guided by conscience plays a key role in Paul’s emphasis on relationships in 
Roman culture, especially in the letter to Romans as well as I Corinthians (I Cor 10:25-27). 
He, however, does not use the word ‘conscience’ in Romans 14-15. Paul bases his call for 
abstention from meat in a social setting of a dinner party in Corinth in deference to a person’s 
conscience, emphasizing the priority of relationship as it is grounded in the love of Christ (I 
Cor 10:25-27).90 Winter clarifies the issue of conscience at Corinth by stating that the 
purchase and consumption of meat purchased from the meat market in Corinth were both,
85 Karris, “Occasion,” 75.
86 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 32.
87 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 32.
88 Cranfield, 2:695, 700.
89 Kasemann, 366.
90 Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence o f Secular Ethics and Social Change (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2001), 287-301.
separately, permissible, but consumption of meat offered in an idol’s temple was 
inappropriate to eat.91 He says, . .when a companion at a private dinner drew attention to 
the fact that it [meat] had been offered to idols because he thought it was inappropriate for a 
Christian to eat it (I Cor 10:25-29a).”92 Continuing he states, “It was for the sake of 
conscience of the latter [the companion] who had kindly drawn attention to this fact, and not 
the conscience of the Christian, that Paul requires them to desist from eating.”93
Scholars generally overlook such a distinction. For example, Dunn cites the issue of 
clean and unclean when he draws the Corinthian discussion into Romans 14.94 Morris 
mentions that “tolerance was important”95 in the context of discussion about conscience in 
Corinth, but fails to mention I Corinthians 10:25-27. Schreiner indicates that the 
“‘conscience’ comes to the forefront in I Corinthians (I Cor 8:7,10,12; 10:25,27-29), but it 
is not mentioned in Romans 14:1-15:13.”96 Cranfield only refers to I Corinthians 10:25-27 
when comparing Corinthian and Roman contacts.97 He cites the Corinthian discussion, while 
understanding the tension between ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak’ and similarities between 
Corinth and Rome, adding that the two churches in separate cities are dealing with issues 
unique to each local community, noting that idolatry, in his estimation, was not the problem 
at Rome.98
However, in Romans, Paul, acknowledging freedom in Christ, maintains that meat is 
not the primary issue but rather the importance of relationships between a brother and sister 
in Christ (Rom 14:13-15). Paul’s great theme of unity in love arises in Romans (Rom 14:15).
91 Winter, After Paul, 287-301.
92 Winter, After Paul, 300.
93 Winter, After Paul, 300.
94 Dunn, 825-26.
95 Morris, 479.
96 Schreiner, 707.
97 Cranfield, 2:692-93.
98 Cranfield, 2:692-93.
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Conscience appeared to play a vital role in the social conduct of relationships in Corinth, but 
what played a vital role in conduct and relationships in the Epistle to the Romans?"
It is suggested that I Corinthians 8-10 foreshadows this vital role by appealing to 
Paul’s ethic of conduct not to please oneself in social settings (Rom 15:1-7). The situations at 
Corinth and at Rome had similarities but there were important differences that determined 
Christian responsibility and conduct. Paul addressed each situation according to its actual 
setting based on his understanding of the present historical context in each city and church 
respectively. Schreiner recognizes the differences in particular situations stating, “It is more 
satisfying to say that Romans 14-15 reworks some material found in I Corinthians 8-10 and 
applies it to a new situation.”100 If I Corinthians 8-10 is concerned with Christian witness in 
the wider community of Corinth and conscience determines conduct, what determined 
conduct in Rome where Paul focuses upon unity in the body of Christ (Rom. 14:1-15:13)? 
The parallels and differences demonstrate the fundamental key to interpreting Romans 14:1— 
15:13. Obligation, then, becomes the critical difference that distinguishes the Christian 
communities in Corinth and in Rome. It serves as the key to interpreting Romans 14:1-15:13.
3. Obligation as Paul’s Key to Conflict Resolution 
The most important question concerning Romans 14:1-15:15:13, is how Paul resolved the 
conflict between ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak.’ Cranfield concludes that “obligation (Romans 
15:1) will be a test of the reality of their faith,” hence he cites moral obligation as a necessary 
component of conflict resolution.101 Dunn agrees in principle with Cranfield, believing what 
was at stake was “nothing less than the whole self-understanding ...of Christianity itself,”102 
signifying “Christ the exemplar” when conflict runs headlong into the Jewish diaspora in
99 Fitzmyer, 687. He notes, “Although Paul, is, in effect, talking about conscience, he does not use that word 
here. Instead, the word is conviction (pistis).”
100 Schreiner, 705.
101 Cranfield, 2:730. See n. 1 where he states, “Here clearly denotes moral obligation.” Sven K. Soderlund and 
N. T. Wright, eds., Romans and the People o f God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999). They have no discussion 
on the Romans 15:1-13.
102 Dunn, 811.
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places like Rome.103 The Jewish and the Gentile understandings of what it means to serve as 
Christians require ‘the strong’ of the church to take up “responsibility.”104 This involves a 
true sense of obligation which mandates Christ as the model in order to achieve resolution.105 
He represents modem scholarship when he suggests, in a brief comment, that Paul’s “must” 
or “ought” of obligation (o^eiAw) only asks the strong to “bear with” the weaknesses of the 
weak.106 He speaks of the “sense of obligation,”107 whereby the model of Christ becomes 
central in ‘the strong’s mind and heart. He explains the obligation as flowing out of liberty 
that produces a “self-limitation” because of the love of neighbour (Rom. 14:15) and for the 
benefit of the congregation.108
Moo,109 Stuhlmacher,110 and Schreiner111 agree with Cranfield and Dunn. Moo further 
declares Romans 14:1-15:13 is “A Plea for Unity,”112 while acknowledging, “the strong who 
pride themselves on their ‘strength’ are obliged.”113 However, he, surprisingly, relegates 
‘obligation’ to two separate footnotes.114 He speaks of an obligation incumbent on all 
Christians due to faith115 and to its root meaning as a term for financial debt.116
103 Dunn, 835,811.
104 Dunn, 836.
105 Dunn, 835.
106 Dunn, 836.
107 Dunn, 836-7.
108 Dunn, 842.
109 Moo, 826-7.
110 Stuhlmacher, 219-20.
111 Schreiner, 707. He approaches the brink of discovery as he reviews “a call for mutual acceptance between the 
strong and the weak” by referring to the decree of Claudius in AD 49 and its surrounding social impact but then 
misses the point of Romans 14:1-15:13 when, in a footnote, he critiques Reasoner’s hint that Roman status and 
honour influencing the strong and the weak by stating, “but the evidence is insufficient to draw any definite 
conclusions on social status.”
112 Moo, 826.
113 Moo, 866.
114 Moo, 866. See n.7 where he states that Paul uses an infinitive with 6(J>£iAu) “to denote an obligation 
incumbent upon Christians by virtue of their faith.”
115 Moo, 866.
116 Moo, 812. See n. 7 where Moo notes obligation’s financial meaning extended to religious and moral 
obligations.
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Meanwhile, Stuhlmacher’s emphasis rests upon the Pauline paraklesis111 which 
encourages mutual acceptance on the basis of “self-denial in accordance with the model of
1 1 o
Christ” which leads to a common obligation of tolerance from the strong to the weak.
Schreiner, like Stuhlmacher, calls for mutual acceptance obligating the strong in faith 
to help the weak in faith.119 He comments, “The resolution of this division is crucial, for it 
relates to God’s saving purposes.”120 Meanwhile, Stuhlmacher emphasizes the strong’s 
“common obligation to tolerate and bear the weaknesses and limitations of the weak.”121 He 
concludes that the strong are obligated to live in the church for its benefit and edification.122
Morris123 and Kasemann124 both quickly press “obligation” as necessary for conflict 
resolution. Morris addresses the strong as having no choice in the matter in bearing the 
weaknesses of the weak,125 and adds, “Here he is concerned that the strong take seriously 
their obligation to use their God-given strength in the service of the God who gave it and 
therefore in that of their weaker fellows (cf. Gal 6:2).”126 Kasemann speaks simply of the 
strong’s “special obligation.”127 Jewett produces a limited discussion on “the declaration of 
obligation,” its social context, and his view of the reciprocal nature of obligation.128
However, as will be argued in this thesis, many interpreters have not taken into 
account the fundamental legal role obligation played in determining conduct in Roman 
society. Reasoner rightly hints at the importance of Roman obligation as “Paul’s solution to
117 Stuhlmacher, 219.
118 Stuhlmacher, 229-30.
119 Schreiner, 745.
120 Schreiner, 745.
121 Stuhlmacher, 230.
122 Stuhlmacher, 230.
123 Morris, 475-507. He observes, “It is best to accept the fact that we are ignorant of the precise situation and 
simply to consider what Paul says” (p. 475).
124 Kasemann, 320.
125 Morris, 496 n. 4.
126 Morris, 496.
127 Kasemann, 381.
128 Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 875-79.
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the controversy”129 in resolving the conflict at Rome between ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak.’130 
He acknowledges that a clearer understanding of these two groups requires an investigation 
into Roman social life131 and designations of social status.132
Furthermore, Reasoner in his monograph indicates the need to answer two questions 
which he sees as critical to interpretation: (1) “How does Paul’s description of the ‘strong’ 
and the ‘weak’ and his response to them fit with the first century society?”; (2) “How does 
Paul’s description of and response to the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ fit the rest of the Romans 
letter?”133
Reasoner outlines Paul’s solution to the controversy in Chapter 10 entitled 
“Obligation: Paul’s Solution to the Controversy.” 134 He begins by mentioning the 
“enlightened strong” and the “superstitious weak” and how “Roman society was held 
together by cords of personal obligation.”135 Reasoner divides Chapter 10 into two sections: 
(1) The background of obligation; and (2) obligation in Romans 14:1-15:13.136 Under the first 
section Reasoner explains several key elements to the concept of obligation under three 
subheadings: (1) “Ethic: obligation as a moral issue;” (2) “Exchange: the continuing 
mutuality of obligation;” and (3) “Between persons: obligation as dynamic behind 
patronage.”137 The first subheading addresses the ethic of obligation as related to four key 
virtues: knowledge of the truth, an organized society that requires the performance of certain 
duties, courage, and self-control or temperance.138 Obligation is connected to virtue by 
discussing the concept of obligation as “duty” and by focusing upon the “reciprocity ethic” as
129 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 175.
130 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 188.
131 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 22.
132 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 45-63.
133 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 23.
134 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 175-199.
135 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 175.
136 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 176, 187.
137 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 176, 179,181.
138 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 176.
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“central to the notion of obligation.”139 In Roman society an obligation often required a 
reciprocal duty such as the repayment of a debt paid in good faith.140 The debt could be 
material but also included relational aspects such as obligations between friends.141 Vital to 
the concept of an obligation was the moral sense of fulfilling an obligation or duty and the 
reciprocal exchange. One aspect of the “morality of obligation” was the reciprocal ethic 
connected to the idea of benefits or “gift-giving” that required a reciprocal response such as a 
return of honour or gratitude to the giver of the gift.142
The second subheading discusses the exchange of goods and services as a function of 
the “mutuality of obligation.”143 On both sides of obligation, the giver of the gift and the 
receiver of the gift, each person was expected to perform duties to give relationships “lasting 
force.”144 Primary to Reasoner’s discussion in this section was the concept of mutual 
obligations between parties where each party was conscious of obligations which “ensured 
that relationships continued.”145
The third subheading discusses obligation as an important aspect of patronage. 
Reasoner skims key elements of patronage, but lightly approaches the important sense of 
social hierarchy as it relates to obligation. Reasoner recognizes the importance of patronage 
as an exchange between two parties, between patrons and clients, and between friends and the 
impact it might have had on the church in Rome.146 One weakness of this section is the 
limited attention given to social hierarchy which appears to play an important role in social 
obligation as well as the conflict in the church in Rome.
Reasoner’s discussion in the first section of Chapter 10 of these key elements of
139 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 176.
140 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 177.
141 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 111.
142 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 176-7.
143 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 179.
144 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 181.
145 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 181.
146 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 184-6.
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obligation is important, such issues as the ethics of reciprocity, benefits, duties, mutual 
obligation as an exchange of goods and services, and the dynamic personal obligations 
requiring the performance of an act based on the commonly understood concept of 
patronage.147 In this first section he clearly highlights key social elements of obligation but 
misses the legal impact of obligation both in society and its implications for the church in 
Rome.
In Chapter 10, the second section, Reasoner addresses the biblical text of Romans 
14:1-15-13. He divides the biblical text into three subheadings: (1) Romans 14:1-12; (2) 
Romans 14:13-15:6; (3) Romans 15:7-13.148 In the Romans 14:1-15:13 introductory section 
he mentions that “Paul is making ample use of social force” by focusing upon such thoughts 
as the command to welcome members of the church and the social obligations that church 
members have to one another.149 Of interest in this section is his comment in an introductory 
sentence in a paragraph that says, “While the concept of obligation has been applied to the 
NT in a variety of ways, its place in Romans has not been fully explained.”150 Reasoner then 
discusses obligation briefly under three subheadings.151 He discusses Paul’s argument “to 
bring both groups closer to performing unfulfilled obligations necessary for communal 
harmony.”152 He further mentions the obligation of the strong to the weak as one aspect of 
their Christian responsibility and call to deny self in the spirit of self-sacrifice.153 Reasoner 
also discusses Paul’s social ethics “based primarily on a divine-human relationship, rather 
than on a mere respect for one’s fellows.”154 He concludes this chapter by highlighting two 
important issues related to Romans 14:1-15:13: (1) the importance of surrendering personal
147 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 176-186.
148 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 190,191, 194.
149 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 187.
150 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 188.
151 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 190-9.
152 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 190.
153 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 191-3.
154 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 195.
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rights in an effort to create church harmony; and (2) the emphasis on Paul’s directions in 
Romans 14-15 that “would not work without the use of obligation throughout Roman society 
as a means of defining relationships.”155
In the biblical text of Romans 14-15 Reasoner sees obligation at work in three 
divisions: Romans 14:1-12; 14:13-15:6; and 15:7-13.156 Romans 14:1-12 highlights two 
important obligations, according to Reasoner: (1) the obligation primarily to the weak (in 
most of this section) to stop judging the strong and a few references to the strong to do the 
same (Rom 14:1; 14:3; 14:10); and (2) an obligation of thanksgiving based on a sense of 
“calling” which places God as ruler and judge.157 Obligation in this section implies personal 
accountability and the priority of communal harmony while emphasizing the “person’s 
relationship before Christ’s place as ruler of all and God’s role as judge.”158
Reasoner notes that the next biblical section (Rom 14:13-15:6) is addressed mostly to 
the strong. The obligations to the strong here are both negative, do not offend the weak (Rom 
14:13), and positive, bear the weaknesses of the weak (Rom 15: l).159 He sees in this section 
the practical obligations to build up the church, to follow Christ’s example, and to glorify 
God (Rom 15:6).160 Reasoner sees both the duties, benefits and the “social values” at work in 
the relationships requiring obligations, but equally emphasises that the “believer is primarily 
under obligation to God, on the basis of divine benefits that God has shown in Christ (Rom 
6:12-8:39).”161
Reasoner appraises the importance of the “vertical dimension” obligation, that is, that 
because Christ accepted each of them the members of the church are obligated to welcome
155 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 195, 198-9.
156 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 190-9.
157 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 190-1.
158 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 191.
159 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 191-2.
160 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 191-4.
161 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 192-3.
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each other.162 The vertical dimension requires obligations from both the strong and the weak 
in the form of instruction that runs against ‘the typical dynamic between those of ‘strong’ and 
‘weak’ status in Rome.”163 In essence, Reasoner offers that Paul’s instruction required 
obligation in such a way that he “superimposes the relationship of the believer to Christ onto 
the controversy” in the church, thus providing a legitimate, albeit unusual way to resolve the 
conflict in the church
Reasoner is accurate in addressing these foundational issues related to obligation. He 
has taken a step forward in linking obligation as a key to understanding and interpreting 
Romans 14-15. However, three advancements in the concept of obligation would have 
provided greater depth and understanding to its use in interpreting Romans 14-15. First, 
obligation possessed numerous and powerful implications as an underlying social force 
connected to its legal impact in Roman society.
Second, obligation finds its ultimate meaning in the roots of Roman law. As such, the 
concept of obligation interacts with the customs, social relationships, and the fabric of how 
Roman society functioned on a daily basis. This means that obligation as a cultural norm in 
Roman society is more complex and persistent than Reasoner suggests. This will be argued in 
the first half of the thesis in chapters 1-5.
Third, reading Romans carefully, it appears that Paul’s argument in Romans, 
beginning in verse 1:14, progressing through Romans 9-11, and climaxing in Romans 14-15, 
focuses upon a vital concept: obligation. In the second half of the thesis in chapters 5-8 will 
discuss and show how Paul is preparing his readers for a resolution of conflict through a 
reversal of obligations.
This thesis will seek to defend the view that Roman obligation serves as the critical 
tool of social convention in understanding Romans 14:1-15:13 and Paul’s resolution between
162 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 194-5.
163 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 195.
24
‘the strong’ and ‘the weak.’ Hinting at the value of understanding Roman obligation in 
Roman society, as Reasoner does, highlights a gap in our understanding of Romans 14:1— 
15:13. He, in effect, knocks on the door of Roman obligation without opening it.
The ancient historian Ramsay MacMullen underscores the importance of the social 
relations by noting that Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon was preceded by a firm calculation 
of the people, “social blocs and classes, sympathies and antipathies,” adding further that 
Caesar must know and reflect on the train of relationships that transmits his will to the 
masses.. .164 Caesar, as the leader of the Roman people, understood their social relationships. 
In a similar fashion, Paul, as a spiritual leader, understood the social structure of the Roman 
people.
It will be argued that Paul’s critical use of Roman obligation provides understanding 
of the Epistle to the Romans on the basis of social relationships. Analysing cultural and 
ethnic norms regarding food laws, Sabbath days, and evaluating who are ‘the strong’ and ‘the 
weak,’ as most commentators do, limits interpretation. While appraising social class 
distinction, Reasoner only hints at the deeper contextual social setting and the endemic social 
expectation in the first century for the interpretation of Romans 14:1-15:13.
4. Modus Operandi
This study focuses upon Paul’s use of 6<j)dAu) as a social concept rather than a word study. A 
cursory review of 6(|)£tAu) and its derivative forms shows its use in both extra biblical and 
biblical sources.
Prior to Paul’s use of the word 6(j)£iAio at the time of his writing his letter to the 
Romans it had roots in Greek philosophy and law (see page 5). The ancient Greek author and 
poet Homer (7th or 8th century BC) in The Iliad speaks of the Epeians in the war against the
164 Ramsay MacMullen, Roman Social Relations 50 BC to AD 284 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 
121.
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Pylians as those who “owe (o(f)£iAov) a debt,” a reference to some type of payment.”165 The 
ancient Greek historian Herodotus (484-425 BC) in Histories has a dialogue between King 
Croesus and a man named Adrastus who indicates his obligation of service (“owing you as I 
do a requital of good service”).166 The Greek philosopher Plato (429-347 BC) in Laws uses 
obligation in the sense of legal punishment, stating “if he be convicted (6(f)£iAq) again on a 
like charge.”167 The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC) in Nicomachean Ethics uses 
obligation is the context of honour, friendship, and reciprocal duty (“a debtor ought to pay 
what he owes”).168
The word 6(j)£iAu) or one of its derivative forms is used rarely in the Greek Septuagint 
(LXX), but three examples are Deuteronomy 15:2, Ezekiel 18:7, and Isaiah 24:2. Each 
example used in the sense of a financial debt or obligation.
Two Jewish authors, Josephus (AD 37-100) and Philo (20 BC - AD 50), discuss 
obligation and use the word at or near Paul’s use of the word in his letter to the Romans. Two 
Roman authors, Dio Chrysostom (AD 40 -120) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (60 BC -  
after 7 BC), both of whom wrote in Greek, discuss and use obligation. A detailed discussion 
can be found in Chapter 1 with an emphasis on the legal underpinnings of obligation. It will 
be suggested in Chapter 1 that the use of 6(f)£iAw and its derivative forms near the first 
century were impacted by Roman law both “as a reflection of Roman society” and with a 
clear emphasis on laws of obligation that defined “social relationships.”169
In the New Testament 6(|)£tAw and its derivatives are used sparingly. The noun 
ocj)£iA£Tri^  and its derivative noun forms are used seven times: in Matthew 6:12 in the Lord’s 
prayer as an ethical reference to forgiving our debtors who wrong us; in Matthew 18:24 in the 
parable of the talents; in Luke 13:4, often translated “sinners,” speaking of the possible guilt
165 Homer, Iliad 11.685.
166 Herodotus, Histories 1.42.
167 Plato, Laws 10.909a.
168 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.13-14; 8.14.4.
169 Crook, Law and Life, 7, 13.
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of the men on whom the tower of Siloam fell; in Romans 1:14, 8:12, and 15:27 as an 
obligation; and in Galatians 5:3 as an ethical obligation for Jews who keep the whole law.
The word 6<|)£iAp and its derivative forms are used three times: in Matthew 18:32 in 
the parable of the talents; in Romans 13:7 as an obligation to pay a tax; and in I Corinthians 
7:3 where the husband and wife have duties in respect to each other. The word 6(|)£tAr||ia and 
its forms are used two times: in Matthew 6:12 asking Christians to forgive their debtors, those 
who have wronged them; and in Romans 4:4 of a reward or payment for work done or what is 
due.
The word o<|)£iAu) and its root stem verb forms are used thirty five times. The word is 
used thirteen times in the synoptic gospels, once in Acts (17:19), three times in Romans, 
seven times in I-II Corinthians, one time in Ephesians, two times in II Thessalonians, one 
time in Philemon, three times in Hebrews, and four times in I and III John. A random 
sampling of the use of 6<{)£iAw in the New Testament finds it used with respect to a binding 
Jewish oath (Matt 23:16,18), as a term of a term of financial debt (Matt 28:18; Lu 16:5, 7; 
Philemon 18), as a word that incites an obligation(s) or duty (Lu 17:10; I Cor 5:10; 7:3; 11:7; 
Eph 5:28), and as a term indicating a moral or spiritual obligation (II Thessalonians 1:3; 2:13; 
I John 2:6; Rom 15:27).170
Three examples of the use of 6(J)£iA- and its derivative must be highlighted. First, 
John’s use of 6(j)£iA£i in John 19:7 is set in the context of Jewish ethical laws related to 
blasphemy from Leviticus 24:16. The law in Leviticus 24:16 states that a person who 
blasphemes the name of the Lord “shall surely be put to death.” In this sense the idea of 
obligation makes the one who blasphemes liable to a penalty.
170 E. A. Judge, “Appeal to Convention,” in The New Testament in Its First Century Setting (ed. P. J. Williams, 
Andrew Clarke, Peter Head and David Instone-Brewer; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 186. Judge 
acknowledges the importance of social obligation in Paul’s letters. He says, “The English auxiliary verbs (e.g. 
‘should,’ ‘ought,’ and ‘must’) are regularly used to soften the direct imperatives that confront us with someone 
else’s demand.” He adds, “The Pauline letters...are strong on imperatives.” Also, “Where they do use Greek 
auxiliary verbs (or nouns) of obligation there is typically an explicit argument to justify it.”
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Another example is found in I Corinthians 5:10 where 6(j)£iA£T£ is used. In verse 10 
Paul is clarifying what he had said earlier, that is, that Christians should “not keep company 
with fornicators” (I Cor 5:9). He names three groups of people that Christians should avoid: 
the covetous, idolaters, and fornicators. Paul uses the word 6<(>£iA£T£ to acknowledge the 
impossibility of completely avoiding the previously mentioned three groups of people. 
Hypothetically, to completely avoid such groups of people would require or obligate 
Christians to not live in the world. Paul resolves the issue with a direct imperative from 
Jewish ethics found in Deuteronomy 17:7 and Deuteronomy 24:7, that is, “Put away from 
among yourselves the wicked person” (I Cor 5:13). Obligation in this sense as Paul uses it I 
Corinthians 5:10 is still used in the concept of duty, albeit a hypothetical one. It is also 
important to note the wider context of I Corinthians 5 includes Jewish thought, ethics, and 
ideas of judging (God judges those outside the church or synagogue; judgment for purity’s 
sake in the church or synagogue is permissible, thus, “put away the wicked one”).
A third example of importance is found in I Corinthians 9:10. Here Paul, after quoting 
Deuteronomy 25:4 in I Corinthians 9:9 about not muzzling the ox while he is treading the 
com, uses the verb 6(j)£iA£i in stating that the one who ploughs is under an obligation or a 
duty to plough in hope of partaking in the harvest. Paul quotes Moses (I Cor 9:9) and in the 
wider context acknowledges that the labourer for the Lord should expect and hope for sharing 
in the harvest of the gospel as well as make his living from the gospel (I Cor 9:1-14). The 
duty in I Corinthians 9:10 is an obligation to plough in hope to partake in the harvest of the 
gospel.
While each of the three examples mentioned above possess Jewish influences, the 
primary thrust of the uses of 6c|)£iA- and one of its derivative forms favours a Greek 
understanding in the sense of an obligation. In each case, while Jewish influence is 
unavoidable in the context, each is written towards a mostly Gentile audience. In every
28
instance clear interpretation of the scripture passage and the uses of obligation mandates 
interpretation in light of contextual principle of setting the word in its wider cultural context.
Applying this contextual principle to Paul’s letter to the Romans is the background of 
Roman culture which adds a unique set of criteria to the interpreting obligation. The Greek 
influence of obligation merges with the Roman influence of Roman law to give further depth 
to the meaning of obligation. Significant to Paul’s letter to the Romans is the fact that he uses 
the root stem of 6<})£iA- as a key to his argument early in Romans (1:14) and near the end 
(Rom 15:1: 15:27), while using the derivative form of the word throughout (Rom 1:14; 4;4; 
8:12; 13:8; 15:1; 15:27). Roman law in Paul’s era will be discussed in Chapter 1 and its 
importance in Roman culture as a key to interpreting Romans 14-15. It will be suggested in 
this thesis that Paul appears to have the concept of obligation in mind in each major section in 
Romans: Romans 1-8; 9-11; 12-14; 15-16. Each of these sections, especially with Paul’s 
sense of obligation and readiness to preach the gospel and his words that indicate social 
distinctions, the Jew and the Gentile, the Greek and the barbarian, the wise and the unwise, 
and the strong and the weak (Rom 1:14; 15:1), encourage further investigation into the 
cultural and legal implications of Roman obligation in the context of Paul’s letter to the 
Romans.
The ancient historian E. A. Judge points out the dangers of New Testament scholars 
ignoring the cultural implications: “Modem students have thus created for themselves 
problems of New Testament acquiescence and inconsistency, through neglecting to identify 
the situation to which the New Testament writings were actually addressed.”171 This thesis 
seeks to avoid this and explores the socio-historical implications of Roman law in an effort to 
identify the situation in Rome in the first century. An exploration of the social implications of
171 E. A. Judge, Social Pattern, 7.
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Roman law in its social context will reflect society in Paul’s letter to the Romans.172 As such, 
reviewing the social and historical implications of Roman law will give a clearer 
understanding of Romans 14:1-15:13.
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to open the door to the world of Roman obligation 
and investigate it as the key to the interpretation of Romans 14:1-15:13 and the means to 
resolve church conflict. It will follow Professor Judge’s admonition and seek to identify the 
situation and to explore Paul’s use of the concept of obligation. It will discuss the full range 
of obligations in Roman social relationships, their complexity and importance by means of a 
socio-historical approach. It is suggested that this Roman background approach sheds new 
light on the passage to resolve the conflict between ‘the strong’ and ‘the weak.’ Without an 
understanding of first century ‘obligation’ one fails to grasp the power of Paul’s command to 
the Romans, “We who are strong are obligated to bear the weaknesses of the weak.”173 
Obligation supplied the critical ethical tool and model for Paul to resolve the conflict in 
Romans 14:1-15:13.
In order to demonstrate obligation as ethics as the powerful key to conflict resolution 
between the strong and the weak in Romans 14:1-15:13, the approach of the thesis involves 
researching the socio-historical aspects of Roman law and the thesis aims to discuss: Chapter 
1, the legal basis of Rome’s obligation society; Chapter 2, the cultural mores of Rome’s 
obligation society; Chapter 3, the hierarchical pattern of Rome’s obligation society; Chapter 
4, conflict resolution in Rome’s obligation society; Chapter 5, racial conflict in the Roman 
church; Chapter 6, Paul’s prolegomenon to the resolution of racial polarization; Chapter 7, 
the new obligation for the church at Rome; and Chapter 8, the compelling obligation: imitatio 
Christi. A historical and sociological approach to Romans 14:1-15:13 will investigate Roman 
society as an obligation society and the thesis, divided into two sections: Part I, obligation in
172 Crook, Law and Life, 7.
173 Rom 15:1.
Roman society and Part II, obligation in the Christian community at Rome, will demonstrate 
the importance of understanding the critical sociological and historical dynamic of the power 
of otjjeiAp as the key to conflict resolution in Romans 14:1-15:13.174
174 E. A. Judge, Rank and Status in the World o f the Caesars and St. Paul (Christchurch: Canterbury, 1968), 31. 
He says, “Sociological theory may have its explanatory uses, provided it survives the discipline of documented 
facts. But ancient history has no particular need to look to other epochs for fresh sources of understanding.”
Chapter 1: Legal Basis of Rome’s Obligation Society
Introduction
Roman society thrived as an obligation society. This chapter lays the foundation of legal 
obligation as a key concept for the daily traffic of relationships in Roman culture. James 
Jeffers notes, “Personal relationships were far more important to the functioning of ancient 
society than they are to the modem Western world.”1 In the Latin culture of the West, as well 
as in ancient eastern and modem cultures like China, one could not move in society without 
taking cognizance of one’s obligations.2 What made the obligations in Roman civilisation 
different from other ancient ones was that the Romans codified the laws of obligation in its 
jurisprudence.3 This codification generated the distinctive nature of Roman society which 
underlay every action. It aimed at clarifying the actions and social conduct of those persons 
living under the throughout the Roman empire. Conduct, therefore, was rooted in Roman 
societal relationships from the perspective of obligation. The purpose of this chapter is to 
establish the legal basis of Rome’s obligation with an emphasis on relationships as crucial for 
conduct.
In order to demonstrate this legal basis this chapter will explain: (1) “obligation” as a 
technical, legal term embracing a wide range of applications; (2) the Roman law of obligation 
in general; (3) Obligations, and Roman Law in society; (4) Legal classifications and the law 
of obligations; (5) “Ought” and Romans 15:1; and (6) First-century literature, word usage,
1 James S. Jeffers, The Greco-Roman World o f the New Testament (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity Press, 
1999), 192.
2 See Confucius, The Analects o f Confucius (trans. and annotated by Arthur Waley; London: Unwin Hyman, 
1988). Richard P. Sailer also draws this comparison in greater detail in Personal Patronage under the Early 
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 111-16.
3 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 175-99. He discusses obligation but does not connect the important legal 
aspect to the social dynamic of Roman culture and to social relationships as an important component of Roman 
obligation. He sees obligation “as a means of defining relationships,” but does not explore the legal aspects (p. 
199)
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and legal underpinnings; and (7) The dating of Roman law in light of the letter to the 
Romans.
1. Obligation in General 
The key to understanding Roman social relationships is reflected in the term obligation 
(6({)£iAfj). In the Oxford Latin Dictionary the word obligatio means “the pledging or 
guaranteeing (of something);” “the state of being legally, etc., liable in some respect, the 
creation of such a state, a legal or financial obligation.”4 Zimmermann, in his important work 
The Law o f Obligations: Roman Foundations o f the Civilian Tradition, indicates the term 
typically means “that something or somebody is bound.”5 The person or thing which is bound 
formed a relationship that was cemented.6 However, it was not a one-way response but rather 
a two-way relationship whereby both of the bound parties understood their own and each 
other’s rights, duties, and obligations.7 According to Sir Henry Maine, the two-way 
relationship of obligation “signals rights as well as duties, the right for example, to have a 
debt paid as well as paying it;” while also being perceived by the Romans as a “legal chain” 
which was equally important from either end of that chain.8 Zimmermann shows there were 
emotional aspects of the legal chain of obligation by speaking of the “formal transactions of 
the ancient Roman law [of obligations].”9 He says that obligation “gave rise to an intensely 
personal relationship.”10 This intense personal relationship created a vibrant, energetic and, 
sometimes, vengeful bond in a code of conduct.
4 “Obligatio,” Oxford Latin Dictionary (ed. P. G. Glare; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 1214.
5 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law o f Obligations: Roman Foundations o f the Civilian Tradition (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 1.
6 Ramsay MacMullen, Roman Social Relations: 50 B.C. To A.D. 284 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 
65. He indicates that “the cement of their [Romans] daily financial relationships was people...”
7 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 5.
8 Henry Maine, Ancient Law: The Connection with the Early History o f Society and its Relation to Modem Ideas 
(London: John Murray, 1894), 324.
9 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 5.
10 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 5.
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The language that best describes this code of conduct which governed the intensely 
personal relationships in Roman society is the “ethic of reciprocity”11 Every person in the 
Roman world possessed rights and duties based on their individual rank and status. These 
factors combined to create complex relationships which in turn gave rise to reciprocal rights, 
duties, and responsibilities. Status and rank created a distinct Roman hierarchical social scale 
(see chapter 4).
Obligation(s) fit into Roman society by virtue of its legal definition. As such, it was 
understood by those who lived in the ancient world as a part of the landscape, whose 
communication, business, and conduct of its citizens and those with alien status were under 
the imperium. Crook indicates that Roman law reflects Roman society as he places “Roman 
law in its social context.”12 Furthermore, he argues doing this can “strengthen the bridge 
between two spheres of discourse about ancient Rome by using the institutions of the law to 
enlarge understanding of the society and bringing the evidence of the social and economic 
facts to bear on the rule of the law.”13 Johnston questions cause and effect with the 
tautological issue of methodology concerning law and society, that is, “whether it is law 
which influences patterns of social or economic behaviour or it that is shaped by them.”14 He 
sees an element of truth in both possibilities.
This thesis, therefore, works on the basis of the influence of Roman law on both the 
culture and the social patterns that determined conduct in the world under the Roman empire 
during the first century. It is suggested here that if the social patterns and the influence of law
11 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 19. Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 176. He mentions that the “reciprocity 
ethic” is “central to the notion of obligation.”
12 Crook, Law and Life, 7.
12
Crook, Law and Life, 7.
13 David Johnston, Roman Law in Social Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 27.
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were weighed in first-century Rome, the greatest weight of influence would tilt toward law as 
a determining factor for social practice and social control.
There is, however, a tendency in classical lexicography to limit the understanding of 
Roman obligation merely to a term of debt, just as biblical commentators limit their 
understanding of key terms in interpretation by focusing only on lexicographical entries 
borrowed largely from the Greek classical dictionary.
Chadwick in his significant work, Lexicography Graeca: Contributions to the 
Lexicography o f Ancient Greek, identifies this as one of the “defects” of lexicography, 
asserting that improved “treatments of a few words would lead me to propose new 
interpretations of many passages.”15 Romans 15:1 serves as an example as to how lexicons 
miss the strategic impact of obligation in antiquity and give word meanings, which by reason 
of the size and also the methodology of lexicography, often minimize the social context and 
the recognized mores, which are vital links to solid exegesis.
Liddell and Scott list the primary definition of <5cj)£iAu) as “to be indebted,” “to owe,” 
or “to be bound to.”16 A cursory reading of the lexicon might lead one to believe that 
obligation is simply a means to pay back a loan or a necessary part of financial responsibility 
where debtors repay creditors and creditors thank the debtor for repaying the amount of 
money borrowed. This is a narrow comprehension when the social impact is explored 
through the complexity of the Roman law of obligations and the tangled web of social 
relationships reflected in it. Obligation was “power” in the ancient world as well as “virtue” 
(dp£Tq), a virtue of civic goodness not to be underestimated in the structures of power and in
15 John Chadwick, Lexicographica Graeca: Contributions to the Lexicography o f Ancient Greek (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), v, 1-30. He speaks of the Liddell and Scott Lexicon, “It is time to stop worshipping this 
ancient monument and to replace it with more modem structures” (v).
16 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th rev. ed.; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), 1277.
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the quest for self-understanding toward one’s position in society. Obligation demanded that 
everyone know his or her place in society; notwithstanding, Roman law made obvious the 
signs and symbols as to where a person stood in society. This bond held society together, an 
“invisible rope” influencing social practice, control and conflict resolution.17 Zimmermann 
details the legal understanding of this rope in Rome among both the jurists and the lay 
persons:
The very word obligatio always reminded the Roman lawyer of the fact that, in 
former times, the person who was to be liable, that is, over whose body the creditor 
acquired a pledge-like power of seizure, was physically laid in bonds; and, even 
though this piece of symbolism was soon abandoned and the idea came to prevail that 
the debtor could be legally bound even if his body was not physically put into chains, 
the concept of obligation, in the minds of laymen as well as lawyers, seems to have 
retained the connotation of some sort of invisible rope around the neck of the debtor, 
tying the specific debtor to a particular creditor.18
The “invisible rope” or legal chain mandated relationships of reciprocal exchange between
two parties, and oftentimes more than two parties. While the physical chains were to
disappear, the concept of obligation as a legal social chain was strongly embedded in the
psyche and code of conduct for those living under the Roman empire. It was a concept not to
be misjudged, underestimated, nor ignored.
Obligation had its roots in the Roman household code,19 but there was another area
that can be described by the term “patronage.”20 Thus, obligations between parties connected
persons in relationships. Children were obligated to their fathers. Other members of a
household also had obligations, such as a wife to her husband. Other obligations included
those of a client (cliens) to a patron (patronus); slaves to their masters; ffeedmen to patron
owners; soldiers to their military commanders; citizens to the emperor.
17 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 5.
18 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 5.
19 Peter Gamsey and Richard Sailer, The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture (Berkley, Calif.: 
University of California Press, 1987), 126-47.
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To the reader in Western society, the social strata appear to complicate any 
contemporary understanding of obligatory relationships. However, for those living under the 
Roman empire the social strata and its obligatory impact clarified conduct within their 
relationships. Because of this, those of the lower classes or of a lower status obligated 
themselves to the higher, the poor obligated themselves to the rich, and the weak obligated to 
the strong. Clearly, a society of obligation empowered the strong and obligated the weak in 
compelling invisible ropes of intensely personal relationships. Understanding how Roman 
society functioned was vital to social interplay in politics, business, and daily life. This 
webbed stratification and its social impact as a means of security for conduct, where the weak 
obligated themselves to the strong, proved to be a powerful resource engineering Roman 
society.21
A person could not move in society or act in a relationship without first thinking of 
his or her obligations. Borkowski in his Textbook on Roman Law suggests that this 
motivation produced a binding action “in a natural consequence of the agreement between the 
two parties.”22 In chapter four these and other relationships will be discussed in greater detail. 
It is suggested here that one must broaden the concept of “obligation” in Roman society from 
mere debt to an intimately powerful concept binding all relationships between people.
2. Obligations and Roman Law in Society 
Obligation in Roman society embraced persons of that society in a wide range of 
relationships. The “invisible rope” was at work in daily life in Rome, under the imperium, in 
the forum, in the marketplace, in the transaction of business, and in the household.
20 Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, “Patronage in Roman Society: from Republic to Empire,” in Patronage in Ancient 
Roman Society (ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill; London: Routledge, 1989), 63-87.
21 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107-25.
22 Andrew Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law (London: Blackstone Press, 1994), 241.
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Understanding this “invisible rope” requires an investigation into Roman law and its 
relationships as a means of conducting daily Roman relational exchanges.
Roman law is best understood in the first century as an unwritten code. Roman law 
necessitates focusing on “code.” The word, by its etymology, implies conduct, especially in a 
given realm among a particular people within a jurisdiction of territory in relationship with 
another party or parties at a given moment in time. Sohm delineates Roman law as the law of 
the city of Rome that advanced and progressed.23 He says, “The characteristics of early 
Roman law, as we find it, or suppose to have existed are formalism and rigidity.”24 These 
words stand as a starting point, but Roman law became less formal and reduced in its rigidity, 
or more difficult to classify, as time passed. Sohm also expressed the subordination that 
Roman law represented, saying, “All law exists in order that people may live and be strong, 
and the power of the law over the individual is rooted in that subordination of the individual 
life to the common life which is demanded by morality.”25 He further asserts that law 
“preserves the power of the people” and that “law and morality are bound together by strong 
ties,” a “binding” feature of law.26
Maine clarifies how law is related to a specific time and place, arguing that “every 
law [flows] into a command of the lawgiver, an obligation imposed thereby on the citizen, 
and a sanction threatened in the event of disobedience; and it is further predicated on the 
command, which is the first element in a law, that it must prescribe, not a single act, but a 
series or number of acts of the same class or kind.”27 He goes on to depict ancient law as “in
23 Rudolph Sohm, The Institutes: A Text-Book o f the History and System o f Roman Private Law (trans. by James 
C. Ledlie; 2nd edition; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901), 50.
24 Sohm, The Institutes, 50.
25 Sohm, The Institutes, 25.
26 Sohm, The Institutes, 24.
27 Maine, Ancient Law, 7.
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the air...scarcely reaching the footing of custom; it is rather a habit.”28 In the first century 
Roman law was a series of acts in relationship that Romans undoubtedly understood and 
practised in their code of conduct. Simply put, Roman law for Roman citizens became 
custom and a habit. To borrow Maine’s words, it was “in the air,” an integral part of the 
commerce, conversation, politics, breath and life of society. Johnston allays the “remarkable 
penetration of Roman legal culture wide throughout the empire.”29
Where, then, did Roman law find its expression in Roman life? Watson argues that it 
did this in a dispute between the patricians and the plebeians in the fifth century BC.30 
Defending their rights to life and property, the plebeians detested patrician exploitation and 
demanded equality with a right to comprehend the law.31 Mitchell suggests that a “struggle 
between the orders,” as it is often described, took shape in the throes of the weaker plebeians’ 
quest for equality in the culture dominated by the stronger patricians.32 In a maze of 
circumstances the plebeians were able to form a tribune and the Roman jurists produced The 
Twelve Tables P  Robinson reports them as “the foundation of Roman law, the legal attitude 
of Rome.”34
Cicero discusses legal privilege {lex virtutis) and the rules, adding, “You know what 
fellows, for we learned the Law of the Twelve Tables in our boyhood as a required formula; 
though no one learns it nowadays.”35 More will be said about Cicero later in this chapter. 
Earlier Livy had referenced the Twelve Tables as “the fountain-head of all public and private
27 Maine, Ancient Law, 8.
29 Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 11.
30 Alan Watson, The Spirit o f Roman Law (Athens, Geo.: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 1.
31 Watson, Spirit o f Roman Law, 1.
32 Richard E. Mitchell, The Patricians and Plebeians: The Origin o f the Roman State (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 11-30.
33 Mitchell, Patricians and Plebeians, 11-30.
34 O. F. Robinson, The Sources o f Roman Law: Problems and Methods for Ancient Historians (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 2.
35 Cicero, The Laws 2.23.58-9.
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law.”36 He alludes to the struggle of the orders, “The plebs, besides the fact that they hated 
the name of consul quite as much as that of the king...”37 Watson portrays the formulation of 
The Twelve Tables as privileged political manoeuvring which required superb political 
skill.38 From the plebeian’s perspective, Maine, while commenting that social necessities and 
opinions precede law and that law affords harmony, is pointed when he says of Roman law, 
“Equity is universally obscure.”39 Indispensably, in Roman life, the need to resolve conflict 
arose.
A brief pause in this discussion is necessary before continuing to examine the 
foundation for Roman law in the first century. Until the time of Augustus the interpretation of 
law fell into the hands of the powerful Roman senate with its power of making decisions, 
advising the praetor, and developing the law with its popular statute through the 
constitutiones.40 Augustus inaugurated change, although with some resistance, giving priority 
to princeps and providing legal innovations which changed the way law and conduct were 
generated.41 Augustus in his reign reduced the powers and independence of the governors, 
and essentially, the senate, as he monopolized power as the imperator42 This single 
adjustment motivated law and conduct in Roman society. To support this reformative shift in 
policy, Borkowski notes the chief role of the Roman army in expansion and social control.43 
He adds a salient point not to be overlooked in Roman conquest and law, “If the [Emperor]
36 Livy, Roman History 3.34.6; Robinson, The Sources o f Roman Law, 2.
37 Livy, Roman History,3.34.8.
38 Alan Watson, The State, Law and Religion: Pagan Rome (Athens, Geo.: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 
14-21; Robinson, Sources o f Roman Law, 2.
39 Maine, Ancient Law, 24-25.
40 Sohm, Institutes, 111.
41 Sailer, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 92-93.
42 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 34-35.
43 Borkowski, Textbook, 14-15. He states, “Every Emperor needed the unswerving support of the army” (p. 14).
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neglected interest in the army, or failed to reward it properly, or showed himself incompetent 
as commander-in-chief, he was unlikely to reign for long.”44
Two clear but separate persuasive sources worked in concert to determine Roman law 
as it moved into the first century: ius and praetor/edict.45 Ius was an “old, unwritten, 
undeclared law.”46 Associated with ius was the compelling concept of ius honorarium, a 
built-in system of intuitive Roman legal counsel framed so by the “expert counsel of the 
jurists.”47 Roman honour in law created obligations and reciprocal response, while favouring 
those of the higher orders (see Chapter 3). Crook says, “What they (the Romans) did was to 
build up alongside that primitive system (of law) more flexible institutions, enabling the law 
of the Republic to keep pace with its economic and social development and its increasing 
contact with foreign peoples.”48 The Romans did this in the later Republic and during the 
principate. Roman law in the first century was often oral in nature, flexible and adaptable.
Praetor and edict served as a second persuasive source of Roman law. Johnston, says, 
“The most formal source of Roman private law was the edict of the urban praetor, an office 
created in 367 BC which in the hierarchy ranked second only to the consuls.”49 Augustus 
seized upon these two important factors in his legal innovations during his reign: praetor and 
hierarchy. Finley makes reference to the praetor in the context of words about Roman 
ideology with its “self-perpetuating elite and its annual turnover at the highest level” and 
when he speaks of an operative “principle of inequality, of hierarchy”50 (see Chapter 4). 
According to Crook, edicts were “pronouncements of an officer of the people to the people
44 Borkowski, Textbook, 14.
45 Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 2-3.
46 Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 2.
47 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 184.
48 Crook, Law and Life, 24.
49 Johnston, Roman Law, 3.
50 M. I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 140. Riggsby, 
Roman Law, 77. He says, “The Roman legal system...created a variety of inequalities.”
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(or to some particular set of them), saying what he requires to be done - not only about the 
law but anything.”51 Augustus used the edict as he narrowly drew powers toward himself 
during his reign. Praetorian law integrated tightly with Roman hierarchy and its command of 
duties.52 In Augustan Rome an unwritten code of law ruled the day.
3. Legal Classifications and the Law o f Obligations 
Did Rome have a specific law of obligations in the shadow of honour? The challenge of 
understanding Rome as an obligation society and the consequential law of obligations for the 
first century arose because the unwritten code of law dominated the culture. No clear 
definable tablet spells out the law of obligations in written form. Schultz addresses this, “First 
and foremost we have to emphasize that the classical lawyers never attempted to define 
obligatio,” a genuine classical definition did not exist, and definitions were not forthcoming 
until the classical era of Roman written codes.53 However, the law of obligations operated as 
a means of transaction, contract, and binding response for the parties involved.54 Rome’s two 
goals of government were “the maintenance of law and order, and the collection of taxes.”55 
The law of obligations helped achieve these two goals. Finley rightly observes “that 
obedience to the authorities became so deeply embedded in the psyche of the ordinary 
Roman citizen that it carried over into his explicitly political behaviour.’56 Obligations were 
an embedded aspect of that behaviour both politically and socially. How, then, can this 
unwritten code and/?syc/ze-laden awareness be described?
51 Crook, Law and Life, 20.
52 Crook, Law and Life, 22-23.
53 Fritz Schultz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 455.
54 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 1-8.
55 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 20.
56 Finley, Politics, 130.
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Cicero describes the law of Rome, in all of its divisions and intricacies “like limbs of 
the body.”57 Admittedly, Crook notes that “some of the limbs were awkward and difficult.”58 
Under Augustus’ new imperial order obligation took on a different face: He was the head (the 
strong head, at that) as the chief patron of society. The elite with their circle of the honoured 
ones were the heart, muscle and organs that pumped society. The arms, legs, and hands were 
the lower class of society, utterly dependent upon the main body. The law of obligations was 
the blood that made it all flow in one unified, cohesive, functioning relational unit.59 
Augustus as the head (patron) is a reminder of family law and the paterfamilias, a 
momentous concept which underlies all that occurs in the law of obligations.60 The 
application of the law itself appears in numerous sources and circumstances in the literature 
of antiquity, thus reinforcing the law of obligations as an assumed tool of social convention 
and response.61
What were the basic components of legal obligations as Romans grasped them in 
social practice? The basics were: informal and formal laws; transactions in agreement and 
consequences of a failed agreement; persons, property and actions; and, debt, civil law, and 
praetor (each concept closely connected to the dynamic Roman concept of honour).62 As 
these components are discussed, the aspects of the social linking of class and status, “social
57 Cicero, Topics 28. Crook, Law and Life, 19. Cicero’s statement is an excellent way to view Roman law in the 
first century. Cicero’s comments flow with the language of the law of obligations: “...when the thing has been 
set up for definition is divided into its members as it were: for instance if  one should define the civil law as made 
up of statutes, decrees of the Senate, judicial decisions, opinions of those learned in the law, edicts of 
magistrates, custom, and equity. Definition by analysis includes all species that come under the genus which is 
being defined as follows: Abalienatio (transfer of property according to the forms of civil law) of a thing which 
is mancipi is either transfer with a legal obligation (mancipatio) or cession of law between those who can do this 
in accordance with the civil law.”
58 Crook, Law and Life, 19.
59 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 20-21,149, stress this critical point with two important ideas: (1) 
Augustus sought to demonstrate “his own sufficiency in it through the traditional roles of patronage and 
beneficence.” (2) “Meanwhile, the operation of patronage rather than the application of formal procedures and 
rules determined the admission and promotion of administrators...”
60 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 127-130.
61 Cicero, On Duties 1.160.
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compact”63and the legal resolve between parties that encouraged social cohesion can be
observed. A clear understanding of these laws and their application provides a basis for
comprehending obligations as a means of social relations and conflict resolution.
According to Nicolas, three determinations in Roman law were instrumental in the
law of obligations. They revealed something as the person (persona) or the thing (res) or the
action.64 The law of persons indicates “persons” (personae), “as those capable of rights or
duties;” “things” (res) are the rights and duties themselves; and “actions” are “the remedies
by which rights and duties are enforced.”65 Nicholas states, “To put it another way, every rule
of law has three aspects: the person affected, the subject matter concerned, and the
remedies.”66 He discusses persons under different sub-headings: citizens and non-citizens;
the Roman family patria potestas; and the position of slaves, in law and in fact, while also
touching on other subjects such as paterfamilias, marriage, guardianship, and obsequium, a
debt of respect owed to a patron.67 Obsequium is sometimes used as a synonym for obligatio
and intimated “incidental legal consequences” while maintaining “a reciprocal duty of
support.”68 The language of obligation involves the legal discussions of classical Roman law
when it involves persons.
The law of things (res) constitutes another aspect of Roman law. Nicholas’s
explanation gives important insight into the Roman psyche of obligation:
Res, like ‘thing,’ is an elusive word, and the Roman lawyers, as is their habit, leave its 
meaning to emerge from its use. In its simplest sense it denotes merely a physical 
object - a table, a house, a piece of land-but for lawyers there are also abstract things, 
things, which only exist in the mind’s eye, such as a debt, a right of way, and many 
others...A man’s assets are either property or obligations. The difference between the
62 Borkowski, Textbook, 240-301.
63 Maine, Ancient Law, 345.
64 Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 60.
65 Nicholas, Introduction, 60.
66 Nicholas, Introduction, 60.
67 Nicholas, Introduction, 64-97.
68 Nicholas, Introduction, 75.
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two is the difference between owning and being owned. Thus a man’s assets may be 
his house and his furniture, which he owns, his bank balance, which, however one 
may speak of having money in the bank, is a debt owned by the bank, and his right to 
his unpaid salary, which is likewise a debt. His assets will often, of course, be more 
complicated than this, but they will fall into one of these two categories. For example, 
if he is a shopkeeper he will own, we may suppose, his shop and stock-in-trade; he 
may have ordered, but not received, further supplies from a wholesaler, and these 
will, from the Roman point of view, be still owned by wholesalers but will be owed to 
him (if he has not yet paid for them he correspondingly owes the price); he will have 
supplied goods on credit to his customers, and here again there is obviously a debt.
He may have acquired the goodwill of the business of a former competitor, and this 
constitutes once more a debt - the debtor’s duty being not, as in the previous cases, to 
pay a sum of money or to supply goods, but to refrain from soliciting his former
69customers.
Suddenly the “invisible rope”70 of Roman law arises in social relations and conditions, with
tangible actions and obligations, as in the legal evidence of property, or in the invisible but
recognized obligation, such as who has the right to walk through a right of way or who has
the right to walk first through that right of way in an intersection. The complexity of Roman
obligations(s) appears endless. The tangled web of relationships could get highly emotional
and tensely perplexing.
Obligations and duties were understood from status in Roman society (see chapter 4)
and through contracts. Obligations were incurred “mainly by contracts made by parties, or
through delicts committed by one against the other.”71 Borkowski observes,
The concept that an obligation can arise from a contract can readily be appreciated, a 
natural consequence of the agreement between two parties. That a delict, essentially a 
unilateral act, can create an obligation is perhaps less obvious, but is understandable; 
a wrongful and damaging act should incur a duty to compensate the victim in a 
civilised legal system. ...An obligation had twofold consequences: a duty arose on the 
part of the person incurring the obligation; and there was a corresponding right in the 
other person to enforce that duty by legal action, which would normally result (in the 
developed law) in an award of damages.72
69 Nicholas, Introduction, 99.
70 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 5.
71 Borkowski, Textbook, 241.
72 Borkowski, Textbook, 242.
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Maine sees contracts as a chain only undone by solutio, saying, “The Romans kept, in fact, 
the entire picture of the ‘legal chain’ before their eyes, and regarded one end of it no more 
and no less than the other.”73 He also explains the restless intricacies of contractual 
obligation when he says that “the neglect of a mere technical formality was as fatal to the 
obligation as misunderstanding or deceit.”74 In reality, though, obligation became an asset 
and created a bond of personal relationship between persons and their obligations in a 
contract.75
Contracts in themselves produce both liability which is precisely determined and that 
which “is not precisely determined nor accurately defined and which is (at the outset at least) 
indefinable.”76 Sohm distinguishes between the two, strict iuris negotia, a contract “binding 
parties to exact performance of what they promised, and “good faith negotiations,” “which 
bind parties to perform, not what they actually promised, but rather whatever can be fairly 
and reasonably required in each particular case, which may be either more, or less, than what 
was promised.”77 In each case, the parties involved must maintain due diligence, which 
conveys a binding obligation to “behave in the way any careful man would behave under the 
circumstances.”78 Zimmermann marks this vagueness in Roman law, “The progression from 
concrete to the more abstract and general would appear to accord best with the way the
70Roman lawyers developed their law of contractual obligations.” In the social construct of 
Roman society the application of strict and good faith contracts surfaces in potential 
extremes: literal, harsh enforcement on the one hand, or submission which responds to the
73 Maine, Ancient Law, 324.
74 Maine, Ancient Law, 308.
75 Borkowski, Textbook, 242.
76 Sohm, Institutes, 388.
77 Sohm, Institutes, 388.
78 Sohm, Institutes, 388.
79 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 32.
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moods, whims, politics, attitudes, or power of a given moment. Law was left much to the 
subjective interpretation in a given set of circumstances and could change suddenly.80
Contracts were later classified as either verbal (verbis), literal (litteris), real (re), or 
consensual (consensu). Commonly understood in law, verbis involved formal words; litteris 
required a contract in written, documentary form; re comprised a contract where property, as 
it was understood by the Romans, was transferred; and consensu (aligned with societas, see 
chapter 3) maintained a contract which involves parties for sale and hire.81 The verbal 
contract was the most ancient of the four.82 This is important to note for purposes of this 
thesis because of the oral nature of obligations and the endemic nature of Roman society 
where face, status, and relationships were intertwined with the social patterns.
The discussion of these types of contracts is informative,83 but most important for the 
first century is the verbis contract and its companion, stipulation. The Roman concept of 
stipulation84 is foundational in social relations, or, as Zimmermann refers to it, “...stipulation, 
prototype of a contract verbis and [the] cornerstone of the Roman contractual system.”85 
Watson describes stipulation as “oral, in question and answer form, and the verb used in the 
reply had to be the same used in the question.”86 Cicero illustrates this in a speech, “In the 
case of a solemn contract, he who does not perform an obligation which he has taken upon 
himself by pronouncing a single word, is promptly condemned without any scruple on the
80 Cicero, On Duties 1.33. He says that when laws “...moral duty..varies with varying circumstances” (3.32).
81 Schultz, Classical Roman Law, 468-69; Sohm, Institutes, 391; Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 77-78.
82 Maine, Ancient Law, 326; Sohm, Institutes, 391.
83 See Schultz’s works Principles o f Roman Law and Classical Roman Law.
84 Cf. Fritz Schultz, Principles o f Roman Law (trans. Marguerite Wolff; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 35. He 
cites this as the law of stipulatio with a parenthetic note: “alternative obligation, impossibility o f performance.”
85 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 32. He also calls it “by far the most important contract” (p. 68).
86 Alan Watson, The Law o f Obligations in the Later Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 1.
47
part of the judge.”87 The formula for stipulation engaged a verbal correspondence of question
and answer. Johnston says,
Stipulatio...was concluded by question and answer, which had to be in formal terms 
and had to correspond to one another. The promisee (or stipulator) would ask, for 
example, ‘Do you promise to pay 1,000 sesterces?’, and the promisor must reply, ‘I 
promise to pay 1,000 sesterces.’ The exact correspondence between question and 
answer created an obligation binding on the promisor; but, if the two did not 
correspond exactly, no obligation came into being.88
Johnston further adds, “Stipulatio could therefore be used to give legal force to any
agreement of any kind.”89 Obviously, for this kind of obligatory exchange to take place the
parties had to meet face-to-face. “This presented no problem at a time when Rome was still
essentially a medium-sized country town and when the range of commercial activities of its
inhabitants was fairly limited.”90 Watson discusses a whole series of laws of obligations that
might flow out of these face-to-face encounters.91 This fact in Roman society made contracts
accessible and relationships paramount.
More essential to the concept of a contract was a Roman mos known as fid.es. Cicero
refers to fides as foundational to contracts in the Roman legal system, “The foundation of
justice, moreover, is good faith (fides)-that is, truth and fidelity to promises and
agreements.”92 In an oral culture, the Romans were unconcerned with evidence in legal
matters because fides supplied “sufficient security for the purely oral promise.”93 Cicero
highlights this mos in the context of contracts:
But in taking an oath it is our duty to consider not what one may have to fear in case 
of violation but wherein its obligation {debet) lies: an oath is an assurance backed by 
religious sanctity; and a solemn promise (promiseris) given as before God as one’s
87 Cicero, On Behalf o f Caecina 3.7. The words indicate, “I pledge myself!”
88 Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 77-8.
89 Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 77-8.
90 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 70.
91 Watson, The Law o f Obligations in the Later Roman Republic, 1-9.
92 Cicero, On Duties 1.7.23.
93 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 70.
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witness, is to be sacredly kept. For the question no longer concerns the wrath of the 
gods (for there is no such thing) but the obligations of justice and good faith (/idem).94
Fides was a critical mos to the structure and relationship of obligations in Roman society (see
Chapter 3). Fides is an example of the conscious familiarity Romans possessed when it came
to law, contracts, social exchanges, and social responses due to respect whether in family,
politics, or business.
The oath-like promise95 exchange (stipulatio) and its accompanying mores fides
found meaning in an ancient Roman sacral religious ritual known as ctttevSu), “to present a
drink offering.”96 This word is important because a response to stipulation could come with
only one word, spondeo, which means, “I give.”97 “The speaking of the required words
creates a bond and serves notice on the parties that they are engaged in something
serious...”98 While spondere as a Roman ritual custom of rite faded in the later Republic, it
attached itself to the legal matter of Roman obligation as a means of binding parties in an oral
agreement.
The orality of this stipulatio, although, generally, the promise was clear, does not 
mean that differences of opinion, debate, disagreements, or disputes did not occur. 
Zimmermann’s caution here suffices, “Verbosity begets obscurity, and obscurity gives rise to 
disputes.”99 The question-answer format supposedly reduced such an opportunity for a 
dispute.
In discussing the law of persons (personae) and the law of things (res) one cannot 
dismiss the law of actions (actiones), a third instrument in the trilogy of Roman contracts.
94 Cicero, Ott Duties 3.29.104.
95 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 72. He alludes to the fact that “promise,” or promittere, “meant literally, to 
stretch forward” (one’s hand), but that by the later Republic it “remained the simple and oral formality.”
96 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 71. Also used in 2 Tim 4:6; Phil 2:17.
97 Watson, State, Law and Religion, 42.
98 Watson, Law of Obligations in the Later Republic, 32.
99 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 68.
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Zimmermann references actions as the “how” in the law, examining the right of performance 
from another party as “basically what obligations were all about.”100 Cicero communicates 
actio as an action vital to maintaining the practical side of business and the unity (societas) 
that proceeds from it.101
The law related to actio is expansive. Actions were imbued with things, persons, 
contracts, and an expected circular chain of agreement and response. The circular chain 
included both parties because the actions included actions of promise, but also actions 
promised in case of non-fulfilment of obligations.102 The non-fulfilment of obligations could 
produce a wide array and an open display of disputes and verbal exchanges. It would not be 
unusual to see such an outburst at home, in the forum, or in the marketplace. The duty of 
Roman society meant that “every lawful agreement begets an action” and the Romans did act, 
in highly animated fashion.103
4. “Ought” and Romans 15:1 
Obligation (“ought”), duty, ofjicium, or obsequium, as relational obligations engendered in a 
Roman society, created what Maine names as “social compact” in a contract.104 He contends 
that “social compact” in the New Testament period grew out of Roman despotic influence.
He says,
Long before this theory [about contracts] had clothed itself in definite shape, the 
phraseology of Roman contract-law had been largely drawn upon to describe that 
reciprocity of rights and duties which men had always conceived as existing between 
sovereign and subjects. While the world was full of maxims setting forth with utmost 
positiveness the claims of kings to implicit obedience-maxims which pretended to
100 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 28.
101 Cicero, On Duties 1.5.17. He includes this in a discussion of Roman virtues, “Before the three remaining 
virtues, on the other hand, is set the task of providing and maintaining those things on which the practical 
business of life depends, so that the relations of man to man in human society may be conserved, and that 
largeness and nobility of soul may be revealed not only in one’s increasing resources and acquiring advantages 
for one’s self and one’s family but far more in rising superior to these things.”
102 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 114.
103 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 546.
104 Maine, Ancient Law, 309, 345.
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have their origin in the New Testament, but which were really derived from indelible 
recollections of the Caesarian despotism-the consciousness of correlative rights 
possessed by the governed would have been entirely without the means of expression 
if the Roman law of obligation had not supplied a language capable of shadowing 
forth an idea which was yet imperfectly developed.105
Maine’s concept of “shadowing” supplies language for the apostle Paul in Romans 15:1, yet
with one critical difference: Paul did not desire to create a Christian society in despotic style
with inequality, competition, and impervious strength-weakness classification; Paul aimed,
under the Gospel, to create a different model where equality, servitude, and the strong did not
dominate their weaker peers. The Roman legal language which Paul apparently uses finds its
main source in Roman contract law.
“Ought” or obligation finds surface meaning in the commentaries in the concept of
debt.106 Rome did not have banks, per se, as commonly understood in modem culture, but
rather understood banking primarily in terms of private relationships.107 Andreau defines
banking and business as “all operations involving money on its own, independent of trade
which consists of transactions involving merchandise.”108 There were no money bills, but
only minted coins which served as monetary instruments, which, in turn, became a source of
buying and selling as well as a source of loan by moneylenders.109 Andreau says that money
“also reinforced not only social relations but also an intuitive awareness of the cohesion of
the community, symbolized by the political authority of minted money.”110
The amount of money possessed by a person accentuated social divisions and
inequalities, while becoming a tool which the elite and wealthy would use for personal and
105 Maine, Ancient Law, 345.
106 Cranfield, 2:730; Dunn, 811. “Ought” in English does no justice to the full meaning of “ought” in first- 
century Rome.
107 Jean Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World (trans. by Janet Lloyd; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 1-29.
108 Andreau, Banking and Business, 1.
109 Andreau, Banking and Business, 1-5.
110 Andreau, Banking and Business, 2.
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political gain, often with the elite lending money to another individual for loan {mutuum)}11 
The elite and wealthy can be placed in two categories: (1) the senators and equites high on 
the hierarchical ladder and (2) the professional moneylenders, often “small-scale 
entrepeneurs, defined by the name of their trade and did not belong to the privileged 
orders.”112 Loans were still, typically, in the hands of the elite and, land being the primary 
source of wealth,113 in the hands of the wealthy.114 The complexity of a loan among social 
groups meant that money was viewed differently. For example Andreau asserts that the “elite 
saw money in relation to their patrimony” or lineage.115 The result of any loan was debt, 
creating “debt-bondage.”116 Finley cautions against a mere use of the word “debt” only in 
terms of money, “A very broad general word is required, no less all-embracing term than the 
word ‘debt’: power over a person took various specific forms, as did the obligations which 
were so often the occasion for its coming into play.”117 Obligations, in essence, cemented the 
loan.
The loan, legally, represented a type of contract. Stipulations were agreed upon and a 
relationship between a creditor and debtor was established.118 Loans made with interest 
required stipulations, although Crook speaks of the “gratuitousness of mutuum,” because 
there was an attitude of “the hatred of the usurers” in Roman society.”119 Zimmermann refers
111 Andreau, Banking and Business,1-9.
112 Andreau, Banking and Business, 4; Finley, Ancient Economy, 56.
113 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 102-132, 161-80.
114 Finley, Ancient Economy, 56.
115 Andreau, Banking and Business, 4. Andreau discusses money in “The Financial Activities of the Elite” (p. 9).
116 M. I. Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece (London: Chatto & Windus, 1981), 153.
117 Finley, Economy and Society, 153. Finley’s discusses “debt-bondage” under the heading “Debt-bondage and 
Slavery.” His clarification of debt from Greek society is important because of its influence in Roman society. He 
adds in the context of the Roman system of legis actiones (laws of action), “The harshness of the laws of debt is 
a well known and ubiquitous fact of early and archaic societies, in particular when debtor and creditor came 
from different social classes” (p. 152).
118 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 154-6.
119 Crook, Law and Life, 211.
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to a loan at interest as “a reciprocal contract.”120 Gratuitous loans without interest were 
common because money was loaned “to gain political influence, to generate loyalty (fides) or 
to create a situation of dependence” as well as between friends and in the context of 
paterfamilias with its indigenous Roman moral duties and obligations.121 Zimmermann 
discusses obligations and loans where there were also loans to sons in power, loans involved 
in overseas trade, and loans to sportsmen for training, equipment and other necessary items 
for preparation for a competition.122 In many cases of mutuum, stipulations became “a 
convenient way to make certain incidental provisions binding, for instance, those relating to 
the time of repayment or the place of performance.”123 Money served as only one aspect of 
debt, the relationships, moving both vertically and horizontally on the social scale, and 
obligations flowing from a loan served as the means to complete the chain of the law of 
obligation.
Another kind of loan owing to obligations was commodatum. This was the loan of 
something, for example, a spade for the garden, a slave for a task, or property on “loan for 
use, without payment” [in monetary terms].124 It was also a gratuitous loan beginning when 
an object was handed over and requiring an obligation to restore it as it was received.125 Land 
could be the object of commodatum, but the lender and borrower both had articulate 
conditions and obligations which would be enforceable.126 If the object was not duly returned 
under the conditions of the loan, then the lender could set forth legal actions (actiones)
120 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 165.
121 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 155. Cf n. 13, Zimmermann notes, “The average Roman paterfamilias did 
not go to a professional moneylender (fenerator) but turned to his amid  when he was in need of capital.”
122 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 177-87.
123 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 155.
124 Crook, Law and Life, 210.
125 Zimmermann, The Law o f Obligations, 188-9.
126 Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law, 285. Borkowski’s discussion of commodatum includes the role of such 
themes as potestas, paterfamilias, and diligentia. A borrower should be diligent to care for an object and return it 
as such just as if it were his own or his father’s. See also Oxyrhynchus Papyri (trans. Bernard Grenfell and
53
which, in turn, allowed the borrower to set forth legal actions creating a mad circle of legal 
proceedings as well as also inciting more deliberations about each one’s obligations. The 
cycle of obligation in any contract could be endless, all the more demonstrating a 
motivational reason for obligations to be fulfilled. Crook refers to commodatum as the kind of 
loan which “belonged to the ‘mutual-help’ sphere of social ideas.”127 In Roman law and 
society mutuality is not an obscurity, but rather a necessity, with obligations enforcing a 
society of mutuality, although the concept of “mutuality” was not always in gratuitous terms. 
Rome was a mutual obligation society, often coerced and forced.
Obligations, in general, in Roman society streamed through a channel of power from 
lower to higher, the weaker members of society obligating themselves to the stronger 
members. A contract set off a chain of binding obligations for both parties.128
5. Literature Near the First Century, Word Usage, and Legal Underpinnings 
The legal basis of Rome’s obligation society, the social relationships, and the bonds of 
obligation understood in the oral nature of Roman culture find expression in the literature of 
the first century. Cicero wrote about duties and “the faithful discharge of obligations” 
assumed during the late Republic of Rome.129 Cicero refers to the commonly understood 
terms of obligation: social ties, mutual obligation, and due “moral obligation” to country and 
parents, in which he calls the two obligations the services which “have laid us under the 
heaviest obligation;”130 and even the obligation of war or pay-back under which he cites 
honour as a motivation in the Twelve Tables.131 Cicero knew that the structure of Roman 
society eroded when people in Roman society ignored obligation as a practical social
Arthur Hunt; vol. 1; Oxford: Horace Hart, 1898), 61:10: 68:7,25; 70:5; 98:10;101:25;103:15; 104:20. The 
references are to “binding contracts” of contract, loans, land leases, and wills.
127 Crook, Law and Life, 210.
128Riggsby, Roman Law, 212-134. See his comments on “binding promise” (122).
129 Cicero, On Duties 1.4.15
130 Cicero, On Duties 1.15.49.
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construct. Cicero has no love for such people: “Such people contend in essence that they are 
bound to their fellow citizens by no mutual obligations, social ties, or common interests. This 
attitude demolishes the whole structure of civil society.”132 Cicero speaks pointedly of 
obligation and its legal implications for daily social relationships.
Another Latin author, Seneca the Younger (4 BC to AD 65), used the terminology of 
obligation when discussing the Roman virtue and benefits.133 Seneca notes the importance of 
gratitude, goodwill in the realm of the Roman good man, and debt (debitum) in reference to 
duty, noting, “our feeling about every obligation depends in each case upon the spirit in 
which the benefit is conferred; we weigh not the bulk of the gift, but the quality of the good 
will which prompted it.”134 He notes the nature of obligation when he refers to “two sides of 
the ledger,” a direct reference to obligations required of both parties in an exchange of 
benefits.135 Seneca also notes the emotional pressures and often difficult interpretation of 
obligation in relationships when he mentions “to feel an obligation,” meaning that a person’s 
obligations go beyond mere legal duty to moral and social duties not to be refused.136 Seneca 
conveys obligation in the domain of benefits (see Chapter 3).
Two Roman authors, both of whom wrote in Greek, lived in Rome and knew the 
Roman world of antiquity, Dio Chrysostom, a Greek philosopher and historian, (AD 40-120) 
and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek historian, (60 BC-afier 7 BC), write about 
obligation in their respective works. Dio Chrysostom discusses benefits while discoursing on 
the subject of an ideal king as the father (TTaTqp) or patron of his people.137 The king
131 Cicero, On Duties 1.12.37.
132 Cicero, On Duties 3.28.
133 Seneca, Epistles 81.1.
134 Seneca, Epistles 81.6.
135 Seneca, Epistles 81.6.
136 Seneca, Epistles, 81.26.
137 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 1.22.
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possesses voluntary benefits as well as “other functions of royalty he holds as obligatory.”138 
Dio’s use of “obligatory” entails Roman law as a basis for kingship when he uses the word 
v£vo|iiK£v.139 Dio also discusses benefaction where men of virtue “grant to men of excellent 
character what is their due,” thus requiring Roman men to honour those greater than them by 
fulfilling obligations.140
Dio Chrysostom reveals a hierarchy of deposed honours and the obligations or debt 
which can be incurred from person to person as well as from city to city.141 While discussing 
obligations in a boundary dispute, Dio implies a hierarchy: that one is superior to the other, 
and that the superior are those who do not “court a quarrel.”142 The legal realm of Roman law 
understood strength and weakness as categories, clearly defined in a system of honour and 
benefaction. As with benefaction, Dio alludes to the debts of a citizen, the debts of one 
person to another, and benefaction’s elementary role in conduct: “Moreover, I have 
conducted myself in such a way that, while I have, as I think, repaid the people in full to the 
best of my ability as citizen, yet to you I am still indebted, and I could never outdo your 
benevolence toward me.”143 Conduct as a Roman ethic of social response and competition to 
outdo others fuelled the fires of Rome’s obligation society. An obligation could last for a 
moment, for days, for a lifetime, or even after death.
Dio also notes the importance of obligation in relation to loyalties and friendship,144 
but also the envy which loyalty, friendship, and unfulfilled obligations might incite.145 The
138 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 1.23
139 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 1.23.
140 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 31.28; 68; 78. For example, he discusses obligations between the cities of Rome 
and Rhodes, and says, “God has everywhere appointed the superior to rule over the inferior” (3.62).
141 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 4.44.
142 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 34.43
143 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 50.5.
144 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 34.25; 4.43. Friendship is “likemindedness.”
145 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 4.106-15.
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intensity of obligation for good and bad from both its legal, social, and personal aspects 
cannot go unnoticed.
While most obligations relate to relationships, there is still the commonly understood
use of obligation in the sense of a debt owed in the form of a loan, that is, to “repay this
obligation, as well as earlier debts.”146 In the complexity of the tangled web of obligation,
though, even debt might incur a favour which spins off other obligations:
But since the question before us concerns my not proving false toward my native land 
and not defrauding you the promise I made under no compulsion, a promise by no 
means easy to make good and involving no small outlay of money, this I conceive to 
be a difficult matter and one calling for much serious cogitation. For there is nothing 
more weighty, no debt bearing higher interest, than a favour promised. Moreover, this 
is shameful and bitter kind of loan, when, as one might say, because of tardy payment 
the favour turns into an obligation, an obligation the settlement of which those who 
keep silent demand altogether more sternly than those who cry aloud. For nothing has 
the power to remind those who owe you such obligations as your having utterly 
forgotten them.147
Dio’s discussion describes the legal basis of obligation which intertwines a complex personal 
response that the Romans understood.
The historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus also discusses an obligation to the gods.148 
Dionysius tells how Remus fell into the enemy’s hands in Roman history and how obligation 
required Numitor to punish Remus for the harm he had done.149 The context lays obligation 
in the realm of Numitor’s obligatory power over Remus, while requiring Remus to respond 
accordingly to that power.150 Dionysius’s discussion of the war between the Romans and 
Latins is rich with the legal language of Roman obligation: friendship; justice; debt; revenge 
of an enemy; loyalty; military obligation; piety; benefits; obligations to the commonwealth
146 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 47.21; 54.10.
147 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 40.3.
148 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 1.24.1.
149 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 1.81.3.
150 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 1.81-82.
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(TroAiq), honour, and obligations to fathers.151 Dionysius’s speech from the dictator Aulus 
Postumius to his soldiers calls for bravery and not cowardice, an obligation to serve Rome 
and die with honour.152 Obligation in the Roman psyche, ultimately, found care and security 
deriving from an obligation to fathers and forefathers.153 All citizens and children were 
ultimately obligated to cherish and protect Rome from an obligatory duty to fathers, both 
Roman and familial.
Dionysius links obligation as a Roman concept linking patriarchal and ancestral 
royalty of privilege, strength, and duty whereby the kingdom obligates a kingly line of 
succession to sons and grandsons.154 Dionysius highlights the importance of loyalty to Rome 
and the debt owed to Rome in Minucius’s speech to Marcius in an effort to renew friendship 
and reconcile him to Rome, “.. .give yourself back to your country as a most honourable 
repayment of the debt (6(j)£iAripa) you owe her for having given birth and rearing so great a 
man.155 The importance of paternal power and overpowering influence of the obligations of 
family members to the father cannot be underestimated in wider Roman legal, political, and 
societal structure of relationships.156
The debt owed to country, to fathers, to military commanders, to friends, and to 
patrons was gratitude. Senators and patrons gather clients and friends to “ask these too to 
show their gratitude for former favours now when they were ready to give their votes.”157 
When Marcius eventually entered the city of Rome at the forum, he was stoned and later
151 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 6.
152 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 6.9.6. Dionysius also mentions the obligation for cowards to 
die with dishonour. Roman honour obligated soldiers to brave acts for the glory of Rome and for a victory which 
would “celebrate the triumph for this war, while your children, wives and your parents welcome you back!” 
Dionysius hints of military obligation as an honourable service..
153 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 11.40.7-8.
154 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 4.29.2.
155 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 8.28.5.
156 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 11.14.3.
157 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 7.54.3.
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given honour in death by his supporters “to show fitting gratitude” 
(6<j)£iAo|i£vag...xdpiTa<;).158 Gratitude was a “noble debt.”159 Obligation induced a 
reciprocal response in the realms of debt and Roman honour.
Two Jewish authors, the Jewish priest and Greek historian of aristocratic descent, 
Josephus (AD 37-100), and Philo (20 BC-AD 50), an Alexandrian Jew and philosopher, also 
relate obligation to the chain of conduct in Rome’s obligation society. Josephus wrote his 
vast corpus while in an imperial house given to him by the emperor and knew Rome well. He 
uses obligation in the context of treaty, of reconciliation, and even of a marriage proposal.160 
He tells of the Arab Syllaeus who made proposals to Herod requesting that Salome be given 
to him in marriage.161 Josephus writes, “This connection, he said, would not be unprofitable 
to Herod through his association with the government of Arabia, which is now virtually in his 
(Syllaeus’) hands and by rights should be more so” (koci paAAov ocj)£iA£G0ai).162 Obligation 
implies connections, associations, and legal rights.
Josephus uses obligation in the sense of kingly succession and family rights in the 
context of that which was “rightfully due.”163 He uses the word also to refer to debts owed to 
creditors or higher authorities164 and the release of such debts with circumstantial rights 
attached to debts and debt freedom.165 Josephus allows that rights also imply certain 
responsibilities when he writes of the decree of Halicarnassus.166 The decree flows with the
158 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 8.59.2.
159 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 5.68.2.
160 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 4.221; 16.224.
161 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 16.224.
162 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 16.224.
163 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 4.250; 16.79.
164 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 16.170.
165 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 4.268; 9.50; 18.158; 19.275; 20.181.
166 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 14.257.
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language of Rome’s obligation society with the mention of such words as piety, benefactors,
friendship, and payment of a debt in the form of a monetary fine.167 The legal decree says,
Whereas at all times we have had a deep regard for piety toward the deity and 
holiness, and following the example of the people of Rome, who are benefactors of all 
mankind, and in conformity with what they have written to our city concerning their 
friendship and alliance with the Jews, to the effect that their sacred services to God 
and their customary festivals and religious gatherings shall be carried on, we have 
also decreed that those Jewish men and women who so wish may observe their 
Sabbaths and perform sacred rites in accordance with the Jewish laws, and may build 
places of prayer near the sea, in accordance with their native custom. And, if anyone, 
whether magistrate or private citizen, prevents them, he shall be liable to the 
following fine and owe it to the city.168
Two keys items for understanding obligation flow from this passage in Josephus: (1)
obligation incurs a legal responsibility and (2) Roman obligation models itself after Rome, a
model to be propagated, promoted, and imitated.
Josephus’s word usage of obligation places it in the context of Roman honour and
favours incumbent to relationships,
Undismayed by the emperor’s anger, Agrippa asked Antonia, the mother of 
Germanicus and the future emperor Claudius, to grant him a loan of 300,000 
drachmas so that he might not lose the friendship with Tiberius. Antonia, both 
because she still remembered Berenice his mother-for two ladies had been deeply 
attached to each other-and because Agrippa had been brought up with Claudius and 
his circle, provided the money. When he had discharged the debt, there was no longer 
any obstacle to his friendship with Tiberius. Subsequently the emperor Tiberius 
recommended his grandson to Agrippa and bade him always accompany him on 
excursions. When Agrippa was received as a friend Antonia, he took to attendance 
upon her grandson Gaius, who was held in highest honour because of the popularity 
enj oyed by his father.169
Indispensable to understanding Rome’s obligation society and the legal ramifications 
that follow it are the tangled webs of power, friendship, debts, and favours associated with
167 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 14.258.
168 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 14.258.
169 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 18.164-167.
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Roman honour170 and the implications for conduct in the enmeshed relationships of Roman 
society.
Philo, an Alexandrian Jew whose nephew became a prefect to Egypt, was trained in
the Greek-paideia method, was well educated, and was familiar with Roman civic, political
and legal policies. He uses the concept of o<|)£iAq with a view to a hierarchical structure,
noting the superiority of the emperor and the prestige, fortune, and honours due to an
emperor.171 Philo details the simple rule that nations, cities, and people are to give the
“reverence due to Caesar.”172 Obligation as a legal basis with its civic obligations expanded
beyond Rome to cities, states, and people where Roman justice and jurisdiction prevailed.
Philo discusses obligation in the context of Jewish laws in the area of religious
obligations. A king and lawgiver “ought to have under his purview not only human but divine
things; for, without God’s directing care, the affairs of kings and subjects cannot go right.”173
The faithful Jew is under obligation to honour God.174 The wise man has a “bounden duty to
honour truth.”175 In this religious realm, certain obligations require purity176 and offerings
demand the virtue of gratitude:
Further, let him examine the motives which determine him to make the offering. For 
either he is giving thanks for benefits already received or is asking for security in his 
tenure of present blessings or for the acquisition of others to come, or for the 
deliverance from evils, either present or expected, and all these demand that he should 
(6(()£iA£i) put himself into a mental condition of mental health and safety. For if he is 
offering thanks for what has already been granted, let him not shew ingratitude by 
falling from the state of virtue in which he received these boons.177
170 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 4.318. Josephus uses obligation in the context of Jewish reverence, honouring 
God, obeying him, and giving him his due.
171 Philo, The Embassy to Gaius 140-141.
172 Philo, The Embassy to Gaius 152.
173 Philo, Moses 2.5.1.
174 Philo, The Special Laws 1.209.3; 1.224.7.
175 Philo, Moses, 2.128.
176 Philo, The Special Laws 3.59.4.
177 Philo, The Special Laws 1.283-284.
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Philo connects obligation to the language of benefits, virtue, conduct, and punishments for 
failed virtuous conduct.
Jewish virtue requires that a man’s outward appearance be chaste,178 that debts be 
discharged correctly,179 and that virtuous duty demands for those in the commonwealth to 
“excel in self-restraint and the other virtues.”180 The virtues of which Philo speaks lay closely 
akin to piety, moral virtue, legal justice, and relationships which invite responses in the 
practice of codes of conduct in a given set of circumstances. Such response is bound to the 
obligation of Roman conduct with its underlying legal ramifications and expectations.
6. Roman Law in Paul’s Era 
While the usage of legal obligation in the first century has been discussed, one of the 
challenges of Roman law is narrowly dating Roman law near the time of Paul’s letter to the 
Romans. If one accepts Jewett’s explanation of a general consensus date for Paul’s writing 
his letter to the Romans between the winter of AD 56-57 or the early spring of 57,181 then 
how did obligation function near that time? It suggested that to understand Roman law in 
Paul’s era the classical period of Roman law, codes and legal examples must be considered.
Roman legal history in the early empire of Principate follows, according to George 
Mousourakis, general historical divisions of Roman history, thus dating Roman law in the 
early empire from 27 BC to AD 284.182 Riggsby dates Roman law in a “classical period” 
from the end of the Republic to AD 235.183 Jolowicz and Nicholas refer to this period from 
the last 150 years of the republic and the first century of the empire as “the formative period
178 Philo, On the Virtues 20-21.
179 Philo, The Special Laws 3.159.2.
180 Philo, On the Virtues 127.
181 Jewett, Romans, 18.
182 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 1.
183 Riggsby, Roman Law, 21.
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of Roman law.”184 Versteeg says, “The Classical period of Roman law began in the first 
century BC and lasted through the 3rd century AD.”185 Crook refuses to date law and society 
in general Roman historical periods such as “classical,” instead focusing on law and life from 
90 BC to AD 212.186 This section of the thesis gives an idea about Roman law, life and 
obligation as it is used from, roughly, 90 BC to AD 212.
Five key informative factors are important to Roman law during this period. First, 
while Roman government changed, and a Roman revolution ensued in the first century, it 
was “a revolution of government, not of social structure: and in the age of the Principate the 
ground-bass of both society and law remained the same, however subtle and remote the 
variations played above it.”187 Jolowicz and Nicholas state, “The influences which were at 
work in the development of law during the Principate were largely the same as those which 
had been active during the later republic.”188 Second, the empire in the first century was 
increasingly growing to become “a race of ffeedmen, foreigners, and slaves...”189 This 
required new laws and the clarification of old ones. For example, in 2 BC the lex Fufia 
Caninia was passed to enact Augustan measures of social legislation regarding slaves with 
the “object to oblige slave owners to use their powers of manumission wisely and to set free 
only those slaves who had proved that they deserved freedom: indiscriminate and 
irresponsible manumission was to be avoided.”190 Third, the upper social class became more 
entrenched, despotism grew, and, while jurists increased and principles of law developed,
184 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 5.
185 Russ Vansteeg, The Essentials o f Greek and Roman Law (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), 98.
186 Crook, Law and Life, 8-9.
187 Crook, Law and Life, 9.
188 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 406.
189 David Naismith, Outline o f Roman History: Romulus to Justinian with Special Reference to the Growth, 
Development and Decay o f Roman Jurisprudence (London: Butterworths, 1890), 79.
190 Keith Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 10. Bradley 
speaks of the fragment of a Latin will that mentions the lex Fufia Caninia and discusses “the slave society of
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“political rights did not undergo much change.”191 As such, the lower class experienced 
frequent humiliation and “had a distinctly inferior standing in the eyes of the law and were 
subject to heavy and degrading punishments (such as forced labour in the state mines, 
flogging and torture, condemnation to gladiatorial games and beast-hunts, and execution by 
crucifixion).”192 Fourth, Roman law increased in volume with imperial edicts as general 
ordinances, decrees or judgments, and by mandates set forth to the magistrates or 
individuals.193 Fifth, Roman expansion through military victories enacted the need of Roman 
law for conquered territories as each one was placed under obligation and, according to 
Riggsby, as “Rome took the package of legal rights and obligations that had previously 
distinguished ‘real’ Latins and started giving them out to others (even people who had been 
bom Roman) as a matter of policy.”194 These factors influenced Roman law in the first 
century.
A review of key elements of Roman law from 90 BC to AD 212 would include legal 
references from the Twelve Tables, Cicero, the Institutes o f Gaius, the Roman jurist 
Justinian’s legal works, and a random sample of edicts and decrees.
The Roman historian Livy (59 BC-AD 17) writes, “Even in the present immense mass 
of legislation, where laws were piled on laws, the Twelve Tables still form the fount of all 
public and private jurisprudence.”195 While only 115 fragments of the Twelve Tables exist, a 
compilation identifies such law as (1) preliminary legal proceedings, (2) trial, (3) debt, (4) 
paternal power, (5) inheritance and guardianship, (6) ownership and possession, (7) real 
property, (8) torts or delicts, (9) public law, (10) sacred law, (11) supplementary laws such as
Rome” in terms of powerlessness, “rightlessness,” degradation and servitude, even naming slaves as 
merchandise (10-30).
191 Naismith, Outline o f Roman History, 85.
192 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 94.
193 Naismith, Outline o f Roman History, 82.
194 Riggsby, Roman Law, 23.
64
intermarriage, and (12) supplementary laws regarding distress, slaves, and valid laws which 
were binding.196
P. R. Coleman-Norton says, “The value of the Twelve Tables consists not in any 
approach to symmetrical classification or even terse clarity of expression, but in the 
publication of the method of procedure to be adopted, especially in civil cases, in the 
knowledge furnished to every Roman of high or low degree as to what were both his legal 
rights and duties, in the political victory won by plebeians, who compelled the codification 
and the promulgation of what had been largely customary law interpreted and administered
1Q7by the patricians in their own interests.” The terms “rights and duties” are important for 
Roman obligation. The Twelve Tables, for example speaks to the rights of a debt, a debtor, 
and the ensuing obligations, such as a credit binding a debtor with bonds (“with thong or with 
fetters, of which shall be not less than fifteen pounds”) or the creditor’s obligation to supply a 
debtor with bread, or some other punishment.198 Zimmermann’s idea of an “invisible rope” in 
the time of Justinian had roots in a literal rope prior to the period of classical law.199 Jolowicz 
and Nicholas add a salient comment regarding the Twelve Tables in the binding nature in the 
sense of a legal contract, “For obligation is a means to securing satisfaction, whereas 
vengeance is itself the satisfaction sought.”200 In other words, a duty is recognised by a 
creditor and debtor, a duty is expected to be performed, but if it is not performed the creditor 
“wants a hostage or a pledge with whom or with which he can do what he likes if he does not
195 Livy, Roman History 3.34.6.
196 P. R. Coleman-Norton, The Twelve Tables: Prefaced, Arranged and Annotated (rev. ed.; Princeton: 
Department of Classics, 1948), 3-18.
197 Coleman-Norton, The Twelve Tables, 2.
198 Coleman-Norton, The Twelve Tables, 4-5.
199 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 5.
200 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 160.
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get his rights.”201 The word “hostage” implied an intense relationship and the word “pledge” 
implied the often oral nature of obligation reflected in the Twelve Tables.
Cicero (106 BC-43 BC) says that the law of the Twelve Tables was learned in 
boyhood “as a required formula.”202 “The provisions of the Twelve Tables are couched in the 
form of terse commands and prohibitions, exhibiting a rhythmical cadence that must have 
facilitated memory retention.”203 While the Twelve Tables formed the foundation of Roman 
society, by the time of Cicero the legal rules, and solutions for societal and legal problems 
had evolved into “ordinary expectations that social and legal relations entailed.”204 In other 
words, while obligation found its legal roots in the Twelve Tables, “Roman lawyers alluded 
to the nature of an obligation, the nature of a contract, and such like.”205 Cicero referred to 
and discussed obligations in his works, especially in On Duties and The Laws. Of keen 
interest is that Cicero’s words on obligation endorse “the Stoic view that the world is 
governed by a universal soul, a divine reason, whose dictates constitute an Eternal law.”206 
Virtue will be discussed in chapter two.
Cicero is valuable source for this thesis and also for understanding obligation. 
According to Crook, in Cicero’s matching up of law and society, “the evidence of Cicero is 
too valuable to sacrifice.”207 Watson adds, “The clearest indication, though, of the social 
importance which a knowledge of law had for the early Romans is in Cicero.”208 Griffin and 
Akins discuss Cicero’s interest in social obligations, focusing on the socially superior with a
201 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 159.
202 Cicero, The Laws 2.59.
203 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 25.
204 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 124.
205 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 124.
206 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 123.
207 Crook, Law and Life, 9.
208 Alan Watson, The Law o f the Ancient Romans (Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1970), 5.
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“general lack of interest in obligations towards recognised social inferiors.”209 This is not to 
say that Cicero had nothing to say about social inferiors, but that he was more likely to write 
from the perspective of a social superior as a legal advocate and lawyer.
Cicero speaks of obligations as duties of persons to the immortal gods, of citizens to 
country, children to parents, in general terms.210 For example, Cicero says in a dialogue, 
“Well, then, are not the claims of the country paramount to all other duties?”211 More 
specifically, he speaks of obligatory duties of clients to patrons, of young men to their elders, 
of citizens to honour fellow citizens, of individuals in cities to established laws and customs, 
and of friendship, and even how to demonstrate justice to an enemy.
Cicero appears mostly general, yet he discusses laws and obligations in The Laws 
such as the law of a citizen to obey a magistrate.213 Obligation was codified in the Institutes 
o f Gaius. Little is known about Gaius, except that he was a Roman citizen, a jurist who was 
thought to have lived from AD 117 to 180, and author of the Institutes whose “primary value 
lies in the information it imparts on the state of classical law and jurisprudence.”214 Gaius is 
especially helpful in the area of legal obligation.215 Gaius wrote the Institutes in a time of 
transition with regard to Roman legal matters, yet for him obligatio had a history that 
originated in “the contractual relations recognised by the civil law.”216
Gaius discusses obligations as contract or delict.217 The discussion and list of 
obligations is too exhaustive to list for purposes of this thesis, but a few examples will be 
given. First, consider some general contracts in Roman law. A person was under obligation if
209 Cicero, On Duties (ed. M.T. Griffin and E. M Akins; Cambridge: University Press, 1991), xxiii.
210 Cicero, On Duties 1.160.
211 Cicero, On Duties 3.90.
212 Cicero, On Duties 2.69; 1.122; 1.123; 1.148; 1.43-44; 1.35-40.
213 Cicero, The Laws 3.5.
214 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 117.
215 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 117.
216 Zulueta, The Institutes o f Gaius: Part II, Commentary, 142.
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he received a loan of money, wine, oil, com, bronze, silver or any other real thing.”218 A 
person who made a verbal promise was under obligation to the one promised.219 Contracts of 
sale, hire, partnership, and mandate they could carry a reciprocal aspect with both sides 
incurring obligations, depending on whether the contract was written or verbal.220 In Roman 
law a new obligation could arise when an old one was discharged such as a new third party 
entering into a contract or payment of a debt.221
Second, consider obligations of delict. Gaius addresses delictual obligations incurred 
from theft, robbery, damage to property, or injury to a person.222 Obligations of delict might 
include a penalty, such as flogging; an action, such as paying the owner the highest value of a 
stolen slave or cattle; or a remedy, such as paying the value of the thing damaged or stolen.223 
Zulueta points out that the words obligare and obligatio “hardly occur in the account of the 
delicts,” but the words still place the liability of obligation in the form of a contract.224 
Jolowicz and Nicholas note that vengeance might be a form of delict and contract, stating, 
“The idea of obligation emerges therefore only when the stage is reached at which the person 
wronged may agree to forgo his vengeance if the wrongdoer will pay him composition, and it 
is precisely in these agreements for composition that we find the beginning of a contract.”225 
In other words, failed obligations could produce duties and liabilities in the form of a contract 
and retribution for unmet obligations.
217 Gaius, Institutes, 3.88.
218 Gaius, Institutes, 3.90.
219 Gaius, Institutes, 3.92-3.
220 Gaius, Institutes, 3.136-41.
221 Gaius, Institutes, 3.176.
222 Gaius, Institutes, 3.182.
223 Gaius, Institutes, 3.182-223.
224 Zulueta, The Institutes o f Gaius: Part II, 142.
225 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 160.
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Zimmermann makes a poignant summary statement, “Thus, significantly, it was 
Gaius who started subdividing the law of obligations in a rational manner.”226 Nicholas adds, 
“The Institutes o f Gaius are therefore of unique importance because they provide the only 
evidence for classical law which we can with reasonable certainty believe to be free from 
alteration either by post-classical editors or Justinian’s compilers.”227
A student textbook for the jurists of Roman law called Justinian’s Institutes (AD 533) 
is important because some of the Latin text is borrowed from The Institutes o f Gaius, or an 
“updated revision of Gaius’s work.”228 Obligation is defined by Justinian as a “legal tie 
which binds us to the necessity of making some performance in accordance with the laws of 
our state.”229 Justinian’s own metaphor regarding his textbook was cunabula legum, “a cradle 
of the law,” an ordering of the law that is “pragmatic, inherited from the past, based 
ultimately on praetor’s edict...”230 Book 3 discusses obligation in such categories as state law 
(statute) or praetorian law (also known as honorarian law in a given jurisdiction) with 
obligations contracted by conduct, by words, by writing, and by agreement.231
Justinian’s Institutes were produced near the completion of the compilation work
939called the Digest o f Justinian (AD 533). The Digest, more than a history of legal practice,
provided readers the force of Roman law that “was to govern the lives of the people and the 
practice of the courts.”233 Riggsby adds, “Instead of a smooth, unified legal code, we have a
226 Zimmermann, The Law o f Obligations, 24.
227 Nicholas, Introduction, 35.
228 Riggsby, Roman Law, 39.
229 Justinian, Justinian’s Institutes'. Translated with an Introduction (trans. Peter Birks and Grant McLeod; 
London: Duckworth, 1987), 105.
230 Justinian, Justinian’s Institutes, 15.
231 Justinian, Justinian’s Institutes, 105.
232 Crook, Law and Life, 13. Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 19. He says, “The procedural system in 
Justinian’s day was different from that of classical times, although the Digest regularly refers to the classical 
formulary system...” (p. 19).
233 Crook, Law and Life, 15.
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document that shows its origins in cut and paste.”234 The compilation “should be viewed as 
interconnected parts of an organic whole,” while noting that Justinian “aspired to produce a 
comprehensive, systematic and authoritative statement of existing law based on the legal 
inheritance of the classical period.”235
The Digest begins by speaking of justice, law, statutes, human status, and duties 
{officio) of senators, consuls, prefects, governors, and other government employees who 
enforce law.236 The legal “duties” outlined obligations. Book 44.7 addresses obligations and 
actions noting that obligations “bind another person to give, do or perform something for 
us.”237 The massive volume of the Digest prevents one from speaking to every obligation, but 
it does address such matters as patrons and clients, parents and children, masters and slaves, 
and the principal duty offered to parents and patrons as well as specific issues such as the 
obedience of a soldier, who, if he commits an offense against his father, should be punished 
for the offence.238 The compilation of the Digest itself, according to Watson, “shows that 
Justinian’s aim was not to change and modernize the writings of the classical jurists.”239
Massurius Sabinus was a Roman jurist from the Sabinian school of jurists in the first 
century who wrote The Urban Praetor’s Edict and was also still alive at the time of Nero.240 
Sabinus’s responses in the Digest spoke of obligations between a patron and a freedman, 
observing that “the freedmen should provide services, while being himself responsible for his 
food and clothing; but if he cannot maintain himself, the patron is to provide his food.”241
234 Riggsby, Roman Law, 39-40.
235 Mousourakis, A Legal History, 191.
236 Digest 1.1-22.
237 Digest 44.7.3.
238Digest 1.7; 2.26; 2.27; 3.37.14-15; 3.37.15.1; 3.38.1-4.
239 Watson, Law o f the Ancient Romans, 92.
240 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 381.
241 Digest 38.1.18.
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Massurius Sabinus addresses the obligations of contracts, partnerships, marriage, and such 
issues as children, orphans, and tutors.242
A random sample of Roman statutes and laws shows the operative use of obligation as 
reflected in the first century. The book Ancient Roman Statutes lists a number of edicts and 
laws in documented form related to obligation near the first century. A few examples are 
listed as follows: Decree of the Senate on Political Clubs (associations, retributive obligation, 
56 BC); Edict of Caesar on privileges of Hyrcanus (obligations of friendship, 46/44 BC); 
Decrees of the Senate on Rome’s Water Supply (obligations requiring actions, 11 BC); Edict 
of Augustus on Jewish Rights (rights and obligations, 1 BC); Edict of Claudius on Jewish 
Rights (obligation to end disturbances and to be subject to Roman law, AD 41); Edict of Geta 
on Priestly Immunity (release of duty or obligation from working the fields, AD 54); Rescript 
of a Procurator on Vardagate’s Municipal Problems (obligations of freedmen and their civic 
duties, patrons, AD 69); Charter of Malaga (obligations of magistrates, voting rights, and 
legal obligations of personal sureties, AD 82/84); the Edict of Nerva on Domitian’s 
Benefactions (renewed benefits and the obligations of goodwill associated with benefaction, 
AD 96); and Regulations for Warehouses (obligations for leasing warehouses and payment 
due, AD 96).243 A general perusal of the edicts and law finds them listed on bronze tablets, 
marble columns, tablets and etched in stone on buildings in both Latin and Greek in villages, 
towns and cities.244 Obligation was reflected in Greek, in Latin and expanding Roman entities 
in the first century.
A random sample of specific laws, edicts and legal inscriptions is best illustrated by 
documents “written on a series of wax tablets excavated at Muricine near ancient
242 Digest 2.18.1; 2:17; 2.23.2; 2.27.
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Pompeii.”245 The documents involve the legal affairs of a family named the “Sulpicii,” were 
buried by the volcanic eruption of Mount Vesuvius (AD 79), and are called the TPSulp from 
their Latin name “Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum.”246 A few samples are listed as follows: 
TPSulp 4
Guarantee-of-appearance made by Zenon of Tyre, freedman of Zenobius, for the 
coming 11 June in the Forum of Puteoli in front of the Hordonian altar of Augustus at 
9 AM. Gaius Sulpicius Cinnamus asked that HS 1200 be promised, and Zenon of 
Tyre, freedman of Zenobius, made the promise. Done at Puteoli 9 June 52.
TPSulp 54
Written-commitment of Marcus Lollius Philippus for HS 20,000. Written 
commitment of Gaius Avilius Cinnamus on behalf of Marcus Lollius Philippus 3 
October 45.1, Marcus Lollius Philippus, have written that I received HS 20,000 in 
cash as a loan and owe it to Gaius Sulpicius Cinnamus. Gaius Sulpicius Cinnamus 
asked for a formal promise for the above-specified HS 20,000; I Marcus Lollius 
Philippus, made the promise. Done at Puteoli 3 October of the same date. I, Gaius 
Avilius Cinnamus, have written at the prompting of Gaius Sulpicius Cinnamus that I 
have made a guarantee for the above-specified HS 20,000 at my own risk on behalf of 
Marcus Lollius Philippus and Gaius Sulpicius Cinnamus. Moreover, I declare have 
sworn by Jupiter and by the guardian spirit of the divine Augustus that I have not 
served as guarantee for the same men in any other matter this year. Done at Puteoli.
TPSulp 60
Accounts of Titinia Antracis
Paid out to Euplia of Melos, daughter of Theodorus, with the approval of her tutor 
Epichares of Athens, son of Alexander: HS 1,600. He asked for and received HS 
1,600 from her domestic chest...
For the chest. Epichares of Athens, son of Aphrodisius, at the prompting of Titinia 
Antracis, offered a guarantee to Titinia Antracis for the above-mentioned HS 1,600 in 
cash on behalf of Eulpia of Melos, daughter of Theodorus. Done at Puteoli 20 March 
43.
243 Allan Johnson, Paul Coleman-Norton, Frank Bourne, Clyde Pharr, eds., Ancient Roman Statutes: A 
Translation with Introduction, Commentary, Glossary and Index (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1961), 82- 
162. Particularly noted are documents 94, 107, 141, 150, 178, 179, 180, 182, 192, and 202.
244 Johnson, Coleman-Norton, Bourne, Pharr, eds., Ancient Roman Statutes, 82-202.
245 Riggsby, Roman Law, 235.
246 Riggsby, Roman Law, 235.
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TPSulp 79
15 March 40.1, Lucius Marius Iucundus, freedman of Dida, wrote that I gave 13,000 
modii of Alexandrian grain to Gaius Sulpicius Faustus, grain which rests in bin 26 of 
the upper Barbatian granary of Domitia Lepida as a pledge against HS 20,000, which 
I have written in a document I owe to him. If next 15 May I have not repaid the 
above-mentioned HS 20,000 or arranged security, then you will be permitted to sell at 
auction the grain in question under the condition of the pledge in question. If you sell 
it for more, return the difference to me; if for less, I will return the difference to you 
or your heir. We have discussed and I have agreed that the grain in question is at my 
risk or that of my heir. Done at Puteoli.247
Each of these examples suggests an obligation dated “from the early to the mid first century 
AD.”248
Another sample comes from the papyrus at Oxyrhynchus [1021] as a draft of a 
proclamation of Nero (AD 54):
Fulfilling the debt to his ancestors, the manifest god Caesar has departed to them, and 
the expected and hoped for imperator of the world has proclaimed: the good spirit of 
the world, the origin of [the greatest of] all good things, Nero, has been proclaimed 
Caesar. For this reason, all of us ought to wear wreaths and sacrifice oxen to show to 
all the gods our gratitude. Year 1 of Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus on 
the twenty-first of the month New Augustus.249
This sample indicates obligations of honour surrounding Nero’s reign.
Roman law in the first century produced legal and social obligations in society. Still,
Parkin and Pomeroy supply a word of wisdom, “given the importance of established systems
of conduct and their enforcement throughout the Roman world, it is impossible to give more
than a fleeting impression of Roman law.”250
7. Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated the binding nature of obligation in Roman law. First-century 
conduct in Roman society possessed a powerful, yet invisible rope, which incited a code of 
conduct in relationships. The first-century dweller knew of the legal code of obligation and
247 Riggsby, Roman Law, 237-51.
248 Riggsby, Roman Law, 235. Obligations are indicated by the words: guarantee, promise, oath, obliged, debt, 
loan, pledge.
249 Robert K. Sherk, ed., The Roman Empire: Augustus to Hadrian (Cambridge: University Press, 1988), 102-3.
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its incipient obligations although the code was primarily oral in nature. No known, written 
code of law existed during the first century. In spite of this, each citizen understood Roman 
law and its priority in social practice dominated the mind of the Roman in daily social 
practice in its many facets. The law of obligations was classified by the Romans and first- 
century literature overflows with the language, ideology, and the legal significance of Roman 
law. Apart from Roman law, social practice in the Roman empire cannot be fully 
comprehended. Apart from Roman law neither can we understand the Sitz im Leben of 
Romans 14:1-15:13.
Even with an understanding of Roman law, however, there were cultural mores 
beneath the layers of law which fit into the social pattern of conduct and which influenced the 
obligations and duties of conduct. These cultural mores will be discussed in the next chapter.
250 Tim G. Parkin and Arthur J. Pomeroy, Roman Social History (London: Routledge, 2007), 292.
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Chapter 2: Cultural Mores of Rome’s Obligation Society
Introduction
It has been suggested in Chapter 1 that Rome was an obligation society of widespread 
proportions. The legal dynamic and intensity of obligation in personal relations in Roman 
society energized a chain-like series of legal, practical, and social obligations. The power of 
obligation has been seen both in its legal basis for society and in its strategic role in social 
practice and relations.1 The legal basis introduces integral mores that helped shape Roman 
society in the first century.
Mores refers to the customs, the mos maiorum, or what is commonly called “the 
custom of our ancestors.”2 Mos is the singular form, “custom.” Mores are the plural form, 
“customs.” The singular and plural forms are often used interchangeably. Mores were part of 
an unwritten law or code that reflected Roman societal norms with unwritten rules that aimed 
for unity, remedies of conflict, and severity of punishment that reinforced binding actions of 
justice. Jolowicz and Nicholas acknowledge that “Roman law, like that of other nations, of 
course originated in custom.”4 As such, customs “exercised a regulative function in Roman 
society.”5 They were “a common body of [societal] norms.. .for governing a whole 
community.”6 Crook explains customs in terms of the behaviour of what people actually do 
that influences that law.7 In essence, a custom precedes a judicial sentence and generally
1 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 58-63. He makes points of contact with an “application of sociological 
theory” in Romans 14:1-15:13, but only makes a light reference to the customary sense of honour and shame in 
Roman society. He also discuss the customs of duty, benefits, good faith, and the ethic of reciprocity in the 
context of patronage, albeit briefly and succinctly (176-86).
2 David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source o f Law (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 17. As important as this 
chapter is to Roman obligation, Reasoner in The Strong and the Weak focuses on social status, hierarchy and 
social theory but gives little attention to Roman customs and their force in obligation (see pp. 45-63). Cicero 
exclaims, “Oh the times! Oh the customs (mores)!” as an exclamation of the influence of Romans customs
(Against Verres 2.25).
3 Bederman, Custom as a Source o f Law, 17-22.
4 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 101.
5 Gamsey, Social Status, 230.
6 Mousourakis, Legal History, 22-23.
7 Crook, Law and Life, 27.
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were felt to promote the “physical and moral well-being” of society.8 Customs reflected 
common practices based on their “longevity, consistency, and widespread observance.”9 
Customs serve as “a positive source of obligation.”10 Ultimately, mores reinforced Roman 
virtues and excellence of the men of the past in the Roman empire who possessed “high 
moral standards of qualities such as self-control, propriety and severity.” 11 Mores intersected 
Roman identity as a way of life in a “complex pattern of traditions” and also reinforced 
Roman superiority, authority and a culture favouring the powerful or elite.12
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the cultural mores of Rome’s obligation 
society in light of a discussion of virtue (& p £ T q ). It also investigates the connection between 
obligatory societal bonds and virtue to the basic mores which represented Roman social 
practice.
In order to demonstrate an understanding of cultural mores in the first century three 
topics will be discussed: (1) A rationale for virtue in light of Roman obligation; (2) Roman 
virtue; and (3) cultural mores as indispensable to daily Roman social practice. These mores 
provide a clearer understanding of the bonds and ties of relationships in Roman culture.
1. A Rationale for Virtue in Light ofRoman Obligation 
When Paul used the Greek word 6(j)£iAop£v in Romans 15:1, the legal and social implications 
of the word involved “a part of the philosophy of the Romans that the duty of a citizen 
included taking his share of the burden of the law.”13 There was “constant sense of the 
omnipresence of legal concepts amongst the Romans” that produced a sense of duty that had 
roots in Greek philosophy.14 Greek philosophical ideas influenced Roman law, ideas of
8 Maine, Ancient Law, 5, 19. See also pp. 5-20.
9 Bederman, Custom as a Source o f Law, 19.
10 Bederman, Custom as a Source o f Law, 20.
11 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 61.
12 Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, Rome’s Cultural Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 34. 
See also pp. 17-37.
13 Crook, Law and Life, 33.
14 Crook, Law and Life, 34.
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Greek dialectical method and Epicurean and Stoic philosophy.15 The Greek philosophical 
ideas developed a general concept of law or “rule of life” that influenced the idea that a 
custom preceded a legal judgment and “that a judgment must affirm a custom or punish its 
breach.”16 Greek dialectical methods influenced Roman law, although there is debate about 
the jurists’ ability “to make constructive use of it.”17 Regardless, according to Watson, “the 
prominent role of the jurists in Roman law is undeniable” and the jurists often struggled in 
legal decisions “to come up with a sane solution” when conflicting principles arose.18 Still, 
the underlays of Roman law included Epicurean and Stoic influences, especially among 
Rome’s educated upper classes, that “were primarily concerned with offering rules for life 
with the practical tendencies of the Roman character...”19 “Stoicism, in particular, appealed to 
the Romans’ sense of duty and it formed an important and positive force in society.”20 The 
Roman jurist from the first century, Massurius Sabinus, might have been a Stoic, but that is 
only speculative.21 Maine speaks of “the alliance of lawyers with the Stoic philosophers,” 
adding, “Several positions we find in the remains of Roman juris-consults are scarcely 
intelligible, unless we use the Stoic tenets as our key.. .”22 Stoicism, had some influence on 
Roman law and contributed to the progress of Roman society.23
Fundamental to Stoicism is the concept of virtue which maintains “that virtue is self- 
sufficient for happiness.”24 The Stoics believed in the good life, or a life of excellence 
characterised as virtue and Stoicism influenced Roman thought and political philosophy.25 
Stoics follow the path to the good life through two rational beliefs: “the virtuous person is
15 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 97,406,414; Maine, Ancient Law, 1-5.
16 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 96; Maine, Ancient Law, 4-5.
17 Alan Watson, The Spirit o f Roman Law (Athens, Geo.: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 163.
18 Watson, The Spirit o f Roman Law, 57, 99.
19 Mousourakis, Legal History, 43.
20 Mousourakis, Legal History, 43.
21 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 378-80.
22 Maine, Ancient Law, 56.
23 Maine, Ancient Law, 54-57.
24 Christopher Gill, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 15.
25 Mousourakis, Legal History, 212 n. 19.
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self-sufficient and happy; and moral duty requires human beings to live honourably.”26 In 
simplistic terms, Stoic philosophy invited ethical actions, an altruistic, dutiful commitment to 
public service, and “the subordination of all individuals, including oneself, to the universal 
reason at work in the world.”27 Actions, duty, and subordination became three concepts 
important in many respects to the nature of an obligation.
Fundamental to Roman law was a Stoic belief in an eternal law that coincides with 
“the law of nature, which, as pertaining to a man’s communal life, furnished the principles of 
right and wrong guiding human action.”28 Roman law based on the law of nature produced, 
ultimately, the nature of an obligation and the nature of a contract.29 Obligations and 
contracts take into consideration “an obligation to consider the interest of others in 
determining how to act.”30 Graver notes, “In theory, that obligation should extend not only to 
others in existing social systems (the polis within which one is bom) but also to every human 
being, since all rational human beings are in fact united in a single cosmic community.. .”31 
In Roman law and society virtue influenced certain actions. As such, Greek philosophy that 
influenced Roman law had social implications, albeit obligations of noble and virtuous 
actions. It is suggested, therefore, that Paul’s use of Roman obligation in Romans 15:1 
(6(|)£iAop£v) requires an investigation of Roman virtue and the socio-cultural impact of mores 
in the underlays of Roman law.
2. Roman Virtue
Evidence suggests “a remarkable penetration of Roman legal culture wide throughout the 
empire.”32 However, references to Roman legal sources and the unwritten code of law which 
Romans understood in social practice only tell part of the story in comprehending its
26 Raymond Belliotti, Roman Philosophy and the Good Life (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2009), 61.
27 Prior, Virtue and Knowledge, 213-14.
28 Mousourakis, Legal History, 123.
29 Mousourakis, Legal History, 124.
30 Margaret R. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 176.
31 Graver, Stoicism and Emotion, 176; Epictetus, Discourses 2.10.
32 Johnston, Roman Law in Context, 11.
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obligation society. The Romans themselves understood law in society and “recognised that a 
moral ‘obligation’ may exist where there is no legal obligation Mores, or character, or 
customs as a way of life, figured heavily in the daily trafficking of conduct and social 
relations.34 Crook notes that the Romans themselves invested in relationships, “The cement 
of their daily financial relationships was people, not things.”35 Consequently, people needed a 
set pattern or moral precept as to how to relate in daily life and a depth of understanding as to 
how to operate in relationships. Mores provided one critical aspect of that pattern and 
operation in influencing ethical behaviour in Rome’s obligation society.
Mores in the daily life of the ancient Romans imply obligations or duties which have 
an ethical basis in the Roman concept of virtue. The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 
BC) gives an example of virtue where he views virtue (dp£Tq) as “moral goodness,” “the sort 
of disposition that is created by the best movements of the spirit’s best actions and emotions,” 
operative in persons trained to reason, act and conduct themselves according to the highest 
and best.36 MacIntyre says, “One of the features of the concept of a virtue...is that it always 
requires for its application the acceptance of some prior account of certain features of social 
and moral life in terms of which it has to be defined and explained.”37 Virtue finds its ideal 
description in Roman culture for Cicero (106-43 BC) in the Roman “good man,” a person of 
character “established by the performance of countless duties and possession of praiseworthy 
qualities.”38 Cicero (106-43 BC), a Roman orator, legal advocate, and politician, “is the 
clearest indication.. .of the social importance which a knowledge of law had for the early
33 W. W. Buckland, The Main Institutions o f Roman Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1931), 237. Buckland says that debitum and obligatio mean “much the same” (p. 237). He speaks of legal 
obligations and the “intensely personal nature of obligatio” (p. 236).
34 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 210. Gamsey holds that character is influential in court cases and 
“...was intimately connected with social position: boni mores, good character, were nothing less than the virtues 
of the higher orders.”
35 Crook, Law and Life, 243.
36 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 2.1220a.24, 23-37.
37 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981), 174.
38 Cicero, On Duties
79
Romans.”39 As an orator Cicero was influenced by Stoic philosophy and his writings reflect
Greek thought.40 Epictetus (AD 55-135), a Stoic philosopher, a teacher of practical ethics,
and a freedman who personally understood obligations considering he was a former slave,
describes Cicero as the “good and excellent man” who is a good citizen, a man of moral
purpose, and a man who carefully weighs matters, examining and judging them carefully.41
More will be said about the “good man” later in this chapter. The Roman concept of virtue in
the Roman “good man” intersects with obligation at its most essential core in social practice.
As a legal advocate and politician, Cicero was a “patron,” in essence, “a social
superior who was supposed to look out for a set of social inferiors (‘clients’), who were in
turn loyal and supportive of him.” 42Riggsby adds,
In principle, this relationship should be long-standing and inclusive of many 
activities: advice (both legal and practical), gift giving, access to persons of different 
social ranks. In this context, the patron would be more likely to have access to legal 
knowledge than his clients, both by virtue of better education and by being a part of or 
connected to the governmental apparatus. Still, the most important thing a patron 
brought to a case might well be his personal authority rather than his specific legal 
knowledge. If authority and knowledge became somewhat confused with each other, 
that worked to the patron’s advantage.43
In the end, an advocate achieved wanted prestige and expected “some concrete show of the
client’s gratitude.”44 The politics of virtue had social implications and expected obligations of
reply, such as gratitude.
Virtue intersects with Rome’s obligation society and the morals and ethics which
entail obligation.45 Therefore, a brief discussion is necessary.
39 Watson, The Law o f the Ancient Romans, 5.
40 Mousourakis, Legal History, 123.
41 Belliotti, Roman Philosophy, 203; Epictetus, Discourses 1.12.7-8; 2.12.23-25.
42 Riggsby, Roman Law, 50.
43 Riggsby, Roman Law, 50.
44 Riggsby, Roman Law, 51.
45 Wayne A. Meeks, The Origins o f Christian Morality: The First Two Centuries (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1993). Meeks discusses virtue and vice in Chapter 5, “The Language of Obligation” (pp. 66-90). Meeks 
also discusses Christian virtue and exhortations as the grammar by which “kinds of social practice shaped and 
reinforced and gave meaning to the moral sensibilities of the early Christians” (p. 91).
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Cicero, in his extended discussion On Duties, speaks to Marcus on the indispensable
need for “moral goodness” in Roman society46 and addresses four cardinal virtues: wisdom,
justice, fortitude, and self-control.47 He delineates these four virtues:
But all that is morally right rises from some one of four sources: it is either (1) with 
the full perception and intelligent development of the true; or (2) with the 
conservation of organized society, with every man rendering to every man his due, 
and with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and 
strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness and moderation of 
everything that is said and done, wherein consist of temperance and self-control.48
Cicero considers these virtues in the language of obligation and its two-fold goals: “relations
man to man” set in the context of daily life49 and an “orderliness” which complements society
in the realm of good behaviour.50 The language of obligation resonates throughout Cicero’s
discourse with such words as “common bonds,”51 mutual help,52 “to contribute to the general
good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our
industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man,”53
“common social ties,”54 “no duty (qfficium) is more imperative than that of proving one’s
gratitude,”55 “the infinite bond of union,”56 “the bonds of fellowship...none more powerful
than when good men of noble character are joined in intimate friendship,”57 obligations to
country58 and individuals,59 to devote wealth to “beneficence and liberality,”60 as a general
rule of virtue, to uphold honour and dignity,61 and, finally, to fulfil the duty “to respect,
46 Cicero, On Duties 1.15.
47 Cicero, On Duties 1.15.
48 Cicero, On Duties 1.15.
49 Cicero, On Duties 1.17.
50 Cicero, On Duties 1.15.
51 Cicero, On Duties 1.20.
52 Cicero, On Duties 1.22.
53 Cicero, On Duties 1.20.
54 Cicero, On Duties 1.45.
55 Cicero, On Duties 1.47.
56 Cicero, On Duties 1.53-54.
57 Cicero, On Duties 1.55.
58 Cicero, On Duties 1.1.58.
59 Cicero, On Duties 1.59.
60 Cicero, On Duties 1.68.
61 Cicero, On Duties 1.124.
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defend, and maintain the common bonds of union and fellowship subsisting between all 
members of the human race.”62 What does the performance of the virtues produce?
Performance of the virtues in social exchange produces reciprocity and mutuality. Of 
reciprocity, Cicero speaks of doing a duty and requiting one, “Whether we do the kindness or 
not is optional; but to fail to requite one is not allowable to a good man, provided he can 
make the requital without violating the rights of others,” so that “the greater the favour, the 
greater the obligation.”
Of mutuality, Cicero expresses bonds in services of exchange, “another strong bond 
of fellowship is effected by mutual interchange of kind services; as long as these kindnesses 
(beneficia) are mutual and acceptable, those between whom they are interchanged are united 
by the ties of an enduring intimacy.”64 The virtues aim to create bonds of relationship which 
endure and to provide necessary help for members of Roman society.65
Valerius Maximus (c. 20 BC-c. AD 50), a patrician aristocrat who wrote during the 
reign of Tiberius, gives examples of the use of the language of obligation.66 Skidmore in his 
important monograph Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen notes that Valerius Maximus’s 
works “advance Valerius’s moral purpose,” “serve as models of conduct” and communicate 
“various departments of human life.”67 Valerius Maximus discusses virtue in the language of 
obligation,
Distinctions fallen deservedly to individuals would give pleasure to candid minds 
when placed conspicuously in view, because contemplation of the rewards of virtue
62 Cicero, On Duties 1.149.
63 Cicero, On Duties 1.48; 1.49.
64 Cicero, On Duties, 1.56.
65 Judge, Rank and Status, 30. Help was not always gratuitous and benevolent, but often obliged in stratified 
circles of friendship, politics, and social practice (30-31).
66 Valerius Maximus, Memorable Sayings and Doings 8.15. Clive Skidmore, Practical Ethics for Roman 
Gentlemen: The Works o f Valerius Maximus (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1996), xv. See also V. Henry 
T. Nguyen, Christian Identity in Corinth (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 58-60. Nguyen discusses Valerius 
Maximus, exempla and persona in relation to virtue.
67 Skidmore, Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen, 53. Skidmore highlights rhetoric and its use of examples 
(exempla) to portray the Roman “good man” and the failures of men, while sketching the virtue and non-virtue 
of particular Romans in their moral conduct and immoral misconduct. Skidmore connects conduct, obligation, 
and their relationship to virtue through exempla.
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and of its works is equally pleasing; for Nature herself gives us good cheer when we 
see honour strenuously sought and gratefully paid. But although the mind at this point 
is carried by its every impulse straight to the house of Augustus, a temple most 
beneficent and most honoured, it will better be held in check, since to him for whom 
ascent to heaven lies open earthly tributes, no matter how great, are still below his 
desert.68
Augustan honour and its pursuit are pivotal to Roman conduct. Valerius Maximus shows the 
relationship of virtuous honour to Augustus’s new order with an emphasis on “the 
ideologically correct behaviour of a society’s subordinate members” in “stories that celebrate 
social concord.”69 His “ethical claims are the encouragement of virtue and the deterrence of 
vice.”70 Valerius Maximus’s mention of honour, gratitude, benefits, and rewards combines to 
indicate a behavioural path of personal obligations both to and from Augustus. Virtue in the 
Roman mind dictated behaviour which implied certain obligations.
The Greek historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus (c. 60-7 BC) illustrates virtue 
(ap£Tq) and obligation in Tullus’s speech, “Our chief magistrates and membership in the 
senate are held and other honours among us are enjoyed, not by men possessed of great 
fortunes, nor by those who can show a long line of ancestors all natives of the country, but by 
such as are worthy of these honours; for we look upon the nobility of men as consisting in 
nothing else than in virtue.”71 He also speaks of Julius Caesar whose authority, dignity, 
honour and “house became the greatest and at the same time the most illustrious of any we 
know of, and produced the most distinguished commanders, whose virtues were so many 
proofs of their nobility.”72
The language of obligation in its Roman nuances interlinks the vocabulary of virtue as 
honour. J. E. Lendon, Empire o f Honour: The Art o f Government in the Roman World
68Valerius Maximus, Memorable Sayings and Doings 8.15.
69 Martin Bloomer, Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric o f the New Nobility (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1992), 56.
70 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, xvi.
71 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 3.11.5.
72 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 1.70.4.
83
designates Rome as an “empire of honour.”73 He observes the possessors of honour in Roman
society exerted power and influence, stating,
By virtue of this honour, an illustrious man was capable of influencing the conduct of 
those around him. He could get his way by praising or blaming; the mere fact of his 
honour made others defer to him; by virtue of his honour he could get his way by 
participating, to his profit, in the exchange of reciprocal favours. The strength, social 
significance, and complex interplay of these methods is a function of the two-fold 
composition of Graeco-Roman honour, of its being attributed both by the aristocratic 
community as a whole and by individual aristocrats. Persons of great distinction could 
simply honour those whose conduct they liked, while dishonouring those whose 
conduct they disliked, and others’ expectation of such treatment would drive them to 
obey these great men’s wishes.74
Virtuous Roman honour was inextricably connected to the language, practice, and
relationship of obligation in society. Having noted this, it is necessary to view the
outcropping of virtue and honour by looking at specific mores relative to Rome’s obligation
society.
3. The Formal Bond o f Society 
As has already been suggested, Roman obligation was a broadly accepted concept that 
constituted the fabric of society. Although complex, the relationships required ‘virtue’ and 
common social agreement for relationships to remain amiable and to bear influence upon the 
wider spectrum of social control in the Pax Romana. If obligation is the bond of society, then 
the links in the chain of this bond are the formally comprehended and practised ethics of 
reciprocity which inspire the relationships. While the relationships were cemented by the 
bond, the ethics of obligation promised a dynamic commodity of exchange, much of which 
was visual, sometimes verbose, oral, and accepted in the common language and practice of 
Roman social exchange in the first century. What were those accepted commodities, referred 
to here as the mores, or “customs, morality and the way of life,”75 of obligation?
73 J. E. Lendon, Empire ofHonour: The Art o f Government in the Roman World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), 25-26.
74 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 55-56.
75 G. Woolf, “Becoming Roman, Staying Greek: Culture, Identity and the Civilizing Process in the Roman 
East,” Proceedings o f the Cambridge Philogical Society 40 (1994): 120.
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i. Honour
First, the mos of honour (,honestas) formed the foundational element of ethics in Roman 
society. Lendon describes this foundational element, “Honour was a filter through which the 
whole world was viewed, a deep structure of the Graeco-Roman mind, perhaps the ruling 
metaphor of ancient society.”76 Honour became an unspoken, yet identified custom that 
impacted social relationships on the hierarchical scale of a stratified society. A quest for 
honour created a society of ambition, greed, and a struggle for power where people were 
always seeking to climb the social scale. It also created a society with a competitive edge, an 
edge which spawned political manoeuvring, community tension, circles of friendships, and 
unspoken rules of conduct evident to all. Judge clarifies the competitive nature of honour: 
“Essential public works were therefore undertaken at the personal charges of the wealthy, the 
competition of honour being relied upon to keep the system working.”77 The endless cycle of 
citizens attempting to outperform other citizens to achieve public honour created a tense 
society of unmitigated ambition.
In society Romans sought honour and an understood role of their places in a system of 
honour. A Roman looked outward “for confirmation of his own existence and an assessment 
of his own worth,”78 by turning to other people. “The mirror in which each Roman could 
survey his own honour or shame was held to him by his fellow men.”79 Those who had the 
status of honour expected those inferior to them to glorify and recognize their superior 
virtuous status. Failure to properly recognize the honourable might lead to open shame or 
public humiliation. This honour-shame evaluation of self-worth found its social application in 
obligation.
76 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 73.
77Judge, Social Pattern, 19.
78 Florence Dupont, Daily Life in Ancient Rome (trans. Christopher Woodall; Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 10.
79 Dupont, Daily Life, 10-11.
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An array of words related to honour are honestas, hinting at a person’s reputation,80 
honestus, noble or “clothed with honour,” 81 or “of honorable conduct, morality, virtue,”82 
and honestiores, denoting the status of the “distinguished” who by virtue of their position on 
the social scale received special privileges under the purview of the law.83 Each of these word 
forms of honour reinforces the role of obligations. A code of honour provided social 
distinctions that were clearly recognized in Roman society.
The complexity of honour and the shame-evaluation mirror resulted in an ideal goal 
for Romans, i.e. becoming “the good man.” The ideal of a good man came from the time of 
Homer.85 Skidmore explains how “example,” a rhetorical device for older men teaching the 
younger men, was held forth in Roman society.86 Skidmore also writes, “An educational 
practice dependent upon such a concept is a product of a particular kind of society, in which 
imitation and competition were closely connected, and the aim of success was to triumph
0*7
over one’s rivals.”
In The Iliad advice is given as a teaching example, “Always to excel, out-topping all 
the rest.”88 Skidmore allows, “The ideal value to which everything must be sacrificed in 
Homeric society is arete (ap£Trj), and glory is the recognition of it by one’s fellow 
warriors.”89 This idea was transferred to the first century BC where Seneca the Younger (4 
BC - AD 65) aligned it closely with benefaction, “The best man is he who gives readily, 
never demands any return, rejoices if a return is made, who in all sincerity forgets what he
80 “Introduction,” Cicero: On Duties (ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), xliv-xlv.
81 “Honestus,” A Latin Dictionary (ed. Charlton Lewis and Charles Short; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), 861.
82 “Honestus,” A Latin Dictionary (ed. Charlton Lewis and Charles Short; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), 861.
83 Crook, Law and Life, 97; A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 69.
84 Andrew Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study o f  I  
Corinthians 1-6 (London: Brill, 1993), 162-69. He discusses “the good man” in the context of Romans 5:7.
85 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 3. Maine, Ancient Law, 1-5. Maine says, of Homeric influence on the codes of 
ancient law, “These rudimentary ideas are to the jurist what the primary crusts of the earth are to the geologist” 
(p. 3).
86 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 3-21.
87 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 3.
88 Homer, Iliad 6.208; Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 3.
89 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 3.
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has bestowed, and accepts a return in spirit of one accepting a benefit.”90 Seneca the 
Younger, a Roman Stoic philosopher and statesman, addressed the reciprocal nature of 
honour and the good man: “To a good man I shall hand back his benefit, to a bad one I shall 
fling it back; to the former, because I am indebted to him, to the latter, in order that I may no 
longer be indebted to him.”91
Cicero speaks also of the reciprocal duty of a good man where obligation bleeds 
through, “Whether we do the kindness or not is optional; but to fail to requite [repay] one is 
not allowable to a good man, provided he can make the requital without violating the rights
QOof others.” The ideal man desired honour as a primary and expected virtue. This masculine 
vision of virtue created the image of the good man which in turn supplied the duty or actions 
with respect to the reciprocal nature of obligations. It was virtue to possess honour and to 
have others cater to it.
Cicero supports honour as indigenous to those with political interests seeking a place 
in Roman society, “indicating which precepts must be laid to heart by all who look forward to 
a career of honour.”93 Honour and its accompanying language usage establish mores that are 
linked together by obligations.
“Honour” appears to be connected exclusively to the wealthy, the famous, and elite in 
Roman society. Could the poor Roman citizen offer anything in a society where status was 
power and power was status? The poor could offer “honour,” political and social allegiance 
to their superiors who understood the value of friends in every sector of society.94 On the 
other hand, “The (wealthy) Roman citizen, when called upon to take care of some matter for 
another person, felt honour-bound to carry out the task entrusted to his charge.”95 Lendon
90 Seneca, On Benefits 2.17.7.
91 Seneca, On Benefits 7.17.2.
92 Cicero, On Duties 1.48.
93 Cicero, On Duties 3.6.
94 A. R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), 35.
95 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 415.
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says that honour “among aristocrats, once acquired, was not a passive possession, like an 
engraved watch or an honorary degree.”96 “Rather, those who had honour were able to exert 
power in society by virtue of the desire of others for it, and the concern of others not to lose 
it.”97 Honour conferred a social convention of inestimable value and power in the obligations 
it assembled.
Roman honour among the elite carried with it majesty, “a form of prestige with
compulsive force,” which the Romans knew and observed in social practice as majesty or
maiestas.98 MacMullen mentions maiestas as the “Romans’s sense of the need to master
others: their drive for greatemess.”99 Valerius Maximus describes maiestas,
There is a sort of private Censorship, the majesty of famous men, potent in 
maintaining its greatness without lofty tribunals or the service of apparitors. It glides 
up to the hearts of men covered with the adornment of admiration and enters welcome 
and pleasing. One might well call it a protracted and enviable unofficial office.100
Valerius Maximus’s discussion of maiestas echoes the language of another mos such as piety
and the language of obligation such as “due honour.”101 The Roman statesman and follower
of Stoic philosophy, Cato the Younger’s (95-46 BC) maiestas proved so powerful that when
he departed from the theatre to avoid seeing an actress undress on stage, “the people followed
him as he went out with tremendous applause.”102 Prestige in honour was not to be refused,
for two parties in any relationship knew the relative distinction of conduct, duty, and
obligation.103 The inferior (weak) honoured the superior (strong), including the display of
obedience, reverence, and physical demonstrations of honour such as an inferior uncovering
96 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 55.
97 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 55.
98 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 55.
99 Ramsay MacMullen, Romanization in the Time o f Augustus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), x. As 
a result o f Romanization in the East, conquered populations acknowledged their inferiority and “their position 
was a result and reward of the Roman’s drive to be acknowledged masters...and when at last the hunger for 
‘greatemess’ had been achieved, Roman superiors mled and inferiors submitted in the context of conquest 
whereby the Romans established Roman architecture, plans, laws, values, virtues, and mores in conquered 
territories” (p. 24).
100 Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings 2.10.1; Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 55.
101 Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings 2.10.2.
102 Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings 2.10.8; Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 59.
103 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 59.
his head in the presence of a superior.104 Honour as a societal mos meant that “if a man did 
more than deference required, that could be an honour; less, an insult.”105 Honour possessed 
powerful positive aspects in Roman society, but it could equally have negative, even cruel, 
implications if improperly demonstrated or refused. Ultimately, honour acted “as a cloak or 
lubricant to other forms of power.”106
While honour lubricated power, it was also embedded in the Roman mind from an 
early age107 with the concept of authority, that is, auctoritas. Romans lived in an aristocratic 
“opinion-community” where honour, respect, shame, and the unwritten social code of honour 
and its psychology were “inculcated early, vigorously enforced in the household, and 
operated for the most part at an unconscious level.”108 Authority, in Roman terms, “is 
impressive with moral power.”109 Auctoritas follows a pattern of influence by which “a 
distinguished man could use it to get others to do his bidding,”110 by which cities responded 
in civic duties according to Roman law in an effort to unify all subjects under a single set of 
regulations,111 and by which even a judge’s decision in a court of a law can be influenced.112 
Auctoritas fits into the realm of honour and “naturalized into the vocabulary of honour.”113 
Roman honour serves as a foundational Roman mos which produced a series of Roman 
benefactions.
104 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 59.
105 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 59.
106 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 25.
107 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 61.
108 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 61.
109 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 208.
110 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 61.
111 MacMullen, Romanization in the Time o f Augustus, 11.
112 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 212.
113 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 212. See also Plato, Gorgias 484. Plato asserts that one natural 
right (of power) could be that “the possessions of the inferior and weaker should all belong to the superior and 
stronger.”
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ii. Beneflcium or benefaction
Second, was the mos of beneflcium “which basically means ‘kindness’ or ‘favour,’” 
according to Sailer.114 Beneflcium was “a purely gratuitous act which, in contrast to an 
officium, did not give the benefactor a right to repayment.”115 “Services” is another way to 
describe beneflcium. Flowing from honour are two essential ethical mores which are closely 
tied together: beneflcium and officium.116
Seneca the Younger’s moral essay On Benefits specifies such beneflcium, with 
Gamsey and Sailer noting that it “is not a work of sociology or anthropology, but an ethical 
treatise about how men ought to conduct themselves in the giving and receiving of favours 
and services.”117 In such an exchange of services Seneca the Younger states in his moral 
essay, “Let us make our benefits, not investments, but gifts.”118 Cicero declares that “there is 
nothing more honourable and noble than to be indifferent to money, if one does not possess 
it, and to devote it to beneficence and liberality if one does possess it.”119 Beneflcium kept the 
right hand open to ways in which it could contribute to a city, to community projects, or to 
larger Roman society while obligating the receiver.120 In a sense, the left hand of the 
benefactor giving beneflcium also remained open until the obligated entity returned the 
favour. Seneca detested such an attitude, “The man who, when he gives, has any thought of 
repayment deserves to be deceived.”121 “The ideal benefactor was supposed to act without
114 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 17.
115 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 19.
116 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 176-83. Reasoner discusses the customs of duty, benefits and the role of 
reciprocity.
117 Peter Gamsey and Richard Sailer, “Patronal Power Relations,” in Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in 
Roman Imperial Society (ed. Richard A. Horsley; Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press International, 1997), 96.
118 Seneca, On Benefits 1.1.9.
119 Cicero, On Duties 1.68.
120 Seneca, On Benefits 1.3-4.
121 Seneca, On Benefits 1.3-4. For a discussion concerning civic benefactors and their importance to honour see 
Bmce Winter, Seek the Welfare o f the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1994), 26-40.
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thought of what was due him, but this was unrealistic.”122 By virtue of the benefaction, the
gift given obligated the receiver to return a favour.
Beneficium dramatically influenced the honour which a benefactor received and the
obligations it conferred through the public display. Winter writes,
The welfare of the city in the Graeco-Roman world depended on the ongoing 
contributions of civic-minded benefactors. They paid for the public works from their 
private resources in order to enhance the environs of their cities and, in time of famine 
to ensure the supply of grain at cost affordable to every citizen. This was a means of 
maintaining social order. The epigraphic and literary evidence...demonstrate that there 
were established conventions for the acknowledgment of benefactors. Rulers praised 
and honoured those who undertook good works which benefitted the city. At the same 
time they made conventional promise to honour publicly those who in the future 
would undertake similar benefactions.123
Benefaction and honour were tightly intertwined. The tight bond wove both the “established
conventions” and the “conventional promise” into a web of expected obligations involving
the giver, the receiver, and the people of the city.124 “Benefactions to a city require
considerable wealth, since they would normally include activities such as providing roads or
public buildings, adorning public buildings, constructing public utilities, or subsidizing the
grain supply in times of shortage, either by bringing ships carrying grain to one’s particular
city, or by making grain available for sale at less than the market price.”125 “The strength of
the obligation was considerable and the social pressure to acknowledge and respond to the
beneficium extreme.”126
While benefaction alerts the mind to charity or philanthropy, the idea of the rich
helping the poor, in the Roman world benefaction was a common transaction of power based
upon social status. Finley writes, “Normally, generosity was directed to the community,”
122 Gamsey and Sailer, “Patronal Power Relations,” 96.
123 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 26, discusses epigraphic evidence from Ephesus and the island of Cos concerning 
benefactors (pp. 26-40).
124 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 26.
125 Christopher Bryan, A Preface to Romans: Notes on the Epistle in Its Literary and Cultural Setting (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 35-36.
126 Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership, 166.
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adding, “not even the state showed much concern for the poor.”127 The poor, as weaker
members of society, found themselves fulfilling obligations to the benefactor.
Beneficium did not necessarily end when the benefactor died. Part of the arrangement
of the terms of benefaction allowed benefactors to pass on to heirs instructions and wishes at
death. In essence, beneficium “was from a legal viewpoint no more than a gift with an
obligation attached.”128 Wealthy benefactors with discrete motives quietly set forth
arrangements of trust which caused them “to believe that the wider purposes of their gifts
could be achieved in perpetuity.”129 Obligations related to beneficium might endure for years,
spinning a cycle of obligations that spanned many generations.
Benefactions and its accompanying societal mores formed a link to the Roman social
system of duty, response, and reciprocal obligations. Bryan notes the systematic link between
honour and beneficium in Rome in relationships such as that between a patron and a client,
while mentioning the “ethics of benefaction and obligation.”130 He observes,
There are the witty (and often cruel) references to the relationships of patrons and 
clients in Martial (for example, Epigrams 1.99, 108; 2.5, 13, 18; 5.44,47; 10.24;
12.18,29,40) and Juvenal (for example, Satire I). All point to a system that 
dominated the entire spectrum of relationships, both private and public, from the 
relationship of Rome itself with its ‘client’ states to the relationships within each 
individual household, with the head of the household himself ‘patron’ of all other 
members-which in practise meant an extended network of wife, children, 
freedpersons, and slaves. It was a system that included the universal patronal power of 
the emperor, the power exercised by powerful and aristocratic senators on behalf of 
their proteges, the protection and gifts they might all offer to their plebeian ‘clients,’ 
and the virtually unbreakable chains of obligation and duty bound freedpersons to the 
families that once owned them.131
This system of beneficium served as an indispensable tool of social practice and an ethical
obligation for the Romans themselves as they expressed mores in their daily lives.
127 Finley, Ancient Economy, 37-38.
128 Hands, Charities and Social Aid, 18.
129 Hands, Chanties and Social Aid, 18.
130 Bryan, 36.
131 Bryan, 36.
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iii. Officium or Duty
Third, was the mos of officium. The word occurs “in the sense of the performance of an 
action arising from such a relationship [reciprocal], and as a social and ultimately a moral 
duty.”132 “The Romans themselves recognized officium as a basic element in their social 
relations.”133 Sailer implies that officium developed rules and regulations “according to a 
particular category of people (e.g., craftsmen)” which retains an “element of reciprocity.”134 
Sailer writes,
...officium entailed an element of reciprocity - thus an officium from a patron to a 
client was possible, just as from a client to a patron. This reciprocal aspect is reflected 
in the language of debt associated with officium: a man receiving an officium is often 
said ‘to owe’ (debere) one in return, and the phrase officium reddere expresses the 
idea of acquitting oneself of a debt.”135
Officium was the “official” attendance of the client to his patron with a set of obligations.
Legally, Crook appraises officium as a “complementary concept” to fides
(faithfulness), as a kind of “mutual serviceableness” in relationships.136 Officium maintained
a sense of dutiful decorum, yet could obligate a weaker person to a stronger, and/or wealthy
person, for a long duration. The dominant class were those who owned land.137 Playing the
political games, “which involved huge stakes in bribery, bread, and circuses,” meant that
citizens often borrowed to release one debt and incur another.138 The “vicious cycle” meant
that friends borrowed from friends with the end result meaning that debtors rarely escaped
debt and that officium became the means of exchange to bind the debtor to the creditor.139
Once debt was incurred social obligations proved unavoidable.
132 Matthias Gelzer, The Roman Nobility (trans. by Robin Seager; Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 67. Contra Wayne 
Meeks, The Moral World o f the First Christians, 52. He prefers that which is “appropriate,” believing qfficia is 
“often misleadingly translated ‘duties.’”
133 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 15.
134 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 15.
135 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 15.
136 Crook, Law and Life, 94.
137 Crook, Law and Life, 171.
138 Crook, Law and Life, 171.
139 Crook, Law and Life, 171.
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As a part of the officium friends acted on behalf of friends, even in their absence, 
referred to as the negotiorum gestio.140 Winter speaks of the “politics of friendship,” “a 
person’s actions,” and “the reciprocal relations” so basic to friendship in Roman society.141 
Hands moves one step beyond reciprocity where he acknowledges that friendships were 
nourished142 and maintained by a “considerable number of services essential to comfort and 
security which could not be bought for money” and that reciprocal services in friendships 
were “based on the consideration of mutual advantage.”143 By mutual advantage Hands does 
not necessarily mean that the relationship is merely horizontal. It could also be, and was 
mostly, vertical. “Duty” as a mos in Roman society fits into a complex network of friendships 
and relationships.
iv. Fides or Faith
Fourth, a vital Roman mos was fides, ‘trust’ or ‘faith’ in the dynamic of exchange. If officium 
and beneficium were the exchange of services with certain rights and duties, then fides was 
the bond of loyalty and trust pledged by the transaction. Roman fides, in its technical, legal 
sense, minimized risks in relationships and the ensuing service exchange, especially in 
friendship, which involved more than simple friendship. Thus fides set forth a mores of 
accepted conduct, “if it was in any event of prime concern for the Roman citizen to keep his 
word, he would certainly do everything in his power to honour a promise given to a 
friend.”144 Fides secured both transaction and friendship in reciprocal exchange. Security and 
bonds of irrevocable trust efficiently supply strength to the personal connections made up and 
down the social scale. Gelzer writes,
140 Crook, Law and Life, 236.
141 Bruce Winter, After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence o f Secular Ethics and Social Change (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2001), 130, citing B. Rawson, The Politics o f Friendship: Pompey and Cicero (Sydney: Sydney 
University Press, 1978), and Sailer, Personal Patronage, 14-17.
142 Seneca, On Benefits 6.33.1; Richard P. Sailer, Personal Patronage, 13. Sailer says, “Amicitiae (friendship) 
by contrast to love (amore) requires the constant nourishment of the new official'
143 Hands, Charities and Social Aid, 32-33.
144 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 115.
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The entire Roman people, both the ruling class and the mass of voters whom they 
ruled, was, as a society, permeated by the multifarious relationships based on fides 
and on personal connections, the principal forms of which were patrocinium in the 
courts and over communities, together with political friendship and financial 
obligation. These relationships determined the distribution of political power. To 
maintain their rights citizens and subjects alike were constrained to seek the 
protection of powerful men, and the beginner in politics had need of a powerful 
protector to secure advancement.145
The connections, both personal and political, some motivated because of advantage and
others from disadvantage, gave rise to the critical nature of trust in obligations. Why would
the disadvantaged break the bond of trust and risk losing protection? Why would the
advantaged break the bond of trust and risk losing the valuable power of friendship? Even the
advantaged of Roman society knew the power of a network of trusted friends bound by good
faith {fides), if for no other reason than as a voting block at the time of elections. To break the
bond offides would have personal and powerful negative repercussions.
Cicero further completes thoughts of fides as a sense of trustworthiness and
faithfulness related to justice. Cicero says that “the foundation of justice is good faith [fides],
that is, truth and fidelity to promises and agreements.”146 Roman law and justice strove
toward “simplicity and clarity,”147 with fides providing a moral quality which was related to a
person’s status, “aimed at credibility” in nurturing the relationship, and tied relationships
together.148 In relationships the Romans knew that fides “demanded that a man kept his word,
no matter what form it was given.”149 “Characteristic of Roman fidelity is the strictly binding
nature of an agreed upon contract of obligation.”150 A lack of fidelity, or faithlessness, “was
145 Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, 139.
146 Cicero, On Duties 1.23.
147 Schultz, Principles o f Roman Law, 79.
148 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 87.
149 Schultz, Principles of Roman Law, 224.
150 Schultz, Principles o f Roman Law, 225.
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in their eyes a social blot.”151 Ultimately, for the Romans, to practise fides in social relations 
and “to be faithful” is one of their standard principles of life and survival.152
v. Pietas or loyalty
Fifth, another mos was pietas, known as “devotion,” also akin to loyalty and fides. An 
intimacy of relation flows from the idea of pietas. Romans viewed its origins in the 
household code. While not limited to households, where family members demonstrated pietas 
toward the father (patria potestas), the endearing term reflects a closeness in the social 
cohesion of a given relationship. In Roman families, power resided with the father, the 
relationships being “almost wholly asymmetrical,” with “the obligation of obedience imposed 
on the rest of the household and underwritten by the core value of pietas.”153 Transferred 
from the household code into the daily function of conduct in Roman society, pietas served as 
the key virtue of social respect whereby all persons living in the Roman empire, citizens and 
aliens, Gentiles and Jews, urbs andplebs, honestiores and humiliores, practised some form of 
pietas in both their own distinctive lifestyle and conduct.
Pietas, like other mores, became difficult to define narrowly in terms of social 
practice. Judge asserts lack of clarity surrounding pietas, “...there is no systematic theory of 
social obligation expounded, or at any rate none that is obviously consistent from one writer 
to another, the subject is of very great concern to them.”154 Pietas possesses no systematic 
theory which has been developed and, yet, like the writers, was of great practical and ethical 
importance to most Romans. The aspect of pietas and its accompanying “bond of duty,” led 
family members to take serious steps of devotion, including such concern for making
151 Schultz, Principles o f Roman Law, 224.
152 Schultz, Principles o f Roman Law, 223.
153 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 102.
154 Judge, The Social Pattern, 72.
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preparation for the burial of relatives.155 Clients and associations practised the same kind of
devotion of duty with respect to preparing for the burial of their members.156
Hands suggests that the wealthy demonstrated pietas, not in the sense of caring for the
poor, but as “a sense of duty for the extended family of the city.”157 The pietas of obligation
influenced the families, the business partners, and the city with great magnitude so that a
sense of dignity returned to those demonstrating pietas. The wealthy acted in accordance with
status and forever responded to obligations by “conforming to a code of ethics based on
1 ^ 8pietas, fides, reverentia, and amicitia”
Sailer makes a salient point when he says that the emphasis on pietas “is on duty 
rather than affection or compassion.”159 He also describes pietas as “a virtue displayed 
primarily toward a higher power, whether it be the gods, the fatherland, or parents.”160 Pietas, 
for all its value as a virtue in Roman society, was not at all linked with merciful compassion, 
but a devotion which aimed to fulfil obligations and, in most cases, those obligations were 
fulfilled by a weaker person toward a stronger member of society.
vi. Societas or society
Sixth, was the mos of societas (KOivwvia), that is, society. Societas “derived ultimately from 
the ancient automatic common ownership of family property by undivided heirs.”161 In legal 
terms, societas evoked a “state of consensual contract of partnership.”162 It illustrates the 
complexity of relationships and the resulting obligations in partnership. Societas can be 
thought of as “relational fellowship,” partners together for a common cause such as
155 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 98.
156 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 78-79.
157 Hands, Charities and Social Aid, 92.
158 Zimmermann, The Law o f Obligations, 415.
159 Richard Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 105; M. O. Lee, Fathers and Sons in Virgil’s 'AeneidTurn  
GenitorNatum ( Albany, New York: 1979) 17-23. Lee “stresses that Aeneas is pius because he places duty 
above feelings of tenderness and compassion” (105 n. 11).
160 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 105; J. P. Neraudau, Etre enfant a Rome (Paris: “Les Belles Lettres,” 
1984), 121.
161 Crook, Law and Life, 229.
162 Watson, The Law o f Obligations in the Later Roman Republic, 125.
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commerce and trade, and, according to Winter, “Relationship constituted the essence of 
societas”163 As an example, since agriculture was the basic industry, farmers from the rural 
countryside, many of them close relatives or friends, would form a societas to carry out their 
business of trade.164 Craftsmen in societas, common in Rome, depended on their patrons to 
perform their respective crafts.165 Obligations ensued as “the great man, the tyrant, powerful 
aristocrat, Hellenistic monarch or Roman emperor, sought out and encouraged the finest 
craftsmen he could find, to the enhancement of his own reputation, both by the association of 
his name with great works, and by the portraits he might commission from sculptors, 
painters, gem-cutters and coiners.”166 Societies were formed around the slave trade and the 
business of money lending. The apostle Paul’s tent-making constituted a societas. Values, 
tools, and person-to-person fellowship (Kovaivia/collegium) in their simplest terms were 
shared. The sharing induced a social tie of obligations.
Crook writes, “Societas was a consensual, bona fide contract.”167 Societas ’ primary 
focus is the pooling of resources, such as money, expertise, supplies, tools, labour, property, 
or some combination for a “common purpose.”168 Zimmermann writes, “Socii, in the words 
of [David] Daube, are not bent on getting the most out of each other; they are, in the first 
place, ‘friends,’ pursuing common interests against third parties.”169 An important note 
should be mentioned in Roman law, “unlike sale or hire, it [societas] is not a transaction in 
which parties’ performances are reciprocal.”170 Does this mean that no obligations were 
involved? No, it simply means that legally each partner bore responsibility for his “own
163 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 130.
164 Watson. The Law o f Obligations in the Later Roman Republic, 126.
165 Alison Burford, Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972), 124-52.
166 Burford, Craftsmen in Greek and Roman Society, 125.
167 Crook, Law and Life, 229.
168 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 451.
169 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 451; David Daube, “Societas as Consensual Contract,” 6 (1938): 
Cambridge Lord Justice, 391.
170 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 451.
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acquisitions and contracts accrued to and bound only to himself.”171 Strictly speaking, this 
was a legal determination, but societas still construed obligations of loyalty and gratitude, if 
nothing else.
It appeared that societas, then, formed a bond between partners of common interest or
trade, but it also had meaning in the grander scale of Roman social distinction and conduct in
society. Cicero speaks of these bonds of relation man to man. He writes,
Again, that wisdom which I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things 
human and divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union [societas] 
between gods and men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most 
important of the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that that duty 
[officium] which is connected with the social obligation is the most important duty.172
Cicero’s use of the language of law here proves of great value in understanding first century
BC conduct. Used apart from its basic legal constraints, conduct might create chaos.
Connected to Roman law, conduct found meaning and relational interpretation for social
cohesion and control. Obligation produced a kind of societas where the different strata of
society cohered and related. Cicero leaves little to the imagination in terms of obligation as a
duty which forms a bond in Roman society as well as to other persons. Obligation in societas
solidified such relationships by expounding duty.173
vii. Dignitas or dignity
Seventh, was the mos of dignitas, or “dignity.” In Roman law honestiores and humiliores 
became legal definitions used to make judgments in courts.174 Once these legal distinctions 
had been made, then other considerations in regard to status followed. One consideration was 
dignitas,175 a term best defined as “worth or rank.”176 Zimmermann sees it as a legal term
171 Crook, Law and Life, 230-1.
172 Cicero, On Duties 1.153.
173 Cicero, On Duties 1.153.
174 Ramsey MacMullen, Changes in the Roman Empire: Essays in the Ordinary (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 192.
175 MacMullen, Changes, 192.
176 MacMullen, Changes, 193.
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“comprising all rights of personality.”177 MacMullen views this relation of power as one of 
the “ordinary inducements to obedience by people who enjoyed ‘clout.’”178
Dignitas is best understood through the window of a narrative account of Julius 
Caesar. He “plunged the Roman world into war to protect his own affronted dignitas,”179 so 
that after crossing the Rubicon in January 49 BC he wrote to his troops to qualify his 
motives:
‘As for myself,’ he said, ‘I have always reckoned with the dignity [dignitas] of the 
Republic of first importance and preferable to life. I was indignant that a benefit 
conferred on me by the Roman people was being insolently wrested from me by my 
enemies.’180
Dignitas was something worthy to be protected at all costs. MacMullen prefers an energetic 
concept, a dignitas which “sounds like an active quality.”181 This active aggression is seen 
again when Caesar plans to attack his enemy, Ambiorix, “and, in despair of being able to 
bring the frightened fugitive into his power, he deemed it the best thing, out of regard for his 
own prestige [dignitas], so completely to strip his territory of citizens, buildings, and cattle as 
to make Ambriorix hated by his subjects who might have a chance to survive...”182 
MacMullen adds, “What Caesar wants to assert through total war is a certain perception of 
himself, the same perception that Cicero values. He must be seen as capable of ruthless and 
effective action.”183 Dignitas, when invoked, could be used to one’s advantage and, when 
ignored, could be brutally punishing.
Cicero who supports such indignation, while speaking of the protection of friends and 
the duty to repay when an attack is launched, says, “They are performing a duty, they are 
defending their friends, they act as men of spirit are wont to act; when injured they are
177 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 1084.
178 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 190.
179 Martin Goodman with Jane Sherwood, The Roman World: 44 BC-AD180 (London: Routledge, 1997), 28.
180 Caesar: The Civil Wars 1.9,17.
181 MacMullen, Changes, 192.
182 Caesar, The Gallic War 8.24.
183 MacMullen, Changes, 193.
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indignant, when angry they fly out, when challenged they fight.”184 Dignitas commanded 
response in daily relationships of obligation depending on whether you were comrade or 
enemy, friend of foe, or of a higher or a lower class. Regardless, it was an emotionally 
charged precept.
Dignitas was recognized in courts, on roads, in public places, in clothing, and as a 
Roman way of life among people “of all classes, of all pursuits, and of all kinds.”185 Croom 
suggests the visual aspects of dignitas in public places with the upper classes in discussing 
their clothing, “The upper classes would not have appeared in public wearing their tunics 
unbelted, unless attending a funeral or a court case or some other occasion when their 
emotional state would be suitably reflected in a lack of attention to their dress.”186
Dignitas was also something which always wanted to be kept intact. Cicero warns his 
political critic, Torquatus, of his temptation not to protect his dignity, “But unless you put 
some measure of restraint on yourself you will impel me to forget our friendship and think of 
my own dignity. No one has ever brought suspicion on me whom I did not overturn and 
overwhelm.”187 The failure to complete obligations called for an equal and opposite 
obligation. In the opposite reaction, obligation itself transports the intensity and emotional 
charge which often incited passionate negative outbursts when the mores and the bond of 
relationship were broken.
In respect to status, dignitas is a standing related to personality and honour that one 
wanted balanced in every circumstance and displayed on all comers of public transport. 
Ultimately, “only those with dignitas were fit to mle, for they also had auctoritas 
[authority].”188 Dignitas engendered obligations not to be refused.
184 Cicero, On Behalf o f Caelio 21.
185 Cicero, On Behalf o f Caelio 21.
186 A. T. Croom, Roman Clothing and Fashion (Stroud, Glouchestershire: Tempus, 2000), 32.
187 Cicero, On Behalf o f Sulla, 46.
188 Zvi Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps (Oxford: Transaction, 1988), 19.
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viii. Gratia or gratitude
Eighth, was the mos of gratia, that is, gratitude. Sailer differentiates between gratia and the 
corresponding words of honestas, beneficium and officium, by stating that gratia differs 
because “it represents an attitude rather than an action, and basically means ‘goodwill.’”189 
The idea is that beneficium or officium created a sense of debt whereby it referenced a subject 
to be “pleasing” to the benefactor.190 This was not uncommon in the legal obligation of daily 
life, as such “a benefit may have been transferred as remuneration for certain services 
rendered by the other party or as a reward for an act of rescue, or the donor may have wished 
to induce the donor to act in a certain way or to produce a certain result.” 191 One very certain
1QOresult would be to invoke gratitude.
Gratia also speaks of “‘influence’ of the man who is dispensing favours and to whom 
it is owed.”193 Gratia fits into the mores of kinship with regard to family relationships and 
with regard to the circle of friendships.194 It was also a part of the conduct between clients 
and patrons and governors and provinces, with “one of the expressions of gratia was a 
dedication inscribed on stone.”195
Cicero attacked Mark Antony in Philippics, defending himself in one of his orations 
of the seriousness of friendship breached and declaring that he had not breached a friendship 
which they shared when Antony was a youth. The obligations of friendship caused Cicero to 
view his feud with Antony: “For what word is there in that letter that is not full of civility, of 
friendliness, of kindness ?”196 Cicero continues by saying that he did not want to appear
189 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 21.
190 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 21.
191 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 478.
192 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 190-194. He discusses obligation, officia, beneficia, and “obligatory 
gratitude” or thanksgiving as a function of reciprocal obligations (p. 193).
193 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 21.
194 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 24.
195 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 165.
196 Cicero, Philippics 2.9.
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opposing the favour [gratia] won in the bonds of friendship.197 In a few lines Cicero connects 
the obligations of friendship, benefits, and gratitude as necessary for relationship and as a 
means of defence. Konstan writes, “Hence it was Antony who breached the amicitia, and 
what is more did so by trading in beneficia and gratia-the coin of personal relations-of a dirty 
and proper sort.”198 The passion with which Cicero writes indicates the powerful convention 
supplied by gratia. There seemed to be no way to divorce gratia from either beneficia or 
amicitia in Roman social relations. Gratia became an irrevocable ethic in the cohesive social 
aim of Roman obligation.
Finally, a host of other mores might be listed, each as a means to ensure that Pax 
Romana might continue to endure in the world of the first century. Some are: dementia 
(pardon), iustitia (justice), and libertas (liberty).199 These mores were also a key to 
maintaining obligations’ core focus of “reciprocity and social cohesion”200 throughout 
Roman society.
Cicero goes to great lengths to emphasize the duties of obligation.201 Perhaps he 
summarizes best the essential mores of obligations as rules for conduct in Roman society 
when he says, “From all this we conclude that the duties [officia] prescribed by justice 
[iustitia] must be given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge and the duties imposed by 
it; the former concern the welfare of our fellow men; and nothing ought to be more sacred in 
men’s eyes than that.”202 For Cicero intelligence was not the key to success, much less 
survival in Roman society, but rather the completion of obligations and duties woven into the 
fabricated mores and bonds of reciprocal relationships.
197 Cicero, Philippics 2.9.
198 David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 127.
199 Henry C. Boren, Roman Society: A Social, Economic, and Cultural History (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 
1977), 150.
200 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 69.
201 Cicero, On Duties 1.53-7.
202 Cicero, On Duties 1.155.
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4. Conclusions
In this chapter the mores of Roman society have been shown. Roman virtue was a key aspect 
of Rome’s obligation society. Virtue demanded that a person fulfil obligations and duties to 
maintain honour, loyalty, dignity and other mores as pivotal to relationships. The 
quintessential “good man” and the virtuous ideal of the good man are connected to the 
Roman ideology of obligation. The mores serve as an invisible, yet clearly understood set of 
principles in the Roman way of life. They were practised daily, openly, and in relationship 
connecting people like a complex spider web. Apart from the mores of Rome’s obligation 
society Roman society would not have functioned as smoothly.
Critical to the mores in Roman social relations was the concept of Roman honour. 
Equally important to Roman social relations were the concepts of giving and receiving, 
beneficium and officium, and the dignity, trust, and sacredness of obligations associated with 
reciprocal exchange in relationships. This finds meaning in the mores of obligation, apart 
from which Rome’s obligation society would not have achieved Pax Romana nor an ordered 
society which functioned with a high degree of complexity, but also fluidity. Order in the 
structure of Roman society made the complexity somewhat sensible and gave rise to fluid 
relationships in the understood hierarchy of Roman culture of politics, household (domus), 
and society {societas). The structure of Rome’s obligation society, its hierarchical pattern, 
reciprocal relations and influence in the first century, will be discussed in the next chapter.
Finally, understanding the mores as an aspect of obligation in relation to 
Paul’s solution for resolving conflict between the strong and the weak is important. The 
mores of duty, benefits, honour, and gratitude will be discussed in chapter 8.
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Chapter 3: The Hierarchical Pattern of Rome’s Obligation Society
Introduction
It has been shown how the mores of Roman society influenced action and conduct. 
Roman law and the mores of society combined to spur obligations. The Roman law of 
obligations and the mores functioned in society under a pattern of social hierarchy in 
clearly defined relationships.
This chapter formulates an understanding of obligation for social relationships in 
the first century. Fundamental to Paul’s use of obligation as his readers understood it was 
the web of social patterns forming relationships. Each citizen and non-citizen in Roman 
society fits into a particular group that followed an already established social pattern. 
Lendon states, “Roman government was at its most effective when official hierarchies 
recapitulated the social hierarchy, when lawful authority, the ability to coerce, and the 
preponderance of honour lay in the same hands; when this was not the case Roman 
government worked less well.”1 Roman law accentuated social distinction “in the spirit in 
which the law” was administered.2
Government and law, however, merely skim the surface of the Roman empire, for 
common social practice identified rank and status in everyday Roman life. As previously 
noted, even clothing worn in public distinguished between the elite and the non-elite. A 
key to understanding these distinctions and social arrangements relates to the princeps 
and Augustus’ alignment of social priority. The Roman senate officially recognized 
Augustus as pater patriae in 2 BC, an “extraordinary position”3 foundational to society. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the social hierarchy of Rome’s obligation 
society.
1 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 222; Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 45-63. He discusses such key 
elements of hierarchy as status, hierarchy in a stratified society, social ideology and social theory.
2 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 3.
3 Wilffied Nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 87.
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In order to demonstrate the hierarchical pattern of society structured on 
obligations this chapter will discuss: (1) A rationale for hierarchy in light of Roman 
obligation; (2) the role ofprinceps in the social pattern and social order; (3) Roman status 
and order (ordo) as a marker of social distinction between citizens and non-citizens in 
society and the hierarchical pattern in Roman society as the basic foundational tool of 
social convention; (4) the obligations required in reciprocal relations engendered from 
status and ordo with reference to the priority of reciprocity from the weak to the strong; 
(5) the role of paterfamilias as vital to the legal and practical role of the hierarchy; and (6) 
the first-century social hierarchy at work with an insight into anti-Semitism.
1. A Rationale in Light o f Roman Obligation 
Paul’s use of 6(j)£iAop£v in Romans 15:1 suggests an obligation that “denotes sometimes 
the right, sometimes the duty, but more properly it denotes the whole relationship.”4 The 
rights, duties and relationships that produced obligations in Roman society were filtered 
through an oligarchical society made a clear distinction between social classes.5 Crook 
says of the distinction, “It perpetuated enormous differences in wealth and social power, 
and the upper class which determined its legal rules enshrined them in a code of values 
relevant to itself which cannot automatically be assumed to have been equally relevant to 
the lives and habits of the mass of people.”6 The legal rules became a source of obligation 
on which Roman daily life functioned.7 Parkin and Pomeroy add, “”An essential feature 
of the Roman world is the importance of hierarchies.. .it was essential to fit in to a social 
group in order to gain assistance from one’s peers and to facilitate patronage connections 
with those more powerful.”8 Roman society “took for granted the idea that different
4 Nicholas, Introduction to Roman Law, 158.
5 Crook, Law and Life, 10.
6 Crook, Law and Life, 10.
7 Parkin and Pomeroy, Roman Social History, 3; Mousourakis, A Legal History, 124.
8 Parkin and Pomeroy, Roman Social History, 3.
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people had different value.”9 The Roman legal system itself “recognised or created a 
variety of inequalities.”10 Still, the distinctions accentuated personal differences and the 
inequalities reinforced the social hierarchies. “All of these distinctions produced a 
different set of rights.”11 The distinctions and hierarchies generated obligations of all 
kinds.12
Paul’s discussion concerning Romans 14:1-15:13 presupposes both class 
distinction and hierarchy at work in the Christian community at Rome. From this 
presupposition it is suggested that an investigation of the hierarchical pattern of Rome’s 
obligation is necessary.
2. The Essential Element in Obligation: Princeps
Historically, the primary induction of hierarchy into Roman society belongs to the Greek
value of praise and honour found in the days of Homer, according to Andrew Clarke.13
The quest for praise and honour created an oral tradition which influenced societal mores
in ancient Greece. However, the primary visual definition of hierarchy and the
solidification of hierarchy as status in Roman society came through the role of Augustus.
Alfoldy highlights this key perception:
The consolidation of the imperial monarchy from Augustus onwards completed 
the social system in a clear manner. In the person of the emperor and imperial 
house the social hierarchy gained a new summit, supervening the old apex of the 
social pyramid-the small circle of oligarchic families at each other’s throats. From 
Augustus onwards there were no longer several principes civitatis with their 
factiones, as in the Republic, but only one princeps of the Senate and of the 
people, and of the whole genus humanum. His leading position was founded upon 
the factors which had secured social pre-eminence from time immemorial - power, 
prestige, and wealth.14
9 Riggsby, Roman Law, 77.
10 Riggsby, Roman Law, 77.
11 Riggsby, Roman Law, 77.
12 Crook, Law and Life, 36-67.
13 Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership, 23.
14 Geza Alfoldy, The Social History o f Rome (trans. David Braund and Frank Pollock; rev. ed.; Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 99.
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From the days of Homer to Augustus, hierarchical stratification in Roman society 
produced a series of agreed mores.
Rostovtzeff in The Social and Economic History o f the Roman Empire 
acknowledges the “divergence of opinion among scholars about the character and 
significance of the activity of Augustus.”15 Whether Augustus was a revolutionary or a 
reformer remains open to debate, but one concept that finds agreement among historians 
is that Augustus began “a new history in the ancient world.”16 He laid claim as Imperator 
Caesar divi filius Augustus, commander and chief of the Roman army. Princeps, which 
means “founder” and a term “closely aligned with superiority in honour in Republican 
usage,”17 hailed Augustus as the first citizen of Rome, establishing him as the foremost 
citizen with due praise and honour. Rome was a “society of blame and praise,” where 
praise was the goal in relationships and in the moral life, according to Dupont.18 Princeps 
was the noblest of relationships. The princeps’ position of due praise and honour 
followed his possession of highest dignitas, while he invoked the privileges of such
Roman virtues as virtus, iustitia, and pietas.19 Woolf adds to these virtues philanthropia
0(\andpaideia, then describing these two qualities with one word: humanitas. He says,
But it is clear that by the late first century BC humanitas had been formulated as a 
thoroughly Roman concept, embodying concepts of culture and conduct that were 
regarded by Romans as hallmarks of the aristocracy in particular, yet also 
appropriate for mankind in general. Humanitas thus distinguished an elite as 
cultivated, enlightened, humane and so fitted to rule and lead by example, but it 
also encapsulated a set of ideals to which all men might aspire.21
15 M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History o f the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 
38.
16 Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History, 38.
17 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 129 n. 111.
18 Dupont, Daily Life in Ancient Rome, 11.
19 Alfbldy, Social History, 100.
20 Greg Woolf, Becoming Roman: The Origins o f Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 55.
21 Woolf, Becoming Roman, 55.
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Augustus became the embodiment of princeps, a set of ideals personifying humanitas and 
an image to imitate.22 His titles and roles supplied him with ample authority to become 
guarantor of dignitas as well as the “guardian of good moras,.”23Notwithstanding, as the 
guardian of such customs, this gave the princeps the right to admit certain persons into 
both the senatorial and equestrian orders and to expel others from their orders.24
Princeps became the guardian of Augustus’ role as “first citizen,” while the Res 
Gestae served as the printed advertisement of these victorious triumphs in this leading 
role.25 Bosworth outlines a theory that Augustus’s triumphs, described in his Res Gestae, 
originated from the “Hellenistic ruler cult,” namely, Demetrius Poliorcetes’ naval triumph 
at Cypriot Salamis; and that Augustus was aware of the “divine honours which the 
Athenians conferred upon Demetrius before his victory.”26
The Res Gestae became a means of propaganda to transport signals of Augustus’s 
own claim to honour and an affirmation of his “own godlike status.”27 The Res Gestae 
promotes “self-advertisement,” while communicating tones and undertones for the 
Roman reader, aiming to educate so the reader would grasp the allusion and make a 
connection between Augustus’ conquests, benefactions and his divine status.”28 
Networked beneath the words of Res Gestae is the powerful demand to honour Augustus 
as princeps. Augustus, in the Res Gestae, in the context of transferring power to the 
senate and to the Roman people, amid laurels on his doorposts, a civic crown given and a 
golden shield of recognition of his virtue, clemency, justice and piety, says, “After that 
time I took precedence of all in rank, but of power I possessed no more than those who
22 Augustus, Res Gestae 2.8. Two key words follow in succession: exempla and imitanda. Paul’s use of 
examples to encourage conduct or imitation is found in Rom 15.
23 Augustus, Res Gestae 1.6-7.
24 Augustus, Res Gestae 2.8.
25 Augustus, Res Gestae 1.1-7.
26 Brian Bosworth, “Augustus, the Res Gestae and the Hellenistic Theories of Apotheosis,” JRS vol. 89 
(1999):1.
27 Bosworth, “Augustus, the Res Gestae and the Hellenistic Theories of Apotheosis,” 1.
28 Bosworth, “Augustus, the Res Gestae and the Hellenistic Theories of Apotheosis,” 1.
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were my colleagues in any magistracy.”29 Although not ostentatious or obvious to the 
casual person living in the Roman empire, Augustus quietly demanded honour from those 
beneath him, allowing that his conquests had provided benefaction without which the 
empire might not have experienced wealth and tremendous growth.
The Res Gestae from the outset signalled obligation by its discreet use of words. 
Augustus speaks of his triumphs as the “Deified Augustus” who restored liberty to the 
Republic. He says, “The number of citizens who bound themselves to me by military oath 
was about 500,000.”31 Shipley translates Augustus’ use of the Latin word sacramentum as 
“bound.”32 The word sacramentum can be translated as an oath, but the Oxford Latin 
Dictionary mentions it as both “an oath sworn by both parties...” and “a solemn 
engagement or obligation.”33 The oath engaged two parties in a formal relationship of 
obligation.
Augustus’ role as pater patriae was clearly acknowledged by the Romans, that is, 
citizens responded to princeps on the basis of his office, clothing and regalia, as well as 
seating positions on public occasions. In the theatre and the circus public voices 
acclaimed Augustus as pater patriae?4. Public attestation to Augustus’ status and 
hierarchy remained critical for persons in Rome.
The Res Gestae records several titles granted to Augustus including pontifex 
maximus and augur.35 Suetonius mentioned that Augustus wished to show himself a 
prince who desired public welfare, attributing the words saluber magis to Augustus, i.e,
29 Augustus, Res Gestae 6.34.
30 Tony Honore, Emperors and Lawyers (London: Duckworth, 1981), 1-24. He argues for the emperor as 
lawyer, “From Augustus onwards, Roman emperors could expect to spend a great deal of time on legal 
business. If they did not, they offended public, especially upper class...” (p. 1).
31 Augustus, Res Gestae 1.3.
32 Augustus, Res Gestae 1.3.
33 “Sacramentum,” Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 1674-75.
34 Suetonius, Deified Augustus, 58; Nippel, Public Order, 87.
35 Augustus, Res Gestae 1.6-8.
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“the great one promoting healthy conditions.”36 Although not a title, it does authenticate 
the desires of Augustus. “These details [titles, etc.] leave no doubt that from a certain 
moment onward Augustus intended to present himself not only for all the Roman ordines 
alike, but also as that ideal vir gravis et sanctus, who had put an end to the feud between 
social classes and political factions and to the hostile relations between Rome and 
external nations.”37 Augustus longed to be viewed as one who “raised the Roman people 
to greatness.”38 Accomplishing this task meant that image was important because it also 
placed the emperor in the role of a peacemaker.
Gamsey and Sailer further explain, “Princeps recalls the princeps civitatis of 
Cicero’s Republic, who dominates a state by virtue of moral authority rather than physical 
force or even constitutional office; while Augustus suggests an imperial persona which is 
the embodiment of auctoritas.”39 As Augustus arranged for the new era in Rome, he “set 
out to secure for himself a monopoly of military power and glory, establish a legal basis 
for his control of legions and direction of foreign policy, and build an army that could 
undertake a programme of continuous warfare.”40 Along with these emphases, “the 
primary goals of the imperial administration were the maintenance of law and order and 
the collection of taxes to meet military costs and to provide public buildings, 
entertainments, and handouts in the city of Rome.”41 Judge completes this idea of 
authority by acknowledging that Augustus’ plan called for more than mere order, but also 
an emphasis on the household community’s grand theme of “the priority of personal
36 Suetonius, Deified Augustus 42.1.
37 Zvi Yavetz, “Augustus’ Public Image,” in Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects (ed. Fergus Millar and Erich 
Segal; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 15.
38 Yavetz, “Augustus’ Public Image,” in Caesar Augustus, 13
39 Gamsey and Sailer, The Early Principate, 3.
40 Gamsey and Sailer, The Early Principate, 8.
41 Gamsey and Sailer, The Early Principate, 15.
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obligation over public duty.”42 Obligations oiled the machinery of Augustan Rome with 
its ideals and hierarchical pattern.
In addition, princeps supplied the Romans with staple goods and food, or more 
specifically, Augustus served as the grand provider or benefactor. He assumed the title 
cura annonae, which required the emperor to supply com annually to the registered 
poor.43 “Those registered for the com distribution were also entitled to receive occasional 
gifts of money; with such actions Augustus wished to “symbolize his role as the great 
patron of the plebs frumentaria ,” that is, the provider for the poor.44 His provision went 
beyond staple goods. Suetonius says, “He surpassed all his predecessors in the frequency, 
the variety, and the magnificence of his public shows.”45 Augustus in the Res Gestae 
acknowledges his provision, “The expenditures provided for theatrical shows, gladiatorial 
sports, for exhibition of athletes, for hunts of wild beast, and the naval combat, and his 
gifts (donata/dwpea) [to colonies in Italy, to the cities in the provinces] which had been 
destroyed by earthquake or conflagration, or to individual friends {amici) and senators, 
whose property he raised to the required rating, are too numerous to be reckoned.”46 This 
sentence opens windows of meaning to some essential elements to the whole gamut of 
Roman obligation in social bonds: property (rights); political structure (e.g., “senators”); a 
two-tiered strata; relationships with respect to friends; and gifts or benefits {beneficia). 
Augustus’ acted as the chief benefactor, bestowing food and entertainment to the masses. 
In fact, “”no mler ignored his duty to concern himself about the economic position, the 
livelihood, and the amusement of the urban masses, in doing which he was merely
42 Judge, The Social Pattern, 2.
43 Nipple, Public Order, 85.
44 Nipple, Public Order, 85.
45 Suetonius, Deified Augustus 42.1.
46 Augustus, Res Gestae 4.
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fulfilling his obligation and for which he was awarded no prize.”47 Honour was the prize, 
because, “The ultimate fountainhead of all that was good was honour.”48
One aim of Augustus to achieve Pax Romana was to create an atmosphere of law, 
order, and privilege on the social ladder whereby citizens and non-citizens of Rome 
understood their respective roles in society as well as the Imperator’s. As the chief 
protector of security and the chief provider of basic needs an unspoken, silent mores 
evolved in social circles. This silent link was the legal concept of obligation, first and 
foremost an obligation to the Princeps with all the rights, the privileges, and the 
obligations which that entailed. Augustus had providential obligations to the Roman 
people, too. However, each person on the hierarchical scale stood in a “weak” position 
when compared to the “strong” Augustus, obligation serving as the key link because the 
weak were always obligated to the strong in Rome.
3. Status and Hierarchical Patterns 
The role of Princeps placed value on mores akin to maintaining social order. Flowing out 
of this social order were two key elements of Roman society instrumental to social 
cohesion: status and order (ordo).49
As Augustus’ plan for a cohesive society unfolded, he inaugurated status as the 
supremacy of power and strength. Gamsey and Sailer clarify this supremacy, “Augustus’ 
policy went beyond simple social conservatism; the pattern of social inequality and 
differentiation continued from the Republic, but innovations now gave distinctions of
47 Zvi Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps, 105.
48 Dupont, Daily Life in Ancient Rome, 9.
49 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 45-63. He discusses the importance of social hierarchy, status and 
the social differentiation between persons in Roman society based upon status. He highlights terms and 
language designated for the strong and the weak as well as the social hierarchy in society and the two social 
“layers” in the Roman church (p. 59). Reasoner also briefly discusses order and class in relation to portraits 
of the strong and the weak (p. 203-04).
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rank a sharper definition,” identified as “social hierarchy.”50 The law and life of Rome 
intermingled, consequently citizens and non-citizens possessed rights and duties 
(obligations).51 Crook says, ‘“Roman citizen’, therefore, is not just a vague term meaning 
an inhabitant of the Roman empire, but a precise expression of one particular set of rights 
and duties.”52
The hierarchical value and status of individuals related to certain rights and 
privileges, producing a visual orientation of hierarchy in public display. Suetonius 
explains, “...whenever public show was given anywhere, the first row should be reserved 
for senators...he separated the soldiery from the people...He himself usually watched the 
games in the circus from the upper rooms of his friends and freedmen, but sometimes 
from the imperial box.”53 Augustus, as well as the spectators and other participants in 
such public events, could scan the audience and see both hierarchical distinction and 
status displayed in the arrangement of seating.
Flowing from top to bottom, from princeps next in line on the social scale would 
be senators to equestrians to decurions and to plebs. This overly simplifies a system 
which is remarkably complicated because the stratification of Roman society created a 
mass of entangled relationships demanding an intricate but understood series of obligated 
responses. Gamsey and Sailer resist focusing upon “class analysis” when discussing the 
Roman social system, instead deferring to the processes of the social system: law, 
property rights, and relationships interlinking the hierarchical stmcture.54 Alfoldy more 
clearly states, “The concept of class (in the strict German sense of ‘Klasse’) would hardly
50 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107.
51 Crook, Law and Life, 37.
52 Crook, Law and Life, 37.
53 Suetonius, Deified Augustus 44-45.
54 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 109.
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be appropriate for definition of this social system.”55 Treggiari says that “being Roman 
was not a matter of ethnicity but of legal definition.”56 Roman law proves foundational to 
both the strata and the conduct. Strata defined hierarchy which determined obligations 
correlative to legal rights and duties in the social scale.
Rome as an obligation society organized itself on the basis of a hierarchical strata 
of “strong” and “weak” demarcations, or, on the social scale, where the weaker possessed 
duties of obligation and response to the stronger contingent upon the circumstances. The 
strong possessed duties of obligation to the weak, too, but the strong maintained the 
greater prestige and privilege. This might be called an organized inequality, a society, 
according to Cicero, “that puts forth very effort to oblige all sorts of conditions of men.”57
Gamsey and Sailer say, “The system of acquisition and transmission of property 
was the basis of the Roman framework of social and economic inequality.”58 Sailer 
allows that the power of property, its privilege related to status, and the possibility 
property ownership increasing the chance of social mobility upward on the social scale 
was so dominant in the Roman psyche that strategies for property succession resulted.59 
Entry into the propertied strata became difficult to monitor so the emperors instituted 
laws concerning properties.60 These laws determined duties and obligations.61 Gamsey 
and Sailer comment, “Inequalities, deriving from uneven property distribution that was 
confirmed or even accentuated by imperial policies, were underpinned by Roman law.”62
55 Alfoldy, Social History, 149.
56 Susan Treggiari, Roman Social History (London: Routledge, 2002), 7.
57 Cicero, On Duties 2.71.
58 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 110.
59 Sailer, Partiarchy, Property and Death, 161-80.
60 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 110.
61 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 110.
62 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 110.
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Property rights and their ensuing obligations validated the understood social strata, thus 
“like other aspects of Romanization, worked in favour of the Roman-backed elite.’63
Alfoldy discusses the “Orders-Strata Structure and Its Effects” and divides the 
hierarchical pattern of Roman society into “two unmistakable groups: the upper strata and 
the lower strata.”64 In the upper strata, in descending order, comes the emperor 
(imperator), then the ordinary senators (ordo senatorius) then the equestrians (ordo 
equester) then the decurions (ordines decurionum).65 Typically, these members of the 
upper strata served as the “strong” of society. The lower strata consisted of plebs, 
primarily the struggling, the poor, and the “weak” members of society, many of whom 
were indebted and obligated to the “strong.” The strong and the weak as social 
distinctions on a hierarchical scale advanced in ascending and descending modes of 
honour, praise, dignity, and other indigenous Roman mores, each playing a role in social 
practice and conflict resolution.
Borkowski mentions “the struggle of the orders,” a clash between the upper 
(patricians) and lower (plebeians) strata which created friction as the constitution and the 
policies developed in the early history of the Republic.66 This struggle helped formulate 
the Twelve Tables, making both a “clear statement of law” and correcting the notion that 
earlier plebeian resolutions (plebiscite), which proved non-binding to all Roman citizens
fnin the past, especially with reference to debts, would be binding in the future. 
Consequently, and instrumental to the thought of obligation binding all strata, “the 
plebeians obtained the important concession that plebiscita should bind all Roman
63 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 110-11.
64 Alfoldy, Social History, 146.
65 Alfoldy, Social History, 146.
66 Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law, 4.
67 Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law, 4-5.
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citizens, and not just plebeians although patrician ratification was necessary.”68 Two 
principles emerge from Borkowski’s discussion: a bond united the Romans and “the 
strong” patricians maintained the upper hand in societal structure using it like a noose 
around the neck to coerce submission in obligations.69
Aligning the strata structures and ranking hierarchical patterns does not solve the 
complexity of relationships bound to such positions. It is important to ascertain that what 
appears very complex to the reader about Roman society was clear to the persons living 
in that society: obligations ensued because of the strata. Relationships required both 
vertical and horizontal legal obligations and cultural mores between the upper and lower 
strata. Imagine a spider web with Rome at the centre and an unending, expanding, 
complex network of silk strands connecting both horizontally and vertically, including a 
hierarchy within a hierarchy, for example, in a Roman household where there was a 
“sharp hierarchy.”70 Romans comprehended this web because of legal definitions with its 
status and privileges. Gamsey says, “The point to stress here is that they [privileged 
groups] were publicly recognized or recognizable criteria on the basis of which those 
privileges could be identified.”71
The privilege distinctions among groups were viewed by Romans as orders 
{ordines), “divided,”72 and beneath the princeps stood the superior senators, equestrians, 
and decurions “with a large and amorphous mass of plebs at the bottom of the 
hierarchy.”73 “Amorphous” serves as an important word because, while in the words of 
Cicero, a “descending” social scale was distinct, the conduct of those living in Roman
68 Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law, 4-5.
69 Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law, 4-5.
70 Peter Oakes, Reading Romans in Pompeii: Paul’s Letter at Ground Level (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009), 
42.
71 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 235.
72 J. A. Crook, Legal Advocacy in the Roman World (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
85.
73 Treggiari, Roman Social History, 46.
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society constantly changed based upon situations and personal relationships in a variety 
of contexts.74 The ordines helped construct ordo in ancient Roman society.
Senators found privilege in respect to Roman law.75 Small in number, this was an 
“exclusive ordo,”76 one of prestige, which, although not primarily a reward for hereditary 
aristocracy, Augustus did later promote a “hereditary principle” encouraging their sons to 
follow their fathers up to three generations.77 Visual distinction was given to senators as 
they openly wore “the broad purple stripe” on their togas, along with sons who often 
began their political careers in military assignments.78
Equestrians formed the second group on the descending scale. They outnumbered 
senators by the thousands and the majority were marked publicly by “a golden ring and 
a narrow purple stripe on the toga (angustus clavus)”19 Equestrians were generally the 
wealthiest citizens in their respective cities across the Roman empire, while, like
O A
senators, they maintained special legal privileges obliged to the office. Powerful 
definition of “the strong” was advertised to the masses as equites rode horses through 
Rome and its surrounding cities. Valerius Maximus describes this public display, “The 
younger members of the equestrian order filled Rome twice annually with a showing
0 1
(spectaculum) of themselves, for which they had high authority.” The equestrian order 
possessed an “aristocratic ethos” with membership criteria of “high birth, excellence and 
wealth.”82 Like senators, equestrians differentiated between themselves internally, “the
74 Cicero, On Duties 1.60.
75 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 112-13. See also Cicero, On Duties 1.60 where he implied each 
individual has particular duties as those who must calculate their duty based on their place in society.
76 Alfoldy, The Social History, 115.
77 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 113.
78 Suetonius, Deified Augustus, 38; Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 113.
79 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 113-114.
80 Gamsey, Social Status, 240-242.
81 Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings 2.2.9.
82 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 113.
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rank conscious Romans would not allow the vast social gap between the greatest and 
humblest equestrian to go unmarked.”83
Decurions marked the third order. Gamsey and Sailer also refer to this order as an 
aristocratic one, with entrance also requiring the possession of “respectable birth, wealth 
and moral worth.”84 Nippel refers to this order as an auxiliary, a magisterial staff of 
“well-paid public servants (apparitores) organized in corporations (decuriae) of scribes, 
lictors, criers and summoners.”85 Petit says, “Their strength comes from their wealth and 
their feeling of solidarity, which we must not contuse with ‘class consciousness’: they 
had yet no feeling of being victimized, but were proud to be the ornaments and 
benefactors [of Rome]...”86 Decurions also incorporated an internal stratification
87system.
The upper strata comprised of the emperor, senators, equestrians, and decurions, 
while the plebs formed the lower strata. The plebs population was widely diverse “even 
more heterogeneous than that of the upper strata.”88 Yavetz sketches a mosaic of 
manumitted slaves, freedmen, Latins, Italians, Greeks, Asians (especially Syrians), 
Egyptians, Illyrians, and Gauls.89 The diversity accentuates the complexity of mixed 
ethnicity, customs, and the challenge of social control. It also communicated the need for 
an understood plan for conserving social relationships and conflict resolution.
The plebs worked mostly in rural areas in agriculture, although a minority worked 
in the urban areas as craftsmen and traders.90Often the upper strata entered into legally
83 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 114.
84 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire,114.
85 Nippel, Public Order, 12.
86 Paul Petit, Pax Romana (trans. James Willis; London: B.T Batsford, 1976), 95.
87 Alfoldy, Social History, 129.
88 Alfoldy, Social History, 133.
89 Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps, 8.
90 Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps, 99.
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binding relationships with the plebs 91 Gamsey and Sailer say, “A plethora of informal 
relationships between individual neighbours and work associates have largely gone 
unrecorded.”92 The sophistication of the web of relationships and emanating obligations 
appear innumerable. Tacitus speaks of the condition of Rome, mentioning elements of 
strength and weakness, then proceeding to discuss the response of senators and 
equestrians to the death of Nero.93 In his discourse, he specifies “the common people and 
those attached to the great houses [of the upper strata].”94 He continues, “The lowest 
classes (plebs sordida), addicted to the circus and theatre, and with them the basest 
slaves, as well as those men who had wasted their property, and to their shame, were 
wont to depend on Nero’s bounty, were cast down and grasped at every rumour.”95
Three elements of Roman society stand out in Tacitus’ words: a division between 
the strong and the weak; a system of relationships requiring obligations; and a 
condescending tone toward the plebs. This might also explain why Tacitus sometimes 
referred to the plebeian crowd or masses as vulgar (vulgus).96 Their dependence did not 
mean they played an insignificant role in society. Lendon refers to the urban plebs as “not 
just a beast to be placated, but an important prop to imperial rule.”97 Lendon adds, “It was 
commonplace to rank it, alongside the army and aristocracy as an essential imperial 
constituent.”98 Alfoldy says, “Nor should the low social status of the plebs of the city be 
misjudged, although the plebs occasionally appeared a political power factor as late as the 
beginning of the Empire.”99
91 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 156.
92 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 156.
93 Tacitus, Histories 1.4.
94 Tacitus, Histories 1.4.
95 Tacitus, Histories 1.4.
96 Tacitus, Histories 2.90; Tacitus, Annals 15.44.
97 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 120.
98 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 120; Dio Chrysostom, Discourses 1.28-30.
99 Alfoldy, Social History, 106.
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Visual aspects in Rome communicated the low standing of the plebs. They lived
in Rome in the slums, often in insula, “large apartment buildings with no water or
sanitary facilities, always in danger of fire and occasionally of collapse.”100 The urban
plebs could be described because of writings from Cicero who lived in Rome, but “the
conditions of rural society are much less well known.”101
Two important components to the plebs role in Roman society are slavery and the
collegia. Boren talks about slavery saying,
The most important impulse for continuing change in the cities population related 
to one institution-slavery-and to a liberal policy of the Romans connected with it: 
slaves were often freed, and freed slaves were made Roman citizens. The first 
generation of freedmen retained legal obligations to their former masters and 
could not stand for office; in the next generation they had full privileges of 
citizenship. They were viewed as social inferiors by citizens of freebom 
ancestry. 02
Slavery reinforced social distinction as they generally represented the lower strata 
“bottom heap” of the weak in society.103
The collegia or associations form a most interesting picture of obligation with 
their stratification. The collegia were “made up of a few score or few hundred urban 
residents” and “were essentially mutual aid societies formed to meet basic needs of their 
members.”104 These involved licensed bakers, guilds of miners, shippers, merchants, 
craftsmen and the most common association, the burial associations organized around cult 
deities which provided for proper burial of its members upon death.105 Crook says that 
they were subject to “much controversy in the right of free association in Rome,” while 
explaining that membership often involved fees, obligations to each other, and social
100 Henry C. Boren, Roman Society: A Social, Economic, and Cultural History (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath 
and Co., 1977), 128.
101 Boren, Roman Society, 132.
102 Boren, Roman Society, 127.
103 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 117.
104 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 156.
105 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 156-57.
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gatherings.106 Gamsey and Sailer add, “Though these collegia were associations of 
humble men, they still exhibit some of the hierarchical features so characteristic of 
Roman society.”107 Clearly, the tangled web of relationships developed into a more 
complex tangled web. The collegia, in their weak social status, succumbed to those of 
higher status, namely, the strong.108
There are other ways to describe the hierarchical differences: the inferior and the 
superior, or the humiliores and the honestiores. Every person in Rome knew his or her 
place in society, the strong “paraded” their superiority and the weak “humble masses” on 
the bottom of the social scale daily found their inferiority reinforced.109
4. Reciprocal Relations and Patronage 
The Roman law of obligations, the mores of those laws, and the social practice of 
hierarchical status which lead to inequality, all worked in concert to produce reciprocal 
relationships in social management. Relationships by their very nature in Roman society 
“set up a chain of obligations.”110 When first-century Christians became a part of a local 
church body, this did not preclude their external obligations in the wider Roman 
society.111 In reality, the relationships of hierarchy, status, and the obligations inbred from 
those could potentially create conflict within the church.112 Plato (429-347 BC) in 
Gorgias saw the relationships clearly marked as between the inferior weak and the 
superior strong with the advantage going to the strong.113 The Greek historian Dionysius
106 Crook, Law and Life, 266-67.
107 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 157.
108 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 51-2. He discusses collegia in regard to the weak, adding,
“.. .Roman law codified an earlier label in the Roman social world that designated certain groups of people
as weak” (p. 52). This is one of the rare mentions of Roman law in Reasoner’s monograph.
109 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 115-18.
110 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 46.
111 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 47.
112 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 47.
113 Plato, Gorgias 484B. He says “that the great states attack the little ones in accordance with natural right, 
because they are superior and stronger...,” adding, “Then the ordinances of the many are those of the 
superior” (488.C-D).
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of Halicarnassus (c. 60-7 BC) and Philo, the Jewish philosopher from Alexandria, Egypt 
(20 BC-AD 20), discussed these relationships under moral, social, civic, commercial, 
financial, familial, religious, and even those according to nature.114 Winter discussed 
these relationships in terms of obligation: honour, civic obligations in the politeia, 
benefactions, patronage, and patron-clients relationships.115 Gamsey and Sailer consider 
some of these obligations in terms “proper conduct” for both givers and receivers in an 
exchange of services.116 Obligations in their social structure were hierarchical depending 
on the time and place of social setting, including church.
Foundational to Roman society was the ideology of patronage.117 No principle 
influenced relationships and obligations among people in Rome more than patronage.
1 i o
Crook says that patronage is that by which the “wheels of Roman society were oiled.” 
Sailer appeals to the hierarchical structure of Roman society with its clearly defined 
categories of strength and weakness when he speaks of patronage, “...it must be 
asymmetrical, in the sense that the two parties are of unequal status and offer different 
kinds of goods and services in the exchange - a quality which set patronage off from 
friendship between equals.”119 The key to patronage is that a person of lesser status 
obligates him or herself to one of greater status. Consequently, there was no one in 
Roman society who was not obligated to another person in one way or another. Even the 
emperor maintained obligations as the chief protector and provider of Rome and its 
inhabitants. Sailer says, “Patrons supply protection and special access to certain goods 
and services to all citizens on the basis of universal, impersonal criteria, the clients’ needs
114 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 4.9.4.6; 4.9.6.2; Philo, Special Laws 1.54.3; 2.69.5; 
2.113.3; 3.26.5; 3.59.4; 4.56.4; Philo, On the Virtues 1-19; 125.1.
115 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 21, 184,25-195. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 4.9.4.6; 
4.9.6.2.
116 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 149.
117 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 181-86. He sees “obligation as the dynamic behind patronage” (p. 
181). One weakness of his discussion on patronage is the legal force and implications of patronage.
118 Crook, Law and Life, 93.
119 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 1.
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for the patrons declines.”120 Patronage influenced first-century Rome heavily, further
widening the gap between the strong and the weak of society.
Patronage may also be discussed under numerous other headings, or synonymous
terms, as the emperor used patronage throughout Rome. Sailer lists these as seniority,
equestrian career, and merit.121 He indicates the definite role of hierarchy in political roles 
1
and rank. Sailer also follows up with an important point not to dismiss concerning 
reciprocal relations with an advantage toward the strong, “The pace of advancement [in 
political careers] always varied greatly and was thus in the emperor’s discretion, just as 
with senatorial careers.”123 The hint of an understood code of ethics or obligations as a 
means of political advancement appears warranted. The emperor’s role as ideally the 
strongest of strong in Roman society designated him as superior under the concept of 
patronage.
Sailer communicates the attempt of leaders to climb the hierarchical ladder in 
Roman political life in his discussion on merit. His most important discussion on merit 
involves his explanation on the concomitant virtues that must infiltrate the leader’s life.124 
These virtues are vital links in the relationships of patronage (see Chapter 2): obligation, 
loyalty, gratitude, and justice.125 In fact, Sailer asserts that the “dispensation of justice in 
the provinces was thought to require good character more than legal expertise.”126 Still, 
Sailer questions whether one can have a complete understanding of the extent of merit’s 
role in political promotion.127 He concludes, “While the emperor no doubt considered 
merit, the Roman conception of merit was not such as to encourage impartial
120 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 3.
121 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 94.
122 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 94.
123 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 94.
124 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 94.
125 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 101-3
126 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 102.
127 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 110.
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evaluation.’128 One sees the critical virtues as an indigenous part of patronage, yet with 
inequality and subjectivity often accompanying it.
Three components were necessary for patronage: a patron (strong)-client (weak) 
relationship; an exchange of services (reciprocal relationships); a set of obligations 
relating to both the relationship and the exchange.129 Carcopino indicates the primary 
impact of obligatory relations by noting that “from the parasite do-nothing up to the great 
aristocrat there was no man in Rome who did not feel himself bound more powerful 
above him by the same obligations of respect, or, to use the technical term, the same 
obsequim...”130
Several relationships flowed from the ideology of patronage, each respectively, 
ascending from the weak obligating themselves to the strong: citizen to emperor; clients 
to patrons; wife to husband; children/heirs to father (paterfamilias); slaves to masters. 
Again, one sees the complexity of a tangled web of social relationships and the 
understood, yet unwritten obligations that formed a code of conduct on a descending scale 
for Romans in the first century. As will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 8, the apostle Paul 
did not treat this concept casually in Romans 14:1-15:13 and neither did the Romans in 
their eyes or conduct in their daily lives. The relationship of citizen to emperor has 
already been discussed.
It is interesting to note, however, that while all persons in Rome were obligated to 
the emperor, “there was a specific, defined group of amid and clientes who enjoyed the 
personal favour of the emperor and were personally bound to him.”131 They created 
competition, envy, greed, deceit, a quest for power, tense competition, and even caused 
some to commit terrible acts in an effort to achieve their personal ambitions regarding
128 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 110.
129 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 1.
130 Jerome Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome, 171.
131 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 73.
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political aspirations. In fact, “the operation of patronage rather than the application of
formal procedures and rules determined the promotion of administrators.”132 The emperor
also maintained his own household, wherein a “clearly defined hierarchy of posts can be
discerned.”133 In Caesar’s household both his staff and slaves positioned themselves for
promotion and freedom.134 One cannot imagine the constant competition and gaming that
went on in the realm of reciprocal relationships. Epictetus, the Stoic philosopher,
describes this competition as a “contest” (dywva) between the inferior and superior.135
Obligations invoked duty and fulfilling them also became a means of ascending the
hierarchical scale of power.
The patronus-cliens relationship, suggesting a reciprocal obligation from the
patron to the client and from the client to the patron in business, was not an exchange
among equals. Sailer points out that the terminology of patronus-cliens in classical
literature “was not freely used by authors with reference to any member of an exchange
relationship of inferior status,” because “social inferiority and degradation [are] implied
by the words.”136 By no means, however, does this imply that such social inferiority did
not exist. With reference, though, to cliens, “It was usually reserved for humble members
of the lower classes.”137 Dionysius of Halicarnassus undoubtedly differentiates the
superior (strong) from the inferior (weak) when he states,
After Romulus had distinguished those of superior rank from the inferiors, he 
established laws by which the duties of each were prescribed. The patricians were 
to be priests, magistrates and judges, and were to assist him in the management of 
public affairs, devoting themselves to the business of the city. The plebeians were 
excused from these duties, as being unacquainted with them and because of their
132 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 20.
133 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 25.
134 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 25.
135 Epictetus, Discourses 3.101-23. He speaks of moral purpose with the inferior being overcome by the 
superior, adding that “he never enters a contest where he can be beaten, but immediately gives up what is 
not his own.”
136 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 9
137 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 9.
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small means wanting leisure to attend them, but were to apply themselves to 
agriculture and the exercise of gainful trades. This was to prevent them from 
engaging in seditions, as happens in other cities when either the magistrates 
mistreat the lowly, or the common people and the needy envy those in authority. 
He placed the plebeians in the hands of the patricians by allowing every plebeian 
to choose for his patron any patrician whom he himself wished. ...Romulus 
recommended the relationship by handsome designation, calling this protection of 
the poor and lowly ‘patronage,’ but he also assigned friendly offices to both 
parties, thus making the connection between them a bond of kindness befitting 
fellow citizens.138
In essence, patronage “yoked together” the parties in a near blood relationship that went 
beyond generations. Patrons had duties to care for them, to protect them, and to advise 
them in a court of law.139 Clients had duties: to provide dowries for their daughters; to 
share costs of ransom, law suits, fines, and costs incurred in their magistracies and 
dignities, aiming in every act to promote good will among their patronage.140 Patronage 
produced an “invisible rope” of obligation from the client to the patron that was not easily 
undone. More importantly, it was a “laudable feature” of Rome’s development as a 
“central instrument of Roman socio-political control.”141
Visually, this relationship of patronage reproduced itself each day in Roman 
society beginning in the early morning when clients visited the homes of their patrons. 
Carcopino sets the stage for how the patronus-cliens relationship appeared on an average 
day in Rome:
The patronus for his part was in honour bound to welcome his client into his 
house, to invite him from time to time to his table, to come to his assistance, and 
to make him gifts. To clients who were in actual want the patron distributed food 
(sportulae); which they carried off in a basket or more often, to avoid the trouble 
this entailed, he gave them small presents of money when they called. ...A severe 
and meticulous code of etiquette regulated this obligatory attendance. First, 
although a client was free to come on foot rather than in litter, he could not
138 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 2.9.
139 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 2.10.
140 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 2.10.
141 Andrew Drummond, “Early Roman Clientes,” in Patronage in Ancient Society (edited by Andrew 
Wallace-Hadrill; London: Routledge, 1989), 110. Alfoldy, Social History, 101. Alfoldy states thatpatron- 
client relationships reflect “power, prestige, and wealth; that the masses were subject to the emperor in what 
“approximated to that of clientes to a powerful patronus.”
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decently appear without a toga; and this strict insistence on ceremonial dress could 
weigh so heavily on a budget that it would soon have eaten up his sportulae if it 
had not become fashion for the patron to take advantage of some solemn occasion 
to present him a new toga in addition to the five or six pounds of silverware which 
he reckoned on receiving each December, when the Satumalian gift came around. 
Secondly, clients were bound to wait their turn patiently, and this depended not on 
the order of their arrival but on their social status; the praetor before the tribune, 
the eques before the plain citizen, the ffeedman before the slave. Finally, the client 
had to take great care in addressing his patron not to call the great man simply by 
his name but to give him the title dominus-failure to observe this detail might 
cause him to return home empty-handed... Each morning, therefore, Rome awoke 
to the coming and going of clients discharging these customary politenesses.142
Oakes notes that many houses had tablinum or space, even stone benches, for clients to sit
while waiting for their patrons.143 MacMullen allows the importance of these
“connections” in Roman society noting that the relationship varied from time and place,
while also sensing a great distance between master and man, patron and dependent.144
Treggiari gives another feature of the relationship, “Not every citizen was a client or
patron, nor were clients limited to one patron, but networking involved the various elites
and the upwardly mobile.”145 Without question, the complex web of relationships made
for an animated, an intense, and a fearful day not without potential risks.
5. Paterfamilias
While the patron-client relationship shapes Roman society in its foundations, the 
relationship of child/heir to father in the domain of paterfamilias builds essential structure 
to society. Sailer says, “Over the centuries paterfamilias has served as a paradigm of 
patriarchal authority and social; patria potestas has been seen as the embodiment of 
arbitrary, even tyrannical power.”146 Dionysius of Halicarnassus spells out the power 
fathers have over children,
142 Carcopino, Daily Life in Rome, 172.
143 Oakes, Reading Romans, 16,22.
144 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 8,45.
145 Treggiari, Roman Social History, 47.
146 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 102.
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But the lawgiver of the Romans gave virtually full power ( e ^ o u c t i o c v  T T o n p i )  to the 
father over the son, even during his whole life, whether he thought proper to 
imprison him, to scourge him, to put him in chains and keep him at work in the 
fields, or to put him to death...147
Crook mentions that the paterfamilias with its patria potestas influenced the entire
household, family descent, property succession and family inheritance.148 Sailer suggests
a slow rush to judgment on the potential brutality of fathers, “If some historians see the
spirit of the despotic father remaining throughout antiquity, others discover a change as
the early asymmetry of paternal severity and filial duty (of provision and protection) gave
way to mutual affection and devotion in the late Republic or early empire.”149 Still,
paterfamilias as a trait of Roman society in the first century is a reminder of a male-
dominated culture where the strong dominated the weak, in this case the father
dominating the son. Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives new meaning to the colloquialism
“might makes right.” In Rome, no less, this appeared true.
What obligations did the child have to the father? The child was obligated to an
obedience and submission that arose from devotion, orpietas. Cicero discussed the ways
of a man winning a good name and becoming a “good man.” He lists as one of the ways
as pietas to parents, “The best recommendation, then, that a young man can have to
popular self esteem proceeds from self-restraint, filial affection, and devotion to kinsfolk”
(pietas in parentes).150 Sailer highlights the importance of understanding a child’s
obligations in two facets: (1) a duty more than mere affection; (2) a definite virtue
practiced in the presence of a “higher power.”151 Treggiari mentions that the daughter
also falls under the responsibility of her father with similar obligations expected of her
147 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 2.26.4.
148 Crook, Law and Life, 98-99.
149 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 104.
150 Cicero, On Duties 2.46. See also Cicero, On Duties 2.11 concerning the “good man” and devotion.
151 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 105.
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daughter.152 Sailer adds, “Pietas was not simply a virtue of social order applicable only to 
aristocratic males.”153 He further references Cicero’s works as those which “present 
family relationships as a central element of moral obligation and as a set of practical daily 
challenges in daily practice.”154 Virtue motivated obligation. Romans in the empire never 
escaped the bonds or ties of obligation in their display of virtue. The ties that bind require 
devotion that tirelessly obeys and submits, especially for children.
The household code engendered by Roman culture meant also that not only the 
children but the wife had obligations to her husband and children. Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus summarizes some of a woman’s duties: to behave with modesty and 
decorum; to share with her husband in all his possessions and sacred rites; to conform to 
her husband’s needs; and to be virtuous and obedient.155 A woman’s legal status 
depended upon the status of her husband. The complexities of legal understandings and 
laws regarding women are too numerous to list for the purposes of this thesis. However, it 
is vital to note that Mary Lefkowitz and Maureen Fant discuss a woman’s legal status in 
the Roman world under the subtitle “Marital Subordination” and discussing the role of 
women and children in the language of “bondage.”156
Another key element in comprehending a woman’s obligation and subjugation in 
Roman society was the institution of guardianship or tutela, a series of legal rights to hold 
property for its protection.157 Noteworthy here is that tutela was considered a sacred trust 
and that the “Romans placed tutela among the personal officia (duties; obligations),”
152 Treggiari, Roman Social History, 68-73. She discusses Cicero’s relationship, duty, and obligation to his 
daughter Tullia as well as Tullia’s pietas.
153 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 108.
154 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 225-26.
155 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 2.25-26.
156 Mary R. Lefkowitz and Maureen B. Fant, Women’s Life in Greece and Rome: A Source Book in 
Translation (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982), 112-19.
157 Crook, Law and Life, 113-14.
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while connecting it to bonds within the family.158 Crook says, “Women were never 
released [from guardianship] (for even if married except with manus-they were sui iuris) 
[‘in their own power’], and their husband was not their guardian.”159 Cicero alludes to a 
woman’s weakness in Roman society in regards to guardianship, “Our ancestors required 
all women owing to the instability (weakness; infirmitas) of their judgment to be under 
the control of guardians (tutorum potestas).”160 There was a way for a woman to be free, 
in a sense, but it was rare. The absolute, critical values of the paterfamilias and potestas 
cannot be forgotten in Roman society. Crook gives a simple summary, “...subjection of 
women’s legal acts to some male authority was virtually universal in antiquity.”161 An 
impression can be drawn that women were property more than persons in Roman life.
The concepts of princeps, patronus-cliens relationship, the patria potestas and the 
household code which oiled the wheels of Roman society implied obligations in every 
realm of life. These obligations were cross-status, complex, and were never far from the 
ideology or policy of Augustus and his plan for social concord. Gamsey and Sailer 
elaborate,
Augustus’ policy went beyond simple social conservatism: the pattern of social 
inequality and differentiation continued from the Republic, but innovations now 
gave distinctions of rank sharper definition. The social order he established was 
stable and enduring. Under the Principate as a whole, the divisions and tensions 
deriving from the unequal distribution or wealth, rank and status were 
counterbalanced by forces of cohesion such as family and household, structured 
vertical and horizontal relations between individuals and households, and the 
ideological apparatus of state. It meant that a citizen was obligated to the state.162
Cicero produces a list of duties explaining this, “...even the social relations themselves
are gradations of duty (<officium) so well defined that it can be seen which duty takes
precedence of any other: our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to country;
158 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 191.
159 Crook, Law and Life, 114.
160 Cicero, Pro Murena 27.
161 Crook, Law and Life, 114.
162 Gamsey and Sailer, Roman Empire, 107.
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our third, to parents; and so on, in a descending scale, to the rest.”163 While the 
obligations were never far from Augustan ideology, neither were they far from the minds 
of Romans as they related to persons when they ventured into the forum, the marketplace, 
or their own houses.
The reciprocal nature of Roman social relations was a key to fellowship, unity, 
and mutuality, according to Epictetus.164 The political structures, households and 
fellowship each required reciprocity. In Rome politicians displayed their superiority 
through their prestigious houses and villas on the hills of Rome. Wallace-Hadrill notes, 
“Vitruvius makes explicit the social considerations behind Roman architectural form: 
spacious public areas in house are designed for the reception of the public, and he does 
not expect them to be needed in the houses of the humble.”165 The household itself 
became a social function of reciprocity. A member of a household might also serve as a 
patron, a designation of “influence,”166 that expected clients to perform obligatory duties 
of service.167 This influence is visibly demonstrated in the atrium of the house, a 
reception area for clients who gathered each morning for “the calling hour” (salutatio) to 
pay respects and to seek advice from their patron which was the patron’s duty to give.
The house also facilitated a meeting place for friends to exchange benefits, services, and 
obligations, the importance of which, “the Romans could hardly conceive of without 
reciprocal exchange.”169 The household and its capacity for space in the transaction of 
“private initiatives” and as a place for the exploitation of economic opportunities in the
163 Cicero, On Duties 1.55.
164 Epictetus, Discourses 2.14.
165 Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, The Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum, 83. Vitruvius, De 
Architectura 2.6.3. Vitruvius speaks of buildings for those “persons of high rank” and those “planned with a 
view to the status of a client” (2.6.5-6).
166 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 8, sees this influence as “not the absence of law enforcement” but 
as a “force above the law.
167 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 8-11.
168 Mary Johnston, Roman Life (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1957), 30. William Ralph Inge, Society 
in Rome under the Caesars (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888), 148.
169 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 15.
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“social mechanisms” of social life cannot be ignored.170 Vital to patronage was the “door” 
as a mechanism for welcoming (npoaAappavw), a door often displaying honours or 
wreaths, but behind the idea of a door was that of taking in, helping, accepting the face of 
another, and welcoming into a circle.171 Patronage and hospitality possess shared 
characteristics based on an open door, reciprocal exchange, and was often exclusive in its 
reception, especially with the upper strata.172 Valerius Maximus describes Cato as a 
person whose “patrimony was small, his way of life narrowed by self-restraint (mores), 
his clientship not large, his house not closed to canvassers.”173 In patronage and 
reciprocal relations the reason and status of the person welcomed or brought into a circle 
was not taken lightly by the Romans.
Ultimately, the reciprocal nature of exchange in social relations for a society 
(societas / Koivwvia) aimed for the common bonds in the best interest of society and “the 
mutual interchange of kind services... united by the ties of an enduring intimacy.”174 A 
key to the unity was the virtuous wisdom of justice which was followed by Roman 
obligation with its social obligations.175 Society, as Rome viewed it, possessed an 
obligation to mutual help through “giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our
1 7 6industry, and our talents, to cement human society more closely together, man to man.” 
Roman society’s goals sometimes faltered, the “cement” developed cracks, and the
170 John H. D ’Arms, Commerce and Social Standing in Rome (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1981), 150,154.
171 Xenophon, Memorabilia 3.14.4; Josephus, Antiquities 8.4; T.G. Tucker, Life in the Roman World 
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1910), 141-48. Tucker says that contemporaries often complained that 
“obligations frittered away a large portion of their day, and they were kept perpetually busy, ‘doing 
nothing’” (p. 217).
172 Cf. Andrew Arterberry, Entertaining Angels: Early Christian Hospitality in its Mediterranean Setting 
(Sheffield: Pheonix Press, 38-40. He mentions that patronage and hospitality are often confused, but share 
similarities, especially concerning “the granting of assistance and protection,” as well as mentioning the 
dependence of the (weaker) client upon the (stronger) patron, who plays “a superior role” (p. 39).
173 Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings 2.10.8.
174 Cicero, On Duties 1.50-5, 56.
175 Cicero, On Duties 1.153.
176 Cicero, On Duties 1.21-2.
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reciprocal exchange still had the potential to turn into fierce conflict where the strong 
could exploit the weak, and often did so. Conflict arose and swirling around Rome in the 
first century were “webs of intrigue for office and influence,” “secret influence,” and 
among the “managers of patronage” intensely at work where without notice “a 
relationship that cements the bonds of affection now stimulated the fury of enemies.”177
6. First-Century Hierarchy at Work and Anti-Semitism 
Roman social relations on the descending scale influenced daily and political life in Rome 
in the unstable Claudian-Neronian eras. Four key factors demonstrated the hierarchical 
pattern at work, key factors at work near or around the time of Paul’s letter to the 
Romans: dinner parties, benefaction from the Roman elite especially in the marketplace, 
the Claudian edict of AD 49, and the Roman army.
i. Dinner parties and hierarchy publicly displayed
The hierarchical pattern displayed itself publically in Roman clothing, in the elite houses 
in the hills of Rome, in seating at theatres, and in the Roman dinner party. The Roman 
dinner party displayed status and hierarchy as seen in Pliny’s Letters where he describes 
“elegant dishes” served as meals for the elite while the rest, the non-elite “were cheap and 
paltry.”178 Wine was served according to the highest order “to the lower order,” the best 
to the highest at the chief table with his guests of honour, and the worst to social inferiors 
at a table away from the chief, elite, host.179 Petronius’ Satyricon gave insight into the 
aristocratic air of a Roman dinner party by describing Trimalchio’s wealth, his ring of 
gold, the separate tables for dining, especially for slaves, and the lure of offices in a quest 
for status and money.180
177 Tacitus, Annals 1.55; Sailer, Personal Patronage, 2; Syme, Roman Revolution, 24-5.
178 Pliny, Letters 2.6.
179 Pliny, Letters 2.6. See n. a implying that a nota or “censor” was a part of the dinner party marking social 
inferiors.
180 Petronius, Satyricon 28-54.
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Roman society was comprised of social distinction, status, in the words of Cicero, 
“grouped,” and every citizen in every context, even in the sharing of a meal, had to “be 
armed against those influences which disturb the stability [of the state].”181 Stability and 
orderliness came through each person accepting his or her status, respecting another’s, 
and in Roman law as in life in every social setting, all actions be directed to the “highest 
good, the standard of all our actions.”182 The “highest good” meant, ultimately, keeping 
the status quo when it came to social relations, the weak deferring to the strong. The 
hierarchical pattern kept each person in their social order in every context.
ii. Claudius and benefaction
A second factor demonstrating the hierarchical pattern at work in Rome in the first 
century was the benefaction of Claudius and his removal of certain benefits. Benefaction 
was a part of Claudius’ desire for Roman community (k o iv w v ic c ) and, according to 
Gamsey and Sailer, in quoting the second century source Aristedes, aimed for the “hailed 
fulfillment of Claudius’ dream of orbis Romanus, of Rome as the communis patria of the 
world.”183 Benefaction was part of the hierarchical pattern, including the obligations 
attached. One benefit under Claudian mle in Corinth, and more than likely Rome, was 
special provisions for Jews at the meat market. Gill describes the “gifts of the building by 
a member of the social elite” and the presence of a meat market (macellum) in Roman 
Corinth near Leicaion Road “ascertained by a pair of Latin inscriptions.”184 Winter asserts 
that control of the markets by the Romans and later the full restoration of these rights to 
local communities was a good omen for minorities like Jews, indicating they were on
181 Cicero, Laws 1.7.24; The Republic 6.1.1.
182 Cicero, Laws 1.20.53.
183 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 15. Gamsey and Sailer quote Aristedes, “You have caused the 
word ‘Roman’ to belong not to a city, but to be the name of some sort of common race, and this not one out 
of all races, but a balance to all remaining ones. You do not now divide the races into Greeks and 
barbarians.. .you have divided people into Romans and non-Romans (26.63, 65).”
184 David Gill, “The Meat-Market at Corinth (I Corinthians 10:25),” TynB 43 (1992): 389-93.
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good terms with Roman authorities.185 However, the benefits could be removed for a 
season.
The political and social climate during Claudius’ reign became tense in Rome and 
caused him to have two concerns: a concern for order and for social control through 
“adjusting the status and rights of the corrosive elements in society.”186 Maintaining law 
and order helped maintain society, so closely akin to the indispensable force of the well 
ordered Roman obligation with its circular ties in social practice. The unrest in Rome 
caused Claudius to take action in AD 49, according to the Roman historian Suetonius 
(AD 69-130), at or near the time of Paul’s letter to the Romans, by declaring an edict, 
which states “...since the Jews constantly made disturbances at the instigation of 
Chrestus, he expelled them from Rome.”187 The Claudian edict is in Acts 18:2, which also 
mentions the expulsion from Rome of two Christians, also Roman Jews, Prisca and 
Aquila. Levick says the cause for the expulsion is “uncertain” and “obscure,” but “leaves 
open the bare possibility that Claudius was facing clashes between orthodox Jews and 
members of the new Jewish sect, Christians.”188 Noy notes that Claudius took legal action 
to maintain order and to construct unity.189 Momigliano adds that Claudius was “true to 
his policy of favouring provincials,” acted from a desire to remain on good terms with the 
people, and wished to “suppress any proselytizing activities of the faith, now increased by 
the new ferment of a Christianity still indistinguishable from the synagogue.”190
While the reason for the expulsion seems unclear, two possibilities appear likely: 
(1) the disorder around the Jewish synagogue and (2) anti-Semitism. As Jews were
185 Gill, “The Meat-Market at Corinth,” 297-8.
186 Barbara Levick Claudius (London: Yale University Press, 1990), 121-2.
187 Suetonius, The Deified Claudius 25. Leon argues that Claudius reaffirmed Jewish rights after the anti- 
Semitic attitude of Gaius and upon expulsion of Jews expelled only the one causing the disturbances. Harry 
J. Leon, The Jews o f Ancient Rome (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 1960), 26-27.
188 Levick, Claudius, 121.
189 David Noy, Foreigners at Rome: Citizens and Strangers (London: Duckworth Press, 2000), 22
190Amaldo Momigliano, Claudius: The Emperor and His Achievement (tram. W. D. Hogarth; 1934; repr., 
Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1961), 30.
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expelled from Rome in AD 49 the benefits and privileges they enjoyed, such as the ability 
to purchase kosher meat at the market, were more than likely removed.
Concerning the Claudian edict two key elements must not be overlooked in regard 
to Romans 14:1-15:13: (1) the social standing of Prisca and Aqulia; (2) and the 
restoration of rights at the meat market near the time of Paul’s writing of his Letter to the 
Romans and its influence in the controversy in the church at Rome. Prisca and Aquila are 
important because they acted as informants to Paul concerning the conflict, the issues of 
Sabbath days and food, and the polarization of the Roman church after their expulsion 
from Rome. They symbolize, as tentmakers, although “nothing is said about their legal 
status, but they were probably peregrine,” the weak of society and because of their 
diminished status as foreigners, Jews, representing the lower status on the social scale of 
Roman hierarchy.191 The expulsion of the Jews appears as a mixed bag of both anti- 
Semitic and anti-Christian sentiments, but the expulsion appeared brief as Prisca and 
Aquila returned to Rome after a few years.192
When Prisca and Aquila returned to Rome and ministered in the church at Rome 
the issue of kosher food in the meat market was a critical part of the conflict. There were 
similar issues at Corinth, where Roman control of the meat market for “suitable food” for 
“the daily necessities of life” and special provisions for Jews were cut off in AD 49, 
probably as a form of punishment of the Jews.193 Even after Prisca, Aquila and other Jews 
returned to Rome several years later, the Jews found no special privileges for provision of 
kosher meat at the market and this contributed to the serious conflict between the Gentiles 
and Jews, the strong and the weak in the church at Rome. Roman authority exacted by the 
Claudian edict not only caused the expulsion of Jews from Rome, contributed to a loss of
191 Noy, Foreigners at Rome, 259; Crook, Law and Life, 283.
192 Noy, Foreigners at Rome, 259. Gallio’s legal judgment apparently made no distinction between Paul and 
Jews (Acts 18:12-17).
193 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 297 n. 44,287-301.
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benefits and privileges, but also contributed to the conflict in the church in Rome years 
later. The hierarchical pattern at work in Rome provided social control and controlled 
benefits based on the fulfilment of obligations, for after all, “Rome took care everywhere 
to secure upper class control.”194 
in. Anti-Semitism
A third factor demonstrating the hierarchical pattern was anti-Semitism.195 Goodman 
describes the relationship between Rome and Jerusalem as “the clash of ancient 
civilizations,” that the Jews experienced prejudice because of the “separateness of Jewish 
communities in the Diaspora which made the Jews distinctive and therefore vulnerable as 
scapegoats.”196 Anti-Semitism in Rome and its territories surfaced prior to Paul’s writing 
of the Letter to the Romans. Tiberius and Gaius developed anti-Semitic sentiments with 
policies during their respective reigns, Tiberius by his expulsion of foreign Jews and 
conscription of Jewish citizens to military service; Gaius by forcing Jews to worship him 
as divine which they could not obey because of Jewish law.197 Suetonius alludes to the 
tone of anti-Jewish sentiments describing Tiberius’s as an abolishment of foreign cults 
and superstitious rites, including the burning of religious vestments and the Jews of 
military age were assigned to posts with poor climates, including banishment to slavery 
for the refusal to obey.198 By the time of the reign of Claudius, anti-Semitism in Rome 
had been an undercurrent flowing in the river of the Roman mind.
Judge points out the long history of conflict on the surface and Rome’s 
misunderstanding of the Jews by stating that “the Hasmoneans secured for the Jews the
194 Crook, Law and Life, 283.
195 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 64-158. In his monograph Reasoner does not discuss anti-Semitism. 
In contrast, this thesis views anti-Semtism as key social element at work in the church in Rome.
196 Martin Goodman, Rome and Jerusalem: The Clash o f Ancient Civilizations (London: Penguin Books, 
2008), 578.
197 Momigliano, Claudius: The Emperor and His Achievement, 30.
198 Suetonius, The Deified Tiberius 36.
138
status of the friends of the Romans (1 Macc. 8; 12:1-4; 14:24-40; 15:15-24)” and that the 
Romans themselves had attempted to infect Judaism with Roman customs.199 There can 
be little doubt that the conflict through the years from political misunderstandings 
contributed to an anti-Semitism that swirled around AD 49, and according to Slingerland, 
continued to hold the Jews “in contempt.”200 Leon believes that Augustus was favourable 
to the Jews by granting special privileges by the “free distribution of grain and other 
commodities or largesse of money to the poorer citizens and allowing certain privileges to 
carry over beyond the Sabbath so that the Jews could keep it.”201 The favour of Augustus 
diminished with his death and anti-Jewish sentiment began to increase.202
Claudius’s edict was not his first anti-Semitic gesture. In AD 41 he prohibited the 
Jews from assemblies and excluded them from the com dole.203 Philo, Josephus, Tacitus, 
and Suetonius each document Roman anti-Semitic tendencies in their writings.204
The difficulty of understanding Claudius’s anti-Semitic policies at times appears 
confusing on three counts: (1) that Rome did identify Jews as a group and, at times, gave 
them “special treatment in certain circumstances” ; (2) that Roman policy failed to 
clearly distinguish between Judaism and Christianity since the two appeared close in 
proximity and worship; and, (3) that Roman policy constructed measures for punishing 
Jews when social unrest arose out of their lifestyle, social practice, and religious 
movements. Social unrest appears as the cause for the expulsion, reinforcing Rome’s long 
history of anti-Semitism.
199 Judge, “Judaism and the Rise of Christianity,” TynB 45 (1994): 357.
200 H. Dixon Slingerland, Claudian Policymaking and the Early Imperial Repression o f Judaism at Rome 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 221. Slingerland quotes Suetonius, “He treated with respect such foreign 
rites as were ancient and well established, but held the rest in contempt” (Suetonius, Augustus 93).
201 Leon, The Jews o f Ancient Rome, 11, 16.
202 Leon, The Jews of Ancient Rome, 16-23.
203 Noy, Foreigners at Rome, 42.
204 Philo, Embassy to Gaius 156; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 18:81-84; Tacitus, Annals 2.85.5; Suetonius, 
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Noy comments that the Jews were given special treatment under Roman rule 
concerning collections at the Jerusalem temple, special provisions for receiving the com 
dole on a day other than the Sabbath, and for religious preferences.206 Leon speaks of 
Claudian edicts early in his reign concerning the “special rights and privileges of the 
Jews, disclaiming the oppressive acts of Gaius, and emphasizing the Emperor’s high 
regard for the brother kings, Agrippa and Herod, and his confidence in the loyalty and 
friendship of Jews toward the Roman people.”207 Any imperial edict providing special 
provision or restricting liberties in the imperium were “pronouncements of an officer of 
the people to the people (or some particular set of them), saying what he requires to be 
done-not only about the law but about anything.”208 Under Claudius’s mle in the edict of 
AD 49 anti-Semitism increased until it climaxed later into war and the destruction of 
Jerusalem in AD 70. Anti-Semitism in Rome and in the mind of the Romans helped 
solidify the distinction between Greek and Jew, and even the hierarchical distinction of 
the strong and the weak. The hierarchical pattern at work in Rome possessed qualities that 
appeared outright abusive, highly subjective, and highly prejudiced.209 
iv. The Roman army
A fourth factor at where the hierarchical pattern was at in Rome was the army. The 
Roman army was the perfect model of hierarchy, discipline, domination, and obligation. 
The organization of the camp protects the most important military commanders with the 
highest ranks in the middle surrounded by layers and walls of soldiers, the lowest ranks
206 Noy, Foreigners at Rome, 258-259.
207 Leon, The Jews o f Ancient Rome, 22.
208 Crook, Law and Life, 20.
209 Cicero, On Behalf Flacco 66-9. He refers to the Jews “barbaric superstition” and the threat they appeared 
to be to the state and when Jews desired to send gold to Jerusalem in religious rights he said, “Who is there, 
gentlemen, who can honestly praise this action?” (67). He further states the anti-Semitism, “Even while 
Jerusalem was at peace with us, the practice of their sacred rights was at variance with the glory of our 
empire, the dignity of our name, the customs of our ancestors” (69).
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on the outside.210 Communication flowed top-down with information and commands 
flowing from the highest military commander to the lowest in sequential order.211 As to 
discipline they were trained to keep order (to^ ic;), to march in perfect order, to pursue 
high honours through bravery, and to act properly, for even “a slight neglect of duty” 
meant the breaking of a law or desertion of the ranks included laws which punish with 
death.212 Josephus noted that their actions were always “prompt” and disciplined, adding, 
“This perfect discipline makes the army an ornament of peace-time and in war wields the 
whole into a single body; so compact their ranks, so alert their movements in wheeling to 
right or left, so quick their ear for orders, their eyes for signals, their hands to act upon 
them.”213
The army flourished in “an ethos of service, obedience, and loyalty.” As to 
domination the army conquered its foes completely, their “total strength of forces” 
yielded to no enemy and with sheer power subjected their defeated foes to Roman law 
and customs, called Romanization.215 Gamsey and Sailer note, “The motive is clear, to 
turn a nation of warriors into peaceful subjects,” or put another way, to turn enemies into 
subjects who fulfil their obligations under Roman law and rule.216 The Roman army 
worked toward the goal of “good order” and complete obedience from all its subjects.217 
The hierarchical order itself in the army, according to Josephus, verified social distinction 
and the exploitation of the weaker members of society. He says, “One cannot but admire 
the forethought shown in particularly by the Romans, in making their servant class useful
210 Josephus, Jewish War 3.85.
211 Josephus, Jewish War 3.85.
212 Josephus, Jewish War 3.85., 3.102-4.
213 Josephus, Jewish War 3.105-6.
214 Goodman, Rome and Jerusalem, 336.
215 Joesphus, Jewish War 3.69; Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 18.
216 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 18.
217 Epictetus, Discourses 3.24.95. He mentions in education two key Romans ideas of the good and 
excellent man: good order ( e u t o k t o x ; )  and obedience ( e u t t e i O o j c ; ) ,  that is, each person keeping “in orderly 
fashion” and each in “due obedience” fulfilling obligations whatever his or her “post” ( t o ^ i v ) .
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to them not only for the ministrations of ordinary life but also for war.”218 The 
hierarchical pattern at work in Rome proved powerful in controlling the masses and 
establishing peace and order.
At work in the hierarchical pattern was the oppression of the weak with no mercy, 
often enforced by the army. Cicero discusses Roman law, saying, “Hence our law grants 
the appearance of liberty, preserves the influence of the aristocracy, and removes the 
causes of disputes between the classes.”219 In practice this could often be described as 
oppression and brutality. Josephus describes a siege at Jotapata during Nero’s reign in 
graphic terms: “the blade to their throat,” “no pity,” “vengeance,” and “massacre.”220 The 
Roman army was the “image of their ideal society,” displaying their strength in war, 
parading their strength in public triumphs, and in peace, war, or daily life obeying and 
enforcing the regimen of duty without empathy or pacifism.221 Tacitus described their 
display of brute strength as “arrogance” or superiority over Britain in these words, “To 
plunder, butcher, steal, these things they misname empire: they make a desolation and call 
it peace.”222
The hierarchical pattern of Roman superiority and the domination of the weak 
generated an attitude of mercilessness in war, peace, and social practice. If Rome was an 
obligation society, it was also a society of little or “no mercy” when obligations were not 
fulfilled.
7. Conclusions
It has been argued that Roman society was hierarchical in its social pattern. The pattern 
influenced Roman order based on rank and status. The pattern created vertical
218 Josephus, Jewish War 3.70.
219 Cicero, Laws 3.36.
220 Josephus, Jewish War 3.329.
221 Goodman, Rome and Jerusalem, 332-38.
222 Tacitus, Agricola 30.
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relationships that demanded reciprocal relations, that is, obligations of patronage that 
were expected to be fulfilled in a variety of relationships biased toward the strong in 
society. Roman obligation created a social order not to be tampered with in social settings 
like dinner parties, in the distribution of benefits, in the army that was an ideal image for 
Rome, and, when obligations were refused and conflict arose, mercy was not typically a 
consequence.
When conflict did arise, Roman society had a plan for resolving it through obligation 
before the conflict reached an impasse of “no mercy.” Roman hierarchy emerges as a 
pattern of social behaviour. The next chapter will explore the resolution of conflict in 
Rome’s obligation society.
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Chapter 4: Conflict Resolution in Rome’s Obligation Society
Introduction
As has been shown in the previous chapter concerning the hierarchical pattern, the intense 
personal, reciprocal relationships gave rise to conflict in Roman society legally, socially, and 
politically. “Roman citizen.. .is not just a vague term meaning an inhabitant of the Roman 
empire, but a precise expression of one particular set of rights and duties,”1 according to J. A. 
Crook. Legally, the relationships conveyed contracts of obligation which could fail and breed 
expectations which, according to Zimmermann, “can be disappointed in various ways: the 
promisor may fail to entirely perform, he may offer performance belatedly or at the wrong 
place, or his performance may turn out to be unsatisfactory.”2 Socially, the hierarchical 
patterns of society produced conflict which commenced from “the divisions and tensions 
deriving from the unequal distribution of wealth, rank and status.”3 Politically, Augustus’ 
plan and the quest for power in the struggle of ambition cultivated citizenship that “entailed a 
nexus of privileges and obligations in many spheres of activity, juridically defined and 
jealously protected; it was a membership in an order in the strictest sense of that term, 
especially once ‘outsiders’ in noticeable numbers began to reside inside.”4
Power, privilege, ambition, and envy combined to manifest a society where conflict 
appeared inevitable.5 Likewise, conflict was largely unavoidable because by “the first century 
AD, foreigners and their descendants made up the majority of the common people of the city
1 Crook, Law and Life, 37.
2 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 783.
3 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107.
4 Finley, The Ancient Economy, 47.
5Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 22-3. Reasoner sees the social life of Rome, “the status-conscious Roman 
society,” and the relationships in Rome as keys to the solution of the controversy in the church. He adds two 
important comments: (1) interpreters of Romans 14:1-15:13 often exclude the “bigger picture in Rome” and (2) 
interpreters do not often read the book of Romans in light of the whole with respect to Roman social thought. 
This chapter in the thesis seeks to expand upon the background of Roman society, social thought, and solutions 
to controversy.
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(plebs urbana), a large population of free resident aliens, and the entire slave class.”6 Jeffers 
notes the complexity of relationships and melting pot of cultures that inhabited Rome, but 
one questions his opening statement, “The first Roman Christians came from the poorer 
classes of Rome.”7 Rome itself and Rome’s obligation society, both in wider cultural and in 
the narrow confines of the local church, thrived on societal structure, class, wealth, and the 
dynamic of obligations inbred in the construct of Roman social relations. Phoebe, a 
patroness, according to Romans 16:1, assisted many people in the church at Rome, 
suggesting her wealth as a patron and the link of obligations which followed the ideology and 
operation of Roman obligation. The intermingling cultural mix and the categorisation of 
society in Rome set the stage for the turbulent interaction of people which spurred conflict 
which required resolution.8 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss conflict resolution in 
Rome’s obligation society.
In order to demonstrate the resolution of conflict in Roman society, five key aspects 
will be discussed: (1) A rationale for conflict resolution; (2) conflict resolution must be seen 
through the eyes of the Roman law of obligation with a view to the cultural expectations 
which Roman legal structure presented; (3) the Roman social aspects of obligation’s 
emphasis on friendship and enmity (inimicitia) as a tool of social pressure in society will be 
demonstrated with a Roman’s motive for revenge; (4) conflict resolution favoured the strong 
in society; (5) conflict resolution will be demonstrated by discussing Roman obligation as the 
critical tool for resolution; and (6) a brief synopsis for Romans 14:1-15:13.
6 James S. Jeffers, Conflict at Rome (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 8.
7 Jeffers, Conflict at Rome, 3.
7 Jeffers, Conflict at Rome, 1-35.
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1. A Rationale for Conflict Resolution 
Roman law in the times of the Republic recognised a division of orders, a struggle between 
patricians and plebeians or, more clearly, between the wealthy landowners and the poor who 
worked the land.9 Jolowicz and Nicholas say, “The division was probably simply the 
common social and economic one: the greater part of the land presumably fell into the hands 
of a minority of families, which then abrogated to themselves superior rights.. .”10 Land 
ownership in the hands of the few, the law of debt, typically the poor who for various reasons 
were indebted to the landowners, and the unwillingness or inability of the poor to pay back 
their debts to the landowners precipitated laws of resolution.11 The history of such conflict, 
difficult to reconstruct both legally and socially, but no doubt real, still called for resolutions, 
concessions, and a clarification of certain rights.12 These rights and the duty of performance, 
or more appropriately, non-performance, lay at the heart conflict.13 Basic to the spirit of 
Roman law is the concept of a remedy, which, in essence, “is an appropriate action.”14
During the principate, the foundational aspect of social divisions that caused social 
and legal conflict “remained untouched.”15 A “privileged few -  probably less than 0.1 per 
cent of the [Roman] population -  dominated the vast majority beneath them.”16 Conflicts had 
roots in similar concepts: ties of obligation, laws of debt, rights, duties, and actions 
(performance or non-performance).17 Generally, legal and social power in the principate still 
remained in the hands of the privileged few, thus creating a Roman legal system of
9 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 9-10.
10 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 9-10.
11 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 10-12.
12 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 10. Riggsby, Roman Law, 146-47. He discusses servitudes 
(“the dominant one”) and the rights of one landowner and his land over another person and his land (“servient”).
13 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 1.
14 Watson, Spirit o f Roman Law, 8.
15 Mousourakis, Legal History, 92.
16 Parkin and Pomeroy, Roman Social History, 3.
17 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 374-413.
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“inequalities,” legal remedies based on superior rights, and procedure necessary to take 
action or resolve legal disputes.18 These concepts were in the background of obligation 
(d(|)£iAq) as Paul writes Romans 14:1-15:13. This supplies an important rationale for 
discussing conflict resolution in Rome’s obligation society. It is suggested that a review of 
Roman conflict aids in understanding the issues and people in conflict in the Christian 
community in Rome.
2. Legal Aspects o f the Resolution o f Conflict 
The reconstruction of Roman law in regard to conflict between two parties, an error in action, 
or failed obligations, proves difficult. Crook’s reminder, emphasizing social relationships, 
here is instructive, “We cannot go, as a textbook of Roman law would, into the details of 
legal rules and how they were applied to innumerable sets of facts; we can only sketch the 
main institutions and state some of the basic rules.”19 Generally, therefore, it is essential to 
understand conflict in terms of person {persona) and the implications of law for social 
discourse in daily life. A skeleton account of Roman law, as this thesis provides, in regard to 
conflict is basic but essential to the discussion of two fundamental issues surrounding law: 
conflict in the drama of social dynamics and friendship with its obligations emerging out of 
patron-client relationships. Still, some discussion about the foundational legal concepts of 
conflict is necessary.
The legal form of a contract, especially one of an oral nature in the first century, was 
“the backbone of the contractual scheme of Roman law,” while committing the parties to 
obligations which were enforceable.20 “Every contractual promise engenders expectations in
18 Riggsby, Roman Law, 77; Crook, Law and Life, 24; Telegen-Couperus, A Short History, 89-93.
19 Crook, Law and Life, 12.
20 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 546.
147
the person of the promissee.”21 The Romans commonly grasped the depth of this formulated 
contract with understood obligations and the consequences of failed obligations. Epictetus 
speaks of “subsequent steps,” in “how to win a victory” saying, “But consider the matters 
which come before that and those which follow after; and only when you have done that, 
then, if it profits you, put your hand to the task.”22 However, errors and failed obligations did 
occur. What were some basic types of errors in Roman law?
Zimmermann discusses a multitude of errors relating to failed obligations under these 
headings: verba and voluntas (words and will); determining the object of performance; error 
in copore, error in pretio, error in negotio, error in persona, error in substantia, common 
mistake, error in motive, common error in nomine, mistakes in testaments and wills, error and 
protection of the promisee, error of ignorance nocet, and error vincibilis and breaking of the 
bonds.23 In practical terms, conflict was seen in daily life through “personal grievances, 
exclusive loyalty to patrons or the political elite, ambition, violations of trust or obligations, 
envy towards new people joining a group, and power and influence of others in it.”24 Conflict 
was even “promoted through relatives, friends and clients and was acceptable in society.”25 
Zimmermann notes that in looking at these errors, the last thing we can expect to find is a 
“neat and logical theoretical framework.” The most important errors of failed obligations in 
Roman culture were verba and voluntas, determination of object of performance, error in 
negotio, error in persona, error in substantia, and error of ignorance.
21 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 783.
22 Epictetus, Discourses 3.15.1-4.
23 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 587-609.
24 Bruce W. Winter, “The ‘Underlays’ of Conflict and Compromise in I Corinthians,” Paul and the Corinthians: 
Studies on a Community in Conflict (ed. Trevor J. Burke and J. Keith Elliott; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 153.
25 Winter, “The ‘Underlays’ of Conflict and Compromise in I Corinthians,” 153.
26 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 587, 587-589.
148
A truth in word and will refers to the verba contract with its voiced promises by both 
parties, sometimes with specific stipulations.27 The verbal exchange constituted an 
agreement, the terms were non-debatable, but one party fails to meet an obligation. The 
determination of an object of performance means that the contract and the price of an object, 
for example, land, was agreed upon.28 A failed obligation meant not paying the price, 
although sometimes a dispute arose over the actual contract price which could be judged 
invalid.29 An invalid judgment was rare in the first century because of the pledge made 
preceding the contract. An error in negotio meant that the parties exchanged money but as 
time passes neither party understood the item of purpose for the exchange.30 “One of them 
thinks that it is a deposit, the other takes it to be a loan for consumption; and in the second 
case the one party regards it as a loan for consumption whilst the other has a loan for use in 
mind.”31 The vagueness of this failed obligation gives rise to an integral part of Roman social 
relations: they could be highly subjective and whimsical based on circumstances, mood, and 
a person’s status. This was especially true under the legal “innovations” of Augustus.32
The error in persona almost seems comical on the surface as it is an error in mistaken 
identity, that is, a “mistake over the identity of the other contracting partner,”33 not so much 
that the person’s face was not recognized because a person’s face (ttpoctojttov) was vital to 
relationships, but that a third party was involved. Zimmermann notes that this third party 
“appears to have prevented a contract.”34 For example, A receives a loan from B; B feels he 
is not under obligation to A because he realizes that the money for the loan came by way of C
27 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 587-589.
28 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 588.
29 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 588.
30 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 591.
31 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 591.
32 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107.
33 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 592.
34 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 591.
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whom B ordered to pay. If such an error appears confusing, it demonstrates the complexity of 
relationships and the apparent subjectivity of one party with another. Two other errors are 
important for the purposes of understanding the legal aspects of the constitution of a failed 
obligation: error in substantia is a failure to deliver the agreed upon goods, and iuris 
ignorantia nocet is the principle that every Roman citizen should know the law and ignorance 
of it is no excuse.35 Roman law itself gave little legal room or encouragement for those who 
failed in their obligations because of two maxims: one, “a promise is a promise” or, put 
another way, “your word is your bond” as a pledge; and, two, “the ignorance of the (Roman) 
law is no excuse.”36 Fulfilling obligations was all a part of Roman honour and good faith 
(fides).
An error could produce a failure in obligations but so could a breach of contract. A 
breach of contract comes when “the promisor has not complied with the duties imposed on 
him by the contract.”37 Zimmermann gives a clear example of the intricacies of Roman 
contracts when he discusses a “contest,” obligations under the sub-title “supervening 
impossibility,”
A has promised, by way of stipulation to deliver the slave, Pamphilus, to B on 10 
October. After this promise has been made, but before the time for delivery arrives, 
Pamphilus dies. Thus on 10 October A is unable to satisfy B’s claim. If B were to sue 
A, the judge would have to absolve the latter. From the point of view of substantive 
law, this result may be justified in terms of the rule that “ought” implies “can”: if A 
cannot perform, he can be under no obligation to do so.38
35 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 604-5.
36 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 600-609.
37 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 783.
38 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 784.
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Had a stipulation been a part of the contract it might have allowed for legal proceedings to 
procure a resolve by determining a monetary value to the transaction which could incur 
another obligation.39 Obligations could spin a viscous cycle.
If, on the other hand, a debtor was thought in some way to be responsible, the 
obligations perpetuated still.40 Obligations could also perpetuate if, as in the earlier case of 
the slave Pamphilus, B, the debtor had been clearly responsible for the slave’s death. An 
obligation could perpetuate past the slave’s death by assigning a monetary value which could 
incur an obligation for B to pay money to A.41 The determination was made on the basis of 
what Roman lawyers called a “fiction,” which provided “a satisfactory solution to a problem 
by making it possible to apply an already existing (set of) rules that would otherwise not have 
covered the situation.”42 An obligation could perpetuate if the debtor’s behaviour was 
unacceptable.43 A culpa, fault, could be attributed to the debtor if, in a breach of obligations, 
his behaviour had fallen short of an expectation, for example, his behaviour deemed him 
guilty or “at fault.”44 In Roman society “whoever promised something which was and 
remained objectively possible to perform was seen to guarantee his ability to surrender such 
performance.”45 In legal proceedings one has a difficult time distinguishing between the fault 
as substance and the fault as behavioural performance. Behaviour was important in the 
application of law in social roles and a key factor in determining conduct. This made Roman 
law appear to be highly circumstantial and suspect to the outsider, but readily accepted by the 
average Roman.
39 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 784.
40 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 784.
41 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 784-85.
42 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 784 n. 13.
43 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 785.
44 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 787-8.
45 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 785.
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At times, where conflict was concerned, Roman law appeared unfair. Zimmermann 
says, “There was only one form of breach of contract on the part of the debtor that received 
special attention and became institutionalized across the board, and that was the mora 
debitoris (delay of debt).”46 This delay might call for a warning (interpellatio) to be given by 
the creditor, but basically the delay lengthened the time of the obligations.47 A warning gave 
the debtor more time to fulfil an obligation, but ultimately creditors reserved the right to 
make debtors answer to their obligations. The complexity of obligations in this situation 
could become more complex because a creditor could also breach the contract, the mora 
debitoris, by delaying acceptance of a debt.48 “All in all it has become apparent that the way 
in which the Roman lawyers dealt with breach of contract depended on the type of procedural 
remedy applicable in the individual case.”49 What legal actions or remedies could be pursued, 
though, if a party in a contract failed to meet his or her obligations?
A party could take action if another party failed to meet an obligation. Actions were 
“legal procedures” to resolve a claim and critical to conflict resolution on any scale.50 These 
actions were thought of as “remedies”51 by Roman lawyers and “a claim could only be 
pursued in a court of law if it could be expressed in a recognized form.”52 Appeal could be 
made to the judges and the courts. Watson speaks of the spirit of Roman law and actions, 
saying there was an atmosphere of “central indefiniteness.”53 Watson’s comments are 
appropriate here because it is in the course of action where law and social practice work in 
concert the two entities can help the resolution of conflict. Discussing the actions, courts,
46 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 790.
47 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 791-92.
48 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 817-18.
49 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 790.
50 Schultz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), 24.
51 Nicholas, Introduction to Roman Law, 20. He says, “The law is made up of rights (and correlative duties) and 
remedies are the procedural clothing of these rights.”
52 Nicholas, Introduction to Roman Law, 20.
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judges and juries would require judgments in gray areas of law that were overpowered by the 
legal status of the parties involved, but suffice it to say that with Augustus’ Roman 
innovation the Praetor’s edict assumed leadership in resolving many legal battles.54 
“Litigation took on the quality of a family quarrel, for everyone knew the litigants, liked or 
disliked them, and could assess the probability that one or the other might be capable of the 
crime.”55 The courts were often slanted toward those of superior honour and those whose 
wealth afforded them special legal privileges.56 As for the judges,57 Augustus continued,
.. .the lex Julia de iudciis privatis, the old system was to continue, by which the 
praetors laid down the formula for each case and appointed a judge of the facts 
acceptable to both parties, but the list of judges, mostly senators and equites, was 
revised, and it is possible that the state began to accord special status in the creation 
of law to the opinions of selected legal experts.
In looking at the legal ramifications of the resolution of conflict in Roman society Gamsey’s
comment cannot be dismissed, noting that “the legal system in Rome favoured the interests of
the higher orders.”59
Neither can the reader dismiss the key legal aspects of social hierarchy and status as 
an issue in failed obligations in relationships: for example, a patron failing in obligation to a 
client, a son failing in obligation to his father or vice versa, a wife failing in obligation to her 
husband, a citizen failing in obligation to the imperium, the imperium failing in obligation to 
supply com to the plebeians, a slave failing in obligation to his master, a humiliore failing in 
obligation to a honestiore, a military leader failing in obligation to the emperor, a senator 
failing in obligation to the imperium, a non-citizen failing in obligation to a citizen and the
53 Watson, Spirit o f Roman Law, 146.
54 Watson, Spirit o f Roman Law, 21-ff.
55 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 64.
56 Crook, Law and Life, 81.
57 Crook, Law and Life, 80. Crook attests to the social obligation a judge was required to fulfil injudicial 
service, “To serve as a judge if called upon was not only a social duty but a public office, from which you must 
be officially excused.”
58 Martin Goodman, The Roman World: 44 BC-AD 180 (London: Routledge, 1997), 96.
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critical failure of obligations of a friend to a friend.60 The rules of patronage of the inferior 
weak of society being obligated to the superior strong of society played an essential role in 
conflict resolution. The legal aspects of the resolution of conflict invoked a whole series of 
obligations in legal definition as well as the social practise of daily life.
3. Social Aspects o f the Resolution o f Conflict 
A missing link so far in the discussion of Roman obligation is ‘friendship’ {amicitia). The 
Romans placed great value on amicitia and obligations materializing out of the reciprocal 
relationships could have legal, political, and social impact.61 Friendship could possess a 
motive for material advantage, but more readily it was a horizontal relationship whose
fOfoundation was the “exchange of services.”
Friendship was bound in the language and practice of obligation with an emphasis on 
honour, dignity, and “courteous cooperation.”63 “Behind the facade of cooperation lay 
competition: if a friend failed to make a return of the same order [a failed obligation], he 
risked slipping into the position of a ‘lesser friend’ and losing honour in the process.”64 
Gamsey and Sailer address the resolution of conflict, “The personal exchange relationships 
described above effectively mitigated cross-order conflict and tension, the importance which 
has been exaggerated.”65 Regardless of the exaggeration, friendship and the responsibilities 
surrounding friendship spurred an intense, potentially volatile, relationship of obligations.
MacMullen includes such terms as clients, order, power, faithfulness, gratitude and 
friendship (i.e. cliens, ordo,potestas,fides, gratia, and amicitia) in what contemporaries
59 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 277.
60 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107-159.
61 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 154-159.
62 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 154.
63 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 155.
64 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 155-6.
65 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 156.
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perceived as “Roman social relations.”66 As such, he calls these relations “the study of the 
synapses that show how waves of energy travelled through the body politic and made it move 
to war or peace.”67 Patronage, friendship, their interwoven yet discerned relationships in 
social structure, and their binding and clearly defined obligations created an atmosphere 
conducive to conflict. Friendship figured heavily in the entangled conflict. Obligation figured 
heavily in the resolution.
Cicero mentions the essence of friendship as “the most complete agreement in policy, 
in pursuits, and in opinions.”68 He names the link between two friends as “a certain tie which 
strengthens with our proximity to each other;”69 and as “bonds of affection”70 which unite 
two people in relationship. He further notes the reciprocity of friendship in the language of 
honour with its obligations: “.. .if you remove goodwill (benevolentia) from friendship the 
very name of friendship is gone.”71 Cicero mentions mutuality as an essential element of 
friendship in terms of “mutual goodwill and affection.”72 “For nothing gives more pleasure 
than the return of goodwill and the interchange of zealous service.”73
Cicero cites the “chief good” as the “parent and preserver of friendship,” while also 
noting that “without virtue friendship cannot exist at all.”74 One invaluable virtue which 
nurtures friendship is loyalty (fides), the quality of “unswerving constancy.”75 Another virtue 
is common reverence: “For he who takes reverence from friendship, takes away its brightest
66 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 122.
67 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 122.
68 Cicero, On Friendship 15.
69 Cicero, On Friendship 19.
70 Cicero, On Friendship 20.
71 Cicero, On Friendship 19.
72 Cicero, On Friendship 20-21.
73 Cicero, On Friendship 49.
74 Cicero, On Friendship 20-21.
75 Cicero, On Friendship 65.
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jewel.”76 Friendship offers “very great advantages”77 and “advantage is the cement of
friendships.”78 Amicitia binds friends together in an obligation of “mutual interchange,”
which really means that mutuality infers submission on the lesser person’s part in a
friendship to resolve conflict.79
Friendship intersected politics, both in its role for social cohesion and political
ambition. Cicero says,
Now he (Scipio), used to say that nothing was harder than for a friendship to continue 
to the very end of life; for it often happened either that the friendship ceased to be 
mutually advantageous, or the parties to it did not entertain the same political views; 
and that frequently, too, the dispositions of men were changed, sometimes by 
adversity and sometimes by the increasing burdens of age.80
He adds that a “contest for advantage” can mean that the “friendship cannot be successful.”81
Taking the bond of goodwill out of friendship diminishes the power of friendship and
concord which results in “enmity and disagreement”82 Enmity is the result of the lust for
money and strife, while disagreements arise when the “laws of friendship have been
disregarded.”83 Cicero hints at the invisible rope suggested by Zimmermann when speaking
of friendship, noting that “it is best to hold the reins of friendship as loosely as possible, so
that we may either draw them up or slacken them at will.”84 Friendship maintained allowed
the “invisible rope” to be loosened around the neck of the obligated friend and enmity in the
bonds of friendship forced the tightening of the “invisible rope” in critical obligations.
Roman friendship is, after all, “so pliable and elastic that it expands, so to speak, with a
76 Cicero, On Friendship 82.
77 Cicero, On Friendship 23.
78 Cicero, On Friendship 32.
79 Cicero, On Friendship 26.
80 Cicero, On Friendship 33.
81 Cicero, On Friendship 34.
82 Cicero, On Friendship 23.
83 Cicero, On Friendship 35.
84 Cicero, On Friendship 45.
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friend’s prosperity and contracts with his adversity.”85 The reader sees the vital importance of 
friendship in Roman society because if you should take friendship’s obligations and “the 
bond of goodwill out of the universe no house or city could stand, nor would even the tillage 
of the fields abide.”86
Friendship fits into the social scale as among co-equals or unequals.87 Cicero opts for 
equality, but it is of utmost importance in friendship that the superior and inferior should 
relate in the sense of equality, preferably viewed more as “courteous cooperation,” 88 
commonly viewed in Roman eyes as “conflict resolution” or “getting along peacefully.” 
However in reality, Cicero recognizes that “oftentimes a certain pre-eminence (excellentiae) 
does exist.”89 Friends enhance the dignity of their friends, serve as the source of honour for 
friends, lift their inferior friends, and make demands on friends.90 Cicero says, “In brief, it is 
your duty on every occasion to consider carefully both what you will demand and what you 
will permit him to obtain when he makes a demand on you.”91 The underlying theme of 
obligation lay in the root of dignity, honour, status, and reciprocal demands, each social 
construct vital to conflict resolution.
Friendships can terminate, although breaking them off can be “a sort of disaster,” yet 
“sometime unavoidable.”92 Such friendships have ties that “should be sundered by a gradual 
relaxation of intimacy,” or as Cicero once heard Cato say, “They should be unravelled rather 
than rent apart.”93 Unfulfilled obligations, a difference in political views, a withdrawal of 
affection, a change of disposition, and broken bonds of honour, all or one can produce a
85 Cicero, On Friendship 48.
86 Cicero, On Friendship 23.
87 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 155.
88 Cicero, On Friendship 69.
89 Cicero, On Friendship 69.
90 Cicero, On Friendship 74-75.
91 Cicero, On Friendship 75.
92 Cicero, On Friendship 76.
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broken friendship which could result in the arousal of “open hostility” and “serious 
enmities.”94 It was not uncommon for Romans to display these open hostilities and enmities 
between friends in public places.
Dionysius of Halicarnassus discusses friendship with amicitia’s Greek counterpart 
(juAog. The language of friendship in Rome’s obligation society and the mores reverberate 
when Coriolanus pleads with his friend Marcus Minucius, saying, “that a friend or an enemy 
is not determined either by the lineaments of a face or by the giving of a name, but both are 
made manifest by their services and by their deeds, and that we all love those who do us good 
and hate those who do us harm.”95 The speech mentions benefits, honour, an exchange of 
services, hate, enmity, and conduct, all key elements of social relations and the resolution of 
conflict.96 Sailer says, “The fact that men of varying social statuses could be called amid 
(friends) does not indicate that all amicitiae fit into a single category of social relationships 
with a single code of conduct.”97 Friendships were dynamic, tense, and subject to change 
given a change of circumstances.
Contrary to friendship {amicitia), is the Roman’s “phenomenon of inimicitiae 
(enmity, ‘hated,’ ex^P0)-”98 Where friendship linked friends together, enmity came as the 
result of a failure of one of the friends to meet an obligation, a Roman legal and social 
weapon of hate.99 Epstein says, “No two individuals hate each other in precisely the same 
way,” thus requiring the term to “evolve sufficient vagueness to describe myriad different
93 Cicero, On Friendship 76.
94 Cicero, On Friendship 76-78.
95 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 8.34; Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World, 133-34.
96 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 8.34.
97 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 7.
98 David Epstein, Personal Enmity in Roman Politics: 218 -43 BC (London: Routledge, 1987), 1.
99 Epstein, Enmity, 1-2.
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relationships, and its meaning must conform to each individual manifestation, and not vece
versa”100 Epstein continues,
Personal hatred among leading figures, and its most important side effects on a 
society’s political and social developments, are hardly unique to the last two centuries 
of the Roman Republic. In every society, including our own, public figures have 
allowed their personal feelings to influence their public behaviour. If the phenomenon 
of inimicitiae (enmity) was at all unique in Rome, it was because Roman politicians 
who persecuted their inimicitiae in office were tolerated by their society, and because 
the peculiar nature of Roman politics provided such a fertile source of inimicitiae. 
What was distinctive about inimicitiae in Roman life was that it was so pervasively 
and violently pursued.101
Enmity consumed an enormous proportion of the Roman’s energy in social life where
“apparently irrational conduct reveals the emotional pitch of submerged inimicitiae”102
“Inimici used a wide variety of weapons, but shared a burning desire for revenge and a
unique commitment to the pursuit of private warfare.”103 In a society where Jesus’ Sermon on
the Mount ethic of “turn the other cheek” sounded strange, Roman obligation and the
resolution of conflict inspired a bizarre, animated, passionate response, obligations as the
superiority of action being a critical aspect of social resolve and social control.104
Still, personal relationships were paramount in Roman society. Inimicitiae
represented another complex characteristic of obligation in Roman social relations. Epstein
explains this complexity,
The Roman attitude toward inimicitiae was complex and ambivalent. The pursuit of 
inimicitiae and the destruction of one’s enemies was firmly entrenched among those 
virtues Romans thought necessary for the acquisition of dignitas, virtus, and status 
and nobility-qualities the Roman aristocracy pursued from birth. At the same time, the 
Romans recognised that the single-minded pursuit of personal interests was not 
compatible with the best interests of the state or of humanity. The Romans sensed a 
conflict and resolved it only imperfectly, by lame exhortations to inimici not to forget 
the interest of the state or by efforts to control the worst excesses of inimici toward
100 Epstein, Enmity, 1.
101 Epstein, Enmity, 1.
102 Epstein, Enmity, 2.
103 Epstein, Enmity, 2.
104 Epstein, Enmity, 2.
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each other.105
Cicero warns of the enmities and the breaking off of friendships which lead to disputes, 
abuse, and invective as well as the possibility of the “bitter feeling of resentment” and a loss 
of “honour and fame and delightful tranquillity of mind.”106 Enmity in that context might 
lead to an act of revenge.
Revenge in the realm of inimicitiae conjured strong emotions and desires that served 
as “a vital component of the Roman aristocratic ethos.”107 Romans permitted and even took 
satisfaction in outrageous behaviour in the context of revenge.108 The reasons for revenge 
manifested themselves in numerous venues: to preserve the Roman Republic’s ideals in the 
dignity of the state; to protect a political or personal reputation; to achieve glory; to maintain 
and/or increase honour and dignity; to respond to humiliation; to even the score on a family 
dispute in fulfilment of a long-standing familial duty; and to respond to a broken bond of 
unfulfilled obligations pursuant of family loyalty.109 Often legal trials of revenge and 
counter-revenge resulted with legal convictions.110 “Though Roman defendants were often 
unable to conduct their own retaliatory prosecutions, especially when they had been 
convicted and exiled, they might still engage in retaliation through the agency of their sons, 
other relatives or friends.”111 The aristocratic ethos dominated the Roman scene while 
making it difficult to control the conduct of the aristocracy. “Roman society was never very
105 Epstein, Enmity, 28.
106 Cicero, On Friendship 77-84. Cicero states, “In short; there is but one security and one provision against 
these ills and annoyances, and that is, neither to enlist your love too quickly nor to fix it on unworthy men.”(79). 
He also discusses the ambition for advantage in society and the appetite of ambition.
107 Epstein, Enmity, 20.
108 Epstein, Enmity, 9.
109 Epstein, Enmity, 20-24, 114.
110 Epstein, Enmity, 115-119.
111 Epstein, Enmity, 118. Epstein mentions the powerful exercise ofpietas in family ties, “Pietas provided all the 
incentive a son needed to avenge his father.”
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successful, however, in defining acceptable behaviour or in regulating the conduct of its most 
powerful citizens.”112
Relationships in Rome in the context of friendship and enmity formed a part of the 
circle of obligation which helped Rome to facilitate personal conduct, to maintain public 
order, and it even served as a means of policy in policing and providing societal structure
113during the expansion of the Roman empire. After all, under Augustus’ rule, “restoring
political and social order meant integrating the relevant social groups.”114 Integration in the 
empire did not take place apart from the primacy of personal social relations and obligations.
4. Political Aspects o f the Resolution o f Conflict 
Politics in Rome followed the lead of patronage, friendships, and incurred obligations 
spurring from other obligations. Patronage bolstered the politics of both the emperor and the 
elite through their networks and the obligations induced by both friendships and the patron- 
clients relationships.115 While patronal obligations played a primary role in politics, Roman 
politics possessed strong historical roots of conquest and war, land acquisition and debt, and 
conflict incumbent with those issues.116 This historical mentality of conquest and war was 
embedded into the psyche of Roman politics and life while influencing the first century world 
so much so that “without the proper mixture of arrogance and ruthlessness no one could 
attain the highest power.”117 Political enemies “sought not merely to overcome competitors
112 Epstein, Enmity, 127.
113 David Konstan, Public Order, 85-119.
114 Konstan, Public Order, 85.
115 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 150. Contra John R. Patterson, Political Life in the City o f Rome, 59. 
Patterson questions its importance in politics, noting, “The importance of patronage-relationships in Roman 
society is evident but what is less clear is how politically important patronage was. Since there are few overt 
references to patronage in contemporary accounts of the late Republic, it is likely that, although the elite used 
obligations of patronage to induce social inferiors to vote for them, it was just one technique among many rather 
than being of unique importance.”
116 M. I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 111-114.
117 Finley, Politics, 118.
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for leadership but to destroy them, figuratively and sometimes literally.”118 Finley explains
the political conflicts, the pursuit of political support, and the critical role of patronage with
its underlying obligations,
No matter how closed and solitary the ruling class, its politically ambitious members 
were compelled to seek continuing support from the mass of the citizenry, and to 
undermine support for their rivals. In a world that clung to the face-to-face city-state 
community, no matter how fictitious it became in reality, the most effective way of 
accomplishing the latter was to break rivals, by moral obloquy, by financial penalties, 
and, best of all, by physically removing them from the community through exile or 
death. The combat was highly personal because of the constitutional and 
governmental machinery. Power did not rest on, or derive from, office or any other 
formal base. The forums in which it expressed itself constitutionally were large 
bodies, councils or assemblies, which met frequently and had few restraints on their 
right of decision-making; hence, the continuous tension in the lives of the leaders. 
Hence, too, the necessity of building up a personal network, through family alliances 
and through all possible forms of patronage.119
Roman politics and its influence in daily life appropriated wealth, strength, brutality,
exploitation, and “arrogant power drives of individual members of the elite” as a means of
achieving political success.120 The tension of politics and social relations in daily life
between individuals, between an individual and a community, and between politically
ambitious competitors were often publicly displayed and felt.121
Political success for Roman politicians spurred conflict against their rivals and their
accompanying networks. Epstein says, “A Roman politician built power and influence
through a network of friends, relatives and clients united by the bonds of trust. Any violation
or interference with these bonds had the potential for destroying careers and therefore
sparked inimicitiae ”U1 As a means of control over another person, enmity, also “a synonym
for every form of savagery, a model by which violence can be measured,” was the means by
118 Finley, Politics, 118.
119 Finley, Politics, 119.
120 Finley, Politics, 120.
121 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 70.
122 Epstein, Enmity, 128.
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which a more powerful person could suspend all social contact with an enemy, could incite 
hostile activity, could exile a foe, “the consummate legal injury short of execution,” or 
provoke fear to influence foes and weaker persons.123 So intense was enmity in Roman 
society that a person’s reputation could be damaged. “The potential damage of a Roman’s 
reputation might suffer as a result of becoming reconciled is also apparent in the elaborate 
attempt to clothe reconciliations in the mantle of patriotism or comparable virtues.”124 
Furthermore, “the pursuit of one’s inimici was not the principal demand of Roman 
aristocratic society, and would yield with minimal loss of face when it conflicted with higher 
values.”125 Inimicitae allowed the powerful to enforce domination over the weaker elements 
of society, assumed a “particular force in shaping public conduct,” and, through personal 
enforcement, produced freedom for reconciling conflict with a bias toward the strong or 
privileged in society, or at the least “the sanctity of a treaty” or “professions of good faith.”126
5. Conflict Resolution
While the legal, social, and political aspects provide a framework to understand conflict 
resolution, the common chain linking the resolution of conflict is Roman obligation.127 When 
legal, social and political conflicts and tensions arose, always in the context of power and 
relationships, Roman obligation became the means to resolve the conflict. If the terminology 
of Roman law, patronage, the paterfamilias, friendship, and enmity are discussed in 
particular, obligation is the common link in the social dynamic of persons relating to one 
another. Roman obligation itself is highlighted in the resolution of conflict in specific
123 Epstein, Enmity, 74, 73-80.
124 Epstein, Enmity, 8.
125 Epstein, Enmity, 8.
126 Epstein, Enmity, 127-9, 5.
127Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 221. He says, in regard to the controversy in the church, we “should be 
more ready to look for connections between other parts of Romans and the actual state of affairs in Rome.” 
Connecting conflict resolution to the state of affairs in Rome and conflict in the church is important to solving 
the controversy in the church.
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circumstances, often in a subjective interpretation by the most powerful, and often informally 
based on the nature of the relationship. In its simplest terms, there were rules for resolution, 
but the rules came with a bias toward the strong in society.
While the rules were biased, they were treated with utter seriousness, a matter of life 
and death, and, in the sense of the Roman “good and morally excellent man,” he “neither 
contends with anyone, nor, as far as he has power, does he allow others to contend.”128 The 
Romans resolved conflict on the basis of compliance to obligations (no contention) or under 
forced obligation (nor does he allow others to contend) with the purpose of unity, defined by 
the term “society” (societas). “Society” addresses unity under two Greek terms: concord 
(opovoia) and dissension (aTdaiq): thus, “concord is the ideal, and dissension is the great 
enemy.”129 Concord, also thought of as good government, falls in line with Epictetus and his 
thoughts of “good order” (£UTdKTu><;) and “obedience” ( £ U T T £ i 0 u ) < ; ) ;  that is, conflict was 
resolved when the weaker acted orderly and obeyed the stronger.130 “A well-ordered 
community.. .comes into being through the human capacity for judgment (krisis) in matters of 
right and wrong.”131 Dissension (crrdaiq), or “faction,” occurred when, “those who envy 
these men for being honoured begin the faction, or these men owing to their superiority are 
not willing to remain in a position of equality.”132 Dissension called for revenge through the 
implementation of order, that is, conflict was forced in making each man keep “his place in 
the ranks” and in “making their servant class useful to them not only for the ministrations of 
daily life but also for war.”133 Clearly conflict resolution in concord through obedience kept
128 Epictetus, Discourses 4.5.1-2.
129 Jeffers, Conflict at Rome, 142.
130 Epictetus, Discourses 3.24.95.
131 David Cohen, Law, Violence, and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 38; Aristotle, Politics 1275a23-5.
132 Aristotle, Politics 1304a. Aristotle defines a citizen as one who participates in judgments (krisis): “A citizen 
pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as the right to participate injudicial functions and office.”
133 Josephus, Jewish War 3.93; 3.70.
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the winners as winners, more superior, and, in dissension, made the stronger winners, victors 
in a contest of war over their weaker inferiors. Conflict resolution required quick, sound, 
accurate judgments which “produce love in the household, concord in the state, and peace 
among the nations.”134 The goal of conflict resolution results in unity of spirit (love), purpose 
(concord) and social relations (peace).
Conflict was more likely to be resolved if there was a commitment to virtue. Cicero 
discusses conflict and the rules of obligation in the realm of virtue, honour, justice, and 
orderliness. Embedded in the Roman mind, especially of the elite, was the concept of a 
“career of honour,” representing both “a source of legitimate social authority, that is, of an 
authority of people who were brought up to obey,” and a “social sanction” reinforcing a 
person’s reputation.135 Virtue in the mind of the Roman included moral goodness, the 
concept of the “good man,” and the daily moral right “in the range of our comprehension,” 
because in the Roman world one’s moral reputation was an integral part of one’s rank in 
society.”136 “Comprehension” tends to have a subjective aspect to it, an aspect that Cicero 
describes as maintaining progress in “the direction of virtue,” meaning that the virtue 
influenced decision and action.137 Cicero adds, “.. .duties appeal to all men who have a
13Rdisposition to virtue.”
Justice also fills the Roman mind when conflicts arise, part of which, when justice is 
understood, each person “shall be in a position easily to decide what our duty on each 
occasion is.”139 Of justice, three comments by Cicero place conflict resolution in perspective 
and indicate the challenge Paul faced when writing his Letter to the Romans. First, justice
134 Epictetus, Discourses 4.5.35-6.
135 Cicero, On Duties 3.6; Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 69.
136 Cicero, On Duties 3.17; Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 41.
137 Cicero, On Duties 3.17.
138 Cicero, On Duties 3.16.
139 Cicero, On Duties 1.29.
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does not dismiss self-interest: “And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interest and
surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should consider his own
interests....”140 Second, justice is often interpreted subjectively according to Roman custom,
with an “eye to advantage and the profit of the community.”141 Third, justice did not always
mean that the letter of the law was served in its strictest sense, but could be weighed against
law based on social position: “More law, less justice,” a concept given within the frame
reference of “it is no violation of moral duty to give the greater good precedence over the
lesser good.”142 The decision of what was a greater good over against a lesser good was
subjective and became a means of the “greater” to subject the “lesser” to obligation, an
obligation giving the advantage to the strong over the weak. Honour, virtue and justice
influenced conflict and its resolution.
Another factor that influenced the mind of the Roman in conflict resolution was
“orderliness” in Greek euTa^ia, referring to “orderly conduct” in time and place.143 Strategic
to conflict resolution was orderliness, also known as the “moderation,” a Stoic philosophy
indicating “the science of disposing aright everything that is done or said.”144 Cicero clearly
sets forth a foundational plan for conflict resolution in words and deeds, or speech and action,
when he discusses orderliness as “the arrangement of things in their suitable and appropriate
places.”145 He continues by describing orderliness as “right placing” in the “right time” under
the terms occasion and moderation,
By ‘place of action,’ moreover, they mean the seasonableness of circumstance; and 
the seasonable circumstance for an action is called in Greek e u K a i p i a ,  in Latin 
occasio (occasion). So it comes from that in this sense of moderation, which we
140 Cicero, On Duties 3.42.
141 Cicero, The Invention 1.68.
142 Cicero, On Duties 1.33; 1.32.
143 Cicero, On Duties 1.142.
144 Cicero, On Duties 1.142.
145 Cicero, On Duties 1.142.
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explain as I have indicated, is the science of doing the right thing at the right time.146 
The key to conflict resolution was making the right decision at the right time, meaning that 
resolution was often a time-place-occasion requiring a quick decision and demanding the 
meeting of certain obligations on the spot and in the moment. The Romans themselves were 
“good calculators of duty” and “able by adding and subtracting to strike a balance correctly 
and find out just how much is due (debeatur) to each individual.”147 The resolve, however 
calculated in the context of time-place-occasion-duty, anticipated an action related to the 
“orderliness of conduct.”148 Cicero confirms the importance of orderliness in sync with 
conduct as action by saying, “Such orderliness of conduct, is, therefore, to be observed, that 
everything in the conduct of our life shall balance and harmonize, as in a finished speech.”149 
Consider “balance and harmony” as two indispensable keys to conflict resolution: (1) 
“balance” as the hierarchical pattern on the Roman social scale; and (2) “harmony” as the 
fulfilment of obligations that flowed from reciprocity in social relations based on rank and 
status in society. “Balance and harmony” in Roman society entered as the hierarchy was 
accepted and its ensuing obligations performed in action as an occasion arose, two themes 
that reinforced the machinery of Pax Romana and two themes that coerced Roman concord, 
social cohesion, and apparent unity.
How, then, if the influences of honour, virtue, justice, and orderliness influenced 
conflict resolution, was conflict actually resolved? Primary to the whole concept of 
resolution, in line with the Roman hierarchical patterns and social position was the 
undeniable and clearly defined rank and persona, that is, a person’s status (irpoawTTOv).
146 Cicero, On Duties 1.142.
147 Cicero, On Duties 1.59.
148 Cicero, On Duties 1.144.
149 Cicero, On Duties 1.144.
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Rank was determined by the generally accepted classifications of people based on 
property ownership, wealth, and a formal, superior position on the social scale or “ladder” of 
social distinction.150 Status refers to the “the idea of a legal personality,” literally “a face” or 
persona,151 which “was based on the social estimation of his honour, the perception of those 
around him as to his prestige.”152 Occasionally, “contradictions between status and rank gave 
rise to tensions,” but mostly rank and status obligated social inferiors to a wide range of 
relationships with interacting obligations.153 “Roman law was originally based on status 
relationships” and Roman law “intended to interfere with the internal aspects of these status 
relationships as little as possible: pietas,fides, reverentia and the mores maiorum were 
largely relied upon as entirely satisfactory regulatory mechanisms.. .”154 The social 
distinctions of rank and status in these vertical relationships aimed largely at reducing “the 
incidence of social conflict.” 155 However, once conflicting duties arose and called for a 
decision, rank and status and class distinctions took “precedence which is demanded by the 
interest of human society.”156 Even when rank and status did not reduce social conflict it 
became a key instrument in resolving it on the basis of subjection because rank implied 
superior hierarchy and status implied persona, the privilege of authority over others,157 each 
distinction relishing the role in Roman society of subjecting inferiors.
Once rank and status were determined, then certain rules filtered through the Roman 
mind, each filter confirming rules of obligation that expected a definite response. Epictetus
150 Carcopino, Daily Life in Ancient Rome, 52.
151 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 137-39.
152 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 118.
153 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 118-19.
154 Zimermann, Law o f Obligations, 350.
155 Gamsey and Sailer, The Early Principate, 26.
156 Cicero, On Duties 1.160.
157 Gamsey and Sailer, The Early Principate, 3.
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says, “Our duties in general are measured by our social relationships.”158 Cicero adds, . .if 
we follow that rule in comparing courses of conduct, we shall never swerve from the path of 
duty.”159 Every decision related to duty understands good judgment (/crisis) in social relations 
and its sequential, hierarchical pattern in social ties: the bonds of human society, the bonds of 
fellow citizens in the politeia, the bonds of household, the bonds of friendship, the bonds of 
those indebted to you in society, and the absolute, unmitigated commitment to the “common 
good.”160 Along with the bonds of “common good,” follow the “established customs (mores) 
and conventions of a community,” such as agree with virtue, honour, and even privilege.161
In regard to the path of duty, referred to in Epictetus as the “principles of duty,” such 
principles focus on mutual social relations and the fact that nothing should be done 
“irrationally or contrary to the principles of duty.”162 These principles are to be “at 
command,” “ready to be used in any instance,” remembering “who we are, and what is our 
designation, and must endeavour to direct our actions, in the performance of our duties, to 
meet the possibilities of our social relations.”163 Epictetus emphasizes the “commands” and 
“prohibitions” commensurate with duty and obligation.164 The “remembrance” of “who we 
are,” accordingly, reflects status, rank, the path or principle of duty, obligations and the social 
ties that create unity by resolving conflict. Epictetus adds, noting a strategy for the time- 
place-occasion importance of understanding the proper obligatory response in a given 
situation, “We must remember what is the proper time for song, the proper time for play, and
158 Epictetus, Encheiridion 30.
159 Cicero, On Duties 3.19-20.
160 Cicero, On Duties 3.26.
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in whose presence; also what will be out of place; lest our companions despise us, and we 
despise ourselves; when to jest, and whom to laugh at, and to what end to engage in social 
intercourse, and with whom; and, finally, how to maintain one’s proper character in such 
social intercourse.”165 The path or principles of duty started with a moral obligation and 
filtered downward in the Roman mind from state, household, friendship, and other categories 
based upon hierarchy, obligations, and superiority, the stronger possessing a powerful 
advantage over the weaker in society. Decisions for action and resolution could take place 
any time and a Roman had to be prepared to respond in action or resolution immediately. The 
path of duty was a clear calling for action, as mentioned earlier in Cicero’s comment on 
“gradations of duty” (gradus officiorum).166 along the ascending hierarchical scale. The key 
to resolution, along the lines of “a path of duty,” cut paths understood in the realm of Roman 
obligation’s hierarchical pattern, which were “the variety of ways the powerful people in 
classical society had developed techniques for creating obligation to themselves amongst 
lesser individuals...”167These techniques called for instantaneous decisions influencing 
resolution.
The path of duty, its techniques for obligation, required a “good faith,” a promise 
based on a code of ethics for a person to keep his word and obligations.168 Cicero 
acknowledged that “good faith” (fides) is a promise “made good,” “the foundation of justice,” 
and “truth and fidelity to promises and agreements.”169 Good faith linked people together in a 
network of trust, loyalty, and reciprocal relations “reflected in the language of debt associated 
with officium,” that is obligation.170 Cicero comments that good faith procured “a bond,”
165 Epictetus, Discourses 4.12.15-8.
166 Cicero, On Duties 1.160.
167 Judge, “St. Paul as a Radical Critic of Society,” Interchange 16 (1973): 196.
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For our ancestors were of the opinion that no bond was more effective in guaranteeing 
good faith than an oath. That is clearly proved by the laws of the Twelve Tables, by 
the ‘sacred’ laws, by treaties in which good faith is even pledged to enemies, by the 
investigations made by the censors and the penalties imposed by them; for there were 
no cases in which they used more rigorous decisions than in the violation of an 
oath.171
Conflict, disputes and obligations could be “settled by simple assertion under oath.” Good 
faith on the path of duty created a binding obligation not only to social inferiors, but also 
placed obligations on the superior should an obligation be refused or not performed, an 
intensely personal, emotional and obligatory response calling for resolution in waves of 
energy that moved obligations toward peace or war, concord or enmity, obligation in unity or 
obligation through oppression.
A good Roman of moral character would not deviate from the path of duty or 
principles of obligation. Epictetus says, “But whenever you deviate from any one of these 
principles, immediately you suffer loss, and that not from anywhere outside, but from the 
very nature of the activity (evepyeiag).”173 Deviation from the path of obligation was 
unacceptable because it could adversely affect such things as reciprocal relations and a 
responsive obligation, an aspect of patronage and benefits, and the way to “enforce rules” 
through reciprocity.174 Reciprocal obligation “in the extensiveness of the patronage network 
was a powerful force for social cohesion,”175 a kind of forced cohesion. A reciprocal 
obligation might have negative effects, meaning that if a weaker person refuses an obligation 
to a stronger then the stronger has another obligation to the weaker. Patronage, in Roman 
obligation, almost never ceased, so that there was “no end to duties.. ..”176 Benefits, in the 
context of reciprocity “advertised” inferiority, rules of subordination, and social
171 Cicero, On Duties 3.111.
172 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 65.
173 Epictetus, Discourses 4.12.17-8.
174 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 106.
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consequences.177 In fact, Roman obligation, even in conflict resolution, possessed the power
of reciprocity and “introduces another aristocratic code.”178 The refusal of an obligation
invited hostility from the stronger or superior. Epstein explains,
The Romans expected gratia (gratitude) in return for services rendered. Gratia was 
essential to cement relationships within the pyramids of friends, proteges and clients 
that dominated the Roman political landscape. Failure to display sufficient gratia was 
a violation of some sort of contract or expectation and occasioned bitter hostility.179
Such hostility might include moral condemnation, the destruction of a person’s reputation,
shame, and other forms of exploitation or extortion based by the more superior person in
society.180 Roman obligation had an exploitive, extortionate, and vindictive side to it for
those refusing to remain faithful to their obligations, so much so that those with “prestige
stood ready to crush the ungrateful.”181 An observer of the behaviour of the prestigiously
superior and the fear of the inferior might conclude this: “the line between corruption and
non-corruption is not only extremely difficult to draw but also shifts according to the
observer’s ethical system.”182 Conflict resolution itself bordered on unfair action, corrupt in
nature, when the privileged strong exploited the weak in legal proceedings, politics, and,
especially, social practice.
175 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 146,201.
176 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 67.
177 Sailer, Personal Patronage under the Early Empire, 127. See also A. R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid, 50- 
51. He discusses euergetism, reciprocity, benevolence, “the nature of return,” and patronage saying, “The 
acceptance resolutions of social clubs and political assemblies alike follow almost a set formula in stating the 
various honours which the donor is to receive in return for his gift.. .The formula runs to the effect that in 
recognizing the generosity o f the donor the recipients have conferred upon him honours which are not less, but 
rather more, than the equivalent of his gift. The implication of this was threefold: firstly, that the obliged party 
had repaid his obligation, as honour demanded, with interest; secondly, that it was now for the donor, both as a 
matter of material interest and moral obligation, to display his generosity still further; and, thirdly, that others 
should be inspired to emulate it.”
178 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 63.
179 Epstein, Enmity, 42.
180 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 124-7.
181 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 158; Finley, Politics in the Ancient World, 120. He says, “...it is an indubitable 
fact that for centuries the Roman state had been an exploitive instrument unique in antiquity in strength, brutality 
and the scale and reach of the exploitation.”
182 Finley, Politics, 51.
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Conflict resolution aimed to fulfil obligations that would result in a peaceful solution 
through behaviour and conduct. When a peaceful solution ensued it reinforced superiority, it 
strengthened social ties in their legal, political and social aspects, and it solidified social 
cohesion. When conflict was resolved unpeacefully, through exile or rejection, like Claudius’ 
edict of AD, or through the harshness of enmity and revenge, it reinforced inferiority, coerced 
social ties, and resolved conflict, but often masked the underlying tensions in the circuitous, 
never-ending cycle of obligations in an atmosphere of “irresponsible exploitation.”183
6. A Brief Synopsis for Romans 14:1-15:13 
A brief overview is necessary for understanding Roman conflict resolution for a clearer 
picture of the social and legal implications that will aid an interpretation of Romans 14:1- 
15:13.184 Rome’s obligation society was based on relationships in the essence of a legal 
contract with social ties, a complex network of obligations and duties based on rights.185 
Roman culture produced recognised mores or customs that “became a positive force of 
obligation, more akin to statute than some inchoate natural-law sense of morality or right or 
innate practices.”186 The customs in their “currents of influence” reinforced legal and social 
superiority, thus accentuating an already present pattern of social hierarchy.187 Crook refers 
to custom, not as a source of law, but more as “a guiding principle” of conduct in the realm of 
Roman honour.188 The social hierarchy was based on two keys: order and patronage. Order 
created a stable society, reduced tensions, and enhanced social cohesion.”189 Patronage 
advocated a patron (“father”) who “was a social superior who was supposed to look out for a
183 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 5.
184 The Latin Vulgate uses the verb debemus correlative to 6<f>£iAonEV (Rom 15:1).
185 Ibbetson, An Introduction, 6-10.
186Bederman, Custom as a Source o f Law, 20.
187 MacMullen, Romanization, 24; Crook, Law and Life, 24,27-30.
188 Crook, Law and Life, 27.
189 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107.
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set of social inferiors (‘clients’) who were in turn loyal and supportive.”190 Patronage implied 
duty to the father (superior) by the client (inferior) and an obligatory debt associated with 
reciprocal social duties (qfficia) and compliance or obedience or “appropriate behaviour”
(obsequium).191 As has been shown, the social stratification between the strong and the weak, 
the superior and inferior duties and behaviours, and the conflict natural to Roman society, 
could combine to incite conflict and tension.
It is precisely this baggage listed above, some of it societal and possibly emotional, 
that Paul had to overcome to resolve the conflict between the strong and the weak. It is 
suggested that an obligation that produced order (the benefits of mutual friendship) and of 
appropriate behaviour (not enmity) for the Christian community in Rome was what Paul 
aimed to exploit in Romans 15:1 to resolve conflict.192
7. Conclusions
It has been argued that Roman obligation was the means of conflict resolution in Rome’s 
obligation society. The legal, social, and political aspects of Rome’s obligation society 
influenced conflict resolution. The primary influence and the critical tool of conflict 
resolution, Roman obligation, supplied rules and standards for conflict resolution based on 
legal dynamics, on reciprocal social ties of friendship and enmity, and on political 
motivations based on a hierarchical social scale.
Section one in this thesis has examined the various elements of the basis of Rome’s 
obligation society: Roman law, mores, the hierarchical pattern, and conflict resolution. 
Rome’s obligation society defined the social superiority of the strong over the weak in the
190 Riggsby, Roman Law, 50.
191 Sandra R. Joshel, Work, Identity, and Legal Status at Rome: A Study o f Occupational Inscriptions (Norman, 
Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 33. See also Sailer, Personal Patronage, 15-21.
192 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 179-86. He discusses friendship, the exchange of good and services, and 
“the continuing mutuality of obligation.”
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context of the rules, emotion, and intensely personal nature of Roman obligation. Section two 
will explore racial conflict in the Roman church, Paul’s prolegomenon to resolution, a new 
obligation for the church at Rome, and Paul’ establishment of a new model for obligation for 
the church. Paul’s challenge involved innovatively reinterpreting Roman obligation for the 
strong and the weak in the context of Christian ideals, conventions, and ethics of a radical 
nature. The next chapter will explore conflict in the Roman church and the problem of 
polarization that existed.
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SECTION TWO:
OBLIGATION IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN ROME
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Chapter 5: Conflict in the Roman Church
Introduction
It has been argued that Rome’s obligation society had a path of duty by which 
conflicts were resolved. The challenge of the Roman church is the two-fold crisis of 
the first-century church: identity and harmony. The church in its early formation had a 
clear identity based upon Christ. It resolved issues in an effort to find harmony under 
the cross of Christ. This harmony, as seen from earlier chapters, was more complex 
than simply asking people to learn to relate to each with respect, kindness, and 
harmony. MacMullen says, “Access Roman law was the privilege of Roman 
citizenship, as every reader of St. Paul’s life well knows.”1 Leon Morris states it 
succinctly, “Those converted to Christianity in the first century did not come with 
minds like empty slates.”2 Obligations, rights, duties and remedies for conflict filtered 
through their minds.
What Paul attempted to communicate in Romans 14:1-15:13 is that a new and 
different obligation had to order conduct in the church and this required adjusting the 
old prejudices of Augustus and adopting the new principles of Christ. Still, the old 
prejudices entered into the Roman church and became a part of the untangling of the 
complex web of relationships which the apostle Paul sought to convey in order to 
achieve harmony in the church.3 The purpose of this chapter discusses the old 
prejudices, more exactly, the polarizing conflict in the church in Rome.
1 Ramsey MacMullen, Romanization in the Times o f Augustus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000), 12.
2 Leon Morris, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1997), 477.
3 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 64-158. He does a thorough job of discussing food consumption, 
Sabbath days, and issues surrounding the controversy between the strong and the weak from Romans 
14. Two important issues will emerge in this chapter of the thesis: (1) an emphasis on contributing 
social factors such a “rights” in the realm of Roman obligation; and (2) the role of anti-Semitism in the 
controversy in the church.
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In order to demonstrate conflict as the cultural precedent in the Roman church, 
this chapter will discuss (1) Paul’s challenge; (2) Paul’s warning and the crossover of 
anti-Semitism into the Roman church; (3) the general dichotomy of church conflict 
and polarization outlined in Romans 14; (4) the specifics of the conflict in the Roman 
church between the strong and the weak over Sabbath days and food; (5) the 
unresolved conflict between the strong and the weak and the two ways of approaching 
the conflict.
1. Paul's Challenge in the Church in Rome 
Paul’s challenge for conflict resolution in the church between the strong and the weak 
centred upon overcoming the Roman, legal, political, and social expectations related 
to conflict resolution. His greatest challenge was assisting the church in looking at 
conflict resolution not through Roman eyes, not through the cultural norms of rank 
and status, and not through the hierarchical pattern with its downward scale of 
obligations in relationships.4 Obligation appeared systematic, relational, and in the 
machinery of Roman engineering, innovative, giving rise to sharper distinctions of 
rank, or do, a path of duty, and reciprocal relations in a “circle of privilege” that 
purported stability through inequality.5
Paul did not want the Romans to view the church as another association 
(icollegium) that followed a stratified social pattern. Paul’s challenge was to assist the 
church in looking at conflict resolution through transformed eyes, through spiritual 
norms that overlooked rank and status because of Christ, and with innovative 
obligations that would give rise to a fresh spiritual model, one that did not ignore 
princeps, but placed Christ in higher priority calling for a proper ethical response.
4 Nguyen. Christian Identity in Corinth, 129-51. Nguyen appraises a similar situation in Corinth where 
Paul’s challenge for conflict included overcoming an obsession with persona, social stratification, and 
hierarchy imbedded in Corinthian minds by Roman legal, social and obligatory rights and duties.
5 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107,117, 107-25.
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Paul’s challenge was to overcome the ethics of pure Roman obligation, thus 
inviting a new ethic based on obligation first and foremost to Christ. Judge sums up 
Paul’s challenge, “The kind of thinking that Paul did belongs to this field [of ethics] 
precisely because it is not systematic, and not derived or related deliberately to other 
systems of ethics: it is an independent attempt, within the context of current language, 
ideas and conventions, but beginning from a fresh and radical starting point, to judge 
the value of things in human life.”6 Paul’s challenge involved the use of the language, 
idea, and convention of Roman obligation by transforming them into a radical ethic 
with Christ as the starting and ending point. Paul’s challenge included a revolutionary, 
countercultural, re-ordering of obligation as it was viewed through Roman eyes in 
social practice so that conflict between the strong and the weak could find a peaceful 
resolution.
2. Paul's Warning
Paul gives four commands in his warning to the church in Rome. Each, according to 
Moo, appeals to a plea for unity: “Do not condemn one another! (14:1-12); Do not 
cause your brother to stumble! (14:13-23); Put other people first! (15:1-6); and 
Receive one another! (15:7-13).”7 Schreiner mentions that the structure of these 
sections is debated,8 but undebatable is the fact that Paul exhorts the church. The 
Greek verbs indicate that the conflict in the church involved condemnation, people 
causing others to stumble, selfishness, and a lack of Christian reception. Paul warns 
the church with two negative and two positive commands.9 More importantly, he 
warns them that the secular mores established in their minds influenced their actions, 
conduct, and relationships, but they would not work to create harmony in the church
6 Judge, “St. Paul and Socrates,” Interchange 14 (1973): 111.
7 Douglass J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1996), 35.
8 Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1998), 703.
9 Epictetus, Discourses 3.96-102. He discusses order, obedience, duty, and not abandoning one’s “post” 
(tcc ^ iv )  as two keys for the good and excellent man to act upon: commands and prohibitions.
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or fulfil the righteousness, peace and joy of the Holy Spirit (Rom 14:17).10 His
warning calls for a new kind of action based upon God’s kingdom.
Bryan views Romans 12:1-15:13 as an exhortation (parainesis) as the “climax
and purpose of his protreptic,” with the exhortation of 12:1 inviting the church to
adhere to the “communal values” that follow faith and an exhortation signalling what
is to come.11 Kasemann sees Romans 14:1-15:13 as a “special exhortation” following
the earlier general exhortation.12 Stuhlmacher identifies the special exhortation in
relation to Paul’s desire for “mutual acceptance,” where the Roman house church was
dominated by Gentile Christians but now was to receive with open arms the Jewish
Christians after the return of Jews to Rome in the wake of the reversal of the edict of
Claudius.13 Jewett sees the “sectarian atmosphere” of the early church as one that Paul
aimed to unify under Christ “that did not seek ‘to erase their subgroup identities.’”14
Witherington further adds to the context of Romans 14 when he mentions
Horace and Cicero:
Horace in Satires 1.9.68-72 describes an interesting conversation that 
transpired in Rome and is of relevance to our discussion of Romans 14. One 
person refuses to talk to another and adds, “Today is the thirtieth Sabbath. 
Would you affront the circumcised Jews?” The other replies, “I have no 
scruples.” The first rejoins, “But I have. I am a somewhat weaker brother, one 
of many. I will talk another day.” The discussion clearly links Jewishness or 
sympathy with Jewishness with being a weaker brother, in the context of 
Rome. There is, furthermore, the discussion in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 
4.26 where he speaks of the morally weak person as one who has intense 
belief that something ought to be avoided, even though in actuality it cannot 
be avoided. He calls it ‘an act of judging that one has knowledge where one 
has none.’15
10 Bruce W. Winter, After Paul Left Corinth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 43.
11 Bryan, 194.
12 Kasemann, 364.
13 Stuhlmacher, 223.
14 Jewett, Romans, 836; Philip F. Esler. Conflict and Identity in Romans: The Social Setting o f  Paul's 
Letter (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 352.
15 Witherington, 333; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.26. Horace, Satires 1.9.68-72. In a footnote 
Witherington thanks Charles Talbert for the reference.
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Witherington cites Horace and Cicero after acknowledging the Roman persona as an 
underlying contextual theme of Romans. He states, “The Roman persona, which 
included elements of assumed superiority in culture, race, and matters religious, is 
what Paul must deal with if he is to build a bridge of unity between Jewish and 
Gentile Christians in Rome.”16
Conflict required a plan to unify the Jewish and Gentile Christians, but the 
complexity of cultural underpinnings meant that the bridges went beyond mere Jewish 
and Gentile barriers. Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations illustrates this fact: “So it is true 
that the passions of ungovernable men are in continual conflict: satisfy one and you 
have to resist another.”17 Obligations of one kind or another seemed circuitous and 
unending. This circle of never-ending obligations clearly adds to the complexity of 
relationships in the church as well as requiring supernatural resolve.
The conflict between Jews and Gentiles also pointed toward another cultural 
bias that had infected the church: the crossover of anti-Semitism into the church. Paul 
warned against anti-Semitism in Romans 11:13-21 and Romans 12:3-4. In the former 
passage he tells the strong Gentiles to “boast (KccTccKauxw) not against the branches”
(11:18), that is, not to demonstrate prejudice against the Jews. The Latin equivalent of 
“boasting” is gloria (glory), a word intertwined in the culture of obligation. Epstein 
says “the most fertile source of ruptured friendship among the ruling class, was the 
universal and ferociously competitive desire for honour and glory {gloria).”18 Romans 
competed for privilege in an effort to gain wealth, status, and fame while rivalry and 
ambition influenced the Roman persona that led to factions in society and in New
16 Witherington, 333.
17 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.20.73.
18 Epstein, Enmity, 41; Cicero, On Friendship 33-5; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 1.45.109.
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Testament churches.19 The fierce emotion attached to such boasting and glory is 
difficult to describe.
Clarke writes one “aspect of secular leadership which had been adopted by the 
Corinthian church was its tendency toward boasting and taking pride in men.”20 He 
notes that the cultural evidence suggests boasting as a symbol of status, boasting in 
men, and self-interest, as well as self-praise which included self-display as “an 
important and accepted aspect of leadership in the Graeco-Roman world.”21 Paul’s 
warns against this kind of display in the church.
Paul outlines the polarizing conflict between the strong and the weak and 
details the specific cause for the conflict while expressing his warning of concern 
(Rom 14). The conflict arose over the strong and the weak and their different beliefs 
about Sabbath feast days and food.
3. Dichotomy o f Church Conflict in Romans 14 
Romans 14 discusses two primary issues facing the church in its endemic social 
relations: Sabbath days and food. However, three general background issues from 
Romans 14 must first be addressed: the influence of ethnicity regarding the issues at 
hand, the practical nature of Roman social relations, and the theology of Paul as he 
seeks to resolve the conflict.
The influence of ethnicity of the Jew-Gentile struggle had long been a source 
of contention in the first-century church. The diaspora, a term “which was coined by 
the Septuagint and has been used for centuries with exclusive reference to Jews,” by 
definition, form “local and translocal identities,” thus they “retain a sense of 
belonging elsewhere (in memory, myth or longing to return), but also typically
19 Epstein, Enmity, 90; Aristotle, Politics 1302a32,1302b5-20. He says those seeking honour engage in 
factions to gain shares for themselves with u(3piq {hubris), superiority in arrogance.
20 Andrew Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 95.
21 Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership, 99, 95-99; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.20.46;
2.27.65.
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develop a strong sense of attachments to their present place of belonging.”22 Barclay
refers to this clearly as a “double-consciousness,” a “not here-to-stay” mentality that
often contributed to “an ambiguity of identity.”23 His introduction discusses identity,
cultural self-expression, power and politics as well as acknowledging the complex
“power dynamics.”24 Barclay’s comment on Josephus is worth noting here because it
signifies the complexity and paradox of finding a place, belonging, and relating in
Roman society and has relevance for Romans 14. Barclay says,
A similar paradox, of acquiescence as the route to self-empowerment, is 
illustrated in the final essay on “The Politics of Contempt” in Josephus’s 
apologetic work, Against Apion. Rome’s supercilious treatment of 
“subjugated” nations is here illustrated by her treatment of Egypt and Egyptian 
religion, and Josephus’s deployment of such negative cultural stereotypes is 
shown to serve his need to differentiate, as clearly as he can, between Judeans 
and Egyptians. Tracing this strategy through the skillful rhetoric of Against 
Apion, I suggest that Josephus carefully matches his discourse with the Roman 
sense of cultural superiority, but does so, paradoxically, precisely to honour 
and elevate another “subjugated” people, his own Jewish nation. This strategic 
self-positioning on the Roman cultural map is another example of diaspora 
ambiguity and the creativity it can spawn. While adopting cultural values of 
his Roman hosts, Josephus uses these to create a foundation for his own 
cultural tradition. The power dynamics are complex and not resolvable into the 
common alternative portraits of Josephus as national traitor or fearless 
advocate for Judaism. In this light, Josephus becomes a particularly interesting 
example of the complexities and tensions inherit in the diaspora condition.25
Barclay may well have been writing about Romans 14 and the dynamic issues of self­
empowerment, the entanglements of honour, and the stubborn air of superiority 
exhibited by the Romans, and possibly, by the Jews.
Josephus, in reference to the practical nature of the dichotomy between Roman 
law and Jewish laws addresses not only the ethnic challenges, but the practical 
challenge of double consciousness. He speaks of the passion of the Jews, “And from 
these laws nothing has the power to deflect us, nether fear of our masters, nor envy of
22 John M. G. Barclay, ed., Negotiating Diaspora (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 1-2.
23 Barclay, ed., Negotiating Diaspora, 1-2.
24 Barclay, ed., Negotiating Diaspora, 6.
25 Barclay, ed., Negotiating Diaspora, 5-6.
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the institutions esteemed by other nations. We have trained our courage, not with a 
view to waging war of self-aggrandizement, but in order to preserve our laws.”26 
Josephus also illustrates the complexity of the Gentile population understanding 
Judaism and Jewishness when he details a story like the one in which a Jew, a 
lawbreaker forced to leave Israel, arrived in Rome, declared himself an interpreter of 
Jewish law, and then embezzled money from Fulvia, a woman of high rank whose 
husband was friend of Tiberius. Tiberius “ordered the whole Jewish community to 
leave Rome.”28 Even pragmatically, in culture and in the church, confusion of 
consciousness must have entered into the minds of Gentiles who had dealings with 
Jews.
Practically, a Roman did not struggle with loyalty to the Roman empire or its 
officials. Roman law and Romanization inbred loyalty into their consciousness. 
Practically, Jews battled this double consciousness as an issue of loyalty to their own 
status because, according to Josephus, “when pressure is put upon us to alter our 
statutes, then we deliberately fight, even against all odds, and hold out under reverses 
to the last extremity.”29 Contrast this with a Roman sense of law and duty to which 
Jews were required to follow in the Roman world and their “gradations of duty.”30 For 
Jews the practical question arises in decision-making and, for Jews who believed in 
Christ, of loyalties in order of priority on the descending scale: which god or God, and 
which country, Rome or Israel? For Romans these decisions were clear. For Roman 
Christians they were also relatively clear. For Jews living in Rome, Jews whom 
society typically frowned upon, such decisions on the ascending scale created internal 
dissonance. For Christian Jews the sorting out of priority and the disentangling of
26 Josephus, Against Apion 2.271-272.
27 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 18.83-84.
28 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 18.83.
29 Josephus, Against Apion 2.272.
30 Cicero, On Duties 1.160.
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excess baggage required a reordering of priorities on the descending scale. It was 
complex both ethnically and practically. The complexity became even more complex 
when the idea of decisions made on this descending scale complicated church life. 
What were the theological aspects which Paul entertained in his own thinking as he 
began to write Romans 14?
Paul’s theology is set forth in Romans 1 when he speaks of being a “servant of 
Jesus Christ” (1:1), when he addresses his hearers as the “beloved of God” (1:7), 
when he speaks of “the mutual faith of both you and me (1:12), and when he 
identifies himself as a “debtor” (1:14), a word (otjjEiAETqg) indicating from the outset 
of his letter that he had the language of distinctive Roman obligation in mind (see pp. 
22-24). Paul’s theology involved a Christocentric approach based on the cross of 
Christ which solidified identity and demanded harmony (Rom 5:8).31 Paul desires to 
establish (cmpixQqvai) them to anchor their identity in Christ, an identity one step 
beyond Jewish-Gentile conflict. Paul aims to create a harmonious church, a mutual 
faith, invigorated by a sense of not so much Roman political patronage but harmony 
in the patronal aspects of the household of Christ. Early in Romans Paul is using the 
language of obligation that indicates two things: “reciprocity and social cohesion.”32 
Sailer indicates that reciprocity became the “lubricant” of patronage and Roman 
society could hardly conceive of friendship, politics, and households without 
“reciprocal exchange.”33 Social cohesion, founded on patronage, suggests the 
language of family, patriarchy, and even property in the Roman family.34 Paul has the
31 Demetrius K. Williams. Enemies o f the Cross o f Christ: The Terminology o f the Cross and Conflict 
in Philippians (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 236. He views the cross as Paul’s 
“rhetorical weapon” against disunity. He adds, “Thus in Paul’s contests with his opponents the 
‘theology of the cross” is articulated with specific terminology to expose pretense and self- 
complacency, but at other times to instruct the churches about their unity...”
32 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 69.
33 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 5 , 14.
34 Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death, 72.
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thought of the church as family (Rom 14), that is, central to his letter is that Christ is
the head of the church, Christ the head of his family and such a family that requires
the meeting of reciprocal obligations in the spirit of Christ.35
Paul uses the familial word “brothers” twelve times in Romans, indicating
relevance to the language of patronage and family.36 Winter addresses Paul’s inverted
use of patronage for his purposes in creating harmony in the church at Corinth. His
comments serve our purposes here in the discussion of familial language:
Under Paul patronage values had been inverted, with a patron and patroness 
now serving people without respect for their persona and their usefulness for 
any personal political aspirations typical of patronage. The assistance and 
acknowledgement that Paul sought for both was again transformed by the very 
nature of the Christian community whose members Paul addresses as 
“brothers” or “beloved brothers” in familia language that was only reserved in 
Roman society for siblings, either bom in the family or adopted. They were no 
longer fawning and flattering parasites of private patrons, subservient to their 
ambitions and daily agendas, but were family-the family of God.37
Winter’s assertion for Corinth is equally true for Paul’s letter to the Romans. Paul’s
theology for Christians, both Jews and Gentiles, focuses on the principle that the
church is God’s family first and foremost regardless of race, social status, or any other
categorical designation society might want to pin on an individual or a group. Paul’s
theology included old mores given new meaning, ones with Christ as head and his
family intertwined in obligations of service.
4. Conflict Described in Romans 14 
Paul describes the conflict clearly in Romans 14 by discussing the question of 
Sabbath days and food, when to meet and what to eat. The real issue, however, is the
35 David L. Balch, Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in I  Peter (Chico, Calif.: Scholars 
Press, 1981). He discusses the Roman household code in relation to I Peter 3:1-6. An argument could 
also be made that Paul uses the household code as a guideline when writing his Christian household 
code in Ephesians 5:15-6:1-9, thus confirming Paul’s interest in his epistles in the important Roman 
aspects of domus, family, and patronage as a key link to identity and harmony in the churches, 
especially at Rome.
36 Rom 1:13; 7:4; 8:12; 8:29; 9:3; 10:1;11:25; 12:1; 15:14; 15:30; 16:17.
37 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 203.
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conflict between the strong and the weak. Schreiner says that “many scholars concur 
that Romans 14-15 is addressed to a specific situation in the Roman community.”38 
Witherington says that “Paul saved the most controversial ethical matter until the end 
of his ethical arguments.”39 He adds that Paul is using “an effective rhetorical 
technique and allows the rhetor to gain assent on lesser matters from the audience and 
build up momentum for the more difficult issues.”40 In Romans 14 Paul is gaining 
momentum on the path to his last and final argument which he will present in Romans 
15.
Who were the strong and who are the weak has already been discussed in the 
introduction of this thesis. The strong and the weak are used as strategic categories 
designating two groups in the church at Rome.41 The strong were “primarily”
Gentiles, although “there were probably some Jews, perhaps Priscilla and Aquila” 
who adopted Paul’s agreement with the strong, who were not concerned about 
Sabbath days and food as it relates to the church and heir relationship with Christ.42 
The weak were primarily Jews, although it is plausible that a few Gentile proselytes, 
“God-fearers,” were intermingled.43 Martin Luther says of the strong and the weak, 
“Consider in the first place the social orders.”44 When cognizance is taken of the 
social orders, the strong included primarily Gentiles and a few Jews who may well 
have been some wealthy individuals, patrons, benefactors who had their circle of
38 Schreiner, 706.
39 Witherington, 325.
40 Witherington, 325. He quotes Aristotle by noting “the deliberative orator ‘aims at establishing the 
expediency or harmfulness of a proposed course of action: if he urges its rejection he does so on the 
ground that it will do no harm’ (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3.21-15).” He also comments on Paul’s desire for 
unity in the church; “The rhetoric of concord is found throughout this argument in a very clear way” (p. 
327).
41 Contra Francis Watson, “Two Roman Congregations: Romans 14:1-15:13” (ed. Karl P. Donfried; in 
The Romans Debate: Revised and Expanded Edition (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991), 203-15.
42 Schreiner, Romans, 707. Schreiner presents an excellent discussion of the views on the strong and 
the weak.
43 Schreiner, Romans, 707.
44 Martin Luther, “Lectures on Romans: Glosses and Scholia,” Luther’s Works, vol. 25 (ed. Hilton C. 
Oswald; St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1972), 509.
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friends and weaker individuals under obligation to them. When cognizance is taken of 
the social orders, the primarily Jewish weak may well have been poor, those persons 
under obligation to patrons and indebted to the more elite both in society and, 
possibly, in the church. The nexus of relationships in the social orders meant that no 
societal, no ethnical, no pragmatical or no legal tendencies in Roman society pointed 
toward the strong and the weak mixing without racial baggage, consideration of social 
status, or obligations, in its strictest Roman, legal sense. Gamsey and Sailer comment: 
“Roman mle accentuated rather than broke down the divisions between city and 
country, rich and poor, local elites and the urban and rural masses.”45
Paul introduces the term “weak in faith” (Rom 14:1) in the discussion. The 
“weak in faith” were weak both in faith and socially. New Testament scholars discuss 
the “weak in faith.” Nanos discusses the “weak in faith” as “non-Christian Jews...” 
and “that Paul’s intention toward ‘the weak’ was to change their ‘faith’ to a faith in 
Jesus as the Christ.”46 This concept seems improbable because Paul uses “brothers” 
thirteen times in Romans.47 Kasemann acknowledges one view of the “weak in faith” 
as Gentile Christians with a reference to their pagan religious practices of things like 
vegetarianism, abstinence from wine and astrological beliefs in lucky and unlucky 
days based on a fear of demons.48 However, he calls this “quite unlikely.”49 Along 
with Barrett and Murray, Kasemann views the “weak in faith” as Jewish-Christian 
minority “were constantly fed by the pagan environment and by the group of god- 
fearers surrounding the Diaspora synagogue.”50 Cranfield, Stuhlmacher, and 
Witherington view the “weak in faith” as Jewish Christians who were concerned
45 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 203.
46 Nanos, 151,85-165.
47 See Schreiner, 707 n. 7.
48 Kasemann, 368.
49 Kasemann, 368.
50 Kasemann, 368; Barrett, 236; Murray, vol. 2: 174.
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about kosher food and “ceremonial requirements.”51 This thought seems plausible 
because of Paul’s use of words indicating Jewish food laws (k o i v o v , Rom 14:14; 
Ka0apa, Rom 14:20).52
Scholars also express general spiritual sentiments about the “weak in faith.” 
Sanday and Headlam say the weakness “means an inadequate grasp of the great 
principle of salvation by faith in Christ.. .”53 Dunn sees the weakness as a false trust in 
ethnic identity and weakness in the flesh, that is, “a ‘fleshly’ attitude.”54 Fitzmyer 
says of the weak, “Such persons have not really grasped what is meant by the 
uprightness through faith and have sought assurances through added practices.”55 
Morris adds that Paul “has in mind one who does not understand the conduct implied 
by faith; perhaps he is the person whose faith is ineffective.”56
Witherington indicates the social implications of the “weak in faith” by noting 
that “these Jewish Christians were of poor or lower social status.. .thus might be 
undoubtedly looked down upon, both for their foreignness and their supposed 
poverty.”57 Jewett follows a similar line of thinking as he discusses the “weak in 
faith” in terms of social or economic inferiority, a “negative epithet imposed on the 
subordinate members of the congregation,” and he contrasts the weak with those “in a 
more dominant position.”58 It is hard to know if Moo speaks of social hierarchy, but 
he does ask a question in somewhat legal terms, “Who has the right to assess the
51 Cranfield, 2:695-6; Stuhlmacher, 219-20; Witherington, 333-5.
52 Cranfield, 2:696.
53 Sanday and Headlam, 384.
54 Dunn, 2: 797.
55 Fitzmyer, 688.
56 Morris, 477.
57 Witherington, 335. He also mentions “one hierarchical position to be concerned about, that is, with 
his or her master-Christ” (p. 335).
58 Jewett, 834-35.
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believer’s status and conduct?”59 The “weak in faith” obviously found themselves in 
an inferior position in the church.
It is safe to assume also that when it came to the strong and the weak in the 
church at Rome, Roman rule, superiority, social hierarchy, and obligation contributed 
to clearly marked lines of social distinction and encouraged, rather than discouraged, 
divisions between the strong and the weak.60 These divisions frustrated Paul, his debt 
(Rom 1:14) to the church, his own theology which he is arguing in sequential logic, 
and his desire to correct the error within the church.
What was the strong’s theological judgment versus Jewish piety and what was 
the weak’s theological judgment based on restraints of Jewish law and tradition with 
regard to food and Sabbath days?
/. The weak’s theological judgment
Paul begins Romans 14:1 by speaking of the “weak in faith,” thus identifying them 
with the weak as a category of people in the church at Rome ( t o v  5 e  doGevouvia i f )  
moiet).61 Barrett says that their weakness “attests to a failure to grasp the 
fundamental principle, which page after page of this epistle emphasizes, that men are 
justified and reconciled to God not by vegetarianism, Sabbatarianism, or teetotalism, 
but by faith alone...” 62 Cranfield says, “It is evident that, as well as being weak in the 
faith, they were also weak in character, people who, though prone to indulge in 
censoriousness with regard to their fellow Christians, were fundamentally timid.”63 
Cranfield further adds that “they were liable to yield social pressure and.. .their
59 Moo, 833.
60 See also Jewett, Romans, 835; Esler, Conflict and Community, 341. Of the strong and the weak in the 
church each sees one “subordinate group” and another in a “dominant position.”
61 For a discussion of other scholars on other thoughts regarding the weak, “a relic of pagan religion” 
and “syncretistic religion,” see Kasemann, 367-68.
62 Barrett, 256.
63 Cranfield, 2:691 n. 3.
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integrity as persons was at risk.”64 On the contrary, the weak struggled with 
conscience and desire to please God, desiring to have high character and integrity as 
persons. Josephus confirms this, stating, that the Jews know their law and that “unity 
and identity of religious belief, perfect uniformity in habits and customs, produce a 
very beautiful concord in human character.”65 Paul is aware of this struggle of 
conscience, is sensitive to the weak, concerned to carefully use words to “inculcate 
behaviour that unites” and, consequently, makes use of a “rhetorical technique” with a 
“rhetorical pattern” in his words that insists that the “character of his discourse, in 
both its theological and ethical dimensions and parts, is intended to persuade the 
Roman Christians to take a particular course of action to unite and build up the body 
of Christ in Rome...”66 Paul appears to address the weak from his own position of 
concern, love, and with his greater interest in God’s kingdom and his church, not from 
the position of a harsh critic.
It is important to begin with the weak’s theological judgment because the 
strong have no argument without the weak’s beliefs, tendencies in conduct, and 
tradition. Schreiner notes that “the main issue is how Jewish and Gentile Christians 
could enjoy table fellowship together since they differed on which foods were 
permissible.”67 The weak, Jewish in background and context held to the Jewish 
practice of abstaining from pork and practicing vegetarianism. Judge says that the 
Roman contemporaries of Seneca and Paul found it “challenging,” even strange that 
Jews practiced such rites and customs {mores), and that “their daily life was the
64 Cranfield, 2:691 n. 3.
65 Josephus, Against Apion 2, 179.
66 Witherington, 325, 328.
67 Schreiner, 708. Michelle Slee. The Church in Antioch in the First Century CE: Communion and 
Conflict (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2003), 164. Slee notes that “Jewish-Gentile table 
fellowship” was a critical issue in the early churches (p. 164).
191
conscious replication and commemoration of the historical experience of the
people.”68 Judge states,
The philosopher Seneca reveals {Epistles, 108:22) that in his youth he had gone 
in for vegetarianism, but stopped when it was in danger of being taken as 
loyalty to “some foreign rites,” that were “at that time {sc. AD 19?) being 
inaugurated.” In a lost work he later criticized the popularity of Jewish 
practice, especially the waste of one day in seven (cited in Augustine, City o f 
God, 6.11):
The customs of this vicious race have gained such influence that they are now 
received throughout the world.. .The Jews, however, are aware of the origin 
and meaning of their rites. The greater part of the people go through a ritual 
not knowing why they do so. This is clear recognition (and by a highly 
competent observer) of the distinctive character and interest of Jewish 
tradition.69
Philo gives insight into the Jewish recognition from which meats to abstain, “based on 
two signs, the parted hoof and the chewing of the cud,” adding that “any kind which 
lacks both or one of these is unclean (dKaGorra).”70 Gamsey quotes the Letter o f 
Aristaeus to Philocrates saying, “The parting of the hoof and division of the foot 
‘symbolise discrimination in our every action with a view to what is right’; while 
‘chewing the cud’ stands for the gift of memory, ‘calling to mind life and existence’, 
or ‘what the Lord has wrought in you.’ ”71 Philo alludes to the fact of “purification” in 
regard to sacrifice, a purity that, no doubt, was riveted to the Jewish mindset and a 
key to other issues relating to Jewish custom and practice based on Old Testament 
Levitical rules.72 For the weak, purification and kosher food served the rite of 
purification and was “the logic of a revealed religion,” and, “upon its premises, any 
other attitude is ipso facto a rejection of the religion and of God who is its author.”73
68 Judge, “Judaism and the Rise of Christianity,” TynB 45 (1994): 358.
69 Judge, “Judaism and the Rise of Christianity,” TynB 45 (1994): 358.
70 Philo, Special Laws, 4.106.
71 Peter Gamsey, Food and Society in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 92; Letters o f Aristaeus to Philocrates, 120-81.
72 Philo, Special Laws, 1.254.6; 1.268.4; 3.144.2. Also the OT book of Leviticus lays out negative mles 
(chs. 1-17) and positive mles (chs. 18-26), discussing meat in chs. 7 and 11 and the Sabbath in ch. 25. 
See also Deut. 14:1-21.
73 George Foot Moore, Judaism in the First Centuries o f the Christian Era: the Age o f the Tannaim 3 
vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927), 1.77.
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The double consciousness of Jewishness and Roman society struggled to find concord 
for the weak in their thought and in practice both in Roman society and in the church.
The Jewish tradition based on Old Testament law, did not forbid the eating of 
all meat,74 so why were the weak abstaining from meat? Winter notes that “kosher 
meat was one such Jewish need, indeed a Jewish law, a custom derived from the 
Torah and a critical factor in what it meant to be a Jew in the Diaspora.”75 Winter 
discusses the meat market in Corinth, and a similar situation may well have been true 
of the meat markets in Rome, that is, with the Jews returning to Rome after the 
loosening of the Claudian edict of expulsion in AD 49, drawing a conclusion that 
“official provision would also have to be made in the market complex for the Jewish 
community to secure kosher meat and foods.”76 More will be said about this later in 
this section. The challenge of securing meat that met the standards of the weak’s 
concept of holiness forced them to take no risks in purchasing meat in the 
marketplace, thus abstention from meat, not for ascetic reasons or any other reason,77 
but for the sake of religious purity, led them to abstain.
The weak also possessed in their double consciousness a commitment to the 
Jewish practice of keeping a Sabbath day (Rom 14:5), a day of rest valuing one day 
over another, a day regarded as unto the Lord. Most scholars accept that Paul is 
addressing the Jew-Gentile issue and the Sabbath day and its practice was clearly the 
meaning of Paul’s reference in verse 14:5, citing “that Paul is simply introducing 
another example of the controversy between the strong and the weak.”78 Two other
74 Witherington, 334.
75 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 293.
76 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 295.
77 Gamsey, Food and Society, 85-99. Gamsey discusses food issues: abstention, self-denial, and 
Christian asceticism. Of special note, “Abstention from particular foods, especially meat, was 
practiced by some individuals and sects with a philosophical or religious orientation from the late 
Greek archaic period to late antiquity” (p. 85).
78 Cranfield, 2:704.
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views have been considered concerning verse 14:5, the first connecting to verses 2
and 5 a reference to “the observance of particular days as days of abstinence (this
view was generally taken by ancient interpreters)”79 and “the observance of fasts and
feasts on the basis of a law that rules the cosmos,” under a presupposed religious
(astrological?) calendar, meaning the “days stand under lucky or unlucky stars.”80
Given the flavour of Jewishness in Paul’s words in these verses, the Old Testament
Mosaic code with the decalogue’s reference to the holiness of the Sabbath best fits
Paul’s meaning here.81 As with food laws so also with the Sabbath day, “the overall
aim.. .of the Mosaic code as a whole, is transparently the preservation of the holiness
of a people chosen by God and separate from all other peoples.”82
In wider Roman culture there was confusion and even mockery made of
Jewish Sabbath regulations. Josephus quotes Agatharchides,
The people known as Jews, who inhibit the most strongly fortified cities, 
called by the natives of Jerusalem, have a custom of abstaining from work 
every seventh day; on those occasions they neither bear arms or take any 
agricultural operations in hand, nor engage in any other form of public service, 
but pray with outstretched hands in the temples until the evening. 
Consequently, because the inhabitants, instead of protecting their city 
preserved in their folly, Ptolemy, son Lagus, was allowed to enter with his 
army; the country was thus given over to a cruel master, and the defect of a 
practise enjoined by law was exposed. That experience has taught the whole 
world, except that nation, .. .traditional fancies about the law, until its 
difficulties are such as baffle human reason.83
Josephus further adds, “Agartharchides finds such conduct ridiculous; dispassionate
critics will consider it a highly grand and highly meritorious fact that there are men
who consistently care more for the observance of their laws and for their religion than
79 Cranfield, 2:704.
80 Kasemann, 370.
81 Exodus 16:23.
82 Gamsey, Food and Society, 91-92; Kasemann, 369, agrees, “By religious descent Jewish-Christians 
are committed to observance of a fixed tradition which is ultimately related to a law of holiness.”
83 Josephus, Against Apion 1.209-12.
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for their own lives and country.”84 The concept to some Gentiles that Jews in their
religious ritual were so committed to their beliefs seemed “folly,” defective, a
“fancy,” and “baffling to human reason.”85 The double consciousness in the mind and
conscience of a weak Jewish Christian only created baffling confusion for a strong
Gentile Christian in the church in Rome, further increasing divisions and tensions.
One interesting note about the weak’s Sabbath ritual comes from Margaret
Williams who suggests that Sabbath fasting was an “expression of Romano-Jewish
identity.”86 She states,
Unlike the Jewish communities of the Greek East (e.g. those of Alexandria 
and Antioch of the Orontes), which arose for the most part out of voluntary 
settlement, the early Jewish settlement at Rome was different, being mainly 
comprised of prisoners of war, brought to Rome as slaves after Pompey’s 
conquest of Judaea in 63 BCE and Sosius’s recapture of Jerusalem from the 
Parthians in 37 BCE. Militarily, both the original conquest and later recovery 
of Judaea for Rome were major achievements, earning for each of the generals 
concerned a triumph in Rome and a place, quite literally, in the history books. 
It is from those works of history that we can deduce why the Sabbath became 
for the Jews of Rome a day of sorrow and repentance rather than a day of joy 
and thanksgiving.87
She adds that life for “the early members of the Jewish community was anything but 
normal,” Sabbath-keeping became not only Jewish ritual, but also a day of 
“particularly painful associations,” as well as a “sorrowful foundation day” for their 
community, a day of penitence, sadness, and a way of invoking God’s compassion.88 
Her comment is important because Paul’s message to the weak and the strong was 
presented in light of the glory of the kingdom of God, according to Romans 14:17, not 
in meat and drink, but righteousness, joy, and peace. Paul’s underlying message of
84 Josephus, Against Apion 1.212.
85 Josephus, Against Apion 1.209-12.
86 Margaret Williams, “Being a Jew in Rome: Sabbath Fasting as an Expression of Romano-Jewish 
Identity,” Negotiating Diaspora, 8.
87 Barclay, ed., Negotiating Diaspora, 16.
88 Williams, “Being a Jew in Rome,” Negotiating Diaspora, 16. She notes, “On fasting as a means of 
commemorating critical events and as a way of averting or terminating calamity by eliciting God’s 
compassion, see ‘Fasting and Fast days’ in EncJud 6, cols. 1189-96.” This type of fasting is seen in 
Ezra 8:21-3; Psalm 69; and Isaiah 58:5-11.
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respect and tolerance that he wished to communicate to the chinch at Rome came 
through an understanding of God’s kingdom and the joy associated with it. Was he 
also saying to the weak, in a subtle, gentle way, that to experience salvation in Christ 
is to discover the righteousness, peace, and joy he truly offers in harmony with other 
Christians whose opinions differ?
One other mysterious issue persists in Romans 14 and that is the reference to 
drink in Romans 14:17, later mentioned as “nor to drink wine” in Romans 14:21, in 
the theological judgment of the weak. Paul indicates that not only do Jews practise 
Sabbath-days, they also do not drink wine. Since abstention from wine was not 
commanded in the Old Testament as a part of Jewish religion, then why did the weak 
abstain from drinking wine? Das explains, “Longstanding Jewish custom prevented 
the Law-observant from partaking of the meat and wine of non-Law observant 
Gentiles,” thus ‘this well-established custom was probably a safe-guard to avoid 
anything that might have been sacrificed to pagan deities.”89 The weak in their Jewish 
Christian conscience, holiness, and conduct did not want to be tainted at all by 
anything impure or, for that matter, pagan. The meat market, an important element, 
although unmentioned in the text of Romans 14, where meat and wine were 
purchased, and where impure meat and wine possibly offered to idols might have 
been purchased, serves as a key to understanding this abstention.90 The weak’s 
theological judgment maintained its purity to Old Testament law through abstaining 
from certain foods, wine, and in keeping Sabbaths.
89 A. Andrew Das, Solving the Romans Debate, 113; See Philip F. Esler’s discussion of this point in 
Galatians, 93-116, and his interaction with E. P. Sanders’s, Jewish Law from Jesus to the Mishnah: 
five Studies (Philadelphia: Trinity Press, 1990), 272-83, and E. P. Sanders, “Jewish Associations with 
Gentiles and Galatians 2.11-14,” in The Conversation Continues; Studies in Paul in Honour o f J. Louis 
Martyn (ed. R. T. Fortna and B. R. Gaventa; Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 170-88. Das appears to miss 
more serious issues concerning the meat market.
90 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 293-95.
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ii. The strong’s theological judgment
The strong’s theological judgment was simply “that [since] He (the Messiah) who is 
the goal and substance and innermost being of the OT law has come, the ceremonial 
part of it no longer requires it to be obeyed literally.”91 The strong are “completely 
uninhibited by relics of a pagan or Jewish past,”92 practising in their spiritual mindset 
and conduct “Christian freedom,”93 and, living, in “Paul’s view [who sides with the 
strong’s theological judgment], in the realm where differences of opinion about 
lifestyle are fine but should not be allowed to create disunity in the body of Christ.”94 
The strong are “unencumbered” to the questions of food and Sabbath days, not only 
because of the freedom they possessed in Christ, but also because as a Gentile 
(Christian) who might not know of, understand, or keep Jewish concepts such as the 
Sabbath.95
When it came to food, wine, and Sabbath-days, the Gentile Christians saw no 
reason to abstain from certain foods or wine or to keep the Sabbath as a Jewish ritual. 
The Gentile world customarily lived in a Roman world where eating and drinking 
were commonplace. Gamsey states, “Ceremonial eating and drinking are a 
conspicuous feature of ancient society.”96 Graeco-Roman society, dating back to 
Plato’s Symposium, “a post-eating stage of a banquet during which drinking for 
pleasure took place, .. .had social and political as well as cultural significance.”97
91 Cranfield, 2:697.
92 Barrett, 257.
93 Kasemann, 368.
94 Witherington, 334.
95 Stuhlmacher, 224.
96 Gamsey, Food and Society, 128.
97 Gamsey, Food and Society, 129; Plato, Laws 1.641. Plato identifies the symposium as “a wine party.” 
Later in the same discussion Plato says, “You are implying, my friend, as it seems to us, that the 
convivial gathering (K O ivqv 5iaTpi(3r]v), when rightly conducted, is an important element in 
education.” Gamsey (Food and Society) discusses convivium and its social implications of status, 
power, and inequality (p. 136).
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The Romans had dinner parties, civic banquets, client dinners, and meals that 
brought families, friends, patrons, associations, politicians, and other groups of people 
together for conversation, posturing, and communication, so much so that in Graeco- 
Roman society “you are with whom you eat.”98 As has already been mentioned in this 
thesis, when eating and drinking, many hosts of dinner parties seated guests, “placing 
and feeding their guests according to status,” in a hierarchical scale.99 Social barriers 
between the strong and the weak were recognized by the guests; and even when social 
barriers were “ostentatiously lowered and normal social conventions relaxed,” there 
was still “tension.”100 This is important because the Gentile strong to whom Paul 
addressed Romans 14 also possessed their own unique brand of double consciousness, 
a mindset of the Roman world in which they lived and the way of faith in Christ and 
its reinterpretation of basic social function for believers to relate properly in the 
church.
While eating and drinking and “dining with friends was an established social 
and cultural institution in Rome, part of the normal routine of life,” Graeco-Roman 
societies “were relatively free from taboos and restrictive regulations regarding 
food.”101 Biblical scholars often rightly speak of asceticism, of alternative practices of 
vegetarianism, and abstinence from wine based on Hellenistic Gentile religion,102 
even “metempsychosis”103 or “pagan superstition,”104 but as a rule this seems to 
include a relatively small number of people compared to wider Roman culture.
98 Gamsey, Food and Society, 128.
99 Gamsey, Food and Society, 137.
100 Gamsey, Food and Society, 137.
101 Gamsey, Food and Society, 83,136; Jewett, Romans, 839-40. Jewett appraises Roman culture as 
trained to “judge,” so here, in regard to food or anything else, Paul is exhorting them not to judge their 
fellow Christians because “this places them in the shameful status of moral condemnation that God is 
expected to inflict” (839).
102 Kasemann, 368. Schreiner, 714-15; Barrett, 237.
103 Cranfield, 2:693 n. 5; Plato, Lg. 6.782c. Cranfield discusses the “adherents of Orphism.”
104 Schreiner, 714; Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 163-74. Reasoner discusses “superstition as a 
workable explanation for some symptoms of the ‘weak’ party” (p. 163).
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Gamsey notes that paganism “had an ascetic fringe,” but relatively “few demands 
were made by pagan cults on their followers” and what demands were made were 
focused on ritual and the priests associated with them.105 Barrett concludes, “It is 
impossible to pick out from the many examples of religious scrupulosity to be found 
in antiquity any single group of persons corresponding exactly with those described 
here by Paul.”106
It is safe to say that Paul’s focus, in Romans 14, is primarily on Jew-Gentile 
issues regarding the strong and the weak, so the food discussion in Romans appears to 
focus on Jewish practice and Gentile non-practice of abstention to food and wine. 
Unquestionably, eating and drinking and eating and meeting together were not matters 
to be taken lightly by Jews or Romans as a social function of society because “large or 
small, these displays of commensality or collective consumption carried significance 
well beyond the nutritional function of the meal that was consumed.”107 A part of the 
significance lay in the obligations of the host and the social division in meal settings 
along with the tension created by social distinction.
The strong viewed Sabbath days as an unnecessary activity because of their 
strong belief in freedom of conscience. Ziesler notes that the two main interpretations 
of Sabbath days were: (1) the Sabbath, “perhaps taken with other Jewish holy days,” 
and (2) a reference to “pagan and propitious and unpropitious days, a distinction 
perhaps based on astrology.”108 Schreiner says with regard to the Sabbath, “Paul 
would not have been sympathetic with pagan superstition; he would have rejected it 
out of hand.”109 Stuhlmacher notes that of a particular holy day of the week, the 
“problem presents itself not only in Rome, but also, as Gal. 4:10 and Col. 2:16 show,
105 Gamsey, Food and Society, 98.
106 Barrett, 257.
107 Gamsey, Food and Society, 128.
108 Ziesler, 329.
109 Schreiner, 715.
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in other churches of Paul as well;” further noting that “there can be no systematic
adoption of all the commandments of the Decalogue!”110
Literary sources provide insight into the nature of Graeco-Roman attitudes
toward the concept of a Sabbath day. Juvenal in Satire 14 reflects the general attitude:
Some happen to have been dealt a father who respects the Sabbath. They 
worship nothing except clouds and spirit of the sky. They think there is no 
difference between pork, which their fathers abstained from, and human flesh. 
In time they get rid of their foreskins. And their habits of despising the laws of 
Rome, they study, observe, and revere the Judaic code, as handed down by 
Moses in his mystic scroll, which tells them not to show the way to anyone 
except a fellow worshiper and if asked, to take only the circumcised to the 
fountain. But it’s their fathers who are to blame, taking every seventh day as a 
day of laziness and separate from ordinary life.111
Tacitus records that the Jews “first chose to rest on the seventh day because it ended
their toils; but after a time were led by charms of indolence to give over the seventh
year as well to inactivity.”112 He adds in a negative, prejudicial tone, calling them “the
worst rascals,” that the “customs of the Jews are base and abominable, and owe their
persistence to their depravity.”113 Seneca speaks condescendingly of Jewish worship
when he says, “But let us forbid lamps to be lighted on the Sabbath, since the gods do
not need light, neither do men take pleasure in soot.”114 Williams notes, “To Romans,
the Sabbath was “quintessentially alien,” writers were “deeply conservative and hence
highly suspicious of foreign practices,” and a “critical attitude” toward Jewish
Sabbath keeping was to be expected.115 Gentiles in the church carried this kind of
baggage attitudinally toward Jews, most likely in their general perceptions and in their
social connections.
110 Stuhlmacher, 224.
111 Juvenal, Satires 14,96-106.
112 Tacitus, Histories 5.4.
113 Tacitus, Histories 5.5.
114 Seneca, Moral Epistles, 95.7.
115 Williams, “Being a Jew in Rome,” Negotiating Diaspora, 10.
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iii. Contributing social factors and Roman obligation
Roman law and obligation, not being far from the psyche of both Gentile and Jewish 
Christians, established a precedent that caused people in Roman society to be 
concerned with their rights, dignity, duties, and advantage, “the source of a legal 
privilege.. .derived from political position or influence, style of life (character, moral 
values, education, etc.), and wealth.”116 Consequently, three other social factors, each 
impacted by Roman obligation, influenced the background conflict in Romans 14. 
Those three factors are individual legal rights, the obligation of the Romans to provide 
kosher food, and the meat market in Rome after the return of the Jews from 
Claudius’s expulsion.
Pucci Ben Zeev indicates that the legal rights and privileges of the Jews 
caused them to enjoy “a privileged position in the Roman world,” and “the conditions 
for obtaining the privileges were Jewish origin observance of Jewish precepts.”117 It 
was not uncommon, according to Josephus, for legal decrees of rights to be displayed 
publicly, stating, “against the decrees of the Romans nothing can be said -  for they 
are kept in public places of the cities and are still to be found on bronze tablets in the
l i f tCapitol.” Zeev further states that diaspora Jews were granted, “the right to live 
according to Jewish customs {mores) and law,” customs and laws being one in the 
Jewish mind, and that the rights to build synagogues, to assemble, collect an offering 
and send it to the temple in Jerusalem, hold common funds, share common meals and 
festivals, and to celebrate their sabbaths.119
116 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 258.
117 Pucci Ben Zeev, Jewish Rights, 451; J. Juster, Les Juifs I’empire romain (I, Paris, 1914), 213-14, 
232-33. Privilegium is a term used “in its positive meaning,” and is, “namely, a legal enactment 
concerning a specific person or case and involving an exemption from common rules” (p. 451).
118 Josephus, Roman Antiquities 14.188-9.
119 Zeev, Jewish Rights in the Roman World, 460,465. See a fuller discussion of Jewish rights in ch. 5: 
“Were Jewish Rights a Privilege in the Roman World?” pp. 451-482.
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Crook notes “the Jews of Judea were a nation, a clear ethnic group,” “were 
given special license and sanction by the Romans,” and that diaspora Jews “were 
accorded the same license as a ‘permitted religion’ a fortiori”120 He concludes, “It is 
plausibly suggested that they were a specially protected, exempted and sanctioned 
religious minority because it was admitted that they were loyally adhering to their 
ancestral tradition -  their own ‘faithful ritual’, however repugnant it might seem to
191outsiders.” The Romans, when it came to rights and privileges, had a way of 
applying common principles of Roman policy which “were yielding and elastic 
enough to accommodate the most different situations, and most peoples enjoyed, de 
facto or de iure, the right to live according to their laws and customs.”122
While the Jews had certain rights, vital to this discussion for Romans 14 is the 
privilege provided by Romans to secure kosher meat for the Jews in maintaining 
Jewish customs. Winter states that kosher meat was a “Jewish need, indeed a Jewish 
law, a custom derived from the Torah and a critical factor in what it meant to be a Jew 
in the diaspora.”123 He goes on to say, “Josephus records an official decree which 
involved provision of kosher food and which was issued on the resolution of the 
magistrates from the city of Sardis in Asia Minor and passed by the Council and the 
People.”124 The words of his decree indicate a clear path for Jews in Sardis to practise 
“in accordance with their accepted customs, come together and have a communal life 
and adjudicate suits among themselves, and that a place [synagogue] be given them in 
which they may gather.”125 Winter notes how the city of Sardis was meeting its legal 
obligations and how the decree “was passed in the wake of the restoration of rights to
120 Crook, Law and Life, 280.
121 Crook, Law and Life, 280.
122 Zeev, Jewish Rights, 482; Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 292.
123 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 293.
124 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 288; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 14.259-60.
125 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 14.259-60.
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the Jews by the Roman Senate and People.”126 Understanding Jewish rights and 
privileges has significant import for Romans 14, because of the parallels in I 
Corinthians 8-10, because of Paul’s association with Priscilla and Aquila who were 
expelled from Rome under the Claudian expulsion of AD 49 and probably informed 
him of circumstances in Rome, and because “the expelled did not necessarily return to 
Rome to their original homes,” but “they could return to Rome after the initial 
problem died down.”127
There are two features with regard to the Sardis decree and Noy’s comment 
are important to the discussion in Romans 14: first, at Paul’s time of writing the 
majority Gentile strong and the minority Jewish weak, were both aware of each 
other’s rights and privileges and were, in Roman society, renegotiating those rights 
and privileges, as well as within the church at Rome; second, part of the distinct 
problem in the church had to do with discussion over kosher meat and the provision 
of meat that was not kosher ( k o iv o v ) . 128
Roman obligation not only provided rights and privileges for the Jews, kosher 
meat for them to practise their customs, but also gave specific instruction on a local 
level as to who was responsible to provide kosher meat in the meat market. L. de Ligt 
says that “High-frequency markets are said to have existed in every town, and to have 
joined shops and the market hall in supplying the ‘necessities of local life’; 
distinguished from smaller, temporary markets, Tow frequency’ fairs surrounding
126 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 290.
127 Noy, Foreigners at Rome, 259.
128 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 297 n. 44. The meaning of k o iv o v  is “common” and is found in 
Mark 7:2; Acts 2;44; 4:32; 10:28; 11:8; Romans 14:14; and Hebrews 10:29. Reasoner, The Strong and 
the Weak, 97-101. He acknowledges that the issue o f unclean foods was “complex,” but he does not 
mention the legal concepts of (Jewish) rights and privileges and the importance of the meat market in 
Rome.
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assizes, religious festivals, and athletic games.”129 The market served not only an 
important social function in Rome but, according to MacMullen, became a part of the 
“Roman city form” in Romanization where Romans built cities like Rome in new 
territories.130 He tells of a “certain Annobal Tapapius Rufus,” a benefactor of the city 
of Leptis in Africa, who “paid for the macellum, as he made known in a Punic 
inscription on its walls and a Latin translation of that text.”131 Winter notes, “The 
offering of meat as a sacrifice before using it for consumption was a long-standing 
convention of the Graeco-Roman world, and therefore concerns of the Jews about 
meat which had not been offered to idols was critical to their religion.”132 In the meat 
market in Rome, because of Jewish rights and privileges were deprived, Jews would 
not purchase meat for fear that it was k o l v o v  and neither would the Jewish Christian 
weak of Romans 14. Thus, if a meat market was no longer provided for the Jews in 
Rome, it became a part of the conflict and struggle for order between the strong and 
the weak in the church.133
5. Paul's Theological Judgment o f the Unresolved Conflict 
Paul identifies himself with the theologically strong (’Oc|)eQ.o|iev 6e fi(ietq ol Suvaioi 
15:1), but he speaks vehemently to the strong in five important commands. The first 
three are imperatives and the last two are hortatory subjunctives,134 with an 
encouragement to “edification,” or building up each other. First, Paul invokes the
129 L. de Ligt, Fairs and Markets in the Roman Empire: Economic and Social Aspects o f Periodic 
Trade in a Pre-industrial Society (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1993), 28; Winter, After Paul Left 
Corinth, 293-94.
130 MacMullen, Romanization, 36-39.
131 MacMullen, Romanization, 36.
132 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 294; J.-L. Durand, “Greek Animals: Towards a Topology of Edible 
Bodies,” in The Cuisine o f Sacrifice Among the Greeks (ed. M. Detienne and J.-P. Vemanat; E. T. 
Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1989), 104-5.
133 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 297, n. 44.
134 A hortatory subjunctive is also known as volitive. A. T. Robertson, A Grammar o f the Greek New 
Testament in Light o f Historical Research (New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914), 927-35. He says 
the subjunctive “is the mood of doubt, o f hesitation, o f expectation, of brooding hope, o f imperious 
will” (p. 928).
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strong to “welcome” the weak in Romans 14:1 (Toy ao0evouvra if) t t l o t € l
TTpooA.a|iPayeo06);135 second, he invokes the strong to “despise not!” the weak in
Romans 14:3; third, he invokes the weak to “judge not” the one who eats meat
because God has received him in Romans 14:3 ; fourth, he tells both the strong and
the weak not to judge each other in Romans 14:13; and, fifth, he challenges both the
strong and the weak to “follow” after the things which make for peace, and the things
that might edify one another in Romans 14:19. These injunctions aim to create a
1different kind of bond or rope, one with more than mere social ties and obligation 
on a Roman social level. The force of these commands is forward, sequential, and 
steps on the path to Paul’s ultimate, obligatory imperative in Romans 15:1.
Two other issues related to Paul’s theological judgment in Romans 14 are 
critical: (1) his emphasis on breaking down the hierarchical pattern of the perceived 
superior, the strong, dominating the inferior, the weak, in Romans 14:13; (2) the force 
of appeal to Christ as the ideal in Romans 14:8. Both issues contrast Roman culture 
and foreshadow Paul’s final argument in Romans 15.
Paul’s desire to break down the Roman pattern of social hierarchy in the 
church finds meaning in the word e£oi)0eveix(i), which means to disdain or treat with 
no merit, and conveys “strong note of contempt” toward the person or party deemed 
weak in Romans 14:3.137 Cicero references the meaning as “a low opinion” when 
Pompey expressed a very low opinion of Syria.138 Philo uses it to describe those who 
look down on widows, “Come now, you boasters, with your windy pride in your 
prosperity, and your pose of perked up necks and lifted eyebrows, who treat
135 Jewett, Romans, 835. He say of upoaA.anPaveoGe, “When people are received in to a group, they take 
up a common cause, such as joining a military expedition” (835). Throughout Romans Paul appears to 
choose words and imperatives encouraging unity and cohesion.
136 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 5.
137 Dunn, 2: 802.
138 Cicero, Letters to Aticus 85 (4.9).
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widowhood, that piteous calamity, as a joke.. .Mark how the persons who seem this 
lonely and unfortunate are not treated as nothing worth and negligible in the judgment 
of God...”139 Barrett says that “the strong inevitably tend to despise those who are 
weaker -  in mind and in conscience as in other matters -  than themselves.”140 Paul 
aims for “a rhetorically effective levelling device” (TTpoaeA.apexo) and desires for every 
person in the church to retain in the eyes of man what they retain in the eyes of God, 
that is, a person of worth whom God welcomes.141
The other key thought here is “not to judge.” Paul urged both sides “to agree 
to differ, but not to judge, and especially not to denigrate the ‘weak’, while “calling 
for an immediate halt to judging.”142 Regardless, Paul’s theological judgment is that 
“despising and condemning are not Christian attitudes.”143
Paul’s theological judgment reflected his belief that each polarized theological 
judgment regarding food and Sabbath days must lay down their rights and 
privileges.144 Interestingly enough, Josephus records an “edict issued by Claudius 
extending the rights given to Alexandrian Jews to all Jews living in the Roman 
world.”145 The language of the edict has the familiar ring of Roman obligation: rights,
139 Philo, On Moses 2.241-2.
140 Barrett, 238.
141 Witherington, 335. He states, “Paul must come up with a rhetorically effective levelling device to 
strengthen his exhortation; he chooses the metaphor of slaves and masters. V. 4 thus suggests one’s 
fellow Christian has one hierarchical relationship to be concerned about, and that is with his master -  
Christ. Now, if  Christ is the only person in the socially superior position, then all are at the same social 
level -  they are all simply slaves or servants” (p. 335).
142 Winter, “Roman Law and Society in Romans 12-15,” in Rome in the Bible and the Early Church 
(ed. Peter Oakes; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 92.
143 Witherington, 335.
144 Robinson Butarbutar, Paul and Conflict Resolution: An Exegetical Study o f Paul's Apostolic 
Paradigm in 1 Corinthians 9 (Bletchley, Milton Keynes: Paternoster Press, 2007), 117-69. Paul 
apparently follows this mode in 1 Cor in his “apostolic paradigm” of laying down certain rights in light 
of a higher obligation to Christ.
145 Ben Zeev, Jewish Rights, 328; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 19.287-291.
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privileges, benefaction, loyalty, and friendship, including two words in the edict:
KPLVCLQ and £X O U 0£V l^£lV .146
As it is important in regard to these two Greek words, Claudius’s edict holds it 
“in right that not even Greek cities should be deprived of these privileges,” and 
invokes the Jews “not to set at nought the beliefs about gods held by other peoples but 
to keep their own laws.”147 The latter invocation may be directed at some Romans 
who had a disdain for Jewish proselytism.148 Regardless, Paul does not want any 
person in the church to possess a low opinion of another and he desires for them to lay 
down their rights and privileges in the church.
6. Conclusions
It has been shown from Romans 14 that serious racial conflict existed in the church at 
Rome. Paul addresses the challenge of identity for the first century church against the 
competing backdrop of the strong Gentile majority and the weak Jewish minority.
In Romans 14 Paul communicates the dichotomy of the practical nature of 
conflict over food regulations and Sabbath days. He gives an indication of Gentile 
superiority and Jewish inferiority with an anti-Semitic undercurrent in the church. 
Each side in the church holds up their own theological argument defending their 
rights and privileges, but Paul holds up one right and privilege: Christ is master. In 
essence Paul is laying a foundation encouraging each side to set aside their rights and 
privileges for the sake of peace in the greater context of the kingdom of God. A 
church, by nature, possesses a family atmosphere built on the principle of God’s 
household. Still, the conflict as it is presented in Romans 14 is unresolved.
146 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 19.287-291. For a complete discussion of the edict issued by Claudius 
see Zeev, Jewish Rights, 328-342. She says, “Loyalty and good will o f provincials are often mentioned 
in Claudius’ edicts as reasons for confirming their rights” (p. 332).
147 Zeev, Jewish Rights, 329.
148 Tacitus, Histories 5.4-5; James C. Walters, Ethnic Issues in Paul’s Letter to the Romans: Changing 
Self-Definitions in Earliest Roman Christianity (Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press, 1993), 39-40.
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In addition Paul gives instruction in Romans 14 with the force of imperatives 
that indicate his desire and his theological judgment. The word of instruction is clear: 
no judging and no condemning your brothers. The language of Roman obligation 
bleeds through the text of Romans 14.
In the next chapter further evidence will be presented by suggesting a 
prolegomenon to the resolution of racial polarization in the church at Rome.
The polarization between the strong and the weak called for a new pattern of social 
relations according to Paul’s passion under the realm of the kingdom of God.
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Chapter 6: Prolegomenon to the Resolution of Polarization
Introduction
It has been argued in chapter five that there was polarization both in Rome and in the 
church in Rome at the time of Paul’s writing his letter to the Romans. The thesis now 
turns from the conflict in the church at Rome between the strong and the weak and 
Paul’s theological judgment, to what will be argued in this chapter as prolegomenon 
to the resolution of racial polarization in Romans 9-11. The prolegomenon is a critical 
and discursive in Romans 9-11 on the path to conflict resolution in the later chapters 
of Romans.1 While I am aware that Romans 9-11 is often treated as an isolated 
discussion, in this chapter it will be seen as critical to the resolution of the issues in 
Romans 14-15.
In order to demonstrate the importance of Paul’s prolegomenon to the 
resolution of polarization in the church, several key elements will be discussed: (1) 
Paul’s pattern for starting churches and his pathos communicated to those churches; 
(2) the prolegomenon of Romans 9-11 with an emphasis on Paul’s anguish in the text 
of Romans 9 over the conflict in the church; (3) Paul’s plea in a review of the text of 
Romans 10; and (4) Paul’s experience as a Jew in the text of Romans 11. The chapter 
will conclude with Paul’s defence that he is not anti-Semitic, not condescending in 
tone, and sees no reason for boasting.
7. Paul’s Pattern and Pathos 
This section seeks to explore Paul’s pattern for starting churches and his pathos for 
the church in Rome. Paul’s pattern and pathos will be explored by examining Paul’s
1 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 135-36,235-36. In contrast to Reasoner’s book where he 
dedicates almost no space to the text of Rom 9-11 as a part o f Paul’s rhetorical strategy leading to 
conflict resolution, this thesis sees it as a vital part of Paul’s discussion moving toward his resolve of 
conflict by means of Roman obligation. Reasoner does note that Paul “accounts for all peoples,” Jews 
and Gentiles in Rom 9-11 (p. 236).
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pattern for starting churches, a general overview of scholarly work in Romans 9-11, 
the link of Roman obligation to Romans 14-15, and Paul’s pathos.
i. Paul’s pattern for starting churches
First, consider Paul’s pattern for starting churches. Critical to the discussion of Roman 
obligation is Paul’s prolegomenon in Romans 9-11 because one of the challenges Paul 
faced when starting churches was helping each church establish a distinct Christian 
identity. In the text of Romans “we find plenty of evidence that Christianity is 
separate from Judaism, though Paul wants his readers to remember the Jewish roots of 
their faith and the Jewish place in God’s plan.”2
E. A. Judge and G. S. R. Thomas see Paul’s Letter to the Romans as an effort 
to solidify the identity of the church. They say that Paul’s “career shows a regular 
pattern of working first through the synagogue and, after confronting the regular 
Jewish community with his message, forming a new organisation as a result of the 
division.”3 They note that Paul used the term church “indiscriminately to cover the 
activities of primitive Christianity,” and that the Roman church per se at the time of 
Paul’s writing around AD 57 was comprised of “household groups” who were in the 
early stages of establishment.4 Paul wrote from Corinth and one of the challenges he 
addressed was “.. .the rival privileges of Jews and Christians.”5 Their thesis on the 
origin of the church at Rome is clearly stated, “We propose that the Christian 
community in Rome was built up of mainly converts from the East, without any 
regular organisation or public preaching; that it avoided any conflict with the 
synagogues, providing such extra religious facilities as it needed on a domestic basis;
2 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 135.
3 E. A. Judge and G. S. R. Thomas, “The Origin of the Church at Rome: A New Solution,” The 
Reformed Theological Review 25 (1966): 89.
4 Judge and Thomas, “The Origin o f the Church at Rome,” 82, 84, 88.
5 Judge and Thomas, “The Origin of the Church at Rome,” 88.
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and that it was only launched as a ‘church’ in opposition to the synagogues after 
Paul’s arrival.”6
Priscilla and Aquila met Paul in Corinth and, as they worked together for 
“professional reasons” in their tent-making business (Acts 18:2-3), it seems logical 
from Paul’s experiences in Corinth that they had informed him of both the synagogue
n
and house church conditions in Rome. Given Judge’s and Thomas’s remarks it is 
clear that two key elements to Paul’s argument for conflict resolution were: (1) to help 
the household churches solidify their Christian identity as a church in relation to his 
pattern for starting churches; and (2) to clarify his own position, love and empathy for 
the Jews (and Gentiles) as part of God’s plan for salvation. These are two reasons for 
writing his prologemenon in Romans 9-11.
In an effort to clarify the identity of the church both theologically and 
practically for the sake of harmony Paul writes Romans 9-11 as a key element of his 
discussion leading toward his conclusion in Romans 15:1-6.
ii. Overview o f scholarly work
Second, consider how scholars view Romans 9-11. The first consideration is the 
thought of Romans 9-11 as a theological treatise or a historical response to a real 
situation. The influences in Paul’s letter to the Romans makes references that cause 
some scholars to view Paul’s letter in a general sense as a circular letter of theological 
proportions.8 Manson believes the letter to be a “manifesto” concerning his position 
on Jewish-Christian issues arising out of the Corinthian controversy.9 Manson 
suggests that the circular would letter would travel to Ephesus, all the churches in
6 Judge and Thomas, “The Origin of the Church at Rome,” 81-2; Sanday and Headlam, xxvi-vii.
7 Judge and Thomas, “The Origin of the Church at Rome,” 88.
8 Jewett, 42.
9 Donfried, Romans Debate, 3-15.
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Asia, Syria and Palestine.10 Bomkamm sees the letter as “Paul’s last will and 
testament” as to how Paul had “remained true to the source and beginning of his faith 
and message,” albeit a faith with Jewish foundations and a concern for Israel.11 Karris 
views Paul’s letter as a general paraenesis based on I Cor 8-10 and a summary of 
“Paul’s missionary theology.”12 He dismisses the so-called “party- community strife” 
concept in favour of Paul’s letter “as addressed to a problem that may arise in any 
community.”13 Klein follows a similar path indicating that Paul reinforces his 
apostolic authority while at the same time he “addresses the Romans with a 
theological treatise which in most parts seems free of any reference to a concrete 
situation.”14
Nygren summarizes his view in terms of “the fundamental concept of the 
epistle: righteousness from God.”15 He emphasises justification by faith and the 
kingdom of God (fulfilled in Jesus), adding, “The characteristic and peculiar thing 
about Romans differentiating it from the rest of Paul’s epistles, is just the fact that it 
was not, or was only in slight degree, aimed at circumstances with a certain 
congregation.”16
The view that Paul writes a theological treatise or a general missionary 
theology also appears to dismiss the links of obligation as well the persuasive nature 
of Paul’s language to the strong and the weak in his letter to the Romans.
Other scholars see Paul’s letter to the Romans not so much as a general 
theological work, but as one written to a specific historical situation in Rome. Jervell 
suggests that the situation was historical in nature, but with a “surprising twist: The
10 Donfried, Romans Debate, 15.
11 Donfried, Romans Debate, 16-28.
12 Donfried, Romans Debate, 65-84.
13 Donfried, Romans Debate, 84.
14 Donfried, Romans Debate, 42,29-43.
15 Nygren, 9.
16 Nygren, 4.
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primary recipient in mind is not Rome Jerusalem.”17 Jervell comments that Paul 
writes a “letter to Jerusalem” because of an impending trip to Jerusalem, to represent 
Christianity to Jerusalem as an “apostle to the Gentiles,” and to give attention to 
“Israel’s lack of faith and Israel’s future as the people of God...”18 Schreiner asks a 
poignant question, “If Jervell is correct, then why did Paul write to Rome at all?”19 He 
adds, “To see Jerusalem as a destination of the letter when it was actually sent to 
Rome is a curious position.”
Another view concerning Romans 9-11 is the thought that the specific 
historical situation in Rome was conflicted. Schreiner notes, “The majority position is 
now that Paul wrote to resolve the disunity between the Jews and Gentiles.”21 
Marxsen sees the situation as one caused by the Edict of Claudius in AD 49 which 
expelled Jews and the conflict that arose as Jewish Christians returned to Rome after 
Claudius’s death (AD 54).22 Donfried acknowledges that Romans “deals with a 
Roman problem,” but acknowledges the need for more research to clarify certain 
aspects of Paul’s letter.23 Wedderbum notes that in Paul’s letter “it is hardly 
surprising that parts of his letter are less directly related to the Roman situation than 
others, but the whole should nevertheless be seen in light of that situation.”24 Guerra 
views Paul’s letter as a historical situation requiring “mutual acceptance” between the 
strong and the weak.25 Esler discusses conflict and identity as Paul addresses an actual 
situation where Paul exercised leadership over the congregation in Rome to encourage
17 Schreiner, 17; Donfried, Romans Debate, 53-64.
18 Donfried, Romans Debate, 59,63; Schreiner, 17.
19 Schreiner, 17.
20 Schreiner, 17.
21 Schreiner, 19 n. 42.
22 W. Marxsen, Introduction to the New Testament (trans. G. Buswell Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1968), 95-109.
23 Donfried, Romans Debate, 107, 102-25.
24 Donfried, Romans Debate, 195,195-202.
25 Anthony J. Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition: The Purpose, Genre and Audience o f  
Paul’s Letter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 32-39.
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“group goals” of love and virtue “as the key to reconciliation of the rival groups.”26 
Reasoner views the conflict as historical in Paul’s “practical teaching” as an attempt 
to reconcile the strong and the weak.27 Jewett sees the letter of Romans in light of his 
voluminous work in the Sitz im Leben with Paul’s focus on an “ambassadorial letter” 
comprising a mission “to urge the coexistence of the weak and strong in Rome.”28 
Jewett also views the purpose of Paul’s letter with a broader mission. He says, “Its 
purpose is to advocate in behalf of the ‘power of God’ a cooperative mission to 
evangelize Spain so that the theological argumentation reiterates the Gospel to be 
therein proclaimed and the ethical admonitions show that how that mission is to be 
lived out in a manner that would ensure the success of that mission.”29
Jewett’s comment is important, “Since we do not have direct access to the 
audience of Romans, however, it is necessary to reconstruct a model of the audience 
to interpret the rhetorical devices Paul uses to persuade them.”30 Paul addressed the 
audience of Romans in terms of groups or “warring factions,” identified as the strong 
and the weak, Gentiles and Jews, or, if one was looking at Romans 9-11 the factions 
could be identified as Gentiles who were “grafted in” (Rom 11:17,19,23 and 24) and 
Israel (Rom 9:4, 6,27,31; 10:19,21; 11:2, 7 ,25 ,26).31 Paul appears to address both 
groups at different times in his letter to the Romans.
The historical situation and the background in the underlays of Roman culture 
highlight an important factor in understanding Romans 9-11.
Two other considerations are important in a scholarly overview of Romans 9- 
11: (1) the disconnect of Romans 9-11 from the rest of the epistle, or (2) the
26 Esler, Conflict and Identity, 354-55; 339-56.
27 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 37, 37-41.
28 Jewett, 44, 84.
29 Jewett, 44, 84.
30 Jewett, 23.
31 Jewett, 41.
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importance of Roman 9-11 as a key link in interpreting Romans, especially Romans 
14-15.
Sanday and Headlam viewed Romans 9-11 as a “pause in the epistle,” one 
with no connection to the preceding verses, as if the section disrupts the flow of the 
discussion.32 Dodd agrees as describes Romans 9-11 as “the sequel postponed” and he 
adds that the verses form a “compact and continuous whole, which can be read 
satisfactorily without reference to the rest of the epistle.. .”33 Dodd views Romans 9- 
11 as a philosophical conversation, a diatribe, and the words “were very not likely 
written currente calamo with the rest of the epistle.”34 Schreiner acknowledges that 
such a position has “all but vanished today,” while scholars generally believe that 
Romans 9-11 is important to the discussion in Paul’s letter. The scholarly positions 
that Romans 9-11 was a pause in the epistle or disconnected from the rest of Paul’s 
letter to the Romans appears to dismiss key links of obligation which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.
Most scholars see Romans 9-11 as a unity, “an integral part of the letter, if not 
its actual climax.”35 Moo recognizes “the importance of the Jewish motif.”36 Byrne 
views Romans 9-11 as “no less part of the ‘inclusive’ presentation of the gospel.”37
32 Sanday and Headlam, 226.
33 C. H. Dodd, The Epistle o f Paul to the Romans (London: Houghter and Stoughton, 1932), 148.
34 C. H. Dodd, 148,150. Dodd continues by saying that Romans 9-11 “represent a somewhat earlier 
piece of work, incorporated here wholesale to save a busy man’s time and trouble in writing on the 
subject afresh” (p. 151). He suggests that Romans 9-11 a “kind of sermon ...inserted...” and “...the 
epistle could be read without any sense of a gap if these chapters were omitted” (p. 149).
3 Thomas H. Tobin, Paul’s Rhetoric in Its Contexts (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 
252; Krister Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays (London: SCM, 1977), 28, 85. 
Stendahl sees Romans 9-11 as the climax stating, “The real centre of gravity in Romans is found in 9 -  
11” (p. 280). Contra Tobin who discusses how “Romans 9-11 belong together both thematically and 
rhetorically” (p. 251).
36 Moo, 548. He says that Paul “found himself at the centre of debate” between the Gentiles and Jews 
in the church and presented and defended his gospel with an “aim to resolve the tension” (pp. 548, 
549).
37 Brendan Byrne, Romans: SP 6 (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1996), 283. He states, 
“The credibility of Paul’s presentation of the gospel hangs upon a satisfactory resolution of this issue,” 
that is, “the extension of Israel’s privileges to Gentile believers and the inclusion o f those Gentiles 
within the eschatological people of God...” (p. 282).
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Stuhlmacher views this section as Paul’s defence of the gospel, noting that “Romans 
9-11 is just as decisive for the understanding of his gospel of justification as it is for 
the realization of his far-reaching mission plans.”38 Schreiner views it as Paul’s word 
“to stave off Gentile pride by providing the larger theological backdrop to what was 
happening in Rome.”39 Fischer notes that “the relevance of Romans 9-11 has usually 
tested the mettle of commentators,” adding that Paul is aware that his own problems 
are the problems of many of his audience also.”40 Cranfield says of Romans 9-11, 
“One stubborn problem is that of the relation of these three chapters to the rest of 
Romans.”41 He then adds that “a closer study reveals the fact that there are very many 
features of chapters 1 to 8 which are not understood in full depth until they are seen in 
light of chapters 9 to 11 -  the characterization of the scope of Paul’s apostleship by 
‘unto the obedience of all the nations’ in [Romans] 1:5.”42 Dunn says that in “the 
exposition is developed step by step with each claim regarding God’s saving purpose 
as revealed in his word having a ‘two-sided’ character which builds up to the solution 
to the problem.”43 No doubt, Romans 9-11 is more than a mere sermon or exposition, 
but Paul’s prolegomenon is a critical discourse on the path to conflict resolution in 
Romans 15.
38 Stuhlmacher, 144. He mentions that Paul is defending the work of “contramissionaries” that felt that 
“newly baptized Christians hung on to false teaching of a Jewish apostate” (p. 143). This view seems 
hard to imagine in Romans 9-11 given the complex social dynamic and the fact that Paul had not been 
to Rome.
39 Schreiner, 471.
40 James A. Fischer, “Dissent Within a Religious Community: Romans 9-11,” BTB 10 (1980): 105- 
110. He addresses images Paul uses in Romans 9-11, adding that there must be a decision-maker in 
resolving the dissent in the church, that internally persons in the church have to make a decision about 
the conflict, and that “the dynamism in the conflict calls for an act of faith” (p. 106). He implies an 
“ethical” response for conflict resolution.
41 Cranfield, 2:445.
42 Cranfield, 2:445.
43 Dunn, 518. He notes, “It is important to realize these chapters are not an excursus, or an appendix to 
an argument already complete in itself’ (p. 519).
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iii. The link o f Roman obligation to Romans 14-15
Third, consider Romans 9-11 as a key link in understanding and interpreting Romans, 
especially Romans 14-15. Of keen interest, then, is how did Paul present his material? 
Bryan sees Romans 9-11 as the “most rhetorically striking of the whole letter, and 
makes extensive use of virtually the entire range of techniques of the podium and the 
classroom.”44 Witherington says, “From a rhetorical viewpoint this section of the 
letter is part of a refutatio,” that is, that Paul is following a pattern of rhetoric, 
probatio-refutatio, as an argument for a case-argument against the opponent’s case.45 
Witherington adds, “Paul is refuting certain ideas and arguments apparently held by 
Gentile believers in Rome, or at least Paul fears that they hold such views of Jews and 
Jewish Christians.”46 This rhetorical style was a common tool used in Graeco-Roman 
culture. Gamsey writes, “The promotion of rhetoric by emperors was an aspect of 
their support for education in general, which in turn signalled their commitment to the 
Graeco-Roman literary culture; rhetoric was the keystone of the educational 
system.”47 Rhetoric seems plausible because of the persuasive nature of the letter, but 
Witherington’s thought of a refutatio appears to be one-dimensional toward the 
Gentiles.48
Jewett views Romans as a persuasive work of rhetoric.49 He states, “In ancient 
rhetoric there are five means of persuasion: invention, arrangement, style memory and
44 Bryan, 160.
45 Witherington, 237-8.
46 Witherington, 237.
47 Gamsey, The Roman Empire, 181.
48 Witherington, 238. He says, “It was indeed the normal procedure to save the refutatio for later in the 
discourse, unless one’s argument were forensic, making refutation necessary immediately. But Paul’s 
argument is deliberative, and he has deliberately saved the major bone of contention and division until 
the end of his theological arguments, well after he has established rapport with his audience and led 
them through a series of arguments they are likely to consent to, or at least be favourably disposed to 
on the whole. Furthermore, we are probably dealing here with what Quintilian calls prolepsis, an 
anticipatory rebuttal which forestalls certain arguments Paul might expect to hear when he gets to 
Rome.”
49 Jewett, 23.
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delivery, all of which are evident in Romans.50 Quintilian, in The Orator's Education, 
names the five parts of a speech: proemium, narrative, proof, refutation, and 
epilogue.51 Jewett sees Romans “a five part arrangement” with a “visible table of 
contents” which he lists: “an exordium (1:1-12); a narratio (1:18-15); apropositio 
(1:16-17); aproof divided into four discrete arguments (1:18-4:25; 5:1-8:39; 9:1- 
11:36; and 12:1-15:13); and a peroration (15:14-16:16 + 16:21-23).”52 He also views 
16:17-20 and 16:25-27 as interpolations, the former as a warning and the latter as a 
doxology.53 Jewett sees Romans 9-11 as the third proof, a probatio that speaks to “the 
triumph of divine righteousness in the gospel’s mission to Israel and the Gentiles.”54 
He also notes that Paul begins in Romans 9:1-5 with a pathos that aims to arouse 
“similar sympathies on the part of the audience,” an effort to persuade the Gentiles to 
have compassion for the Jews.55
Crook notes that rhetoric was also a vital part of legal, political, and epideictic 
Roman society, as such, “rhetorical performances including the speeches of barristers 
in legal actions, took place in public, in the stoas and the basilicas.”56 In some 
circumstances rhetoric was instilled in the Roman mindset in the intermingling of law 
and life where “it was a part of the philosophy of the Romans that the duty 
(obligation) of a citizen included his taking his share of the burdens of the law.”57 
Epictetus says that the epideictic function of education is to apply, to make 
distinction, and to differentiate between things under our control and those not under
50 Jewett, 23.
51 Quintilian, Institutes o f Oratory 3.9.1-2.
52 Jewett, 30.
53 Jewett, 30.
54 Jewett, 556.
55 Jewett, 556. See also Elliott, Rhetoric, 261-2.
56 Crook, Law and Life, 33.
57 Crook, Law and Life, 33.
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our control, and those “under our control are moral purpose and all the acts of moral 
purpose.”58
Reading Romans 9-11, with its import of Old Testament Scripture and Paul’s 
use of a Graeco-Roman style of rhetoric, leaves the impression that Paul is appealing 
to both Jews and Gentiles in a manner that identifies with their needs, yet consistent 
with his ultimate purpose of resolving the conflict in a plea for mercy. Paul’s pattern 
in this epistle follows his pattern of church starting and a Graeco-Roman pattern of 
rhetoric.
iv. Paul’s pathos
Fourth, consider Paul’s pathos. Reading Romans 9-11 Paul’s “unmistakable pathos” 
emerges.59 Bryan notes, “What Paul affirms here is simply a conviction that even in 
‘bad’ things (Romans 8:28, 31-39), God still works for our final good -  a conviction 
that will form an important part of the arrangement of the next section of the letter 
(9.1-11.36).”60
From this writer’s perspective, Romans 9-11 is a vital part of the letter in 
Paul’s argument for conflict resolution and reconciliation in the church. I see this for 
three reasons. First, the important sense of 6<|)£iA- in one of its derivative forms in 
verses 1:14, 8:12,13:8,15:1 and 15:27, along with Paul’s use of the imperative to 
communicate Christian obligations as will be suggested in the next two chapters of 
this thesis which discuss a new obligation and the compelling obligation for the 
church in Rome.
A second reason for the importance of Romans 9-11 is the logical connections 
Paul makes throughout the letter. One particle that Paul repeatedly uses is ouv, a
58 Epictetus, Discourses 1.9-10.
59 Kasemann, 257.
60 Bryan, 153.
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“transitional particle relating clauses or sentences loosely together by way of 
confirmation.”61 Another combination of particles that Paul uses is apa ouv, which 
Thrall says is “peculiar to the Pauline epistles” while “the purpose of the combination 
is to provide an emphatically inferential connective,” or more importantly, an implied 
“logical connection.”62
A third reason for the importance of Romans 9-11 is the rhetorical function of 
the letter. This writer agrees with Jewett’s observations concerning both the function 
and the general outline of Romans with 9-11 serving as a proof or probatio. In 
Romans 9-11, it seems as though Paul is addressing the church as he does throughout 
the letter, aiming to convince the strong, mostly Gentiles, and the weak, mostly Jews, 
to resolve their conflict. In Romans 9-11 Paul seeks to persuade the Gentiles to adopt 
a different attitude than their compatriots in Rome who were anti-Semitic and to 
accept Jews as a part of God’s redemptive plan. While asking the Gentiles to avoid 
anti-Semitism, Paul was also simultaneously exhorting the Jews toward God’s 
redemptive plan for the Gentiles in the inclusive nature of Paul’s ethic.63 Paul’s 
pathos that emerges in Romans 9-11 is for both Gentiles and Jews to live and to serve 
Christ together as a unified body. Paul’s emotional appeal in his proof in Romans 9- 
11 sets the stage for the new obligations that he will present in Romans 12-13. It also 
advances his powerful thrust toward his compelling obligation in Romans 14-15, 
especially Romans 15:1-6.
61 Robertson, .,4 Grammar, 1191.
62 Margaret Thrall, Greek Particles in the New Testament: Linguistic and Exegetical Studies (Leiden: 
Brill, 1962), 10,11. “It is several times used by Paul to sum up the argument of a whole section (rather 
than merely indicating the logical consequence of the immediately preceding sentence considered in 
isolation)...”
63 See Toney, Paul’s Inclusive Ethic, 91-163.
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Paul’s pathos rises from his commitment to conflict resolution under the 
mercy of God. Might Paul’s pathos, however, have context in a word that he used in 
his letter to the first century Roman church?
Paul’s pathos falls under the guise of the obligation, a word that he used in 
Romans 1:14, oc|)eiA,eur|<;, an obligation, a sense of indebtedness which he feels and 
pursues for both Gentiles and Jews, for the strong and the weak in relation to the 
kingdom of God. Paul’s exordium ox, “the beginning” of his letter, according to 
standard rhetorical devices in speeches for solving conflict, precedes the introduction 
of the subject in question.64 Quintilian explains more clearly the content of an 
exordium,
What in Latin is called the principium or exordium, the Greeks seem to have had 
better reasons for calling prooimion, because our words merely signify 
“beginning,” whereas theirs makes it clear that this is the part which precedes 
the introduction of the subject to be treated. Now oime means song, and lyre- 
players gave the name prooimion to the short pieces they perform to win favour 
before they begin the formal competition; it may be for this reason, therefore, 
that orators also chose this name to denote what they say with the object of 
winning over the minds of the judges before they start on the actual case. 
Alternatively, because the Greeks also call a road oimos, it became the practice 
to use prooimion of what is said before on enters the real matter.65
Based on rhetoric, evidence suggests that Paul’s pathos was indeed his obligation (“I
am a debtor.. Rom 1:14) and his sense of “indebtedness” toward Gentiles and Jews
to help them resolve church conflict by living with a spiritual psyche that was both
countercultural and revolutionary.
The concept of Paul’s obligation, connected to Romans 1:5 as “the obedience to
the faith among all nations, for his name,” places itself in the “rhetoric of obedience in
the Pauline tradition.”66 Kittredge shows how Paul uses rhetoric in the letters to the
64 Quintilian, Institutes o f Oratory 4.1.1.
65 Quintilian, Institutes o f Oratory, 4.1.1-4. “The reason for a Prooemium is simply to prepare the 
hearer to be more favourably inclined toward us for the rest of the proceedings” (4.1.5).
66 Cynthia Briggs Kittredge, Community and Authority: The Rhetoric o f  Obedience in the Pauline 
Tradition (Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press, 1998), 1.
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Philippians and the Ephesians to promote his ethic of “radical obedience.”67 Kittredge 
understands “radical obedience” in light of Bultmann’s “man of faith” that 
incorporates the Pauline idea that “understands the act of faith as an act of 
obedience.”68 Bultmann, commenting on Romans 9:1 and Paul’s use of conscience, 
“indicates that the essential thing about ‘conscience’ is just this obligation to its 
transcendent source of authority.”69 He continues, “Conscience, so to say, steps in as 
an independent witness with the man whose binding obligation she is.”70 Bultmann’s 
radical obedience and ethic in light of Kittredge’s research linking “the language of 
obedience with rhetoric of unity”71 in Philippians and Ephesians indicates that Paul’s 
pathos was a radical ethic of binding obligation. Paul’s letter to the Romans in 
general, and the passion of his words in Romans 9-11 “reflect the urgency of the 
matter as he plans to go to Rome;”72 and also, subversively generates thoughts of a 
radical obedience and ethic through Christ that flows in the context of Paul’s deeply 
felt obligation. How does Paul express this obligation to the Jews that led him to write 
Romans 9-11?
67 Kittredge, Community and Authority, 14-15, 37; Bultmann, Rudolf, Theology o f the New Testament 
(trans. Kendrick Grobel; vol. 1; London: SCM, 1952), 2. Bultmann says that “Jesus’ message is a great 
protest against Jewish legalism” and that “radical obedience is only possible where a man understands 
the demand and affirms it from within himself’ versus a mere outward show of obedience of a law or 
command “without asking the reason, meaning, o f its demand” (p. 12). He also notes, “’Faith’s 
obedience’ is the genuine obedience which God’s law had indeed demanded, but which had been 
refused by the Jews by their misuse of it to establish ‘their own righteousness,’ using it as a means for 
boasting” (p. 315). Kittredge views obedience in light o f two Greek words: u tto k o u o j  and uTTOTCtaau).
68 Bultmann, Theology o f the New Testament, 1:315-16.
69 Bultmann, Theology o f the New Testament, 1:219.
70 Bultmann, Theology o f the New Testament, 1:219.
71 Kittredge, Community and Authority, 176. Of the rhetoric of unity she states, “He [Paul] attempts to 
resolve that conflict by presenting a picture o f oneness” to relieve the “tension between unity-as- 
equality and unity-as-hierarchy in Ephesians and the tension between partnership and obedience in 
Philippians” (p.176). See also James D. Hester “The Rhetoric of Romans: Re-Reading Romans 1:1- 
12,” in Celebrating Romans'. Template for Pauline Theology (ed. Sheila McGinn; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2005), 83-105. Hester views Paul as infusing an “ambassadorial letter” advocating 
diplomacy in his language, and calling for ‘hearing-obedience-faith,’ that is faith implies action (pp. 
83-4; 90-1).
72 Witherington, 239.
2. Paul’s Anguish (Romans 9)
Paul expressed his anguish in Romans 9:2 with two Greek words: Auttp and 68uvr| 
(sorrow and grief), compounded with two descriptive Greek adjectives: peydAr] and 
dSidAeiTTTog (great and continual). Paul’s pathos and obligation toward the Jews 
created within him a sorrow, a “grief of mind,”73 that was great and bore ceaseless 
pain, “mental pain,”74 while heightening his senses and intensifying the “emotional 
intensity” with regard to the Jews.75 Paul’s pathos moved his heart, indicating “the 
depth of sincerity he seeks to convey.”76
Witherington notes that Paul begins this chapter with the “swearing of an oath,” 
adding that “the rhetorically astute audience would recognize this as a prelude to a 
specific kind of argument, namely one having to do with a testimony of witnesses, 
Paul as witness and Scripture as witness, as well as God himself speaking through his 
divine Word.”77 His comment alludes to both rhetoric and Roman law in the context 
of a proof, an oath, and an obligation.
In regard to an oath associated with rhetoric Paul begins chapter nine with an 
oath, “I say the truth...,” and addresses his hearers on the basis of a logical argument. 
Aristotle discusses an oath in the context of binding contracts, the enactment of law, 
and “the oath of the dicast” which allows the hearer to decide to the best of his or her 
judgment, while relieving the person swearing an oath of the charge of peijury.78 
Quintilian notes that “the solemn nature of the oath, with regard to which he will win 
all the greater credence, if without the least show of eagerness to take the oath he
73 Cranfield 2:453.
74 Dunn, 523.
75 Dunn, 523; Sanday and Headlam, 227.
76 Dunn, 524.
77 Witherington, 249.
78 Aristotle, The Art o f Rhetoric 1.15.12.
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makes it clear that he does not shrink from solemn duty.”79 Cicero declares that an 
oath is “upon your conscience” as a part of “legal formulas” and “binding as 
treaties.”80 Paul’s appeal to the church at Rome in Romans 9 begins with his address 
to the Jews in the context of Roman obligation’s rhetorical device of an oath.
Paul’s anguish over the Jews flows out of his own heritage, Jewish history in 
the covenantal lineage of Abraham, and the righteousness of God. His anguish 
appeals on two levels: (i) his love for Israel and the Israelites in the merciful 
compassion of God demonstrated to Jews throughout their history in spite of the fact 
that they have been a prejudiced and inferior people in the eyes of other races and 
nations; (ii), Paul’s anguish finds an emotional link in the church in Rome because of 
their supposed inferior or “weak” status in the church. An oath follows with the 
testimony of witnesses, in this case, Paul, Scripture and God speaking through his 
word, while Paul rebuts the notion that Jews are forsaken by God and that the word of 
God has failed (Romans 9:6).81 Witherington adds, Understanding the “assumption of 
Gentile superiority in the Roman church,” that Paul is here and elsewhere in Romans 
“trying to level the playing field so as to make clear that all are ‘in’ the people of God 
by God’s mercy and grace and that no one has a right to boast in his or her 
accomplishments.”82 Boasting was not mere braggadocios over brave 
accomplishments and superior feats, it was a formalized in Roman society as a 
symbol of status, as a form of a party spirit of dominance in “personality-centred 
parties” of division, and as a “secular practice” among leaders in society.”83
Witherington interestingly notes, in quoting Wright, that there may be another 
and even more subtle sort of message as well. Wright argues,
79 Quintilian, Institutes o f Oratory 5.6.2.
80 Cicero, On Duties 3.108.
81 Witherington, 249.
82 Witherington, 249.
83 Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership, 97, 96-99.
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The retelling of Israel’s story in 9:6-10:21 is itself designed not only to suggest 
a new way of reading Israel’s own history but also quietly to undermine the 
pretensions of Rome itself. Rome, too, told stories of its own history, going back 
to the brothers Romulus and Remus a thousand years earlier, coming through a 
long story of the republic and finally arriving at the emperor who was now 
enthroned as lord of the world. Paul, having declared in 9.5 that Jesus, the 
Messiah, is ‘God over all, blessed forever’...returns to the point in 10.12: Jesus 
is Lord over all, Jew and Gentile alike. Israel’s history climaxing in Jesus, is 
designed to upstage Roman history, climaxing in Augustus.”84
Paul never fails to track the influence of Roman underpinnings in his logical argument
on the path to seeking a spiritual, practical resolve to division within the Roman
church. Ultimately, Paul knew that either the way of Augustus or the way of Jesus had
to achieve victory in the end.
Notwithstanding, his anguish solidified with an oath and witnesses, also 
produced sorrow and heaviness in his heart because of the church’s failure to see 
beyond the superior/inferior categories, the strong and weak divisions, to a 
righteousness that rises above division in the realm of faith in Christ, that is, a 
righteousness of God, “even a righteousness which is of faith.”85 In Romans 9:14 Paul 
asks the question, “What shall we say then?” Moo sees this as typical of the questions 
Paul uses at several points in Romans to “advance his argument” while “at some 
points such questions introduce clarifications of Paul’s teaching.”86 Paul follows with 
the question in verse 9:14, “Is there unrighteousness with God?” Moo asserts that “the 
word ‘unrighteousness’ comes from a Greek word group that is used in both the OT 
and in Paul with reference to God’s faithfulness to his promises and to his covenant
84 Witherington, 249-250; N.T. Wright, “Romans,” in The New Interpreter's Bible 12 vols. (Nashville: 
Abingdon, 2002), 10:623-24.
85 Romans 9:31. The question of “whose righteousness?” continually swirled in the minds of the 
readers, strong or weak, Gentile or Jew? Augustus’ way or Jesus’ way? Roman obligation’s ethic or a 
new Christian one? For example Slee, The Church in Antioch, sets the heart of the conflict and 
dilemma, “’’The issue of Jewish and Gentile table fellowship in the first century CE was problematic 
because o f Gentile association with idolatry” (p. 17).
86 Moo, 591. He also notes that the similar phrases are used in 3:5; 4:1 and 9:30.1 see similarities in 
6:1; 7:7; 8:31; 9:30, and 11:7.
225
with Israel.”87 God’s faithfulness produces in those who believe a “God-kind of 
righteousness.”
Righteousness is used forty-three times in Romans. Campbell sees righteousness 
as “Christ is characterized with 3:22-25 via a tight conjunction of two sets of 
metaphors, the one referring to a sacrificial deliverance, and the other to faithfulness, 
or obedience.”88 Reversing the thought, he sees that in uniting these two perspectives 
of Christ’s atoning work of righteousness and his work of obedience on the cross, “it 
can be seen that Christ functions in essence (and as we would expect) to save 
humanity from every possible dimension of oppression and disobedience.”89 In other 
words, Paul’s anguish is personal and heartfelt as he discusses righteousness 
beginning in Romans 1:17, in Romans 9, and climaxing in 14:17. Righteousness has 
its foundation in the saving work of Christ and its application in an ethical response in 
everyday living. Closely connected to Paul’s discussion on righteousness is Paul’s 
ethic of obedience, a sense of debt (Rom 1:14; 8:12; 15:27) to the righteousness 
illustrated in Christ. Of particular interest to Paul’s discussion of righteousness in 
chapters 1, 8, and 15 are the closely aligned references to obligation related to three 
themes: faith, the Spirit, and the kingdom of God, respectively, “the righteousness of 
God revealed faith to faith,” (Rom 1:17); “the Spirit is life because of righteousness,” 
(Rom 8:10), and “the kingdom of God.. .righteousness, joy, and peace” (Rom 14:17). 
Romans 9 foreshadows Paul’s ethic and plan for Jews and Gentiles to live in the unity 
of the faith of the righteousness of God which he will discuss in chapter 15. Paul’s
87 Moo, 591.
88 Douglass A. Campbell, The Rhetoric o f Righteousness in Romans 3:21-26 (Sheffield, England: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 158-59.
89 Campbell, The Rhetoric o f Righteousness, 159. Campbell connects God’s righteousness to a “clearly 
salvific” nuance, while acknowledging Christ as “God’s complete and final solution to the human 
condition.”
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anguish flows from debt to both Jews and Gentiles in God’s overarching plan, but it 
also leads to Paul’s plea in Romans 10.
3. Paul’s Plea (Romans 10)
Paul begins Romans 10 in the same way as he did chapter 9: pouring out his heart, 
expressing “heartache about his fellow Jews,” of whom “Paul’s heart’s desire and 
what he prays for repeatedly is their salvation.”90 Stuhlmacher, and rightly so, sees 
9:30-33 as a “decisive turning point in the Pauline argument” because of his shift to 
the righteousness of the Gentiles.91 This decisive turning point has implications for 
Paul’s aim of conflict resolution. As Romans 10 begins, three things stand out: Paul’s 
use of the conjunction yap (v. 3), Paul’s plea in a passionate, emotional sense, and 
Paul’s logical argument which aims to counteract Roman privilege.
First, consider Paul’s use of the conjunction yap. Thrall views one use of yap 
as an “introductory particle” in the New Testament “employed to emphasize one 
factor in a given situation which constitutes ‘the point of contact with another set of 
ideas,’ already familiar to the reader,” which would elucidate the fuller significance of 
the whole text.”92 Moo adds, “The paragraph unfolds in a series of logical steps, each 
related to the former conjunction yap, ‘for.’”93 While righteousness is still the main 
topic, Paul addresses his “mainly Gentile readers,” and Paul sincerely wants them to 
know his heartache for Israel and that “he takes no delight or satisfaction in Israel’s 
fall.”94
Second, in Romans 10 as it begins, Paul’s words and plea have beneath the 
surface a strong, almost begging, emotional appeal. Aristotle discusses three qualities
90 Witherington, 259-60.
91 Stuhlmacher, 152.
92 Thrall, Greek Particles, 42. She notes Mark’s use of “for” to introduce OT passages and themes in 
his gospel.
93 Moo, 630.
94 Moo, 631.
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for the orator to produce conviction: good sense, virtue, and good will, such qualities 
while necessary in delivery are not to be presented without emotions.95 He notes that 
“if a man is unemotional or not hopeful” it decreases the chances of the orator’s desire 
coming to pass.96 Cicero addresses emotions as a necessary part of persuasion, the 
speaker himself feeling emotions he wishes to arouse in his hearers, stating, “For just 
as there is no substance ready to take fire as to be capable of generating a flame 
without the application of a spark, so also there is no mind ready to absorb an orator’s 
influence, as to be inflammable when the assailing speaker is not himself aglow with 
passion.”97 Cicero further discusses the emotional appeal as both a moral duty and an 
act of loyalty in the language of Roman obligation, such words as loyalty, duty 
(officium), diligence, and the concept of the “good man,” a concept not absent from 
the Roman mind.98 Paul’s plea in chapter 10 reveals both his pathos and ethos on the 
path of his logical argument to produce Christian action.
Third, in a reading of Romans 10, Paul understands the Jew-Gentile issue as 
more than just an issue of ethnicity and religious background. The strong and weak 
demarcation in the church felt the cultural pull of patronage, the Roman hierarchical 
social pattern, and social privilege where might makes right. Paul’s discussion of 
righteousness in Romans might be placed under the category of “privilege.” Bryan 
sees eight privileges under Jewish law that Paul list in Romans 9: adoption, glory, 
covenants, law, worship (Aorrpda), promises, the fathers (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob), 
and “finally, ‘of their race, according to flesh, is the Messiah,’ underscores the fact 
that the Messiah was (and is) a Jew.”99 Romans 10:1 begins with the word “brothers,” 
both an endearing term and an inclusive term addressed to the readers of Romans.
95 Aristotle, The Art o f Rhetoric 2.4-7.
96 Aristotle, The Art o f Rhetoric 2.4.4.
97 Cicero, On the Orator 2.188-190.
98 Cicero, On the Orator 2.192.
99 Bryan, 169-70.
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Paul’s decisive turn from verse 9:30 and into chapter 10 begins to lay the framework 
for a proposal of a new way to view privilege. The problems in the church at Rome 
were similar to those in Corinth, and as Winter writes, “under Paul’s patronage values 
had been inverted,” and Paul’s language of “brothers” indicates that people in the 
church “were no longer fawning and flattering parasites of private patrons, 
subservient to their ambitions and daily agendas, but they were family-the family of 
God.”100 Paul’s use of brothers here is of significance because he begins the journey 
toward unity and the Christian familial understanding of privilege in God’s household 
in his logical argument in Romans 10.
Paul also expresses his peculiar care and compassion in Romans 10:1 in the 
word £u5oKia, a word that has in effect this meaning: to “consent, accept.”101 It is 
“constantly attested in the papyri, almost always in a legal or financial contract.”102 It 
is a word that both Jews and Gentiles would understand in context. With regard to 
Jews, “a comparison has been made to Mordecai: ‘I was completely willing (euSokicc, 
LXX) to kiss the soles of his feet (Haman’s) for the salvation of Israel.’ ”103 With 
regard to Gentiles, the idea as Paul uses it in Philippians 1:15 of “a right will, pure 
intentions and benevolence toward Paul.”104 It is used in Luke 2:14 in the angelic 
announcement of the birth of Christ (“goodwill toward men”), while finding a 
connection with the salvation of God and his mercies as discovered “at Qumran of the 
expressions (1QH 4.32) ‘the multitude of his mercies toward the sons of his good 
pleasure.”105 While “good will” here “expresses a heartfelt, gracious inclination,” it
100 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 203.
101 Ceslas Spicq, Theological Lexicon o f the New Testament (trans. by James D. Ernest, vol. 2; 
Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1994), 99.
102 Spicq, Theological Lexicon, 99.
103 Spicq, Theological Lexicon, 106.
104 Spicq, Theological Lexicon, 106.
105 Spicq, Theological Lexicon, 105.
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also delivers the thought of benefits, “a good disposition to do God’s will.”106 In 
summary, Paul combines the Jewish concept of goodwill related to salvation (in the 
multitude of his mercies) and the Graeco-Roman concept of gracious inclination, 
almost akin to the feeling or result of the recipients of Roman benefaction. Paul 
desires this for Israel and clearly states his goodwill at the outset of Romans 10.
Romans 10 can be segmented into two sections: (i) verses 1-13 which discusses 
the righteousness of men and the righteousness of God; and (ii) discusses the unbelief 
of Israel and the “inexcusable” nature of that unbelief.107 Paul, according to Barrett, 
analyses the question, “How did the most religious of all peoples come to reject their 
own Messiah, for whose coming they had so long waited?”108
As the question finds an answer it is important to observe the contrasts in 
Romans 9-11, especially with regard to righteousness in Romans 10. Talbert says, 
“Throughout Romans 9-11 are several contrasts: between grace and works (11:5-6), 
between election/call and works (9:11); between a righteousness from God and their 
own righteousness (10:3); between a righteousness through faith and a righteousness 
based on the law (9:30-31).”109 As it relates to righteousness (10:2), Paul states that 
the Jews possess zeal, but that while they seek to stand on their own human 
righteousness by the “gracious privilege of being part of God’s people”, they were 
falling short of the righteousness of God by “not submitting to the right 
righteousness.”110 Their knowledge of God has “a disastrous flaw in it...not according 
to knowledge (eT T iyvw aiv).” 111 The Jews do not know God as he “really is,” and
106 Spicq, Theological Lexicon, 106.
107 Barrett, 182, 189.
108 Barrett, 182.
109 Charles H. Talbert, Romans (Macon, Geo.: Smyth & Helwys, 2002), 254.
110 Witherington, 260.
111 Cranfield, 2:514.
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“there is a lack of comprehension at a vital point.”112 Barrett adds, “The man who 
seeks to establish his own righteousness, however virtuous that may be, can only be a 
rebellious creature of God, for he is pressing himself into the Judge’s throne; the man 
who accepts God’s verdict and submits to God’s righteousness harmonizes with the 
universe, since he falls into his appointed place as a dependent creature.”113 Barrett’s 
concept of harmony with the universe seems far reaching, since Paul’s plea was 
simply a desire for following God’s righteousness practically and faithfully, with the 
simple thought of harmony in the church.
Romans 10:4, “For Christ is the end (teAo<;) of the law for (£i<;) everyone who 
believes,” has puzzled scholars, according to Stuhlmacher, “hotly contested among 
interpreters of Paul,”114 as they seek to understand the meaning of teAo^.
Stuhlmacher focuses not on the Law, but on the Messiah, noting that Christ is not “the 
goal, but the end of the Law, which in turn opens up the righteousness of faith for 
everyone (Jews and Greeks) who believe.”115 Sandlay and Headlam interpret the 
verse as termination, that is, “Law as a method or principle of righteousness has been 
done away with in Christ.”116 Witherington says that teAoc; “seems always to include 
the notion of termination, whatever other nuances it may have,” while concluding, 
“Christ has put an end to the Law as a way of pursuing righteousness.”117 Bryan notes 
that even modem translations like the NEB and JB give the idea of termination, 
“Christ ends the law.”118
112 Cranfield, 2:514.
113 Barrett, 184.
114 Stuhlmacher, 155.
115 Stuhlmacher, 155. He appears to contradict himself saying, “...Christ did not set aside the holy will 
of God, which had fallen under the reign o f sin, but confirmed it and established it with new power!” 
(p. 155).
Sandlay and Headlam, 284.
117 Witherington, 261.
118 Bryan, 171.
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Other scholars follow along the lines of Moo who views Paul’s discussion as a 
part of the “usual category of salvation history,” adding that Paul is “picturing the 
Mosaic law as the centre in the epoch in God’s dealings with human beings that has 
now come to an end.”119 “For what Paul says here is almost exactly what Jesus claims 
in one of his most famous theological pronouncements, ‘Do not think that I have 
come to abolish the law and the prophets, I have not come to abolish them, but to 
fulfil them’ (Matt 5:17).”120 While Romans 10:4 is seen by Moo as the “hinge on 
which the entire section 9:30-10:13 turns,” it, not coincidentally, means that Christ is 
both the righteousness for both the Jew and the Gentile.121
Eic; “appears in an atmosphere where aim or purpose is manifestly the 
resultant idea.”122 Couple this thought with Jesus’ own words in Matthew 5:17, John 
17:4 (“I have glorified you on earth; I have finished the work you have given me to 
do!”), and even those words of Jesus on the cross (“It is finished! [T£T£A£<xrai]), and 
Paul’s thought here is that Christ has come with the purpose or the goal of fulfilling 
the law so that everyone who believes may live in the power of God’s righteousness, 
not their own. “Christ is the goal, the aim, the intention, the real meaning and 
substance of the law-apart from Him it cannot be properly understood at all.”123
Romans 10:5-7 contrast works and faith, Moses and Leviticus 18:5 serving as 
the example of works, while Paul personifies righteousness in 10:6, according to 
Cranfield, “The personification of the righteousness of faith is a rhetorical device 
which could be paralleled popular philosophical preaching of Paul’s time in which 
virtues and vices are sometimes represented as speaking.”124 Paul quotes portions of
119 Moo, 642.
120 Moo, 642.
121 Moo, 642.
122 Robertson, A Grammar, 594.
123 Cranfield, 2:519.
124 Cranfield, 2:522.
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Deuteronomy 30:14 and 30:15 in the next two verses, and “it is significant that both 
these verses are warnings against a self-complacent, presumptuous boasting in one’s 
own merit.”125 The significance lies in Paul’s contrast of obedience (Leviticus 18:5) 
as the “essence of the law,” versus (§£) God’s will by faith through faith based on the 
resurrection of Christ.126 Barrett clarifies, “The divine act of redemption (iii.24) has 
been already performed, not as a reward for legal righteousness but as an act of sheer 
grace.”127 Further significance lies in the fact that Paul follows his argument from 
Romans 3:27, “Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, 
but by the law of faith,” and is plodding toward the path of faith in Christ that calls for 
a surrender of a sense of privilege and hierarchy in relationships in the church at 
Rome.
“Faith,” as Paul quotes Deuteronomy 30:14, “alone is what God seeks, and 
that he himself provides.”128 The “word,” dabar or prj|ia (LXX, also in Rom 10:8) is 
preached (kppuctctw ) ,  and in Deuteronomy 30:11-14, “word” posits as a command, 
but can be “replaced” with Christ, because “as God brought his word near to Israel so 
they might know and obey him, so now God brings his word ‘near’ to both Jews and 
Gentiles that they might know him through his Son Jesus Christ and respond in faith 
and obedience.”129 Deuteronomy 30:11-14 was also used later by Baruch 3:29-30 and 
Philo {Posterity o f Cain, 84-85) to contend that the “law was accessible,” that the 
Israelites knew the law, it was close, it was “not too hard and not too far off;” now it 
finds use by Paul to “argue that the righteousness by faith is accessible and
125 Cranfield, 2:523.
126 Moo, 649-50.
127 Barrett, 185.
128 Barrett, 186.
129 Moo, 653.
233
possible.”130 What response is required is also possible by faith. What is that 
response?
Paul answers in 10:9 that the response is confession and belief, a confession of 
the lips; a belief in the heart, reversing the order of Deuteronomy 30:14, yet 
understanding confession and belief “as the same thing.”131 The confession parallels a 
formula that Paul gives in I Corinthians 12:3 and “furthermore the resurrection would 
clearly distinguish confession of Jesus as Lord from other such confessions in the 
Graeco-Roman world.”132 “Confession is the outward manifestation of this critical 
inner response,” namely a belief in the heart.133
Romans 10:10-13 reiterate Paul’s belief in the heart as related to righteousness 
and that the belief in the resurrected Christ would not bring shame to the one who 
believes. Paul works back to his three concepts of faith, righteousness, and salvation, 
while quoting Isaiah 28:16 again as he did in Romans 9:33 and giving it a “universal 
scope” by adding Trctg-all.134 Witherington notes that the Isaiah quote raises “the 
matter of honour,” which, coupled with the universal nature of “all” cannot be missed 
by his readers.135 As Paul winds down in this section he stresses that “though they 
(Jews) have to learn the humbling lesson that righteousness with God is not theirs by 
right of descent or merit, they also stand under the promise that they too share that 
righteousness through faith.”136 “God is one and the same for both (Jews and Greeks) 
and he shares his riches of forgiveness by grace to all who those who ‘call upon’ 
him.”137 “Paul’s stress is on the wideness of God’s mercy, not the narrowness of the
130 Talbert, 257.
131 Cranfield, 2:526.
132 Witherington, 263.
133 Moo, 657.
134 Barrett, 188.
135 Witherington, 263.
136 Cranfield, 2:531.
137 Stuhlmacher, 157.
234
size of the remnant or elect group.”138 Ultimately, Paul works into the depth of his 
argument, one of his rhetorical reminders in his plea, that there is no distinction 
between Jew or Greek in God’s eyes in the heart of grace and that privilege, social 
hierarchy, and the elitist mentality of the “strong” over the “weak” finds no basis for 
genuine honour in the church where the resurrected Christ is confessed and believed.
Romans 10:14 begins with the Greek construction TTwq ouv, connecting the 
previous verses to the latter in “direct relationship.”139 Romans 10:14-21 describes the 
“chain or sequence of events required for someone to be saved.”140 Paul emphasizes 
preaching, Krpuaaw, and its cognate forms in this section, communicating clearly that 
“salvation happens because someone has been sent, that person has preached, 
someone else has heard, the one who has heard has believed, and the one who has 
believed has called on the Lord and so been saved.”141 Salvation comes in response to 
the hearing of the word and faith in Christ.
Paul’s plea continues in Romans 10:15 as he quotes Isaiah 52:7 speaking of 
the beautiful feet of the person who delivers good news. Stuhlmacher sees Isaiah and 
Joel (quoted in Rom 10:13) as prophets who announced the coming reign of God, 
whereby, “at the inauguration of the royal reign of God there will be a great number 
of people who hail God and spread abroad the news of the commencement of his 
reign.”142 Isaiah and Joel predicted carriers of the good news, messengers, would 
arrive preaching the reign of God and Paul indicates that such a time has come and 
prophecy has been fulfilled; thus in the “preaching of the gospel, this eschatological 
hour has already been inaugurated with Jesus’ exaltation to the position of being
138 Witherington, 263.
139 Stuhlmacher, 158.
140 Witherington, 264.
141 Witherington, 264.
142 Stuhlmacher, 159.
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Lord.”143 The gospel preached by these messengers and apostles is a gospel of peace 
and good news. In the Roman psyche of Caesar’s lordship and Pax Romana the 
suayyeAia was used in common vernacular such as good news for a legal verdict.144 
Paul’s use of the word here provides a subtle contrast to the lordship, peace, and good 
news of the gospel. There is a sense that Paul subtly contrasts the good news of 
Augustus and Christ in the language he chooses as it relates to the faith and hearing of 
the gospel.
In regard to faith and hearing in Romans 10:14-18, Bryan notes the “wordplay 
based onpisteuein (‘have faith’) and its cognates and akouein (‘hear’) and its 
cognates.145 “It works well rhetorically,”146 a rhetorical “chain of syllogisms,”147 the 
dp a  climaxing a syllogism, concluding that faith comes by hearing and that 
“preaching which awakens faith is itself indebted and serves the gospel of Christ.”148 
This gospel has been heard by Israel and they are without excuse, appraising Moses 
(Psalm 19:4) and Isaiah (65:2) as witnesses to the gospel both Israel’s invitation and 
opportunity to welcome the gospel preached.
Paul’s plea for unity unfolds in the one Greek word and one powerful image. 
The word used to reference Isaiah’s quote, “But Isaiah is bold and says,” is 
dTTOToApa, “bold,” a word used only once in the New Testament. Josephus uses 
otTTOToApg when he discusses the bold pronouncement of philosophers against God.149 
Josephus writes these words in the context of addressing law, harmony (Roman 
concord), and unity saying, “Unity and identity of religious belief and perfect 
uniformity in habits and customs (mores), produce a very beautiful concord in human
143 Stuhlmacher, 159.
144 Cicero, Letters to Atticus 23 (2.3.1). “First a trifle of good news. Valerius has been acquitted...”
145 Bryan, 176.
146 Bryan, 176.
147 Stuhlmacher, 159.
148 Stuhlmacher, 160.
149 Josephus, Against Apion 2.180.
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character.”150 The powerful image is that of open arms outstretched, like a father 
opening his arms to a prodigal standing in front of him, God to his people Israel, and 
the refusal of God’s people to respond. God “is presented as a parent stretching out 
his arms toward a wayward child all day long, but the child is obstinate and 
wayward.” Israel lacked faith even though they heard the gospel, choosing to remain 
disobedient and contradicting the gospel of God in Christ. Paul’s anguishing plea 
matches God’s plea here, yet “the paradox of the Gentiles’ faith will be matched by 
the paradox of Israel’s disobedience.”151 Faith was essential to the unity and unity to 
the development of faith. Has God, then, rejected Israel?
4. Paul’s Experience (Romans 11)
Paul begins Romans 11, as he so often does in Romans, with another rhetorical 
question.152 As in the two previous chapters before Romans 11 Paul’s pathos and 
passion seem to leap off the page, while in Romans 11:1 he asks the question, “Has 
God cast away his people?” The theme of the whole section is categorically stated in 
v. 2a: “God has not cast off his people whom he foreknew.”153 The section can be 
divided into three parts: (i) Romans 11:1-10 explaining that God has not cast away his 
people because of his grace; (ii) Romans 11:11-24 denoting how the Gentiles have 
been grafted into the reconciliation and salvation of God; and (iii) Romans 11:25-36 
which explains the mystery of salvation and salvation’s end by a hymn of praise and 
has rhetorical questions concerning his wisdom in response to God’s mercy upon all 
(Rom 11:31).154 Paul’s experience as a Jew “in the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of 
Benjamin”(l 1:1), “is taken simply to mean that Paul’s existence as a Jew who is also
150 Josephus, Against Apion 2.179.
151 Barrett, 190.
152 Moo, 671.
153 Cranfield, 2:542.
154 Talbert, 259-67.
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a Christian proves that the Jewish people as a whole cannot have been rejected.”155 
Romans 11:1 focuses on the fact that Paul was sent as an apostle to the Gentiles and 
the “fact that God called an Israelite for the task is surely the clearest possible 
evidence that Israel and her children continue to participate actively in the work of 
Christ and God’s purposes for the world.”156 Paul never loses sight of the “historical 
facts of the Christian mission” which are so “intertwined with his theological
1 57interpretation.”
Not only has God not rejected his people, but he summarizes I Kings 19:9-18 
“to make his point: the example of Elijah is drawn from Israel’s history to illustrate 
God’s plan in the present situation,” that is, just as God left a remnant of seven 
thousand men in Elijah’s day, so now he leaves a remnant in the day in which Paul 
writes.158 Paul’s use of example, a rhetorical device where history is viewed as “a 
means of ethical education,” is frequently applied.159 This technique was used by 
Homer and Isocrates in an effort to persuade and teach moral goodness with the 
“desire to be best” and the goal of achieving moral excellence “by imitating the deeds 
of others and thus achieve similar glory.”160 This technique will be applied by Paul in 
the climax of his argument regarding obligation in Romans 15.
Romans 11:5-10 addresses the fact that God has left “a remnant according to 
the election of grace” (v. 5) and the elect “serves further to emphasize that the 
existence of the redeemed community is God’s action and God’s grace, not human 
achievement.”161 Paul understands the election by grace, but it is not received by all 
Jews. Some Jews are hardened and blind, citing “two sets of scriptures to back up the
155 Cranfield, 2:544.
156 Bryan, 177-78; Luther, 305.
157 Barrett, 193.
158 Fitzmyer, 604.
159 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 8.
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claim-first Deut. 29:4 and Isaiah 29:10 and then Psalm 68:22-3 and 35:8.”162 “In both 
sets of texts the hardening is described as spiritual darkness, blindness, or 
imperceptiveness.”163 Paul’s experience in Acts 9 could be described as a legalistic 
hardness of heart as he aimed to persecute the church and as blindness on the 
Damascus Road, but, ultimately, he experienced God’s transforming mercy and gift of 
grace. Mercy and grace serve as a hint for Paul’s discussion in Romans 12:1-2. He 
offers these Scriptures as a means of opening a door of hope as a “sign of hope which 
God had established for Israel.”164
This hope is explained in Romans 11:11-24, a hope as wide as God’s mercy 
and a hope transported through Paul’s image of a grafted branch. Stuhlmacher 
explains,
Because Israel’s hardening remains within the purview of God’s work of 
purification on behalf of his people, Paul can look beyond the time of Israel’s 
present delusion. He this states that if the fall of the majority of Israelites, that is, 
their diminution to a very few who have become obedient to the gospel (cf.
10:16; 11:5), has already enabled the Gentile world to attain the riches of 
salvation, then how much more will the reacceptance and salvation of the full 
number of Israel mean someday for the world! In other words, on that day when 
God will lead Israel (11:26) to salvation, his reign will begin conclusively.165
Barrett adds, “Israel will be provoked to envy by the Gentile attainment of
righteousness, and so fly to God’s mercy, so that God may in the end bestow
righteousness on her, too.”166 He also notes that Paul uses rjTTinia, “derived from a
comparative (rjTTouv), meaning, ‘inferior,’ ‘less,’ ‘smaller.’”167 “Smaller” seems to be
the sense here and while it is not certain if that is Paul’s meaning here, but he could be
162 Witherington, 266.
163 Witherington, 266.
164 Stuhlmacher, 163.
165 Stuhlmacher, 167.
166 Barrett, 198.
167 Barrett, 214.
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making a subtle reference to the inferior Jews as a part of God’s plan for the 
reconciliation of the world, the reconciliation as a benefit for the Gentiles.168
In Romans 11:13 Paul speaks to the Gentiles and portrays the branches broken 
off as the unbelieving Jews and the branches grafted in as the believing Gentiles. 
These grafted Gentiles “enjoy the privileges and benefits described as the ‘rich root of 
the olive tree,”’ quite literally, a string of genitives, “of the root of the richness of the 
olive tree.”169 The Gentiles “were grafted in and became fellow sharers in the fatness 
(that is the sap) of the root of the olive tree,” a “symbol of the blessings of that 
religious heritage and the promises that go with it.”170
Paul concludes Romans 11:25-36 with an emphasis upon salvation and the 
universality of the gospel, while rehearsing “the salvation-historical drama” again by 
drawing ‘our special attention to this restatement by introducing it as a ‘mystery.’”171 
For Paul, the mystery “denotes a secret knowledge about a decision hidden in God 
from of old, now revealed in and through Jesus Christ for the salvation of all 
humanity; it is an unfolding manifestation of God’s eschatological activity.”172 Paul 
again returns to his inclusive, familial term “brothers” that he used in Romans 10:1. 
For him the mystery leads to mercy, the mercy leads to a doxology of praise, and the 
praise leads to glorify God. Paul ends Romans 11 speaking of God’s mercy and 
transfers that to a hymn of praise about the riches of God’s wisdom and knowledge, 
including his glory.173 “Therefore, as a direct result of their (believers) insight gained 
from faith, praise and glorification for all eternity are due to God who (through 
Christ) has created all things, sustains all things, and not only desires, but will also
168 Barrett, 214. Barrett says, “The details of this verse may thus remain in obscurity...,” but Paul’s 
eschatology pours through.
169 Barrett, 201 n. 1, 196.
170 Witherington, 271.
171 Moo, 712.
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173 Stuhlmacher, 176.
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save all things from the dominion of death and evil!”174 The mercy, praise and glory 
of God declare the “comprehensive horizon” of God’s righteousness.175 Paul’s 
experience of salvation by faith though God’s mercy and grace reciprocated a 
response of praise and glory to God.
Paul’s overarching concern, and one that he combats in his discussion in 
Romans 9-11, is the anti-Semitic crossover in the church in Rome. The church began 
near the synagogue and started with predominantly Jewish believers.176 As has been 
discussed Claudius expelled the Jews and Jewish Christians in AD 49 so Jewish 
Christians who departed from Rome and the church returned to later.177 The church 
became predominantly a Gentile church and “after Claudius’ death when Jewish 
Christians returned to the city, they found a minority in a predominantly Gentile 
church that had little sympathy with Judaism.”178 As the Jews returned to the church 
in Rome, the Gentiles, culturally, held “many of the common prejudices about Jews in 
general.”179 Quite simply, anti-Semitism had arrived in the church and Paul in his 
pathos, plea, and experience grieved that the church had been infiltrated in its early 
stages with hierarchical patterns of superiority and had not moved past anti-Semitism 
to the realization of Christ’s expectation of equality and privilege to none (socially), 
but privilege to all (spiritually) under grace.180
Paul’s message to the Gentiles, “a diatribe form” starting in Romans 11:19, is 
one indicating that they should not be proud nor boastful.181 Talbert says, “One 
manifestation of this new situation was that Gentile Christians made claims to the
174 Stuhlmacher, 176.
175 Stuhlmacher, 177.
176 Talbert, 262.
177 Talbert, 262.
178 Talbert, 263.
179 Talbert, 263.
180 Contra Moo, 703-4. He says, “Gentile-Christian boasting over Jews is probably not the result of 
anti-Semitism generally, but of a mistaken reading of the course of salvation history.”
181 Talbert, 262; J.C.T. Havemann, “Cultivated Olive-Wild Olive: The Olive Tree Metaphor in Romans 
11:16-24” Neotestamentica 31 (1997):87-106.
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effect that Gentile belief and Jewish unbelief meant that Gentiles had replaced Jews in 
God’s salvific plan.”182 Ambrosiaster puts it succinctly and in language of the strong 
and the weak, “Paul wants to stop this boasting, so that we might rejoice in our 
salvation rather than insult the weak.”183 What words did Paul use to ask the Gentiles 
to stop insulting the weak?
Paul uses a key word and phrase, words loosely connected to the concept of 
Roman obligation. The word is “boasting,” KOtTCCKauxw (Rom 11:18) and the phrase is 
“be not highminded” (Rom 11:20). The intensive use of Kauxaopai emphasizes the 
arrogance and superiority of the one boasting, such as a grave inscription where a 
Roman gladiator “boasted” over his defeated enemy.184 Aristotle used it of a person 
who mocked another’s youth.185 Clarke says, “...a study of the Greek verb 
Kauxaopai and its related forms shows that before the first century AD it was 
relatively infrequently used in literary sources,” but that is not “to suggest that the 
concept of boasting was infrequent to the Hellenistic world.”186 Several words 
synonymous with boasting and “more commonly used” were TTEpiauToAoyia, u(3pi<;, 
UTT£poi|ua and aAo^oda.187 Marshall notes uppiq indicates pride and arrogance, that 
such forget their strength and gifts come from God, and “the hybrist considers himself 
superior to all riches, estimation, beauty, strength, wisdom, temperance, justice, 
eloquence, knowledge; while everyone else he regards as poor, disesteemed, 
unhonoured, foolish, unjust, ignorant, outcast, in fact good for nothing.”188 Judge
182 Talbert, 263.
183 Cited in Gerald Bray, Romans (Downers Grove, 111.: InterVarsity, 1998), 294-95.
184 Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon o f the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1979), 411.
185 Aristotle, Polemics 131 lb.4.
186 Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership, 97.
187 C. Forbes, “Comparison, Self-praise and Irony: Paul’s Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic 
rhetoric,” NTS 32 (1986): 13; Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership, 97.
188 Peter Marshall, Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul’s Relations with the Corinthians 
(Tubingen: Mohr, 1987), 208.
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mentions the Roman world of rhetoric and boasting as a “society of self-admiration, 
including of course its deceptive asteistic refinements, was absolutely de rigeur,” that 
is, “strictly required,” or in a Latin sense, “frozen,” “rigid.”189 Boasting was a rigid 
part of the Roman culture, the kind Paul admonished the Gentiles not to practice 
toward Jews in a superior, anti-Semitic fashion in the church.
Of special interest is another use of KaTaKauxarai in James 2:13, “For he 
shall have judgment without mercy, that has showed no mercy; and mercy triumphs 
(KaTOKauxorai) over judgment.” James’s use of the word indicates that the only 
privilege of superiority rests in the judgment of God’s mercy, a concept not foreign to 
Paul’s argument in Romans 9-11 and also Romans 12.
Paul also uses the phrase “be not highminded,” to forbid boasting and 
superiority by the Gentiles. Dionysius of Halicarnassus speaks of a great general 
named Marcius, who was “superior to all the pleasures that dominate young men,” 
“high-minded,” and “inferior to none of the aristocratic party.”190 Paul uses the word 
in II Timothy 3:4 to describe lovers of selves: “traitors, heady, high-minded, lovers of 
pleasures more than lovers of God.” Boasting, here, takes on a negative connotation 
for the Gentiles who are not to consider the Jews inferior and themselves superior. 
Paul’s experience of anti-Semitism in Roman culture has no place in the church in 
Rome.
5. Conclusions
One of Paul’s major concerns in the church was the racial polarization, the division 
caused by a superior, anti-Semitic, boastful attitude and conduct in the church. He 
passionately defended the privileges of both Jews and Gentiles based on the mercies 
of God and reminded them that the concept of privilege surrenders to grace. Paul
189 Judge, “Paul’s Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice,” ABR 10 (1968): 47.
190 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 8.60.1-2.
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anguished and pleaded over the rigid boundaries drawn by the strong Gentiles and the 
weak Jews in the church. This reflected his personal experience of God’s grace as a 
Jew who became a Christian and the import of conduct transferred into his heart.
Paul uses Old Testament examples throughout Romans 9-11, Elijah, Isaiah, 
and others, as a means of rhetorically illustrating and defending his heart’s desire. He 
challenges Gentile Christians, asking them to stop their proud boasting and to stop 
turning their seemingly superior noses up at Jewish Christians who had come back 
into the church after the death of Claudius.
Paul’s prolegomenon to the resolution of racial polarization in Romans 9-11 is 
an anchor of hope in both God’s transforming mercy and gift of grace. In Romans 9- 
11 Paul opens a window to cast the light of God’s mercy on the Gentile and the Jew 
as a step on the path to finding resolution of the conflict between the strong and the 
weak. Romans 9-11 warns against the arrogance of Roman Christians while forming 
the foundation for a whole new obligation to handle conflict in the church. The 
section begins to pave the way for a new kind of response counter to the way the 
Romans have instinctively dealt with the masses and conflict in Roman culture. The 
next chapter will speak to the application of mercy in actual conduct and the power of 
God’s gifts of grace in service. It will also introduce a new obligation for the church 
at Rome.
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Chapter 7: The New Obligation for the Church in Rome
Introduction
It has been demonstrated in Paul’s prolegomenon to conflict resolution that there was 
racial polarization in the church at Rome. Cicero summarizes the attitude of Rome 
and the challenge which Paul had to overcome in the church. He speaks of the “safety 
of the state” and the “wisdom of the best men,” describing them as “men who are 
superior in virtue, and in spirit [who] should rule the weaker, but also that the weaker 
should be willing to obey the stronger.”1 To end racial polarization in the church it is 
necessary to introduce the new obligation and its basis for conflict resolution from 
Romans 12 and 13.2 Paul instructs his readers, both Jew and Gentile, on the practical, 
necessary steps to take before conflict resolution can take place in the church.
In this chapter evidence will reveal that Paul is setting forth a new obligation. 
In order to demonstrate obligation, it is proposed: (1) to discuss social obligation; (2) 
to discuss Romans 12 contrasting two ways to live; (3) to discuss the foundation of 
the new obligation as prefiguring Romans 15 in the context of the mercies of God; 
and (4) to discuss the new obligation that Paul describes in Romans 12-13 as specific 
obligations in the form of Greek imperatives pertaining to proper Christian conduct 
and healthy social relationships.
1. Social Obligation 
John Chow discusses Roman Corinth and I Corinthians in light of patronage, saying, 
“They [patrons and clients] are bound together mainly because their tie can serve their
1 Cicero, The Republic 1.51.
2 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 187. He acknowledges Romans 12-13 in terms of obligation by 
saying, “Then with 12:1-2, Paul begins to spell out the obligations that church members in Rome have 
toward each other (12:3-21), toward their government (13:1-7), and to society in general (13:8-14).” 
Reasoner does not expand on Romans 12-13 in his monograph, but for the purpose o f undertstanding 
Roman obligation it is important in this thesis.
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mutual interests through the exchange of resources.”3 Paul’s letter to the Romans can 
be seen in a similar vein with patronage serving “as the background for understanding 
the relational ties” and obligations in the Christian community in Rome.4 The binding 
nature of patronage flows from Roman law and the conduct required of patronage 
indicates an obligation.5 Riggsby speaks of a social superior (patron) and social 
inferior (client) and the “social superior who was supposed to look out for a set of 
social inferiors, who in turn were loyal and supportive of him.”6 Patronage implies a 
“duty,” often one or more duties that might invite the “public visibility” of the duty.7 
The duty may be an absolute duty or “right” (KcrropGwpa) or a “mean” (KCtGqKOv) 
duty “for the performance of which an adequate reason may be rendered.”8 Duties can 
follow the line of justice or wisdom, or a legal or social obligation.9 According to 
Cicero, “If wisdom is the most important of virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily 
follows that that duty which is connected with the social obligation is the most 
important duty.”10
Cicero reminds the reader that duties are of “the supreme good” and are 
associated with “practical rules by which daily life in all its bearings may be 
regulated.”11 Furthermore, Cicero stresses the importance of “our duty to the immortal 
gods,”12 duty in social relations, and “our moral obligation” that is due to country,
3John K. Chow, “Patronage in Corinth,” Paul and Empire: Religion and Empire in Roman Imperial 
Society (ed. Richard Horsley; Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press, 1997), 105.
4 Horsley, ed., Paul and Empire, 125.
5 Riggsby, Roman Law, 50.
6 Riggsby, Roman Law, 50.
7 Phebe Bowditch, Horace and the Gift Economy o f Patronage (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2001), 24,1-63.
8 Cicero, On Duties 1.8. Paul uses KaOqKOVTa in Romans 1:28.
9 Cicero, On Duties 1.153.
10 Cicero, On Duties 1.153.
11 Cicero, On Duties 1.7-8.
12 Cicero, On Duties 1.160.
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parents, children, family, and friends in the “intimate relationship of life and living, 
counsel, conversation, encouragement, comfort, and sometimes even reproof...”13
Romans chapter 11 ends with a word about the wisdom of God (11:33-36). 
Romans 12:1-2 begins with an obligation to God. Romans 13:1-3 begins with an 
obligation to country, so to speak. Romans 12 and 13 focus, in general, on the 
performance of obligations as citizens responding to God in his kingdom (Rom 14:17) 
or as children (inferior) responding to the father (patron, superior) God in his 
household (edification or “building up,” Rom 14:19; 15:2). It is suggested that Paul 
presents social obligations for the Christian community in Rome in the realms of 
God’s kingdom and his family. These chapters in Romans (12-13) help pave the way 
for Paul’s final climax of obligation in chapters 14-15.
2. Two Ways to Live
Paul understands that the conflict in the church in Rome occurs, in part, because of 
two different sets of expectations: the way of Rome which imposed conformity to 
culture, and the Christian way through the transformation of Christ.
Roman society was one of “cultural conformity and invention.”14 A key aspect 
of that conformity, according to Judge, was Roman order of a “structural model of 
social relations” related to rank and status, including “the way people use their rank to 
assert superiority over each other.”15 Rome, in law, in politics, in social practice, and 
in its quest for honour and dignity, distinguished itself as society “where clearly the 
sense of hierarchy ruled behaviour.”16
13 Cicero, On Duties 1.160; 1.58; Philo, The Unchangeableness o f God 50; Philo, Special Laws 1.54. 
Philo mentions obligation to God, “a most vital duty,” and civic, family and moral obligations.
14 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Invention in Paul: Some Clues from Contemporary Documents,” 
TvnB 35 (1984): 3-24.
Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Invention in Paul: Some Clues from Contemporary Documents,” 
TynB 35 (1984): 5.
16 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 112.
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Roman society operated on the foundation of Roman law with life and law 
intertwined in daily social relations.17 Winter notes that “Roman law was constructed 
with a bias toward social privilege.”18 It influenced society as a cohesive force and 
was the primary means for keeping order, keeping citizens in check, providing social 
boundaries and implementing social control, often through coercion (coerceo). In 
Caesar’s Civil Wars Scipio is described as a man of authority whose judgment could 
both compel and control one who was going astray, such control falling under two 
concepts: his “strength to coerce;” and “the peace of the provinces, the safety of the 
empire.”19 Roman coercion was not always pleasant. Seneca notes the kind of benefits 
(beneficia) in social practice that are tormenting, “stem and harsh,.. .such as 
confinement (coercere) in chains.”20 Ovid even uses the word in Metamorphoses, 
poetically describing two dragons whose mouths were “curbed” (coercuit) with the bit 
(like horses).21 These word uses give a sense of Roman law: control and coercion for 
the sake, in the minds of Romans in authority, of peace and safety. Roman law, its 
peace and safety for the empire, was interpreted by the privileged in society working 
as a lubricant to cohere different groups of people often forcing conformity through 
coercion.
Roman power, or authorities (e^oumai^) as Paul refers to them in Romans 
13:1, was the “establishment of the imperial monarchy” as the key to the “most 
suitable framework for Roman society,” mled by the aristocratic leaders and those on 
the upper scale of the social strata, according to Alfoldy .22 The aristocracy was a 
“closed order, founded upon birth and upon its functions and privileges in the
17 Crook, Law and Life, 1-8.
18 Winter, “Roman Law and Society in Romans 12-15,” in Rome in the Bible and the Early Church (ed. 
Peter Oakes; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 67.
19 Caesar, The Civil Wars 3.57.
20 Seneca, On Benefits 5.20.2.
21 Ovid, Transformations 5.643.
22 Alfoldy, Social History, 94.
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economic, social, political and religious spheres.”23 Dionysius of Halicarnassus
viewed Roman power as a relationship between superiors and inferiors:
But when they were, he resolved to go out of the camp with a few of his men 
and to meet his mother, after first ordering his lectors to lay aside the axes 
which were customarily carried before generals, and when he should come 
near his mother, to lower his rods. This is a custom observed by the Romans 
when inferior magistrates meet those who are the superiors, which continues 
even to our time; and it was in observance of this custom that Marcius, as if he 
were going to meet a superior power (e^oucria), now laid aside all the insignia 
of his own office (ctpxfjQ). So great was his reverence and his concern in the 
tie of kinship.24
Valerius Maximus adds that the laws are like spiders’ webs: just as spider webs catch 
weaker creatures but let the stronger ones through, “so the humble and poor are 
restricted by the laws, but the rich and the poor are not bound to them.”25 Roman 
power had legal connotations that were related to social relations, honour, wealth, 
status, patronage, property, households, friends, reputation and where a person fit on 
the social scale, such as to whom he was indebted financially or personally in terms of 
service.26 Determining who was in authority in a given social situation and asking, 
“Who is in authority?” was a necessary social function of living in Roman society. It 
was the kind of question that Romans in society asked and kept the answer in their 
minds daily for necessary, spontaneous response.
Asking “who is in authority” may also be a question on the mind of Paul as he 
writes to the Christians in Rome, a question that both Jews and Gentiles needed to ask 
in their own hearts and lives as it related to the kingdom of God, Christ, and his 
church. However, Roman authority not only controlled government, but also dealt in 
practical matters like the meat market (macellum),27 the food supply with its “office
23 Alfoldy, Social History, 7.
24 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 8.44.3-4.
25 Valerious Maximus, Memorables Doings and Sayings 7.2.14.
26 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 148-59.
27 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 6-7.
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of the prefect of the grain supply (praefectus annonae)”28 and demonstrated their 
authority in the public square by the way they dressed (purple stripe on toga) or their 
entourage of friends. These issues were rehearsed in Roman minds to follow proper 
order in social practice in a conformity culture.
If Roman authority enforced conformity, status reminded each person in 
Roman society of his or her position and the required reciprocal response in social 
relationships. Status was “legal privilege” and protection, while in “both criminal and 
civil spheres it unashamedly favoured those of superior social status.”29 The language 
of Romans 12 indicates that Paul was aware of status and its importance in the 
political drama and the social function of the Roman world. Words that Paul uses in 
Romans 12 indicate such a warning against an air of superiority in the church: “not to 
think more highly that he ought to think” (Rom 12:3), honour (Rom 12:10), and 
“mind not high things, but condescend to men of low estate” (Rom 12:16). Paul’s 
words were counter to what society both invited and expected. Epictetus says, “I 
would have the rest of you always remember, then, and be ready to apply the 
following truth: That this is the law of nature for the superior to have the better of the 
inferior.. .”30 While status and “Roman social class constituted the very fabric of 
society and defined one’s place in it,” it also “bred strife and jealousy both between 
and within different classes.”31 Status did not necessarily disappear in the church, but 
had to be set aside for higher means of pleasing Christ and relating to people in the 
same manner as Christ related.
28 Peter Gamsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 218.
29 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 227, 235; Winter, “Roman Law and Society in Romans 
12-15,” 67.
30 Epictetus, Discourses 3.17.6.
31 Winter, “Roman Law and Society,” 79.
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Status also combined with rank, status referring to “positions of influence,”
and rank “meant to denote any formally defined position in society,”32 to clarify
superior inferior demarcations in society that then contributed to the Roman culture of
conformity. MacMullen describes the air of superiority in regard to rank:
Secure in interlaced wealth, acquaintance, and kinship, gentlemen earned yet 
another nickname: “the Haughty.” They earned it by conspicuous consumption 
expressive of their vast resources and, by implication, an insult to the poor. 
They earned it by the progress through the streets, sweeping the hoi polloi to 
the walls. And the earned it by just the same gestures and expressions of face 
we use today to show hauteur-torso tilted back, nose in the air, eyebrows 
raised.33 “I am superior to you,” Epictetus imagines one of them saying...”34
Often the powerful in rank “exercised a number of unfair advantages in the judicial
system of the first century”35 as well as in daily Roman life. Citizens could be
punished, demoted, and charged with the neglect of their duties.36 In daily exchange
in relations the “powerful also exacted bribes, on a small scale but as a matter of
habit.”37 It was “the powerful made the law, the same men who felt free to claims of
peer loyalty, patronage, and favouritism.”38 Rank and status were a key element in
maintaining law and order, while supplying the substance for obligation, domination,
conflict resolution, and, often, cruel acts done in the name of privilege based on law,
“which enshrined established conventions for the privileged and regulated
relationships between social inferiors and superiors.”39 The machinery of Roman law
and social practice in these established conventions regulated relationships in such a
32 Judge, Rank and Status, 9.
33 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 110; A. Buchhler, Political and Social Leaders o f the Jewish 
Community ofSepphoris in the Third and Second Centuries (London: Jew’s College, 1909), 17-ff.; 
Moise Schwab, Le Talmud de Jerusalem (Paris: Besson & Chantermerle, 1960), 1.405. Eusebius, 
Praep. Ev. 6.41.
34 Epictetus, Discourses 3.14.11-14.
35 Winter, After Paul Left Corinth, 62.
36 Nippel, Public Order, 7; Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings 2.9.7; Livy, History 
24.18.7-8.
37 MacMullen, Romans Social Relations, 113.
38 MacMullen, Romans Social Relations, 112-3.
39 Winter, “Roman Law and Society,” 69.
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way that there was little room for discussion or flexibility. Conformity, in a sense, 
became a Roman obligation, or, obligation enhanced the conformity.
The culture of conformity has been called “the grand strategy of the Roman 
empire,” as Edward Luutwak gives the title to his book. The strategy coerced 
conformity in Rome and the Romanization of conquered regions produced conformity 
beyond, a bleeding together of two Romans systems in the first century: in “the first 
system the Romans of the republic conquered much to serve the interests of the few, 
those living in the city-and in fact, those best placed to control policy;” the second 
near the second century AD, which “evolved a more benevolent conception of the 
empire.”40 Conformity, then, including conquering regions and peoples and 
indoctrinating them into Roman law, customs, and social relations. Luttwak suggests 
the expansion and Romanization was both political and military, “The superiority of 
the empire, and it was vast, was of an altogether more subtle order: it derived from the 
whole complex of ideas and traditions that informed the organization of Roman 
military force and harnessed the power of the empire to political purpose.”41 The 
complexity of ideas and traditions both politically and militarily filtered down to 
people in daily life in the form of obligations and a sense or order, just as Augustus in 
his “duties of administration,”42 had envisaged. Cicero often described these ideas and 
traditions in the Roman world as an “obligation due.”43 Practically, conformity 
“developed techniques for creating obligation”, which engineered in social relations 
“a close bond of intimacy which depended upon conformity to the wishes of the more
40 Edward N. Luutwak, The Grand Strategy o f the Empire: From the First Century AD to the Third 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1976), 5.
41 Luutwak, The Grand Strategy o f the Empire, 2.
42 Suetonius, The Deified Augustus 2.3.
43 Cicero, On Duties 1.58.
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powerful.”44 Roman culture aimed for conformity for the purpose of concord and 
peace.
Paul’s words in Romans 12:2, “Do not be conformed (conformari) to this 
world” ( kccI |_ir| auaxni-iaTi^£a0£) must have jolted the readers who lived in the 
Roman world. Conformity to the world was an “arrangement” like words in an 
eloquent speech,45 a subduing of passions,46 and the shape, form, example or scheme 
of concepts “conformed to the ancient precedents.”47 The Greek idea of conformity as 
Aristotle used it was to “remodel” so as to make a definition clear.48 Plutarch used it 
in the sense of carrying an image, shape, or even a thought that affects our 
consciousness, possibly even a person’s actions.49 The concept of conformity in its 
cognate form axripaTi^w in Greek thought also communicates the idea of “posture”50 
like the posture of a ballerina dancing and the concept of “decking out or dressing up” 
for an event like meeting a guest or attending a dinner with guests. Paul used a 
cognate form of the verb in 2 Corinthians 11:14 to describe Satan when he is 
“disguised” (p£Taaxr|paTt^£Tai) as an angel of light. Conformity gives a sense of 
shape or form and carries the idea of surrendering and sacrificing to the superiority of 
a power or influence.
Paul’s use of the word indicated that he did not desire the servants of Christ to 
dress up like the world with its arrangement of thoughts, ideas, posture, form, and
44 Judge, “St. Paul as a Radical Critic of Society,” TynB 16 (1973): 196.
45 Cicero, The Oratory 1.17.
46 Cicero, The Oratory 1.86.
47 Tacitus, Annals 4.8.
48 Aristotle, Topics 151b.8.
49 Plutarch, Morals 2.83c. Plutarch uses the word in the context of training the body for virtue while 
explaining that if a man dreams and finds “no pleasure in anything disgraceful” then he has made 
progress in virtue. The particular use of auaxri|icm£u) relates to the rendering the body and “its 
members so obedient to its injunctions of indifference” so that the training of the body for virtue will 
take hold of the “emotional element in the soul” and “do away with the irregularities and vagaries of  
our fancies and incitements, and carry its repression of them” even into a person’s sleep and 
consciousness. luaxripaTi^w carries with it the idea of an image, shape, or form in the consciousness, 
in the case of Plutarch’s word usage, an image repressed.
50 Lucian, The Dance 17.
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schemes of ancient precedents linked to Roman social relations. Paul’s use of the 
negative \ir\ with the present passive imperative indicates in relation to Aktionsart 
“prohibition against its continuance,”51 while “pq predominates with imperatives, 
infinitives, and participles.”52 Present imperatives are “less pressing, less rude, less 
ruthless than the aorist.”53 Paul anguished over conformity to culture in Romans 9-11, 
especially its class distinction and anti-Semitism and, in a sense, even struggled with 
conformity himself if Romans 7 is any indication. Here Paul discusses themes of the 
struggle between the flesh and the spirit, sin and deliverance, and evil and good. He 
hints of Romans 12:2 in Romans 7:7 when he speaks of the “newness of spirit.” 
However, the reality of struggle does not keep Paul from introducing a new way to 
live, a surprising and radical way, for both Jews and Gentiles in the church in Rome: 
transformation (aAAa |i£Ta|iop(j)oOa0£).
Conflict in the church in Rome finds a resolution when it turns away from 
conformity to culture and steps toward transformation because of new obligations 
arising from God’s mercies. The word &AAa, a “coordinating conjunction,” is a 
particle that functions as a strong adversative and the antithesis of what was 
previously written or verbalized.54 Transformation is the antithesis to conformity to 
culture. Word usage in Philo gives evidence of a dramatic change: Gaius “arrayed 
himself with herald’s staffs, sandals and mantles, a grotesque exhibition of order in 
disorder, consistency in confusion, reason in derangement” and then “when it pleased 
him he would strip them off and change (p£T£pop<j)oOTo) his figure and dress into 
Apollo’s, his head encircled with garlands of sun-rays, wielding a bow and arrows in
51 J. H. Moulton, Grammar o f the Greek New Testament, vol. 3 (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1963), 59, 75.
52 Dana and Mantey, Manual Grammar, 265.
53 Moulton, Grammar o f the Greek New Testament, 75.
54 Moulton, Grammar o f the Greek New Testament, 329.
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his left hand and holding out Graces (xdpiTaq) in his right to signify...”55 Philo 
describes a speech of Moses as he was “transfigured into a prophet” 
(p£Tapop(j)Oup£Vog).56 This dramatic change took place at the Mount of 
Transfiguration in Matthew 17:2 (also Mark 9:2) when Jesus was transformed 
(p£T£pop<j)w0r|) in the presence of Peter, James, and John. Christians in 2 Corinthians 
3:18, beholding the glory of the Lord, “are changed (p£T£pop(f)Oup£0a) into the same 
image from glory to glory.”
Scholars tend to contrast auaxripaTi^£a0£ and p£TCtpop(f)oOa0£, the former 
referring to “to outward form only and so indicates something external and 
superficial, where as the latter refers to inward being and so indicates a profound 
transformation.”57 Cranfield and Dunn refute this contrast saying that evidence 
suggests that it would be unwise to insist on such distinction”58 and the two verbs are 
“more or less synonymous in Koine Greek.”59 A logical question must be asked then, 
“If the words are synonymous, why did Paul not use the same word when discussing 
the prohibition of conformity and the imperative of transformation?” Some kind of 
distinction seems logical based on Paul’s goal of transformation as an action, 
responsibility, and obligation that the Christians in Rome need to continue to take, 
more than “outward conformity,” but “that of moral or inward transformation.”60 
Witherington adds, “Since it is the mind that is being transformed, Paul is talking 
about a change in worldview, a Copemican revolution in one’s thinking, not just an
55 Philo, Embassy to Gaius 95. He mentions the “superior position on the right” and the “inferior” on 
the left.
56 Philo, Moses 1.57.
57 Cranfield, 2:605.
58 Cranfield, 2:607; Dunn, 712. They both mention the synonymous use, yet their explanations seem 
convincing of the distinction and clear contrast between auoxi'llicxi^EaOe and p£Tapop<()oOa0£.
59 Dunn, 712.
60 Witherington, 286. Seneca, Epistles 6.1. He discusses the Stoic concept of inward, moral 
transformation: “I feel, my dear Lucilius, that I am being not only reformed, but transformed
(transfigurari). I do not yet, however, assure myself, or indulge the hope, that there are no elements left 
in me which need to be changed.”
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attitude adjustment.”61 “The transformation is not something which is brought about
in an instant; it has to be continually repeated, or rather, it is a process which has to go
on all the time the Christian is in this life.”62 The passive voice of p £ T ap o p 0 o O c j0 £ ,
“of course, indicates, that the source and power of such a transformation is wholly and
solely God’s”63 through the liberating, equipping power of “the gift of the Holy
Spirit.”64 Fanning discusses, under the heading “commands and prohibitions,” Paul’s
use of the command in the present tense and Paul’s “theological influence” as
progressive steps of spiritual growth in the Christian life, in these words,
Pauline teaching is that when a person comes to be in Christ there is a definite 
break with the old life and the beginning of a new one. However, what is 
equally clear from Paul’s teaching is that this transformation is not 
immediately realized in the Christian’s actual experience. This change must be 
continually acted upon and transferred from the realm of the potential to the 
actual. The Christian must be progressively putting to death the deeds of the 
old life (Rom 8:13), must be more and more transformed (Rom 12:2; 2 Cor 
3:18) and renewed (Eph 4:23), and must be always working out in practice the 
deliverance which Christ has given. ...It is because of this factual basis of the 
Christian’s new life in Christ that Paul is influenced to call upon Christians to 
make a practical break with the past and to begin to live in practice as new 
people. 5
In Christ, Christians “have entered the new age; already they have received the first- 
fruits of the Spirit (8:23), and are under obligation not to the flesh but to the Spirit 
(8 :12).”66
Two essential aspects of this transformation communicate two actions 
necessary for genuine transformation to take place: the renewal of the mind and to 
present the body as a living sacrifice. First, the transformation is communicated 
adverbially, in the renewing of the mind (Trj &votKcxivcjCT£i t o O vooq). Paul speaks of
61 Witherington, 286.
62 Cranfield, 2:607.
63 Dunn, 713.
64 Stuhlmacher, 189.
65 Buist M. Fanning, Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 360-61: 
Epictetus, Encheiridion 29; Epictetus, Discourses, 3.98. He discusses “subsequent steps” and 
“commands and prohibitions.”
66 Barrett, rev.ed., 214.
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a “radical renewal of human nature because the old age is disappearing and the new 
age is at hand.”67 Second, Paul exhorts readers to present their bodies as a living 
sacrifice to God (Rom 12:1). Oakes says that meetings of associations often required 
cultic sacrifices to a patron deity at communal meals.68 The point in the two aspects of 
Paul’s word will encourage readers to change their thinking “from cultic ritual to 
everyday life. From a previous epoch characterized by daily offering animals of 
animals to one characterized by a whole-person commitment lived out in daily 
existence.”69
“The renewing of the mind is the means by which this transformation takes 
place.”70 “Renewal (dvaKodvwau;) occurs only in Christian literature,”71 but “there is 
little doubt that the proper significance of Kccivog is kept in avaKaivwan; here.”72 
“The metamorphosis is not external but inward, involving a renewal of the nous the 
aspect of the human being which is considered the seat of intellectual and moral 
judgment.”73 Moo describes renewal as the “re-programming of the mind,” a 
transformation that “does not take place overnight but is a lifelong process by which 
our way of thinking is to resemble more and more the way God wants us to think.”74 
Paul’s concern is that if the Jews and Gentiles in the church are conformed to this age, 
it will result in an “unfit mind.”75 Transformation means the “mind is not necessarily 
good, and must be renewed,” and that renewing the mind means “to recognize and 
share the act of redemption accomplished in the death and resurrection of Jesus.”76
67 Barrett, rev.ed., 214.
68 Oakes, Reading Romans in Pompeii, 98-99. He discusses associations such as craftworkers and the 
hierarchy within the household where they met and the gathering itself.
69 Dunn, 710.
70 Moo, 756.
71 Dunn, 713.
72 Cranfield, 2:609.
73 Fitzmyer, 641.
74 Moo, 757.
75 Barrett, rev. ed., 214.
76 Barrett, rev. ed., 214.
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Renewal, in this sense, has a cleansing effect and an effect of preparation for service, 
conduct, and living life in the realm of the righteousness by faith (Rom 3:22) and in 
the knowledge of God (Rom 1:28).
The mind is renewed with a newly defined purpose (£i<; to SoKipd^av) and 
with new parameters: the will of God (Rom 12:2). Barrett says, “In this world, 
renewal is most clearly shown in moral life.”77 Paul views the moral life as connected 
to God’s will. “The verb 8oKipct(^£iv can means either ‘prove,’ ‘test,’ or ‘approve (as 
a result of testing),’ while emphasizing the renewed mind as essential to be able to 
recognize and embrace the will of God (it is thus warning against the illusion that 
conscience, as such and apart from its renewal by the Spirit and instruction by the 
discipline of the gospel, is a thoroughly reliable guide to moral conduct).”78 He lists 
three adjectives to describe God’s will in the process of transformation: good (to 
dyaGov), acceptable (Eudpecrrov), and perfect (kcc'i teAeiov). “‘The good’ continued 
to be a guiding concept of popular Greek philosophy, which instructed its adherents in 
a way of life characterized by righteousness and the fear of God.”79 He uses 
£udp£OTOv to underline “the fact that the goodness which is in question here is no 
anthropocentric goodness but a goodness determined by the revelation of God’s will, 
a matter of obedience to his commandments.”80 The word EuapEcrrov is also seen as 
“a technical term of ethics,” meaning “satisfactory.”81 Perfect (teAeiov) is word 
belonging “to the ethical vocabulary of the Old Testament, and also that of the 
Stoics,” while being “defined by them as the man whose character is complete on all 
sides, possessing all the separate virtues as elements of a fully developed
77 Barrett, rev. ed., 214.
78 Cranfield, 2:609.
79 Stuhlmacher, 189.
80 Cranfield, 2:611.
81 Dodd, 192.
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personality.”82 It carries within it the idea of maturity, responsibility, and the ability to
“sustain” necessary obligations (“of the cares of the kingdom”) in spite of pressures,
chaos, and turmoil.83
Paul also aims toward surrender, submission, and a fulfilling of obligations in
regard to God’s will. Epictetus uses the language of obligation in discussing the gods,
the will, and the good and excellent man, saying,
The good and excellent man must, therefore, inquire into all these things, 
before he subordinates his own will to him who administers the universe, 
precisely as good citizens submit to the law of the state. And he that is being 
instructed ought (o<])£iA£i) to come to his instruction with this aim, ‘How may 
I follow the gods in everything, and how may I be acceptable (£uap£crroir|v) 
to the divine administration, and how may I become free?’84
The renewed mind, transformed by Christ and not conformity to the world, requires
“radical nonconformity” which corresponds to God’s will as Christians to “oppose the
trend of this world and do what seems irrational, as God himself did in sending his
son to the cross.”85 Reason is given to a person so that, in accordance with God’s will,
the good and acceptable and perfect will of God, a person “may perceive the demands
n r
of ethics and assess how obligatory they are.” A transformed mind reasonably 
follows God’s commands and spiritually completes obligations in order to please 
God.
A key element in God’s will is the transformation that leads the followers of 
Christ to present their bodies as a living sacrifice to God (TTapaoTfjcrai tcc awporra 
Guafav a y ia v  £uap£C7TOV tw  0 £ u>). In Judaism “to present” incurred the idea of
87presenting bulls and rams for a sacrifice. Epictetus discusses a man’s testimony, the
82 Dodd, 192.
83 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 19.362.
84 Epictetus, Discourses 1.12.7-9.
85 Kasemann, 331.
86 Kasemann, 330.
87 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 4.113.
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state of his body, and his “proof’ in the context of the good and excellent man.88 
More commonly, “to present” indicates a technical term, a cultic, spiritual rite, 
signified in the extra-biblical Greek use of offering as a sacrifice to gods or God, 
while here alone in the New Testament is it used to present a sacrifice to God.89
Paul’s exhortation to the Romans “in the language of sacrificial ritual” to 
present their bodies a living sacrifice contrasted with the cultic rites of sacrifice of 
dead animals.90 Calvin sees Romans 12:1 as the beginning of a “well-ordered 
arrangement” (optimo ordine), a consecration “to cease to live for ourselves, in order 
that we may devote all the actions of our life to his service” mainly because “we are 
no longer in our own power, but have passed entirely into the power of God.”91 
Kasemann sees “present” as “originally cultic” but here “transposed into 
eschatological,” and in contrast “to the bloody sacrifice of animals this is a living 
sacrifice and it is manifest in daily life.”92 Dunn addresses the concept “as an 
important part of group identity: in the ancient world, too, cultic and sacrificial ritual 
regularly served to express national identity and loyalty and participation in a group’s 
distinctive cultic rituals marked the participant as belonging to the group.” Moo adds 
that the sacrificial language is used metaphorically and spiritually: metaphorically, 
noting that the “use of cultic language has an important salvation-historical and 
polemical function, claiming for Christianity the fulfilment of those institutions 
central to the OT and Judaism;” and, spiritually, the term “present” makes it an 
“inevitable vehicle for early Christians to express their own religious convictions”
88 Epictetus, Discourses 3.22.87.
89 Dodd, 191; Cranfield, 2:598; Josephus, Jewish War 2.89.
90 Witherington, 284.
91 John Calvin, Calvin’s Commentaries: The Epistle o f Paul the Apostle to the Romans and to the 
Thessalonians (trans. by Ross Mackenzie; vol. 8; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1948), 263-64.
92 Kasemann, 327.
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with spiritual sacrifices.93 The body presented involves the “whole human person, 
including its mean of expressing itself in common life.”94 Notwithstanding, “to 
present” as Paul uses it here indicates two things: a commitment and a vital step to 
practicing Christian ethics and Christlikeness in daily life, a presentation of the entire 
body, the whole life, to God as a “dedication to the service of God in the harsh and 
often ambiguous life of the world.”95
The sacrifice is modified descriptively by three adjectives: living, holy, and 
acceptable (to God). The sacrifice is living and alive “since it is the offering of the 
one who walks in ‘newness of life’ in union with Christ.96 The sacrifice is holy, that 
is, set apart to God, a holiness that is connected with the mind, wisdom, sacrifice, 
purity, the opposite of vulgar, and “has a great deal to do with behaviour in everyday 
life.”97
The Greek word used in Romans 12:1, AoyiKtjv, reasonable, or “logical,” is 
also used in Epictetus in connection with a sense of “oughtness.” Epictetus uses the 
Greek word 5ei or its cognate verb form four times (“ought” in the sense of a moral 
necessity), a word similar to d(|)£t Aw, in a long discourse about praise to God, saying, 
“Ought (eiSei) we not, as we dig and plough and eat, sing the hymn of praise to 
God?”98 He continues by using AoyiKog in the implication of an action or task natural 
to the person or animal or thing named, “Why, what else can I, a lame old man, do but 
sing the hymn of praise to God? If, indeed, I were a nightingdale, I should be singing 
as a nightingdale; if I were a swan, as a swan. But as it is I am a rational (Aoyixog) 
being, therefore I must (5ei) be singing hymns of praise to God. This is my task ( t o
93 Moo, 750.
94 Barrett, rev.ed., 213.
95 Moo, 751.
96 Bryan, 195.
97 Barrett, 213.
98 Epictetus, Discourses 1.16.16-17,15-21.
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epyov): I do it, and will not desert this post (tcc^iv), as long as it is given to me to fill 
it: and I exhort (TTapaKocAoj) you to join me in this same song.”99
Philo uses the verb form Aonrpeueiv in the context of discussing piety to God 
and serving him as a benefactor in the language of obligation: “And this is just to love 
Him as a benefactor (£U£py£Tr)v), or failing this to fear Him at least as a ruler and 
lord, and to tread in every way that will lead thee to please Him, to serve him not half­
heartedly but with thy whole soul filled with the determination to love Him and to 
cling to His commandments and honour justice.”100 The Latin Vulgate translates, in 
Romans 12:1, A<rrp£U£iv as obsequium, a term synonymous with Roman obligation.
In evaluating Paul’s words in Romans 12:1-2, conformity to culture viewed 
human affairs in “institutional terms,” while transformation involves “something 
much more drastic: the deliberate abandonment of status to open the way to a new 
spirit of human cooperation through mutual service.”101 E. A. Judge describes Paul as 
a “radical critic of society,” openly “engaged in what appears to be a radical conflict 
with the Jewish establishment” and confronting Graeco-Roman ideals of daily life and 
social relations by totally rejecting two “fundamental features of ethical thought” 
deeply imbedded in the psyche of Romans: “self-cultivation and the importance of 
status.”102 Paul, in Romans 12, drives toward “a head-on confrontation with the 
mechanisms” by which the Romans “imposed social power defined as moral 
superiority,” and diminishing the value of the inferior.103 Paul’s “positive response to 
this collision was to build a remarkable new construction of social realities that both 
lay within the fabric of the old ranking system and yet transformed it by a revolution
99 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.16.20-21.
100 Philo, Special Laws 1.300.
101 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation,” TynB 35 (1984): 5-6.
102 Judge, “St. Paul as a Radical Critic of Society,” Interchange 16 (1974): 192-93.
103 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation,” TynB 35 (1984): 23.
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of social values.” 104 This revolution produces a new obligation which required a new 
foundation for social relations and values based on the mercies and gifts of God.
3. Foundation o f Obligation as Prefiguring Romans 15
The mercies o f God (oiKiTippwv) in Romans 12:1 and the gifts (xaptopaTa)
according to grace in Romans 12:6 form a foundation for obligation as Paul moves
sequentially toward his sine qua non obligation of Romans 15. Roman law maintained
two things: first, that Romans, essentially, were at the mercy of Rome’s emperor,
government, means of taxation, and authorities who administered justice in a given
jurisdiction according to law and custom; such law demanded certain duty and respect
along with obligations to maintain Roman order; second, that the Roman emperor
himself be given consideration as the grand benefactor and that benefits or gifts were
bestowed on the citizens and people living in Rome by the emperor, Roman
government, and key superior benefactors whose privilege and wealth supplied cities
and citizens financial gifts for buildings and other vital elements to daily life.105
Cicero describes these Roman legal dependencies and benefaction by noting
that “kings (emperors) were made in order that men might enjoy justice.”106 Note the
connection between the law and the demarcation of justice between the higher
(“strong”) and the lower (“weak”) classes as Cicero continues his discussion,
For, as the masses in their helplessness were oppressed by the strong, they 
appealed to some man who was conspicuous for his virtue; and, as he shielded 
the weaker classes from wrong, he managed by establishing equitable 
conditions to hold the higher and the lower classes in an equality of right. The 
reason for making constitutional laws was the same as that for making kings. 
For what people have always sought is equality of rights before the law. For 
rights not open to all alike would be no rights. If the people secured their end 
at the hands of one just and good man, they were satisfied with that; but when
104 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation,” TynB 35 (1984): 23.
105 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 20-40, 83-103. They indicate these two distinctions in two 
separate chas. (2 and 5): Roman law and benefaction, respectively, “Government without bureaucracy,” 
and “Supplying the Roman Empire.”
106 Cicero, On Duties 2.12.41.
263
such was not their good fortune, laws were invented, to speak to all men at all
107times in one and the same voice.
What Cicero, describes, in essence, is that both the strong and the weak are at the 
mercies of Roman law, justice and authority in the glory of Roman governance, while 
as a part of that glory kindness and generosity are be extended by “bestowing favours 
(benefits) upon many,”108 especially “to the needy either by personal service, or by 
gifts of money.”109
Paul continues the process in writing to the church in Romans 12:1-2 of 
adjusting their mindset from pure Roman custom and conduct to Christian conduct by 
discussing God’s benefits in his mercies of God and gifts according to grace 
(xapig).110 “Mercies” here connects Paul’s earlier thought in Romans 9-11 which 
“are specially set under the sign of the mercy of God,” and, according to Cranfield, 
also “that the whole of 1:18-11:36 is concerned with the action of a merciful God.”111 
He adds, “The words olKTipsiv, eAeo^, and eAeeiv may indeed be absent from the 
first eight chapters; but such words as xppoTOTrig, poKpoGupict, dydnr), and xdpu; 
are used, and the reality of the mercy of God is never far from Paul’s thought.”112 The 
ouv of Romans 12:1 links Paul’s previous thought in relation to God’s mercy and the 
wisdom of that mercy in Romans 11:33-36.113
“Paul’s ground of appeal” is indicated in the words through the mercies of 
God (Sid tw v  o ’lKTippwv toO  GeoO) and “the action of the merciful God.”114 The
107 Cicero, On Duties 2.12.41-42.
108 Cicero, On Duties, 2.12.53.
109 Cicero, On Duties 2.12.41-51, 52.
110 Xapig or, in Latin, gratia, is aligned with benefaction and Roman obligation. See Cicero, On Duties 
2.63.
111 Cranfield, 2:596.
112 Cranfield, 2:596.
113 Dunn, 709.
114 Cranfield, 2:596.
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plural nature of God’s mercies is a “Hebraism directly derived from the LXX,”115 
possessing a singular translational emphasis, not the various “manifestations of divine 
compassion but the divine compassion itself.. .toward humankind, revealed and 
effected in the person of Jesus Christ.”116 The concept of compassion as an Old 
Testament term is “equivalent to X®Pl£” and “has in view the whole salvation history 
of God’s self-revelation.”117 Such God-revealed revelation as compassion in the realm 
of grace stands in stark contrast to the weak at the mercy of the strong and the weak- 
strong at the mercy of Roman government. God’s self revelation is one of benefaction 
on a higher, more spiritual plane than that of Rome. While Paul never drifts far from 
God’s mercy, neither does he, in his argument, forget obligation as a pivotal societal 
link between Rome and its inhabitants; yet, more importantly, obligation as a pivotal 
link of Christian community between God in his mercy, grace, and benevolence and 
the proper obedient reciprocal and ethical response of his followers to God and to 
each other. God’s mercy inspires humility and right conduct toward God and others, 
thus Paul’s exhortation includes proper ethical conduct because “if all theology is 
‘grace,’ all ethics is a matter of ‘gratitude,’ the response of the grateful heart to God’s 
merciful gift of salvation.”118
Paul’s appeal to the mercies of God urges his readers to develop a mindset 
based on God’s mercies and “to contemplate on the depth and variety of God’s 
merciful love.”119 The “mercies,” summed up as “God’s mercy in action,” underscore 
the connection between what Paul now asks his readers to do and what he has told 
them earlier in the letter that God has done for them.”120 Such ethical action in
115 Sanday and Headlam, 352; Kasemann, 326.
116 Bryan, 195.
117 Kasemann, 326.
118 Witherington, 284.
119 Schreiner, 643.
120 Moo, 749.
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response to God’s benevolent grace cannot, however, inspire humble obedience to 
God and compassion to others on the basis of human strength alone. “But God’s 
mercy manifested in his Spirit’s work of inward renewal (see v. 2) does impel us 
toward the obedience that the gospel demands.”121 The Holy Spirit supplies power to 
obedience as well as the gifts of grace that minister to the whole body of Christ.
“The gifts according to grace” form the second foundational aspect to the 
obligation prefiguring Romans 15. Paul uses the word xapicporra to indicate the 
“gifts.” XapiapctTcc used in Romans 12:6 comes from the Greek root xdpicjpa, used 
17 times in the New Testament and six times in Romans, including in Romans 1:11 
where it has a minor connection to Romans 1:14 when Paul speaks of his 
indebtedness or obligation. The xapiaporra inherently possess a benevolent giver, 
God, who “is always distributing the charismata to a Christian congregation (see 1 
Cor 12:11) in such a way as to maximize its potential for harmony and mutual 
ministry.”122 The charismata impacts individual Christians through the Holy Spirit, 
provide a fresh, “new response to God’s mercy,” thus “renewing individuals for 
service to others.”123 Koenig notes that “even the highest charismata become 
worthless displays of egotism unless they are guided by love into serving others.”124
While the xocpiapaTa are delivered by the benevolent God through the Holy 
Spirit, they also find close association with two other key words: grace (xdpic;) and 
good or beautiful (kccAij). Philo, in discussing Noah, links the thoughts of (God’s) 
grace with being well-pleasing (£uocp£crrf]CTai), righteousness, goodness, and “a free
121 Moo, 750; see G. Dehn, Vom christlichen Leben. Auslegung des 12. und 13. Kapitels des Briefs an 
die Romer (Neukirchen/Vluyn:Neukirchener, 1954), 12-14.
122 John Koenig, Charismata: God’s Gifts for God’s People (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978), 101.
123 Koenig, Charismata, 113-16.
124 Koenig, Charismata, 117. See x«pi£ aligned with the xapiagotTa in four key New Testament 
passages on gifts to the churches: Romans 12:6-ff.; 1 Cor. 1:4-7; Ephesians 4:7-8; 1 Peter 4:10.
266
gift and act of kindness.”125 “Grace,” in its purest form in relation to the “gifts” 
(xapiqiorra), is bound to the concept of a benefactor (£upy£Tr)<;) and its 
accompanying words like benefaction, gift, grace, gratitude, and generosity.126 
Spiritually, grace is “the focus of the Spirit’s evidence,” that is, Christ’s grace in 
weakness makes a person strong while also keeping the graced person from 
“superiority” ( u T T £ p - ) ,  from “boasting in spiritual accomplishment,” and properly
i onequipped for service.
The xapicipaTa are also bound to the Greek concept of good (KoAq). Good, or 
beautiful as it can be translated, is wrapped in the web of obligation though Roman 
virtue (ap£Tq) and the noble Roman concept of the “good and excellent man” (koAo  ^
Kal dyaOoq).128 Paul uses KaAq in Romans 12:17 in terms of virtue, “Provide things 
honest (good) in the sight of all men,” indicating a deep, yet high moral nature, 
referring to “a life that an honest Greek would recognize as right and good”129 and “a 
quality of beauty (physical or moral) which would receive general approbation in 
people of sensibility.”130 The word indicates a sense of nobility, a benefit of kindness 
(xapiTi) with a predisposition to help, fellowship, and “good action” (KaAr) 
TTpd^£i).131 The word implies a moral quality that inspires proper conduct even as 
Jesus used it regarding his own shepherding nature (John 10:11), good works (John 
10:32), people with a good heart who follow God’s word (Lu 8:15), and of the 
spiritual fruitfulness a good tree (person) produces (Lu 6:43). The “gifts” possess
125 Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 3.77-78.
126 Herodotus, The Persian Wars 3.140.
127 Frederick Dale Bruner, A Theology o f the Holy Spirit: The Pentecostal Experience and the New 
Testament Witness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 271, 311-14. Bruner discusses grace in the 
context of Paul’s glory, his thorn in the flesh, his weakness, and the Holy Spirit’s power for Christian 
service.
128 Epictetus, Discourses 1.12.7.
129 Barret, rev. ed., 223.
130 Dunn, 748.
131 Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 3.156; Philo, On the Virtues 118-19.
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“good” (Rom 14:21), a moral quality of Christian conduct easily recognized as 
conduct both beneficial and harmonious to the body of Christ.
Paul outlines the “gifts according to grace” in Romans 12:6-21, gifts that 
supply “basic principles for life in the church”132 and “humility and mutual service” in 
the context of “love and its manifestations.”133 The gifts are an “actualization, a 
practical expression, of grace” and “are not given for the self-congratulation of those 
who receive them, but for the employment in the building up of the body.”134 The 
gifts provide a double benefit: (i) to the individuals ministered to such as Acts 4:9 
where a man is healed and (ii) to the church body as a whole such as Paul’s letter to 
Timothy where he indicates the “brothers,” the church, are “partakers of the 
benefit.”135 Six gifts are mentioned in Romans 12:6-8: prophesy (TTpotjjiyraav), 
ministry (SiaKOVig), teaching (SiSaoKwv), exhortation (napaKaAwv), giving 
(|i£Ta§i5ouq), ruling (npoicrrd|j£vo<;), and mercy (eAewv).136 The gifts are grouped 
in two triads, the first three gifts set apart by eite, the sense of which approaches the 
same use as that of Kal.137 The prophets, “in Gentile Christianity and in the 
framework of the local churches seem to have been viewed essentially after the Greek 
model as those who declare the will of God for the present,” more than an Old 
Testament model of voices to interpret the future.138 The prophets speak according to 
the “measure of faith,” avaAoyiav referencing a “measure” or “standard of faith,” “in 
agreement with faith,” an “analogy” of faith “to promises and agreements and
132 Bryan, 196.
133 Moo, 758, 769.
134 Barrett, rev. ed., 218.
135 In both examples Paul uses the word Euepyeaia, a term connected with benefaction and reciprocal 
obligation. See Winter, Seek the Welfare, 35,19-51.
136 Sandlay and Headlam, 358-60. They point out the difference between the gifts o f 1 Cor. 12 and 
Romans 12:3-8 on the grounds that at Corinth Paul had actual problems in mind and at Rome Paul 
wrote with the Corinthian problem still on his mind.
137 F. Blass and A. Debrunner, A Greek Grammar o f the New Testament and Other Early Christian 
Literature (trans. Robert W. Funk; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 237.
138 Kasemann, 340.
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according to belief in Jesus.”139 The word here foreshadows Paul’s argument 
regarding an obligation in Romans 14:1 where he speaks of the “weak in the faith,” 
but the measure of faith, along with grace, also forms an invisible thread on the rope 
of obligation as a key to conflict resolution in the church. The weak and the strong 
respond to the avaAoyiav of their faith by their “dependence on God,”140 thus 
obligating themselves to Christian conduct befitting Christ who benefits the believers 
with gifts according to grace. Faith and grace supplied in the “gifts” according to 
grace influence an ethical response for both the strong and weak.
The next gift mentioned is “ministry,” a technical term referring to one who 
serves at the table or serves a specific item such as a drink to a king.141 The word 
indicates, generally, “the spiritual capacity for practical service” fulfilled by tasks of 
ministry “wholeheartedly”142 and, specifically, “service to the needy” in their 
suffering and needs.143 Dunn notes that all gifts are “acts of service,” while adding 
that the next gift, “teaching,” included more than the simple transferring of tradition 
from the Old Testament and the ministry of Jesus, but primary emphasis was given to 
“teaching as the Spirit inspired (charismatic) functioning of the bodily organ” for the 
benefit of the Christian community.144 The gifts of teaching as well as the other gifts, 
provide focus on the “functions themselves rather than on the status of those who 
exercise them.”145 The discussion of the gifts seeks to eliminate social status and level 
the strong and the weak because of faith, grace, and the humility through faith to God 
the benefactor.
139 Cicero, On Duties 1.23. He says, “The foundation of justice... is good faith (fides), that is, truth and 
fidelity to promises and agreements.” Faith involves obligation that produces actions offides.
Epictetus, Discourses 2.11.22-5, speaks of “standards” by which virtue is “judged and weighed,” 
examined and tested for the “good and excellent man.” Faith is that measure or standard.
140 Dunn, 728.
141 Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 2.65; 11.163.
142 Cranfield, 2:623.
143 Barrett, rev. ed. 219.
144 Dunn, 729.
145 Dunn, 729; Meeks, Urban Christians, 134-35.
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Exhortation follows as another gift (o napccKoAwv £v TTapaKijaEi), that is, a 
“grace-endowed”146 function that involves communication or preaching that instructs 
and comforts in relation to Christian ethics, calling, obedience, and in regard to that 
which is “suitable for church order.”147 The purpose of exhortation edifies the 
congregation and brings glory to God, while “the eyes of the exhorter had to be firmly 
fixed not only on the gospel but also on the concrete situation of the hearers.”148 The 
grace-gifts endowed designate grace functions that inspire, encourage and motivate a 
Christian ethic of obligation as the imperatives to follow in Romans 12:3-8 will show.
The next gift mentioned, giving (Rom 12:8), by definition indicates the 
concepts of sharing, distributing kindness to the poor, and the Jewish concept of 
imitating God by acts of kindness, sharing wealth with the needy, giving support to 
the weaker, and caring for the “less powerful.”149 Josephus instructs the Jews that God 
gives an “abundance of good things not for our enjoyment alone, but that we may also 
share them generously with others.”150 The gift is given in “simplicity,” with the keen 
idea of generosity from the heart and liberality, “a liberality that arises out of and 
expresses the simplicity and single-mindedness of the person of faith.”151 The word 
speaks of “large-hearted generosity” and “is used by St. Paul alone in the N.T., and 
was specially suited to describe the unselfish character of Christian almsgiving.”152 
“The man who gives alms of his own substance is to do it in singleness of purpose 
and not with mixed motives, with the thought of ostentation or reward.”153 The gift of 
giving, as well as the other gifts demonstrated, form threads to strengthen the binding
146 Witherington, 290.
147 Calvin, 270.
148 Cranfield, 2:624.
149 Philo, Special Laws 2.71, 107; 4.72-4.
150 Josephus, Antiquities 4.237.
151 Dunn, 730. Contra Barrett “without hidden motive,” noting “The meaning is probably not ‘with 
liberality’ but ‘being without arriere-pensee in one’s gifts’” (p. 220, rev. ed.).
152 Sandlay and Headlam, 357.
153 Sandlay and Headlam, 357.
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rope of obligation, to enhance the Christological centre of the message of the gospel 
and to stimulate the “ordered unity”154 of the church and the body of Christ.
The next gift that follows, “ruling,” indicates a function of Christian 
leadership. More than likely, “it does not describe any office with precision; it rather 
refers to a function which may have been exercised by several persons, perhaps 
jointly or in turn.”155 The gift of ruling or leadership here contributes to the whole 
church body, supplying accountability between the strong and weak in the 
congregation with a sense of protection, a person “who by virtue of his social status 
was in a position to be, on behalf of the church, a friend and protector for those 
members of the community who were not in a position to defend themselves (e.g. the 
widows, orphans, slaves, strangers).”156 Josephus uses the word in the sense of 
protector of the disadvantaged, saying “that the high priest, being also ethnarch, shall 
be the protector of those Jews who are unjustly treated.”157 Such rulers or leaders 
provided a sense of security and safety in the church as well as serving as the “judges 
of morals” (morum censores).15* Dunn sees the sense of protection as the “thought of 
some member in the congregation who by virtue of his or her wealth or social status 
within the local community (city) was able to act as a champion of the rights of the 
little congregation or its socially vulnerable members, as probably Phoebe” (Rom 
16:2).159 The gift of ruling requires zeal, eagerness, earnestness and vitality adding to 
its obvious quality of support, help, protection and even obligation with its similarity 
to the idea of patronage.160 Stuhlmacher adds, “The one who is entrusted with the care
154 Sandlay and Headlam, 357.
155 Barrett, rev. ed., 220.
156 Cranfield, 2:626.
157 Josephus, Antiquities 14.196.
158 Calvin, 270.
159 Dunn, 731.
160 Cranfield, 2:626. He says, “The cognate noun npocrrdTrig was used o f the patron of resident aliens 
in Athens, and also translated in Latinpatronus; the feminine form o f vpoaiariq  is used in 16.2 of
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of those members of the church who are suffering need should do this in a friendly 
manner and not with an air of repulsion of superiority.”161
Mercy (o eAewv) is the next gift. It refers “to the person whose special 
function is, on behalf of the congregation, to tend the sick, relieve the poor, or care for 
the aged or disabled.”162 Mercy flows as one theme in Romans 12, as acts of pity or 
kindness done in the context of “the divine compassion toward humankind, revealed 
and effected in the person of Jesus Christ.”163 Dunn views the specific act of mercy 
here as a financial gift, “the ministry of ‘poor relief functions as an organ of the body 
when it is done with gladness” according to God’s grace.164 The act of mercy is 
performed with “cheerfulness,” openly and with spontaneity as an “inward iAapOTtig” 
affirms God’s grace, responds with gratitude in an act of mercy because of a deep 
understanding of both Christ’s mercy and the personal need for mercy, all bom out of 
“the secret that in those needy and suffering people whom he is called to tend the 
Lord is Himself present (Matt 25:31-ff.).”165 The cheerfulness “springs from a warm 
heart, and a pure conscience and a serene mind set on something above this world.”166 
If taken in the context of the sacrifice of Romans 12:1, “present.. .by the mercies,” the 
act of mercy possesses a foundation of ethical conduct and unity that follows after the 
“community of fellowship.”167
Each gift in the xocpiaporra influences Koivama and produces xapi^, thus 
works in symphony to transform hearts, to renew social relations, and to establish a
Phoebe... (2 Clement 61:3; 64:1; Calvin, 270)”. See also Clarke, “Jew and Greek, Slave and Free, 
Male and Female: Paul’s Theology of Ethnic, Social, and Gender Inclusiveness in Romans 16,” in 
Oakes, Rome in the Bible, 103-25.
161 Stuhlmacher, 193.
162 Cranfield, 2:627; Calvin, 270.
163 Bryan, 195.
164 Dunn, 732. He concludes that “cheerfulness” is a link to Jewish almsgiving and piety.
165 Cranfield, 2:627.
166 Sandlay and Headlam, 358.
167 Barth, 449.
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“new corporate identity”168 based on the sacrificial spirit of God’s mercies. The 
discussion of Romans 12 and the gifts that benefit the good of the community, 
encourage unity, and while, “far from random ethical notes,” constitute a “unitive 
rhetoric, meant to help the community establish koinonia and to help them survive in 
a difficult environment.”169 The church “can flourish only when every individual 
member and group within the church remains mindful of the good of all, and thus sets 
aside individual interests for the sake of the common life and witness.”170 The 
foundations of obligation, God’s mercies and the gifts at work in individuals, inspire 
community that gives birth to unity in the church. These foundations contrast with 
Roman gifts and abilities which were for selfish, personal endorsement and not for 
others.
4. New Obligations and the Greek Imperative 
Romans 12:9-13:14 displays a long list of imperatives in which Paul challenges the 
church to fulfil the specific commands as he displays obligations in the context of 
God’s mercies, spiritual gifts, and transformation by the renewing of the mind. The 
imperative evokes the mood of command, entreaty, and volition and “is the mood of 
assertion of one’s will over another or the call of one to exert his will.”171 In fact, it is 
“the genius of the imperative to express the appeal of will to will.”172 Robertson’s 
Grammar notes that Moulton finds the imperatives “normal in royal edicts, in letters 
to inferiors, and among equals when the tone is urgent, or the writer indisposed to 
multiply words.”173 The imperative, therefore, by its nature, can carry with it the sense 
of an obligation. In Roman law “the essential element of an obligation.. .was the fact
168 Dunn, 733.
169 Witherington, 291; Barth, 449; Sandlay and Headlam, 358-60.
170 Stuhlmacher, 193.
171 Robertson, A Grammar, 946.
172 Dana and Mantey, A Manual Grammar, 174.
173 A. T. Robertson, A Grammar, 947; J. H. Moulton, A Grammar o f the New Testament Greek, vol. 1, 
Prolegomena (3rd ed.; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1906), 173.
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that the debtor was directly bound to make performance.”174 In the context of the
body of Christ, the imperative carries with it an obligation or debt that binds each
person in the church to make performance of ethical commands for the supreme good
or benefit of the entire body (Rom 15:2).
Cicero classifies obligation as a sense of duty in the two parts: (1) “the
doctrine of the supreme good” and (2) “the practical rules by which daily life in all its
bearings may be regulated.”175 Cicero views the latter obligations as “special duties
for which positive rules are laid down, though they are affected by the doctrine of the
supreme good.. .because they seem rather to look to the regulation of everyday
life.”176 Cicero continues,
And yet there is still another classification of duties: we distinguish between 
“mean” duty, so-called and “absolute” duty. Absolute duty we may, I 
presume, call “right,” for the Greeks call it Korop Gwpa, while the ordinary 
duty they call KaGfjKOv. And the meaning of these terms they fix thus: 
whatever is right they define as “absolute” duty, “mean” duty, they say, is duty 
for the performance of which an adequate reason may be rendered.177
Paul’s “absolute” duty here is for each person to present his or her body as a living
sacrifice, the “mean” duties are set forth in Romans 12:7-13:14 as Christian
regulations and duties to be performed for everyday life. Paul never moves far from
the thought of the “supreme good” in relation to the kingdom of God and God’s
household, the church, while also not failing to give instruction for Christian duties in
1 78the form of imperatives.
174 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 6.
175 Cicero, On Duties 1.7.
176 Cicero, On Duties 1.7.
177 Cicero, On Duties 1.8. The form of word stem o f KonropGcupa, SiopGtopa, is used in Acts 24:2 in a 
legal sense of “right action” or “worthy deeds,” even reform in the nation. A verb cognate of the word 
KaGfjKov is used in Rom 1:28 of those not conducting themselves in accordance with what is proper, 
fitting, or dutiful, if  the legal, contractual sense of one’s duty is considered.
178 In the case of Ephesians 5-6 a strong argument could be made for the obligation to “imitate God” 
and “walk in love” (5:1-2) as the “absolute” duty; and Paul’s reform version o f “mean” duties outlining 
the specific obligations of a new Christian household code (5:2-6:9). Cicero alludes to the household 
code and “mean” duties in On Duties (1.53-55).
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The imperatives, while not in a formal code, possess the flavour of a new 
code of obligations that create an environment where the kingdom of God becomes 
more than meat and drink, but for righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit 
(Rom 14:17). The imperative of command, as found in Romans 12-13, by nature 
“makes a direct, positive appeal to another.”179 Imperatives also “express a request or 
concession,”180 while serving as vehicle to encourage concord, peace, and unity in the 
larger society, community, or in this case, the church. Obligations are to be fulfilled in 
the spirit of mutual obligations, social ties, and unity with an understanding of what 
“ought (debet) to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual 
and of the whole body politic identical.”181 A failure to fulfil obligations in the spirit 
of mutuality and the bonds of fellowship, “uproots the fellowship,” severs the cords of 
the bonds of fellowship, and “demolishes the whole structure of civil society,” the 
society of Romans 12-13 being the church.182 The core threads of the new obligations 
and the Greek imperative of Romans 12-13 are to maintain “common bonds” through 
the virtuous fulfilment of obligations and to “bring a certain amount of propriety and
1 83order into the transactions of daily life” in the church.
The flavour of Romans 12:7-13:14 includes obligations to love, to kindness, to 
honour, to bless, to be of one mind, to not repay evil for evil, to overcome evil with 
good, to submit to civil authorities, to not allow a debt to remain outstanding, to put 
aside deeds of darkness, and to put on the armour of light and clothe yourself with 
Jesus Christ. Guerra sees Paul’s words in Romans 12-13 as a part of what he calls the 
“Roman factor,” an abiding a sensitivity to “the assumed Roman consciousness of 
Christians in the capital city but also concerned to protect the Christian community
179 Dana and Mantey, A Manual Greek Grammar, 175.
180 F. Blass and A. Debrunner, A Greek Grammar, 195.
181 Cicero, On Duties 3.26.
182 Cicero, On Duties 3.28.
183 Cicero, On Duties 1.17-20.
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against civil disciplinary action as was experienced in the past.”184 Paul’s goal is 
provide social virtues and daily obligations connected to Paul’s eschatological 
convictions in line with Roman consciousness, but also superior to them.185 Guerra 
adds, “Paul does not appeal to eschatology in order to trivialize the present but rather 
to undergird his insistence that good social conduct and the love of others should 
characterize the Christian lifestyle.”186 The “Roman factor” of Romans 12-13 takes 
into account the Claudian-Neronian ages with respect to imperial and civil honour, 
displays the new obligations necessary to create unity between the strong and the 
weak in the congregation, and reframes the imperatival force of obligation conducive 
to mind transformed and renewed by Christ.187
5. Conclusions
Paul’s primary emphases in Romans 12-13 are transformation and renewal of the 
mind. Graeco-Roman society imposed a culture of conformity and coercion that 
tended to display arrogance, superiority, and a binding force of the weak that were 
obligated to the strong to maintain order and social control. Paul introduces a new 
obligation with a new and expanded code of obligations that have their foundation in 
the mercies of God and the gifts of grace.
Paul uses the imperitival force of obligation to create the framework for unity 
and peace in the body of Christ. Paul adapts the language of obligation as a means to 
reframe the mind of the strong and the weak in the spirit of Christian fellowship. 
Paul’s Roman consciousness, as well that of his readers, allows contrasting images of 
Roman versus Christian: Roman obligation(s) versus the new Christian obligation(s);
184 Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition, 157.
185 Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition, 157-66.
186 Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition, 165.
187 Neil Elliott, “Romans 13:1-7 in the Context of Imperial Propaganda,” in Paul and Empire: Religion 
and Power in Roman Imperial Society (ed. Richard A. Horsley; Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity Press 
International, 1997), 184-204.
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the debt of love versus the debt of revenge; the clothing of the purple striped toga of 
superiority versus the clothing of the humility of Christ. Paul’s aim as he moves 
toward his final and highest obligation in Romans 15:1 is to create a transformed, 
renewed, sacrificial Christ-consciousness based upon God’s mercies and grace-gifts 
that leads to the display of virtue of the highest order in daily relational transaction 
and conduct that pleases Christ and encourages concord and peace.
The next chapter will explore Paul “compelling obligation” under the new 
obligation and its imperative of force as a critical tool for the climax of his discussion 
on resolving conflict between the strong and the weak.
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Chapter 8: The Compelling Obligation: Imitatio Christi
Introduction
The last chapter demonstrated the transformative nature of Paul’s new obligation 
founded on God’s mercies and gifts. The new obligation produced an informal code, a 
series of obligations that both demanded and encouraged righteousness, peace, and 
joy in Christians in the church in Rome. The new obligation was influenced by God’s 
promise of including both Jews and Gentiles in his plan for salvation. Having shown 
the new obligation, Paul concludes his argument for harmony with a powerful and 
compelling obligation for conflict resolution in the church: imitatio Christi.1 The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss Paul’s new and compelling obligation for the 
Roman church.
In order to demonstrate the compelling obligation of imitatio Christi this 
chapter will discuss: (1) Paul’s theological judgment; (2) the compelling Christian 
obligation of imitatio Christi as both an ethical action and a radical ethic, that is, the 
inversion or reversal of obligation under Augustus and in Roman society; (3) the 
compelling obligation as action for the Roman church as a means of conflict 
resolution which proposes a radically new ordo and a new model to imitate; (4) the 
indispensable, countercultural power of the compelling obligation as the one 
obligation that overrides all other obligations; and (5) God’s intention for unity 
through the imitatio Christi.
1 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 191-94. He focuses on two obligations: (1) for the strong not to 
offend the weak, and (2) for the strong to support the weak. Reasoner highlights a “convivial situation,” 
expected social expectations where members of the Roman church would have to redefine their duties 
and benefits under their higher obligation to Christ (pp. 192-93). While social expectations are a reality 
in Rome, this chapter here aims to provide depth into the social expectations and the force of obligation 
based on Roman law.
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1. Paul’s Theology
Rome’s obligation society functioned, transacted daily business and relations, and 
resolved conflict on the basis of Roman obligation, its legal basis, its reciprocal 
exchange, its patronage, its friendship, and the order of social inferiors under 
obligation to their social superiors.2 The relationship between social superiors and 
social inferiors worked on the basis of each person’s understanding of his or her 
status, social graces, and especially Roman law’s “function as a guarantor of 
stability.”3
The relationship between superior “strong” and the inferior “weak” is the key 
to conflict resolution in the church (Rom 15:1). The strong and weak appeared in 
social life everywhere in Roman society: at dinner parties, on the streets, in political 
meetings, in the marketplace, strategically seated in theatres, and even in the church.4
The weak were “habitually subject to oppression” and were under obligation 
to the strong on the basis of their privilege, status, and advantaged position because of 
“their greater property, power and prestige.”5 Witherington addresses status and 
privilege as “the Roman persona,” writing, “The Roman persona, which included 
elements of assumed superiority in culture, race, and matters religious, is what Paul 
must deal with if he is to build bridges between Jewish and Gentile Christians.”6 The 
attitudes of persons and the dynamics of obligations changed in different social 
settings with varying circumstances and “was of very great concern” to the strong, the
2 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 119-143.
3 Crook, Law and Life, 7.
4 Petronius, Satyricon 30-4.
5 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 280,222, 221-233.
6 Witherington, 333. See also Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 98,200-3,209-10. Zulueta, 
The Institutes o f Gaius: Part 2 Commentary, 23, 84 for further discussion of persona. Zulueta says that 
the law of persons is the law of status influencing obligations (p. 23).
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weak, citizens and inhabitants of the empire, as well as Christians relating socially in 
the church in Rome.7
At the outset of Romans 15:1 Paul makes a theological judgment in which he 
sides with the strong, “who are obviously the majority in the community.”8 His 
hearers clearly understood that language was not only of the strong and the weak, but 
also that of obligation in its purest form of duty for the “supreme good” and in the 
ethics of “moral goodness.”9 Paul sides with the theologically strong, not on the basis 
of Roman social convention and social attitudes with regard to persona, but on the 
basis of “theological beliefs.”10 “The first person plural in verses 1 and 2 demonstrate 
that Paul counts himself among the strong.”11 It is significant to note that Paul, a Jew, 
sides with the strong, because the strong, ‘“the capable, powerful ones,’ a description 
of the mainly Gentile Christians in the Roman church,” expressed their freedom in 
Christ by refusing to get caught up in legalism, especially Jewish legalism.12
In contrast, the weak, somewhat powerless, “without strength,” and “without 
resources, with no one to turn to,”13 were mainly Jews whose “weaknesses are their 
special practices, their abstinences from meat, wine, and the like, erroneous in 
themselves and troublesome to their fellow Christians.”14 The nature of faith for the 
strong requires them not to place themselves in a superior position over the weak, 
because “for the strong it would be and is sin to compel the brother who is still 
unsettled in the faith to follow his or her own example, or, indeed, to demonstrate his 
or her (Gentile Christian) freedom in order to expose the narrow-minded cowardliness
7 Judge, The Social Pattern, 72, 72-77.
8 Kasemann, 381.
9 Cicero, On Duties 1.4-7.
10 Judge, Social Pattern, 77; Contra Jewett, Romans, 876, who sees Paul identifying himself with the 
“strong” on socioeconomic terms.
11 Schreiner, 746.
12 Fitzmyer, 702.
13 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 11.
14 Barrett, rev.ed., 247.
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of the weak (Jewish Christian).”15 Paul appeals to their faith as a matter of conscience 
“by curbing one’s own liberty of conscience for the sake of others.”16 Obligation in its 
etymological roots and social function seeks to bind together and to preserve Pax 
Romana, although here to deliver a peace that will “bind the two groups together” and 
“to promote harmony within diversity rather than to remove the diversity.”17 The 
“invisible rope” of obligation binds the strong and weak to unity of purpose and social 
function in the church. Such an obligation “will be a test of faith (in the sense of basic 
Christian faith); for what is required of them is utterly opposed to the tendency of our 
fallen human nature.”18 Paul knows if the “invisible rope” of obligation in Roman 
conformity has its way, the noose will be tightened and choke not only the Christian 
spirit, but destroy the infant church, even forcing some out of the church. If obligation 
through the transformation of Christ has its way, the result will draw people together 
by building up the Christian community.
Paul indicates two equal parts, each representing one side of a coin, for 
obligation to represent the transformational (Rom 12:1-2) sacrifice of Christ who 
“being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto 
death, even death of the cross.”19 The first side of the coin, the present infinitive of 
Pacrrd^w that follows the present imperative of o<j)£iAu), indicates “to bear” or carry
15 Stuhlmacher, 229.
16 Judge. “The Teacher as Moral Exemplar in Paul and the Inscription in Ephesus,” in Social 
Distinctives o f the Christians in the First Century: Pivotal Essays (ed. D. G. Peterson and J. W. Pryor; 
Peabody, Mass: Hendrickson, 2008), 185,185-201. Cicero, Letters to Atticus 13.20. He says, “In all 
one’s life one ought not to stray a nail’s breadth from the straight path of conscience.”
17 Witherington, 332.
18 Cranfield, 2:730.
19 The discussion focuses on the centrality of the cross and the sense o f its grace in debt (6<j>£iAT)|iaTa) 
from Romans 4:4; the same sense of forgiveness in debt from Matthew 6:12 from Jesus’ sermon on the 
mount; the same sense of the obligation of “laying down” our lives for others because Christ died by 
“laying down” on the cross; and an implied sense of Christ’s own “bearing the weaknesses of the 
weak” in the of humility and submission (of obligation) from the Christological hymn of Philippians 
2:5-11. See Judge, The Social Pattern, 72-77, for a discussion of “theological beliefs” and, while “the 
New Testament is a veritable case book of social precept and practice,” for a discussion of theology, 
Christology, Jesus as a historical turning point in Christian precept and practice with Christ’s 
resurrection power as an influence on Christian obligation.
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the weaknesses of the weak even as Christ carries the cross, indicating the sacrificial 
spirit of denying self and carrying the burdens of others for their benefit.20 The other 
side of the coin, “not to please ourselves” reflects Plato’s Greek thought of virtue and 
honour: “so do not forget that successful action depends on pleasing people, whereas 
arrogance is next neighbour to isolation.”21 Contrast this with the Roman obligation of 
Augustus, “afterwards my own army was led across the Danube and compelled the 
tribes of the Dacians to submit to the orders of the Roman people,”22 or Cicero’s 
Roman obligation where Romans must “become good calculators of duty, able by 
adding and subtracting to strike a balance correctly and find out just how much is due 
each individual.”23 Note especially who are the strong, according to Epictetus’s words 
concerning friendship, “It is a general rule, be not deceived that every living thing is 
to nothing so devoted as to its own interest.”24 Roman society was hedonistic, 
motivated by self preservation and self-interest, with obligations calculated and 
decided on the basis of status, power, wealth, social power; thus the “weak” of society 
were bound to please the “strong” and to expect them to dominate.25 The strong 
expected to please themselves and be pleased by their weaker inferiors. Paul placed 
the obligation on everyone in the church to be self-sacrificing and humble. This 
humility “arises from a wilful subjection of oneself in favour of others, even the 
others who exploit the one.”26 Paul’s words appear countercultural and revolutionary
20 See the cognate uses of paaTct^w in John 19:17 of Jesus carrying the cross; in Luke 14:27 of 
“bearing” the cross in an act of self denial to follow Christ; in Galatians 6:2,10 where “bearing” others 
burdens is done for the good unto all men, especially to the household of faith, a subtle reference to 
obligations in the Galatian church.
21 Plato, Epistles 321B.
22 Augsutus, Res Gestae 5.30.
23 Cicero, On Duties 2.59.
24 Epictetus, Discourses 2.22.15.
25 Epictetus, Discourses 2.22.15. Epictetus confirms the emotion and fierceness of self-interest, saying, 
“Whatever, then, appears to stand in the way of this (self) interest, be it brother, or father, or child, or 
loved one, or lover, the being hates, accuses, and curses it.”
26 Judge, “Paul and Socrates,” Interchange 13 (1973): 115.
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given that “what is meant here by not pleasing oneself is not pleasing oneself 
regardless of the effects which one’s pleasing oneself would have on others.”27
Paul makes an appeal that few seem to have completely grasped in its cultural 
context to help resolve the tension between the strong and the weak. He introduces a 
new ethical foundation for conflict resolution with a well-established concept: 
obligation. This obligation was a revolutionized version requiring radical ethics that 
included the counter-nature concept of self-denial and a countercultural concept of 
self-surrender for the sake of God’s kingdom. Paul’s heart for the kingdom of God 
began in Romans 1:12 with “mutual faith” and an obligation or debt (6(j)£ iA £T q<;) in 
Romans 1:14-16 to Greeks, to Jews, to barbarians, to the wise and unwise, an 
obligation whose foundation is Jesus Christ in his mercy. According to Romans 
14:17-18, Paul’s primary concern is the kingdom of God, not meat, drink and Sabbath 
days, but the pleasing (£udp£CTTO<;) of Christ in service to him that produces the 
righteousness and joy and peace of the Holy Spirit. Paul does not want meat or any 
other thing to destroy the work of God and he desires not only mutual faith, but a 
mutual edification, a building up of Christ’s household based on the compelling 
obligation of the strong bearing the weaknesses of the weak. Judge notes that “the 
idea of the household as a unit of society, which might be compared with republic or 
kingdom, was familiar.”28 Paul’s use of “household” in Romans 14:19 and 15:2 
indicated not only family obligations, but also a solidarity and unity of religion which 
was not uncommon in Roman households.29 Paul’s use of o’lKoSopqv implied domus, 
a phrase more commonly used by Romans instead offamilia, because it “covered a 
larger group than is usually associated with family today, encompassing husband,
27 Cranfield, 2:731; Jewett, Romans, 877, calls this “the crossing of difficult ethnic and theological 
barriers.”
28 Judge, The Social Pattern, 30.
29 Judge, The Social Pattern, 35.
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wife, children, slaves, and others living in the house with a deep sense of loyalty, 
obligations, reciprocal relations, and binding social ties giving “the impression that 
Romans felt a duty to help ‘kin.’”30 The solidarity and unity of obligation of mutually 
helping one another encouraged “a secured peace,” social cohesion, and a goal of 
ethical action in accordance with the supreme good that assisted in conflict 
resolution.31 Paul’s obligation for the strong in Romans 15:2, according to Barth, “the 
sacrifice, the renunciation.. .the end of rivalry, the end of all particularity and 
superiority of behaviour,”32 included pleasing a neighbour for his good (ayaGov) in 
the realm of God’s kingdom.
2. Reversal o f Obligation Under Julio-Claudian Society in Rome 
The “kingdom” was a principle and precept in the realm of obligation that never 
exited the minds of the Roman people in the empire with the deified Augustus and his 
potestas, acts, triumphs, honours, largesses, benefits, submissions, and obligations 
flowing powerfully into first-century Roman consciousness, daily activity, and social 
relations. Paul is asking his readers to respect Augustan precept and practice but, as 
calculators of obligation, to weigh the highest obligation of responding in the church 
on the basis, not of princeps, but of a Christological ethic that produces Christian 
action and conduct.34 One option for conflict resolution was for a permanent split 
between the strong and the weak like the Claudian edict of AD 49. Paul did not desire 
this so he required re-thinking obligation in the supreme good of Christ, by refusing to
30 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 128,145-46,126-147.
31 Cicero, On Duties 1.5-7; 1.35; Sailer, Personal Patronage, 69-78.
32 Barth, 525.
33 Augustus, Res Gestae 1-40.
34 Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 192. He mentions “the obligation of the strong” and obligation 
as a solution to the controversy in the church, but focuses primarily on three things: (1) the vertical 
relationship with Christ that leads to service; (2) the strong’s obligation to support the weak calling for 
them to work out the “social values” in situations such as meals; and (3) the duties and benefits in the 
rendered in the believing community, including giving up some rights (p. 195). Reasoner does not 
address the important reversal of obligations set in the context of Romans 15:1-6 based upon the social 
and legal impact of Roman obligation.
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manipulate obligation and its social networks, especially with inferiors,35 and by 
responding with actions of “self limitation” as Christ did in order to “make the 
concessions necessary to maintain the spirit of the community...and for the good and 
benefit of the community as a whole.”36 A Christ centred-ethic is a radical departure 
from the self-interest, self-serving and superior attitude of the strong in the “mutual 
interchange” of services in Roman society, an attitude where the tendency is to please 
the self and its appetites.37
In Rome its citizens and inhabitants were asked to evaluate a situation 
appreciably and to act with motivation and obligation.38 Cicero says, “Again, every 
action ought {debet) to be free from undue haste or carelessness; neither ought we to 
do anything for which we cannot assign a reasonable motive; for in these words we
-3Q
have practically a definition of duty.” Paul asked his readers to curb their appetites, 
to set aside their obsession with hierarchical status and rank40 for the sake of unity, to 
calculate obligation on the basis of Christ, and act in the spirit of the radical ethic of 
Christian obligation. This radical ethic required the “downward mobility” of Christ 
who humbled himself, not the “upward mobility” of the segmented social hierarchy of 
the Roman machine. It produced attitudes and conduct that bonded the church in unity 
and eliminated the “verticality” of status and the “arrogance and harshness” often 
associated with the legal distinctions of status.41
The radical ethic created a whole new approach to calculating obligation and 
the conduct of the church under the compelling obligation of the strong toward the
35 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 64-71.
36 Dunn, 841-2; Judge, Social Distinctives, 187. He speaks of a sacrifice of “one’s own reasonable 
interest to a higher objective.”
37 Cicero, On Duties 1.56; 1.101, says, “...that reason commands, appetite obeys.” Romans sought 
diligently to please their huge appetites.
38 Cicero, On Duties 1.101.
39 Cicero, On Duties 1.101.
40 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 199. “Roman society was obsessed with status and 
rank...”(199).
41 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 112.
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weak. When it came to eating and drinking, Sabbath-days, buying and consuming
meat bought at the marketplace, matters of significance to individual preference, but
not matters of significance in regard to God’s kingdom of righteousness and the
church, Paul stresses “their common obligation to tolerate and bear the weaknesses
and limitations of the weak.”42 Witherington comments accordingly,
Origen (AD 185-254) offers a telling comment on this section of Paul’s 
discourse: “Eating meat and drinking wine are matters of indifference in 
themselves. Even the wicked people may abstain from these things, and some 
idol worshipers, in fact, do so for reasons which are actually evil. Likewise 
quite a few heretics enjoin familiar practices. The only reason abstinence of 
this kind is good is that it may help to avoid offending a brother.” This brings 
to light a fundamental principle of a truly Christian ethic - it is other regarding. 
A Christian does not demand his or her own rights and privileges, especially 
when the issue is not a matter of ethical principle but rather just personal 
preference.43
The radical ethic required the rethinking of Augustan power in the Julio-Claudian 
tradition and domination in favour of conscientious Christian humility and toleration 
for higher spiritual, moral, and ecclesiastical purposes.
3. Obligation as a Means o f Conflict Resolution 
Paul’s call for a radical ethic, one which reversed the obligation of Augustan 
influence and society, opened the door for a new order (ordo) for the church in its 
nexus of relationships. The Roman innovations to obligation after Augustus provided 
Roman society with order, concord, and stability; but the social order established was 
“stable and enduring” and impacted conflict resolution between the strong and the 
weak of society.44 Gamsey and Sailer note, “Under the Principate as a whole, the 
division and tensions deriving from the unequal distribution of wealth, rank and status 
were counterbalanced by forces of cohesion such as family and household, structured
42 Stuhlmacher, 230.
43 Origen, Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos (ed. By T. Heither, 5 vols. Freeiburg im Breisgau: 
Herder, 1990-95), 5.170; Gerald Bray, Romans (Downers Grove: InterVaristy, 1998), 350; 
Witherington, 345.
44 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107.
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vertical and horizontal relationships between individuals and households, and the 
ideological apparatus of the state.”45 Romans 15:1-2 introduces a radical “order,” an 
obligation for the strong toward the weak rather than for the weak under obligation to 
the strong. Obligation by its nature was stratified and defined social order with such 
distinction that it was important for Romans to “not falter in the discharge of duty.”46 
Paul challenged the Christians in Rome to consider obligation by inverting the social 
orders and distinction, or at the least to level the orders on an even plane, so that 
strong and weak, weak and strong were equal in the church.
Paul outlined a new “order” with an imperative, “Let each of us please his 
neighbour for his own good.” As Paul observed Roman society, he did not ignore his 
basic obligations, but “he deliberately abandoned the security of an established social 
status,” although all indications are that he was “highly placed” on the social scale.47 
Paul’s expectation was that they would view status differently in light of Christ. 
Historically, this implied rebellion to Roman rule, became a threat to Roman 
solidarity in the legal aspects of obligation as glue for society, and created public 
suspicion given the official preoccupation with order defined by rank and status 
practised in relationships and associations and even the public display of order in 
wider society.48 Judge lists the Roman concern for “centres of agitation” and 
examples of unrest, such as Paul at Ephesus who threatened public order in regard to 
the local economy with regard to the silversmiths and the Jewish associations that 
were suspect in Roman eyes.49 Behind the unrest is the importance of social 
stratification, or do, Roman law, and a sequential network of prioritized horizontal and 
vertical obligations. The strong were obligated to please for the common good. Paul
45 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 107.
46 Cicero, On Duties 1.119.
47 Judge, “St. Paul as a Radical Critic of Society,” Interchange 16 (1974): 191.
48 Judge, The Social Pattern, 41. See also pp. 40-48.
49 Judge, The Social Pattern, 41.
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thereby challenged Roman law, ideology, and social practice, for ordo itself favoured
the social position of the privileged, their legal rights, and ensuing obligations on a
wide Roman scale, in local communities, and in the complexity of relationships.50 The
understood use of obligation and the force of the imperative combined to add strength
to what Paul was actually asking the readers of the letter to the Romans to do.
One aspect of the reading of Paul’s letter that is often overlooked is the public
reading of his circulated letter in a meeting of the church. Judge comments on Paul as
a “single-minded apostle of revolution” and on worship in the early church as “lively
social intercourse:”
In that lively social intercourse there was neither solitude nor mystery, no 
shrine, no statue, no cult, no ceremony, no offering to ensure that all was well 
between gods and (human beings]. Instead there was talk and argument, 
disturbing questions about belief and behaviour (two matters of little or no 
concern to religion in antiquity), conscious changes to accepted ways, and the 
expectation of a more drastic transformation soon to come. The purpose of 
classical religion was to secure what was already there against just such an 
upheaval [against concordia].51
Judge’s comments indicate that a public outburst, “restless, argumentative, and single-
minded,”52 in worship might have been expected when Paul inverted Augustan social
order, asked his hearers to consider others before themselves, and introduced them to
a new radical ethic, a binding obligation, in the power of Christ. What Paul obligated
the strong to do and the weak to consider in the church was to focus on a new order
and action for the sake of church unity, transforming obligation “by a revolution in
social values.”53 “The vocabulary of privilege,”54 as Gamsey refers to it, would have
to be transformed and renewed in Christ, thus producing a new order, reconstructed
mores, and would result in a radically new conduct and action. The strong who heard
50 Alfoldy, Social History, 106-10.
51 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation in Paul,” TynB 35 (1984): 6.
52 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation in Paul,” TynB 35 (1984): 6.
53 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation in Paul,” TynB 35 (1984): 23
54 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 221.
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Paul’s obligation might have verbally shouted, “Paul is a fool! A crazy fool! Roman 
people don’t live like that!” The weak might have responded with, “I have never 
heard anything like this before!” Upon hearing of an obligation to consider each 
other’s needs first, both the strong and the weak must have looked at each other and 
concluded, “There must be a mistake! Surely Paul does not mean that at all!” Paul is 
not simply calling the strong to bear the weaknesses of the weak; he is also obligating 
the weak to respect the strong without malice, envy, bitterness and even, if Jesus’ 
words of the obligation to forgive debtors (6(f)£iA£Tatg) are weighed, to respect the 
strong with forgiveness in spite of the unfair abuses incurred.55 So revolutionary was 
Paul’s thought that it inverted common thinking in Roman society for both the strong 
and the weak and revolutionized how the ordo of social stratification worked within 
the church. Only persons with hearts transformed by Christ, minds renewed through 
Christ, and a spirit of resistance to Roman conformity because of Christ could conduct 
themselves toward others in the radical thrust of Roman obligation motivated to the 
higher order and supreme obligation.56
Important to the discussion of conflict resolution in Romans 15:2 is the term 
“good” (ayccGov). The key to conflict resolution involved the surrendering of 
privileges, the strong bearing the weaknesses of the weak, and the strong not pleasing 
themselves. In addition, conflict in the church, between the superior and inferior, 
Greeks and Jews, and other social distinctions in the nexus of relationships, would 
find resolution in “pleasing his neighbour for his good to edification.” The good (dg 
t o  dyaGov) of which Paul speaks possesses the goal or termination of “the good,” in 
the language of obligation, virtue and benefaction, that is, with respect to” benefaction
55 Matthew 6:12 and a similar reference to obligation is used twice in “The Parable of the Unforgiving 
Servant” in Matthew 18:21-35; a revolutionary concept given the legal and relational aspects of Roman 
obligation.
56 Rom 12:1-2.
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based on theology.”57 Winter notes that the “act of benefiting set up a chain of 
obligations,” such duties were now re-ordered and re-prioritized in the church in 
mutual benefaction to partner with mutual faith.58 Paul also uses “Unto the good” in 
Romans 13:4, connecting the idea of benefaction with rulers, a servant, honour, glory 
and politeia as those who act in citizenship as benefactors for the good of others, a 
concept alluded to here by Paul to indicate benefaction in Romans 15:2.59 Paul’s 
sense of obligation “unto the good” in the church often meant breaking common 
social conventions which were “a part of the fabric of the life in politeia” and a part of 
the fabric of the law and life of Rome in the first century.60 Mutual benefaction siq  t o  
ayaOov created a spirit of edification and obligation through God’s mercies and 
grace-gifts producing harmony that would resolve conflict.
Jewett highlights the importance of this sense of mutual benefaction and 
building up (Rom 15:2) as a link to interpretation “in light of Romans 14:19” (“edify 
one another”).61 He says, “.. .each group (the strong and the weak) has the 
responsibility of building up the other, thus reversing the cultural habit of seeking 
honour for one’s own group by heaping dishonour on competitors.”62 The “cultural 
norm” fits into a pattern of mores involving virtue, honour, benefaction, duty, faith, 
loyalty, society, dignity and gratitude (see Chapter 2). Roman society itself promoted 
a code and system of honour engineered by Roman customs {mores), but that also 
included vindictive aspects of behaviour. Lendon says, “Even imagining the 
constraints a system of honour exerted over ancient conduct in terms of social norms
57 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 38. Winter also views the “good work” of Romans 13:3-4 to refer to 
benefaction, especially public benefaction and its linking obligations (34-35). He adds, “Christians 
were not taught to undertake civic benefactions for pragmatic reasons but rather for theological 
reasons” (38). See Andrew Clarke, “The Good and the Just in Romans 5:7,” TynB 41 (1990): 129-42.
58 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 46.
59 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 46, 1-60.
60 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 47-8.
61 Jewett, 879.
62 Jewett, 879.
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imposes a spurious formality on the flexible standards that are themselves one of the
/ jo
standards of a politics of reputation.” He continues by saying that “one of the 
benefits of being held in honour was the ability to ignore, even manipulate, the rules 
that bound others.”64 Epstein intimates that such manipulation of the rules could call 
for hostile action, including “a burning desire for revenge and a unique commitment 
to private warfare.”65 He also comments further, “A Roman, governed by a harsh 
ethos, simply could not afford to ‘turn the other cheek’ and expect to maintain his 
position in society.”66
In essence, Roman society in the realm of honour was a “pride society” as 
well as “shame society.”67 The strong (“pride society”), according to Roman mores, 
felt inclined at times to dominate, manipulate and even insult the weak (“shame 
society”).68 Jewett, therefore, acknowledges clearly Paul’s “fundamental reversal” by 
exhorting the church to “build up” in response to Christian virtue based on Christ, not 
based on Roman societal norms or customs.69 The apostle Paul called for an 
obligation (based on Rom 15:1-2) that included a fresh Christian custom that 
encouraged Christian honour and edification, not competition, humiliation, 
degradation, vindictiveness or insults.
Obligation’s highest order would be to find an example, a model of moral 
excellence to imitate in the compelling obligation of the strong to the weak and the
63 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 31.
64 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 31.
65 Epstein, Personal Enmity, 2.
66 Epstein, Personal Enmity, 2.
67 MacMullen, Romans Social Relations, 109.
68 See Clarke, Secular and Christian Leadership, 23-39. He discusses status, enmity, honour in the 
sense of dyaOo^, and insult in the sense of kocko^ ,  as well as the social display of power and society’s 
bent toward the privileged among secular leaders in Corinth.
69 Jewett, 879; Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 179-86, discusses the “continuing mutuality of 
obligation” and “the ethic o f reciprocity” but does not discuss the dramatic reversal of Roman customs 
{mores).
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7fimutual benefits each provides to the other. The Romans often used a model, 
exemplum or an “example” (TTopdSeiypa), a rhetorical device used as proof for an 
argument, to persuade, to provide moral guidance, and to use “as guides to conduct
n 1everyday life.” Examples were used to indicate virtue, moral purpose, noble actions, 
and when properly amplified become a form of praise, which “consists in 
superiority,” and a thing for others to keep in view.72 Examples were presented “as 
demonstrative proofs, for conviction is produced by these.”73
Valerius Maximus compiled a lengthy list of examples (exempla) to imitate 
from “the deeds and sayings worthy of memorial of the Roman City Roman and 
external nations.”74 Skidmore comments, “The glory individual exemplars have 
achieved encourages readers to imitate their noble deeds; conversely, those historical 
characters whose actions brought infamy are used to deter the reader from a given 
course of action.”75 According to Skidmore, Valerius Maximus invokes two primary 
emphases: virtue as moral excellence (&p£Tp) and a deterrence of vice.76 Skidmore 
comments that examples of history and education are tools for imitation, “The two 
phrases ‘history is philosophy by examples’ and ‘education is the study of characters’ 
express in a few words the Greek view that the prime function of literature was to 
encourage men to use examples as guides to everyday conduct.”77 Logically, an 
example is supplied as a model to imitate, whether an example of instruction, of moral 
guidance, or of virtuous actions.
70 Cicero, The Republic 2.69. Scipio responds to Laelius concerning duty and function: “Of course he 
should be given almost no other duties than this one (for it comprises most of the others)-of improving 
and examining himself continually, urging others to imitate him, and furnishing in himself,... a mirror 
to his fellow citizens by reason of the supreme excellence of his life and character.”
71 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 12. See also Aristotle, The 'Art’ ofRhetoric 2.20.
72 Aristotle, The ’A rt’ o f Rhetoric 1.9.39; 1.9.32-41.
73 Aristotle, The ‘A rt’ o f Rhetoric 2.20.9.
74 Valerius Maximus, Memorable Doings and Sayings 1, preface.
75 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, xvi.
76 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 11-12,17.
77 Skidmore, Practical Ethics, 12.
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The striking example that Paul introduces in Romans 15:3-4 is that of Christ
and the compelling obligation of imitatio Christi,78 The model incited a moral
obligation to peace and embodied a persona that encouraged conflict resolution in the
church. Paul’s example finds an image in the Christ who “did not please himself,” a
statement that “sums up with eloquent reticence both the meaning of the Incarnation
and the character of Christ’s earthly life.”79 Dunn says, “The model is Christ: if he
was willing to suffer misunderstanding and abuse to the extent of giving his own life,
how could those who both gloried in their own strength and called Jesus Lord refuse
the much less self-limitation of curbing the liberty of their conduct when it was
causing their fellow Christians to fall?”80 Judge analyses the Christ model in its
Graeco-Roman context:
Paul’s preoccupation with the death of Christ was the keystone in his 
thinking.. .and his personal identification with that, that is with the experience 
of rejection, was worked out in his own career as constant humiliations and 
rebuffs to which he was subjected. They are not the marks of a man who is by 
nature humble. They are the marks of a man who by status and expectation in 
the social order was eminently placed in his community, and assuming that he 
would not be treated like that, but who took it as a humiliation, that is, as a 
conscious loss of status and repudiation of his natural expectation. He justified 
that to himself, and indeed sought it, because of his preoccupation with the 
model of Jesus.81
The Roman mind was dominated by the images of princeps and Augustus, “an 
imperial persona which is the embodiment of auctoritas,” whose moral authority, law 
and obligations oiled the wheels of the political machinery of powerful Roman rule.82
At the time of Paul’s writing to the Romans, Nero was the emperor of Rome, 
his image and persona wielded power, his home, his triumphs, his art as an actor
78 Epictetus, Discourses 3.3. He says of a procurator of Caesar, “For whom have the people to imitate 
but you, their superior?” See also Epictetus, Encheiridion 3. He speaks of haphazard and 
half-hearted imitation.
79 Cranfield, 2:732.
80 Dunn, 842.
81 Judge, “Paul and Socrates,” Interchange 13 (1973): 115.
82 Gamsey and Sailer, The Early Principate, 3. Gamsey and Sailer note, “We can certainly accept that 
Nero’s revival of law in AD 62 was seen as confirmatory evidence that his rule was sliding into 
tyranny” (p. 6).
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parading on the stage, and his political manoeuvring a public display of his elite 
superiority and status, each in its own right reinforced images of authority.83 During 
Nero’s reign social status and privileged were solidified, so much so that it was not 
uncommon in public places like the circus and theatre for “the Romans to sit in their 
status groups, reinforcing the boundaries between the orders.”84 Given that Nero was 
temperamental, prone to impulse, brutal and unfavourable toward Christians because 
he viewed them as threatening political “subversives,”85 Paul’s obligation of imitatio 
Christi was not only countercultural and revolutionary, but could have also been 
viewed in the eyes of suspicious informers and politicians as an act of rebellion and in 
the eyes of Christians as both an enormous risk and task compelling avant-garde 
obligation.
In Romans 15:3 Paul acknowledges neither Augustus nor Nero as a model to 
imitate, but rather to imitate Christ’s holiness (Rom 1:4), inspiring the good (Rom 
15:2) and good deeds or action (Rom 13:3). As expressions of holiness, such action 
required that even “in the face of mistreatment they were to follow their calling to 
perform good deeds as their imitatio or where public display of ‘competitive acts of 
ostentation’ took place to impress, dominate or reinforce distinctions and orders.”86 
Neither would the church be a place where services, contracts for services and 
transactions would be exacted on the basis of pre-set hierarchical rights, debts, 
privileges and duties of Roman law and life.87 Neither would it be a closed society 
where the nexus of relationships, its benefits, favours, friends, and obligations based
83 Alston, Aspects o f Roman History AD 14-117,118.
84 Alston, Aspects o f Roman History AD 14-117, 118.
85 Alston, Aspects o f Roman History AD 14-117,119.
86 John R. Patterson, Political Life in the City o f Rome (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2000), 52. 
Augustus, Res Gestae 2.8. Augustus says, “By the passage of new laws I restored many traditions of 
our ancestors which were then falling into disuse, and I myself set precedents (exempla) in many things 
for posterity to imitate.”
87 Crook, Law and Life, 61.
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on Roman law and status, would form the “most comprehensive bond that unites 
together as men to men and all to all.”88 Nor would the church act or perform good 
deeds, actions, on the undeniable force of Roman obligation with its “invisible rope 
around the neck of the debtor,” a coercive force that held both parties, the indebted 
and debtor, in bondage and limited openness and freedom in relationships.89
In contrast, the church would be a place where the orders would not be 
calculated; where the “invisible rope” would fall off of necks and excite genuine 
freedom; where the strong and weak would welcome each other in mutual faith; 
where unity would reign in the peace of Christ, and where obligation in the imitatio 
Christi would take precedence and priority above even that of Augustus. The result of 
the imitatio Christi would be glory in God’s kingdom, moral excellence (ap£TT]), 
Christian obligations, and conduct in the holiness of Christ with Christ as Benefactor 
who produces unity in the bond of peace and maturity.90 Unity is one aim of 
obligation and, especially the imitatio Christi, the “bond (vinculum) of connection” 
which by reason and speech finds meaning in fellowship, society, and common 
good.91
The bond of Christ found in the binding obligation of imitatio Christi 
produced the expectation of reciprocal relations to build up the family of Christ in 
mutual faith. A “tension existed between the preservation of traditional values and 
innovative adaptation for new situations,”92 a tension for Paul between Roman and
88 Cicero, On Duties 1.50-51. Williams, Enemies o f the Cross o f Christ, 234-52. He describes Paul’s 
theology of the cross: “group cohesion,” a “reversal pattern” of Roman expectations, exempla, the 
imitation o f Christ, and a theology to instruct church unity.
89 Zimmerman, Law o f Obligations, 5.
90 Cf. Ephesians 4:3; 3:14 as Paul uses “bond” (auvSeapog) in the sense of a tie that binds, a “binding” 
unity like fastenings holding a ship together or joints and ligaments holding a body together; Plato, The 
Statesman 310 A, “But we say that in those only who were of noble nature from their birth and have 
been nurtured as befits such natures it is implanted by the laws...this bond which unites unlike and 
divergent parts of virtue (dpETffe).”
91 Cicero, On Duties, 1.50.
92 Meeks, Origins o f Christian Morality, 78.
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Christian world views; thus, Roman obligation as a means to conflict resolution and 
the innovative obligation of imitatio Christi (Rom 15:1-4) anticipated conflict 
resolution. Paul’s answer for conflict resolution through obligation, involved a 
reformed essence of reciprocal relations that unifies the church, the ability of the 
imitators of Christ to look to Christ, to look past social distinctions, and to share table 
fellowship together. Witherington writes, “Paul’s concern with dietary issues and the 
underlying attitude of acceptance of difference that must prevail in the Christian 
community stems from the compelling need to maintain table fellowship...”93 He adds 
“that shared meals prefigure, reveal, and reflect” God’s kingdom.94 The nature of 
mutual respect, a hallmark of Paul’s thought, and a shared, common meal portrays “a 
clear message -  that of equality, transformed relations, and a common life.”95 Cicero 
names as one goal of obligation, “the conservation of an organized society,” 
commenting that “in the interests of society.. .its common bonds will be best 
conserved, if kindness be shown to each individual in proportion to the closeness of 
his relationship.”96 The common factor of the Christian community in Rome was a 
mutual faith that indicated a new society of obligation, a “partnership,” that is, a 
society “not based, primarily, on an antagonism of interests; its essence is in the 
pooling of resources for a common purpose.”97 Unity in the church discovered its 
common purpose through imitatio Christi and a reciprocity based upon mutuality and
98respect.
93 Witherington, 346.
94 Witherington, 346.
95 C. Pohl, Making Room: Recovering Hospitality as a Christian Tradition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1999), 32; Witherington, 346.
96 Cicero, On Duties 1.50.
97 Zimmerman, Law o f Obligations, 451.
98 Judge, Social Distinctives, 187. He says, “The idea of imitation offered a means of expressing the 
replication of Christ’s experience, especially in social relations, that could be passed on in turn to those 
who believed in him.”
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Paul emphasizes the mutual respect of reciprocal relations with his extensive 
use of the Greek reciprocal pronoun dAApAwv and its Greek cognate forms fourteen 
times in his letter to the Romans, a pronoun which “brings out the mutual relations 
involved.”99 Another Greek word dealing with reciprocal relations that Paul uses in 
Romans 15:7, npoaAap(3dv£(70£, “welcome,” encourages the mutual spirit of 
hospitality, an open door, because “Christ’s act in welcoming men is directed to the 
glory of God.”100 “When the strong receive the weak, and the weak the strong, they 
are in a most significant way glorifying God.”101 Critical to the idea of “welcoming” 
is a reception that is inclusive, not exclusive. Also critical is the reception of a 
person’s face, persona (TTpoaumov), a Greek term not found in Paul’s letter to the 
Romans, but found in Galatians 6:12 as a term “originally carrying the meaning of 
‘mask’ but by the time of the first century it was used to describe the status of a 
person.”102 The idea of “welcoming another” reflects, in Roman society, their faces as 
it relates to status and the accompanying obligations, an idea closely akin to 
TTpoc7Aa|ipdv£a0£ with the force of an imperative indicating a genuine obligation.103 
Cicero saw this concept of face as one’s “countenance,” “so formed his features as to 
portray therein the character that lies deep within.”104 Another Greek phrase that 
speaks to reciprocal mutuality is in Romans 15:5 where Paul speaks of unity in God 
that is “to be likeminded toward one another” ( t o  ccuto (j)pov£iv dAAqAoiq). A 
similar phrase is also used in Romans 12:16, both meaning “to live in harmony among
99 Robertson, Greek Grammar, 692.
100 Barrett, rev. ed., 248.
101 Barrett, rev. ed., 248.
102 Winter, Seek the Welfare, 137-41.
103 Aristotle, Politics 1312M7. The idea concerns “receiving” soldiers into an army, “connections 
banded together.”
104 Cicero, Laws 1.27. Cicero says, “...not only do the eyes declare with exceeding clearness the 
innermost feelings of our hearts, but also the countenance” and behind that character. The footnote 
comments, “Cicero appears to referring both to the facial expression as a mirror of momentary emotion 
and to the countenance...as an index to character” (n. 1); Horace, Epistles 1.18. Commenting on a 
protege and his conduct, Horace says, “He must fall in with his patron’s moods and at all times show a 
cheery face.”
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yourselves,” a phrase “not calling for a rote uniformity of thought, but for a common 
attitude and purpose” contributing to the quality of harmony in the Christian 
community.105 The harmony, “which with one mind and mouth glorify God” (Rom 
15:6), hints that part of the disunity and chaos in the church led to harmful language 
that was neither becoming of Christ, nor in keeping with the building up of Christ’s 
body, neither was it in the spirit of the harmonious household of God’s family.106 In 
the obligation of imitatio Christi his peace would reinforce a healthy, unified 
Christian society, combating hierarchy and even rules of Roman associations, where 
genuine community flourished and glorified God.
4. Imitatio Christi and God’s Intention for Unity 
Paul highlights five Old Testament quotes in Romans 15:1-7 to further explain the 
obligation to unity through imitatio Christi. Paul’s use of Old Testament quotes 
further enhances his argument for mutuality and unity as he draws it to a close. It also 
allows that Christ welcomed both Jews and Gentiles and gives praise to the Lord from 
all people. The five Old Testament quotes come from the law (Deuteronomy), a 
prophet (Isaiah) and the Psalms. They appear vague in meaning, but one thing is clear: 
“the mutual acceptance now of Jews and Gentile believers at Rome, together with the 
Gentiles’ praise of God for sending the Messiah, already makes that final, universal, 
and eternal praise of God of which the Scriptures spoke and to which, properly told, 
the story [of Israel] pointed.”107 Paul begins with an Old Testament quote from Psalm 
68:10 (LXX), the “reproaches,” (oi oveibiopoi) indicating disgraced behaviour,108 
insults in the sense of the “high-minded” insulting those of low desires,109 a type of
105 Dunn, 746.
106 Epictetus, Disourses 4.35-7. He speaks of “control over moral purpose,” saying, “These are the 
judgments which produce love in the household, concord in the states, peace...”
107 Bryan, 215.
108 Plato, Symposium 183C.7.
109 Dio Chrysostom, Orationes 77/8.38.5.
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letter sent to those who fail obligation and honour,110 the “casting in teeth” favours by 
ingratitude,111 and even an inference to shameful conduct of bad reputation.112 Paul’s 
use of the Psalm appeals to the Jews; his use of o v e i S i ^ o v t w v  appeals to the Graeco- 
Roman conscience in their “high-minded” insult and shame society, thus accentuating 
the unifying concept of resolution in the Christ model who took upon himself insults, 
disgrace, dishonour, and shame for both Jews and Gentiles. In Romans 15:3 Paul 
addresses the Christ-model as a fulfilment of the Scriptures, a source in a society of 
shame and reproach where Christians cannot only learn but gain strength to endure 
and to find comfort in life, qualities influenced by the peace of Christ.113
The quote from Psalm LXX 17:50, the second Old Testament quote, indicated 
that Christians under the model of Jesus Christ, the imitatio Christi, and as a unified 
church, “are under a different covenant and are obliged to its commandments.”114 
Paul says that Jesus is a “minister of the circumcision” in Romans 15:8. While 
presented in obscure language, it is “plain that circumcision is taken as a collective, 
equivalent to the Jews.”115 The word “minister” ( S ic x k o v o v )  speaks of God’s 
faithfulness to the covenant, intention of obeying God’s will, and a characterization of 
Christ’s humble service to men.”116 “Paul has underlined once more the special 
priority and privileges of the Jews.. .and it might perhaps be a further encouragement 
for the strong to show considerateness,” or at least to respond to the Jews with 
qualities of patience and comfort like God (Rom 5:5).117
110 Philo, Embassy to Gains 38.305. A letter of reproach was sent to Pilate for failing obligations of 
honour. See also Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 50-1; 71.
111 Dio Chrysostom, Orationes 45.7.5.
112 Lendon, Empire o f Honour, 41. In a discussion of “the good” Lendon acknowledges two important 
facts: (1) “...Roman society was to a great degree a shame culture...;” (2) “Little surprise: in the 
Roman world one’s moral reputation was an integral part of one’s rank in society” (p. 41).
113 See Romans 5:1-6 with an emphasis on “patience” and “hope;” 12:1-2,15:4, “comfort” and “hope.”
114 Witherington, 342.
115 Barrett, rev. ed., 248.
116 Cranfield, 2:741.
117 Cranfield, 2:742.
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Witherington adds that “Paul is mainly exhorting the Christians to be servants 
of their circumcised fellow Christians, and he is also countering ant-Semitism by 
reminding them that God has not given up on his chosen people.”118 If the like- 
mindedness (opoOupaSov) of Christian unity binds the strong and weak together, Jew 
and Gentile alike, it will require self-surrender to self-interests that are neither anti­
service, anti-Semitic, and reflect a radical approach to the issues of order and 
status.119 This radical like-mindedness leads to “like words” (Rom 15:9, ‘I will 
confess,’ E^opoAoyqcropai), an agreement, a confession, a binding contract of words 
that result to declare God’s glory and praise for his mercy, because “unifying conduct 
is doxological by its very nature.”120 Again, Paul’s efforts in quoting the Old 
Testament, no better illustrated than in the use of a Psalm of Israel to communicate to 
Jews and Gentiles (eOvectiv, used six times in four verses) God’s love and Paul’s 
obligation to both (Rom 1:14-16), also confirm God’s plan of salvation, God’s 
promises, Paul’s mission, and the confessional nature of one mind in Christ.121 The 
new covenant of obligation under Christ calls for loudest praise to God.
The third and fourth Old Testament quotes, from Deuteronomy 32:43 (LXX) 
and Psalm 116:1 (LXX), include three imperatives implying obligation to be glad in 
(£U(f)pdv0r|T£), laud (ocIveite), and magnify (£uatv£acrru)aav) the Lord. The three 
words possess ideas of praise in action (“...in action, rejoice in these things” and 
“merriment” of a feast),122 praise in the sacrifice of gratitude (“praise- 
offering. . .expressions of gratitude.. .”),123 and praise in the work or deed of good
118 Witherington, 343.
119 Judge, “St. Paul as a Radical Critic of Society,” Interchange 16 (1973: 203.
120 Witherington, 343.
121 Dunn, 848.
122 Epictetus Discourses 4.4.46; Philo, Special Laws 2.194.
123 Philo, Special Laws 1.224.
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(“commending a deed”) or praise of an action.124 Aristotle underscores that the 
importance of praise is “founded on actions,” moral purpose, and virtue adding, “Now 
praise is the language that sets forth greatness of virtue (dpsTfjg); hence it is 
necessary (Sei) to show that a man’s actions are virtuous.”125 The praise is obligated 
(8s!) by Paul through the force of imperatives based on the imitatio Christi as a 
virtuous action, a sacrifice, and, in the deed of good by the Gentiles, a triad of the 
qualities of Christ toward Jews and Gentiles, qualities that incited conduct to glorify 
God. It is significant that “the inclusion of the Gentiles is not to be regarded as a 
happy afterthought; it was foretold in Scripture.”126 In the church, the unity of praise 
reflects the mutual acceptance of each other in gratitude for Christ’s sacrifice, but also 
anticipates “in a certain sense the song of praise of the eschatological, salvific 
community made up of Jews and Gentiles and redeemed by Christ.”127 God’s promise 
included all and invites all to join in a hymn of praise.
The final and fifth Old Testament quote comes from the prophet Isaiah (11:1,
198LXX), quoting “his favourite prophet,” and connecting his concluding statements 
in Romans 15 with two concepts from Romans 9-11 and one general theme from 
Paul’s letter: The “root” of the Jews (Rom 11:16,17, 18); the plan of God for the 
salvation of the Gentiles (Rom 11:11,12,13,25); and hope as a unifying theme for 
the weak and the strong, Jews and Gentiles, in the words “we are saved by hope” 
(Rom 8:24). The Isaiah quote inserted by Paul in Romans 15:12 refers to “the 
eschatological prospect of peace held out by Isaiah (11:1-6)” by combining inferences 
to Christ as the Messiah, Christ’s resurrection and his rule over the Gentiles.129 The
124 Josephus, Antiquities 14.293.
125 Aristotle, The ‘A rt’ o f Rhetoric 1.32-3.
126 Barrett, rev.ed., 272.
127 Stulhlmacher, 233.
128 Dunn, 850.
129 Dunn, 850.
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Roman mind, ever conscious of the empire of honour, held the rule of the emperor as 
the highest obligation and priority on the scale of hierarchy, thus verse 12 “may also 
be an applied critique of Roman attitudes about the subjugated Jews and about the
1 <a rv
emperor as ruler over all the nations.” This Greek use of words involves “an 
implicit appeal to the Suvcctoi (many of them Gentile Christians) to receive (cf. v. 
15:7), and show considerateness to those weak brothers (most, if not all, of them 
Jewish Christians), according them special honour for the sake of their kinsman, the 
Messiah of the Jews, who is the Gentiles only true hope.”131 The “considerateness” 
Paul speaks of is the compelling obligation of imitatio Christi that unifies and brings 
peace to the strong and the weak, “for in the end all glory, honour, and praise will 
accrue to Jesus Christ, not Caesar.”132
The climax of imitatio Christi is found in Paul’s concept of hope, “a sweet 
hope” that rules the minds of mortals, attends to good, which assists persons in living 
out their “days injustice and piety.”133 Aristotle views hope as stored in the 
imagination, a “sensation” related to pleasure, and a pleasant sensation related to the 
“future in hope.”134 He adds, “The things which we hope for are pleasant, when their 
presence seems likely to afford us great pleasure or advantage, without the 
accompaniment of pain.”135 Given the messianic, Jewish reference to hope from 
Isaiah, the meaning could also be influenced by Roman minds as the weak faced 
“inequalities, deriving from uneven property distribution that was confirmed or even 
accentuated by imperial policies.. .underpinned by Roman law,”136 insults, and 
insinuations negatively attached to some obligations in Rome’s society where the
130 Witherington, 344.
131 Cranfield, 2:747.
132 Witherington, 344.
133 Plato, Republic 1.331 A
134 Aristotle, The ‘A rt’ o f Rhetoric 1.11.6-7.
135 Aristotle, The ‘A rt’ o f Rhetoric 1.11.9;1.11 5-12.
136 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 10.
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strong’s domination produced despair, anxiety, and, often, hopelessness. Hope, in
Paul’s spiritual sense, the realm of Christ’s rule, longs for true justice, piety, pleasure,
and freedom from the oppression often reinforced in Rome’s obligation society. After
all, “an essential characteristic of the believer, as this epistle has very clearly shown,
hope is perhaps also that characteristic which has at all periods most strikingly
distinguished the authentic Christian from his pagan neighbours.”137
As a part of Paul’s climax in Romans 15:13, he expresses a wish, in the
optative mood, “a benediction.” He also communicates themes of peace and joy in the
spirit of mutual reconciliation in the concept of messianic peace from Isaiah 11, but
also reflecting “contemporary Roman heroic ideals.”138 Guerra says,
Beginning with Augustus, imperial propaganda luxuriated in extravagant 
praise of the peace achieved by Princeps. In Vergil and Horace, paeans to 
Augustus evinced a clearly eschatological emphasis, for the emperor was 
credited not only with ending an era of war and conflict but also with 
inaugurating the new age. Pacification was accomplished by the strong yet 
clement hand of the saviour, the emperor. The successors of Augustus 
expected similar accolades from their contemporary bards and were often 
obliged.139
A “golden age” of peace was celebrated in the age of Nero, a peace of imperial 
propaganda that praised “the Pax Romana that had not simply ended warfare, but 
reconciled antagonistic peoples in the warm embrace of the imperial father.”140 The 
poet Calpumius Siculus, writing during the reign of Nero, speaks of the “Golden 
Age” as a time of undisturbed or “untroubled peace.”141 However, the peace with 
God, not a peace of oppression and propaganda, but of service, “will be the result of a
137 Cranfield, 2:748.
138 Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition, 127.
139 Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition, 127.
140 Guerra, Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition, 127; Augustus, Res Gestae 2.12-13. 
Augustus’ words of honour, peace, and Pax Augusta surround the context o f Princeps.
141 Calpumius Siculus, Prima 1.42-45.
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true faith in the Christian’s heart.”142 The peace will provide the benefit of a unifying 
result that impacts the heart when the obligation of imitatio Christi is fulfilled.
Joy is also a result of mutual reconciliation in the church. Paul’s expressed 
wish falls in the context of Isaiah’s long passage on “the root of a branch” (11:1). 
Isaiah 11 and Isaiah 12 tie together three things: (1) a day in which the fruitfulness of 
God’s spirit in the messianic age will bring unity; (2) a day in which the nations will 
come together and be reclaimed under one banner, ending all jealousy and hostility; 
and (3) a day that will result in praise to God and deliver joy by God’s deliverance 
and renewal, “With joy you will draw water from the wells of salvation” (Isaiah 12:3). 
One of the benefits of imitatio Christi is joy, God as benefactor supplying the favour 
that leads to rejoicing. Seneca says, “If he [the benefactor] accomplishes what he 
wished, if his intention is conveyed to me and stirs in me a joyful response, he gets 
what he sought.”143 Even the benefit of joy, as is understood in Roman minds, can 
carry with it the concept of reciprocal obligation, “for every one rejoices to know that 
a benefit extends further than he thought.”144 Joy is a benefit that is reciprocal: the 
benefactor rejoices with joy and so too the receiver of the benefit.
If peace and joy possess, inherently, mixed messianic and Roman 
contemporary claims (Rom 15:12-13), then Paul’s use of “in the power of the holy 
spirit” also possesses these mixed understandings in words that carry the language of 
unity to its conclusion. Isaiah 11:2 speaks “of the spirit of the Lord,” a “spirit of 
counsel and power,” words that Jesus used in Luke 4:18 to speak of the Gospel, 
freedom, the Lord’s favour, and fulfilment of the messianic age with its unifying 
effects. Romans themselves, including Jews who lived under Roman rule and law,
142 Sandlay and Headlam, 399.
143 Seneca, On Benefits 2.31.2.
144 Seneca, On Benefits 2.24.4. Seneca’s words connect obligation and joy: “The greater the favour, the 
more earnestly must we express ourselves, resorting to such compliments as ‘You have laid more 
people under obligation than you think’...”
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upon hearing of the “power of the Holy Spirit,” thought of power (Suvqiig) in terms 
of the machinery Roman government embodied in Princeps, household rule with its 
power in the paterfamilias, and reciprocal social relations based on the weak who had 
little or no power under obligation to the strong who wielded power.145 The power, 
potestas, and Suvapic; are translated as “strength,” a vital role in social structure, 
cohesion and function with the strong with their privilege dominating the weak, 
knowing that “there were publicly recognized or recognizable criteria on the basis of 
which those privileges could be identified.”146 Paul’s genius is in carefully inserting 
Old Testament passages and Graeco-Roman words to communicate unity and mutual 
reconciliation in the obligation of imitatio Christi, but at the same time to place the 
strength of power in God the Benefactor, in Christ the one to imitate, and in the Holy 
Spirit. Paul’s sense of all three factors aimed to express his wish in counter-cultural 
language and revolutionary thought calling for new action under the compelling 
obligation of imitatio Christi. Obligation, its duties and relationships to God first and 
others second, in the power of the Holy Spirit, served as the solution to conflict, racial 
polarization, and tension between the strong and the weak. Imitatio Christi as the one 
obligation that overrides all others supplied clarity, continuity, decisive action, and 
power to conflict resolution in the church.147 Obligation in the imitatio Christi is the 
key intersecting link and social dynamic to church unity.
The resolution of conflict and the behaviour associated with resolution in 
Roman society was based on Roman law, mores, the hierarchical pattern with its
145 Gamsey and Sailer, The Roman Empire, 127; 107-59.
146 Gamsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege, 235.
147 Judge, The Social Pattern, 27. Paul’s obligation and wish for Christian citizens in an imitatio Christi 
politeia was in stark contrast to Roman citizenship: “...into a common citizenship, and the Roman 
republic itself, faced with the demand for continuity and decisiveness in action created by its own 
growth, had allowed an overriding combination of powers to be vested permanently in a single official, 
the Caesar.” Caesar’s power included an obligation to the Roman empire. Paul asked the church in 
Rome to vest their highest priority of obligation in a single person, Jesus Christ.
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reciprocal relations, and the nexus of relationships based on Roman power, status and 
rank.148 Roman obligation was biased toward the strong, “the powerful who made the 
law, the same men who felt free to subordinate the law to higher claims of peer 
loyalty, patronage, and favouritism.”149 The strong dominated, placing the weak under 
obligation to them in the social structure of the Roman empire, a pattern that 
exacerbated “unremitting social tensions,”150 tensions which eased their way into the 
church in Rome. Paul instructs the church to change the model not of imitatio 
princeps, but of imitatio Christi; not of a hierarchical pattern per se, but of an inverted 
pattern of “not pleasing yourselves;” not of a weak-obligated-to-strong dynamic, but a 
strong-obligated-to-weak dynamic; not on the Roman law of obligation coercing 
behaviour, but on the Christian service of obligation based on God’s mercies and gifts 
of grace. Paul’s obligation to the church was revolutionary, calling for a change of 
mindset, and was inclusive, not exclusive.151 After all, Roman obligation sought 
control and domination through social distinction.152 Paul was challenging the strong 
to an obligation to include the weak, to drop social distinction, and welcome them by 
faith. For the Roman church the calculators of obligation were being asked to 
calculate, not the persona of rank and status, but the person of Christ; not on “external 
impressions,”153 but the transformed heart; not to please themselves because Christ, 
their model to imitate, did not please himself and welcomed all. Paul, in an appeal to 
conscience that re-orders conduct, called the church to a unity of purpose through the
148 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 112.
149 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 112-13.
150 Crook, Law and Life, 57.
151 Pieter G. R. deVilliers, “Peace in the Pauline Letters: A Perspective on Biblical Spirituality,” 
Neotestamentica 43 (2009): 17. He writes that Pauline peace “has an inclusive character.”
152 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 88-127.
153 Epictetus, Discourses 2.16. He indicates, “’’The things which a man ought to practise all day long, 
without being devoted to what is not his own, either comrade, or place, or gymnasia, nay, not even his 
own body; but he should remember the law and keep that before his eyes.” Epictetus, Discourses 1.1.7; 
1.28.11. He speaks of the “power to make correct use of external impressions” and the “impression of 
one’s senses,” an inference to judgments made from external impressions. Polybius, Histories, 
15.25.22. The word also means “pomp” or “parade” or “ostentation.”
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imitatio-Christi-transformed and faith-invigorated social convention of Roman 
obligation.154
5. Romans 14-15
Paul’s effort to re-order conduct would require obligation, Christian virtue in the 
realm of honour, a solution of equality and reciprocal exchange, and actions based on 
the best interests of the Christian community. Obligation meant that the strong were 
“under obligation” to the weak, including the weak in faith (Rom 14:1). The strong 
were “under obligation” not to please themselves. Social distinction was a reality in 
Roman society, but Paul struggled “hard for vision that most pagans, many Jews, and 
some Christians do not share.”155 Paul’s vision was unity among Christians in the 
church in Rome, a unity where there was no social distinction and where an inclusive 
spirit thrived to “build an alternative society.”156 For such unity to be achieved the 
Christian community would have to focus on God’s kingdom (Rom 14:17), God’s 
household (Rom 15:2), and reception of others based on the model of Christ (Rom 
14:1; 15:7). Paul promoted an “inclusive ethic” based on Christ’s example of 
welcoming each of them, thus obligating the Christian community to welcome each 
other for the unity of the church and the glory of God.157
154 Guy G. Stroumsa, The End o f Sacrifice (trans. Susan Emanuel; Chicago: University of Chicago, 
2009), 2, 13,42,73. He views the imitatio Christi as “a radical form, expressing the will to go up to 
martyrdom in order to repeat in some way the sacrifice of the Son of God... (p. 73). He also sees 
Christianity as forging an identity in the first century: of “interiorization,” of prayer, worship and 
ethical norms based on metavoia versus a Roman civic religion; of distancing itself from Judaism by 
writing its codes on papyrus versus scrolls; and by focusing on the sacrifice of Christ versus the 
repulsive animal sacrifices in pagan temples.
John D. Crossan and Jonathan L. Reed, In Search o f Paul: How Jesus’s Apostle Opposed Rome’s 
Empire with God’s Kingdom (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 2004), 378.
156 Horsley, ed. Paul and Empire, 206; Reasoner, The Strong and the Weak, 194. He views the strong’s 
actions “as a means toward the ultimate obligation of glorifying God (15:6).”
157 Toney, Paul’s Inclusive Ethic, 103-4.
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This inclusivity would be different than patrons receiving clients in a socially 
stratified society, different than Gentiles158 despising Jews in a conflicted society, but 
rather a reception according to virtue. The virtue would not be based upon Roman 
honour stemming from legal concepts and Greek philosophical models, but a virtue of 
Christian honour based on Christ. This would not require a “competition of honour” 
based on civic pride, social power, and prestige, but virtue in a sense of “oughtness” 
or duty “derived from faith in the gospel, the gift of the spirit, and membership in the 
community of faith.”159 The virtue would inspire Christian duty as Paul was 
“declaring a social obligation that derives from a particular relationship in which the 
benefits have already been received.”160 Jewett observes, “Having received the 
supreme gift of salvation, granted freely to the undeserving, each recipient has the 
reciprocal obligation of gratitude to the divine Giver and of passing on the gift with 
similar generosity to others who are equally undeserving.”161 Grace given by God and 
grace received required a reciprocal obligation of grace with a spirit of patience and 
comfort as Christ benevolently demonstrated to each of them.162
Paul demanded obligation in a radical ethic, but not one based on social 
hierarchy, social pressures, exploitation or aristocratic tendencies from Roman 
society.163 The “radical Paul” called for equality, mutuality, and humility.164 As such 
Christians were called upon to treat brothers and sisters as equals, to “follow after 
things which make for peace” (Rom 14:19), and to practice the humility of Christ 
(Rom 15:3). For Paul, Christ’s humility, especially the meaning of the cross,
158 MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 192 n. 51. He says eOvoq is a Greek equivalent for “class.”
See Rom 3:29; 9:24: 15:10.
159 Jewett, 50, 876.
160 Jewett ,876.
161 Jewett, 876.
162 Rom 1:5; 15:5, 15. Kasemann, 377.
163 Horsley, ed., Paul and Empire, 191.
164 John D. Crossan, God and Empire: Jesus Against Rome, Then and Now (San Francisco, California: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 2007), 163-79; Horsley, Paul and Empire, 241. Fiorenza calls this the “praxis of 
co-equal discipleship” (p. 241).
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“energized his entire apostolic endeavour.”165 Christ’s humility obligated the 
Christians in Rome to discard social superiority, such boasting and the shaming 
hostilities often associated with superiority in Roman culture.166 Christ-like humility 
would reign in the church over personal enmity. The model of Christ would 
encourage “self-denial”167 and result in “one voice.”168
Obligation centred in the “redemptive action of the Messiah who did not 
please himself would be the formula to resolve the conflict between the strong and the 
weak.”169 Paul’s urgent appeal of obligation for conflict resolution in the Christ 
community in Rome would not be centred on Roman legal and social formulas and 
remedies in Rome’s obligation society, but on Christian obligation in God’s kingdom, 
Christian virtue based on Christ’s virtue and actions (both commands and 
prohibitions) anchored in Christ.170
6. Conclusions
Paul’s primary goal in Romans 15:1-13 is to resolve conflict between the strong and 
the weak in the church. His theological judgment identifies the reality of the tension 
between the strong and the weak, a tension with polarizing racial undertones. Paul 
takes the side of the strong while pleading for unity by using the Roman legal and 
social dynamic of obligation. Paul placed the strong under obligation to bear the 
weaknesses of the weak, including the countercultural challenge “not to please 
ourselves.”
165 Horsley, ed. Paul and Empire, 167. Elliot discusses the “anti-imperial message of the cross” and 
how Paul used the nature of the cross and “focused it through the lens of Jewish apocalypticism” (167- 
83).
166 Jewett, 879-80. He says that Christ absorbs the shame (p. 880). See Rom 15:3.
167 Stuhlmacher, 229.
168 Kasemann, 383.
169 Jewett, 879.
170 Contra Elliot, The Rhetoric o f Romans, 298. He says, “Finally, our interpretation suggests a 
corrective of the pervasive Christian chauvinism that is based, historically and culturally, in a 
triumphalistic christomonism. The recovery of the Pauline gospel’s profound rootage in the covenant of 
Israel points beyond the destiny of particular peoples -  ‘the Jews’ or ‘the Gentiles’ -  to the fully cosmic 
scope of God’s re3demptive purpose, as this is signified in the history and future o f Jesus Christ” (299).
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Paul inverted Roman obligation’s understood precepts of Augustan themes, 
princeps, and the hierarchical pattern of Roman social relations in obligation by 
introducing a compelling obligation: imitatio Christi. This created a new order and a 
radical ethic based upon conscientious theological convictions upon God mercies and 
his grace, a stark contrast to Roman obligation based on merciless power and 
graceless abuse of power by the strong of society. Obligation became the means for 
conflict resolution in the church in Rome.
Paul used five Old Testament quotations to reinforce unity, mutuality, peace, 
joy, and hope in the spirit of imitatio Christi. The quotes carried the force of Roman 
understandings that both the strong and the weak could identify, as well as Jewish 
implications that encouraged unity between both the strong Gentiles and the weak 
Jews. The quotes reinforced Christian virtue, behaviour, and community by logically 
discussing the results of what can happen when the strong are under obligation to the 
weak in the imitatio Christi under the rule of the kingdom of God.
Paul’s binding obligation of imitatio Christi designed a spiritual plan that 
included more than mere duty, but faith beyond duty, “good faith,”171 a faith “with 
obligation” because of Christ motivated from the heart, not just Roman law, social 
practise, and convention. The faith produces unity between the strong and the weak, 
encouraging community, reception of all persons, and causing “advantage” to fade 
while pushing weakness “into the background” in the church.172 Paul’s binding 
obligation undercut the classical order by placing a higher priority on the whole
171 Seneca, On Benefits 3.15.1-2. He says, “Would that no compact marked the obligation (obligaret) of 
buyer to seller, and that no covenants and agreements were safeguarded by the impress of seals, but 
that, instead, the keeping of them were left to good faith and a conscience that cherishes justice! But 
men have preferred what is necessary to what is best, and would rather compel good faith (fidem) than 
expect it.” See also Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 789: “The debtor had to adjust his behaviour in 
accordance with the precepts of good faith, and was thus subject to a whole range of duties of care.”
172 Henrik Ljungman, Pistis: A Study o f its Prepositions and its Meaning in Pauline Usage (Lund: 
Gleerup, 1964), 49,48-54. Faith becomes an aspect o f obligation based on God’s mercy.
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person, not merely the quickly calculated persona based on status and rank. Paul’s 
binding obligation laid claim to both Messianic and Roman ideals: peace and joy, 
certainly ideals liberated from Roman power by the “power of the Holy Spirit.”
Ultimately, Paul, in using 6(j)£iAfj to reconcile the strong and the weak, is 
“plundering the Egyptians,” that is, using a term or word by converting it for his own 
uses to communicate the gospel.173 In Romans 15:1 Paul’s “plunders” ocf)£iAq by 
using it as a powerful weapon to reinforce the Christian ethical obligation of imitatio 
Christi rather than pervasive, Roman conventional way of thinking to build up and 
unify the church in Rome.174
The material discussed in this chapter as it relates to Romans 15:1-13 has 
demonstrated that Paul both understood Roman obligation and placed the church in 
Rome under obligation to a higher, more noble, more compelling obligation: imitatio 
Christi which overrides all other obligations. A mutual faith and a unified church 
would be the result: obligation as ethics, the power of Roman 6(j)£iAq as the key to 
conflict resolution.
173 E.A. Judge, “Paul’s Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Practice,” ABR 16 (1968): 40. He calls 
this plundering of a word the “spoiling of the Egyptians” by “turning its subtleties against itself’ and 
emphasizes that the early church fathers would have put it this way.
174 Winter, Paul and Philo, 160.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions
1. Summary
It has been argued that the Roman background of Romans 14:1-15:13 supplies the 
key element in resolving the conflict between the strong and the weak in the church in 
Rome. Paul’s plundering of “obligation” (6(j)£iAp), with its legal, political, and social 
aspects, provided a powerful tool of influence in his innovative argument for the 
resolution of conflict between the strong and the weak.
The Introduction suggested that the strong and the weak were two distinct 
classes of people, one socially superior and the other socially inferior. It noted how 
different scholars categorize the strong and the weak in the Epistle to the Romans. 
Social stratification was suggested and, given the fact that Paul had not yet been to 
Rome at the time of his writing, the precedent of Paul’s experience with the 
Corinthians (I Cor 8-11:1) was discussed as being influential in Paul’s argument in 
Romans 14:1-15:13. An integral part of the interpretation of Romans 15:1 was how 
Roman obligation, with its law, mores, hierarchical pattern, and resolution of conflict, 
played a vital role in Roman social practice as well as in the conflict in the church in 
Rome. Obligation was introduced as Paul’s key to resolving the problems between the 
strong and the weak. The cultural implications of the Graeco-Roman background of 
the New Testament is often observed but not explored in depth, creating a diversity of 
interpretations in Biblical studies.1 Paul’s critical tool for social invention 
reinterpreted Roman obligation based on a new model: that of imitatio Christi.
It was proposed that the appropriate approach to Romans 14:1-15:13 was to 
use the two avenues of Roman obligation: the critical tool of social invention and 
Paul’s new model. Section I of the thesis addressed the law of obligation in Roman
1 Judge, Social Pattern, 7.
312
society. Roman society functioned, in essence, in the nexus of social relationships 
linked together by Roman legal obligation. Section II of the thesis observed the 
Biblical text of Romans 14:1-15:13 and demonstrated a new obligation for the 
Christian community at Rome.
Chapter 1 explained the legal basis of Rome’s obligation society, a network of 
tightly defined social ties, legal responses, and incipient duties associated with 
obligation. Roman law served as the foundation of society and mediated legal 
conflicts. It also persuaded and motivated the social practice of Roman society. 
Primary and secondary literary sources indicate the strategic foundation of Roman 
law for social control, social cohesion, and interpersonal conflict resolution.
Roman law influenced social practice, but also played an essential role in the 
mores of Roman society. Chapter 2 discussed them as a primary influence in the way 
Roman society operated and functioned. Roman society maintained its principal 
foundation in Roman law, but it operated on the basis of indispensable mores. It was 
an “empire of honour,” of duty, piety, loyalty, dignity, and gratitude, each 
representing spokes in the wheel of Roman obligation with obligation the hub that 
enabled Roman society to function. These mores formed a bond in social relationships 
as Romans related in social practice and daily life.
Relationships were cemented together by Roman law, the mores, and 
maintained social patterns that were hierarchical, vertical, and clearly disposed toward 
the privileged (strong) of society. Chapter 3 discussed how the pattern of Rome’s 
obligation society was organized, the advantage of noble birth, wealth, and the 
“aristocrats”2 of Roman society. Roman aristocratic society demanded orderliness 
predicated upon its rank and social status. The hierarchy established rules and
2 Cicero, Republic 3.13.23.
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obligations for both the strong and the weak based upon two key elements: patronage 
and household paterfamilias, with each unique societal construct filtering into the 
broader society with corresponding duties. The hierarchical pattern functioned 
socially in a series of circular commands and prohibitions. It required reciprocal 
relations or reciprocal responses with the obligation of a superior to the weaker as a 
response and vice versa in what Cicero described as an endless “sort of bargain 
between the common people and the powerful.”3 The bargain of reciprocal relations 
cemented their bond of obligation in social practice, thus creating a society of equality 
in inequality with “different kinds of domination and subjection.”4 The socially 
advantaged strong dominated the weak, as was shown in this chapter in the way the 
hierarchical pattern worked in Rome by distinguishing the Gentile “strong” and the 
Jewish “weak.” This distinction created conflict in Rome in the form of racial 
polarization, anti-Semitism to be specific, that had to be faced.
Chapter 4 discussed conflict resolution in Roman society. Roman obligation in 
society was a tool for resolving conflicts of all kinds throughout the empire. Power, 
rank, status, patronage, and friendship along the ascending or descending Roman 
hierarchical scale was an overall strategy with rules and specified obligations that 
brought resolution, concord, and peace in relationships in society, each respectively 
reducing tension; thereby, it did “not disturb the stability of the State.”5
Zimmermann demonstrated that Roman obligation was “an invisible rope” to 
bind the weak to the strong.6 When conflict arose, resolution came through 
compliance and submission when obligations were fulfilled in “good faith.” When 
obligations were refused, coercive obligation took place, a kind of tightening of the
3 Cicero, Republic 3.13.23.
4 Cicero, Republic 3.25.37.
5 Cicero, Republic 6.1.1.
6 Zimmermann, Law o f Obligations, 5.
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“invisible rope” around the neck, as the strong forced the weak to fulfil their 
obligations. In such cases, coercive obligation took place because the strong in society 
possessed social privileges. The weak were often abused, manipulated, exploited, and 
their reputations destroyed because “the weaker should be willing to obey the 
stronger.”7 Roman obligation according to Roman honour and loyalty strengthened 
the bonds amicably and in the case of refusal increased tensions, inciting enmity, 
greed, revenge, and envy. Conflict reinforced social distinction based on how persons 
were read and categorized according to rank, status, and obligation.
Paul’s challenge in the church in Rome was to overcome law, custom, and 
social practice based on Roman cultural expectations of rank and status and to create a 
new obligation for the church with an innovative model for Christian ethics as 
opposed to mere Roman virtue.
Chapter 5 discussed the reality of conflict between the strong and the weak 
with a special reference to polarization in the church in Rome. It considered Paul’s 
warning of an anti-Semitic crossover into the church. In Romans 14 Paul outlined the 
dichotomy of church conflict and polarization in their ethnic, practical and theological 
contexts. He laid out his theological judgment and that of the strong as he discussed 
Sabbath days and food. Paul also outlined the position of the weak’s theological 
judgment concerning Sabbath days and food. Two first-century ways to approach 
conflict were contrasted: (1) the cultural way based upon Roman law, obligation, and 
social practice or (2) a way based upon the values, obligations, ethics, and social 
relations in the kingdom of God.
Chapter 6 digressed in order to establish Paul’s logical and sequential 
argument toward Roman obligation as the critical tool for conflict resolution. Romans
7 Cicero, Republic 1.33.51.
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9-11 was explored and differences between the strong and the weak in the church 
highlighted along with Paul’s prolegomenon in these chapters to the resolution of 
racial polarization. He acknowledged the fact of racial polarization and its unhealthy 
disruption of the stability and unity of the church. His anguish, pleas, and experience 
called for an appeal to the Christian’s conscience and a new obligation to resolve the 
conflict between the strong and the weak, between the mostly Gentile “strong” and 
the mostly Jewish “weak.”
Chapter 7 contrasted two ways to live: in the coercive Roman way in a culture 
of hierarchical obligations or in the cooperative Christian way produced in persons by 
the transforming actions of Christ. Paul presented a new concept of obligation for the 
church so that they could relate, communicate, and live harmoniously, especially with 
their social distinctions, social practices, and plan for conflict resolution. The 
foundation of obligation prefiguring Romans 15 is twofold. These are God’s mercies 
and his gifts of grace. Each one was a benefit of God’s benevolence and his “styled 
philanthropy” which expected reciprocity: gratuitous actions of mercy and grace.8 
Each one supplied the church with a new obligation: for each person to present his or 
her body as a living sacrifice to be transformed by the renewal of the mind through 
Christ. The acts of mercy and grace expressed in service to others because of Christ 
strengthened the church. This created a new obligation establishing a framework for 
Paul’s ethic of obligation.
The compelling, all-encompassing obligation that Paul introduced in Romans 
15:1 was that of imitatio Christi. Chapter 8 explores how Paul sides with the 
theologically strong, outlines a framework for conflict resolution in the kingdom of 
God, and pleads with all his heart for the church not to destroy the work of God. By
8 Hands, Charities and Social Aid, 42; Aristotle, Nicomachaean Ethics 5.5.4-7.
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using obligation (Rom 15:1) he reversed the Augustan expectation of Roman 
obligation based on rank and status with the weak obligated to the strong. Paul 
proposed a radical ethic of the strong obligated to the weak. For both he used the 
command (“ought”) and prohibition (Rom 14:20, “you must not destroy the work of 
God for meat”) while obligating the church to imitatio Christi. This meant that the 
persons in the church had to surrender their privileges in order to bear the weaknesses 
of others and not please themselves. Rather they were to please their neighbours for 
the common good and to build up God’s family, the household of God. This 
overriding obligation of imitatio Christi formed a new model for the church, replacing 
the Augustan hierarchical model of princeps with the Christian reversed-status model 
that welcomed each person based on their worth and dignity in Christ. The 
indispensable, counter-cultural power of obligation concludes Paul’s critical and 
revolutionary tool for conflict resolution. The imitatio Christi would override all other 
obligations and empower spiritual transformation.
Paul’s primary focus was not to debate on Sabbath days and food, ethnical and 
cultural observances, or even social distinctions of authority and power, but on an 
obligation of highest loyalty and action: imitatio Christi. Roman obligation invoked 
legal, social and political action. In the imitatio Christi obligation invoked a new 
covenant with a new spirit for right conduct for social relations and conflict 
resolution.
2. Implications and Significance 
The conclusions drawn from this study present a number of other assertions when 
taken from the concept of obligation.
First, obligation symbolizes a narrow field of study in the area of Roman 
backgrounds which attempts “to cull out linguistic, philosophical and other materials
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which help show the context of New Testament ideas.”9 This thesis also shows one 
weakness of Greek grammars and lexicons because most do not recognize the full 
impact in the first century of a word like 6c|)£iAq. A key concept is to approach 
exegetical issues in the New Testament by going beyond mere word studies in an 
effort to “detect the lines of connection and interaction” in order to clearly understand 
the historical-fact-social-practice dynamic embedded in the biblical text.10 In Romans 
14:1-15:13 there is embedded in the text a rich plethora of historical data concerning 
obligation and its practical importance in daily Roman life in the first-century world.
A cursory reading and a word study analysis of obligation has simply assessed 
it as a financial term of debt, i.e., a moral obligation to repay a loan.11 A word study 
covers the surface of obligation’s apparent meaning, but it misses the essential ancient 
elements of Roman obligation in the hierarchical “interchange of services,” in 
personal contracts, in social reciprocity as the “bond” of obligation, and in the 
emotional intensity characterized by the personal relations of obligation.12 This study 
has evaluated and analysed Roman obligation within its socio-historical setting, 
decrying Roman obligation as a mere static, legal, financial or fiduciary responsibility 
while demonstrating the dynamic of obligation with its duties, responsibilities in time 
and place, and its strategic role in systems of power and social construct. Roman 
obligation does not sink into the background of Romans 14:1-15:13 but rather 
presents itself as an agreed social dynamic in the legal, political, and social aspects of 
Roman society. It is a tool for unified relationships.
Roman obligation has also clarified the importance of the social distinctions of 
rank and status, its role in conflict resolution and its consequences in its faithful duty
9 Judge, “St. Paul and Socrates,” Interchange 14 (1973): 106.
10 Judge, “St. Paul and Socrates "Interchange 14 (1973): 107.
11 Cranfield, 2:730 n. 1.
12 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.5.6.
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or defiant refusal. Judge alludes to obligation’s unique role in Roman society with two 
words: honour and shame. He states, “Honour and shame set the axis of social life for 
ancient cultures, but are upended by Paul in major confrontations.” 13 Paul’s 
foundational purpose in using a conventional mode of social practice, obligation, 
finds totally new meaning as he reinterprets it in theological terms for the church. 
Paul’s theological focus “upends obligation in a major confrontation”14 with the force 
of an imperative directed to the strong, especially, but also to the weak: the imitatio 
Christi. Paul’s theological use of Roman obligation counteracted customary 
hierarchical and prejudicial tendencies in the church. Paul’s primary concern is not 
social class or distinction but conflict resolution that produces unity in the household 
of faith. One could make a case that one of the reasons Paul wrote his letter to the 
Romans involved Roman obligation as his primary driving force for resolving conflict 
by helping the church focus on essential principles in God’s kingdom and the witness 
of the gospel.
Second, by comparing primary Graeco-Roman sources and exploring New 
Testament studies in their socio-historic context in the first century, especially Paul’s 
letters, the student uncovers countercultural innovations presented by Christ and the 
apostle Paul. The genius of Paul’s understanding of Hebrew law, Roman social 
practice, and the integration of Roman law, mores, reciprocal relations, and conflict 
resolution into the dynamic of society, and his ability to turn the expected cultural 
term on its head and reconstruct it in a radical, countercultural, revolutionary way, 
identifies Paul an innovator of the highest order.15 A comparative analysis of Latin 
and Greek words from primary Graeco-Roman sources from antiquity and New
13 Judge, “Appeal to Convention,” in Williams, Clarke, Head, Instone-Brewer, The New Testament,
187.
14 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation in Paul,” TynB 35(1984): 24.
15 Judge, “Cultural Conformity and Innovation in Paul,” TynB 35(1984): 24.
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Testament studies sheds light upon first century social practice, New Testament 
exegesis, and the new innovations for social practice, relationships, and also the 
resolution of conflict for the church. A comparative analysis explores the innovations 
necessary to shape Christian social practice, concord, and reciprocal response based 
on the foundations of God’s mercies and grace.
3. Further Study
The focal point of this study has been on Roman obligation within the word limits of 
this thesis. While not in the purview of this thesis, other lines of thoughts suggested 
themselves as further areas of exploration.
One might investigate Paul’s use of the imperative as a form of stating an 
obligation. Exploring the use of the imperative in Romans 12 and 13 appears to unveil 
a plethora of underpinnings related to Roman obligation. Paul appears to highlight 
Roman obligation; and yet the apparent inconsistency of his arguments in some cases, 
especially in Romans 13:1 where he affirms obligation to the tyrant emperor Nero, 
could also be argued in light of Paul’s obligatory word to Titus in Titus 3:1 
concerning civil authorities, in light of Peter’s obligation of submission to supreme 
authorities in I Peter 2:13-15, and in light of Paul’s apparent disruption of public order 
in Ephesus in Acts 19 along with his other encounters with authorities in his 
missionary travels. Imperatives and their relationship to a code of ethics versus a 
Roman law code might be researched.
Further, Romans 1:14 could be explored in relation to Paul’s obligation to the 
Greeks and barbarians, wise and unwise, and the social distinctions linked together 
under the language of debt. The language of Romans 1 indicates the law of obligation 
in its background: faith (fides), spiritual gifts (beneficia), mutual faith, debtor, and the
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social distinction of Jew and Greek. Paul’s obligation to the people in Rome is bound 
by the Gospel.
Further, Romans 4:4 indicates obligation as Paul discusses Abraham: 
paterfamilias, debt, heirs, good faith and the promise of an oath, each term carrying 
with it an underlying theme of Roman obligation. There may be an appeal to the Jews 
in his argument that possesses a double meaning for Abraham’s faith that uses the 
language of Roman obligation with its binding nature.
Romans 16 could be studied with specific interest in the dynamic of status and 
obligation in the listing of the names in a connection with the language of patronage.16 
The significance of the social interaction between the strong and the weak is solidified 
in Romans 16 both in its social reality and in Paul’s call for resolution based on 
obligation.
Roman obligation might also be investigated in Romans 12:3 and in I 
Corinthians 8:2 in the form of “must” (Set), an imperative that carries the force of an 
ethical, moral obligation. Paul often uses “Greek auxiliary verbs of obligation,” such 
as 8ei; and an argument could be made for reasons of Paul’s use of auxiliary verbs of 
obligation and the force of the verbs in Roman social practice and the church’s 
innovation of such verbs.17
Obligation has been argued and discussed in its many first-century facets as a 
binding force in Roman legal, political and social practice. The intensely personal, 
emotional, and hierarchical dynamic of obligation as a “lubricant” for the mechanisms 
in social practice arises in the language of obligation. Although it does not come 
within the purview of this dissertation obligation can be seen in the Gospels, Acts,
16 Clarke, “Paul’s Theology o f In c lu siv en ess103-25.
17 Judge, “Appeal to Convention,” in Williams, Clarke, Head, Instone-Brewer, The NewTestament, 186.
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Paul’s letters, and I Peter.18 In the Gospels in Matthew 18:21-34 obligation signifies 
the focus of Jesus’ parable on forgiveness: those who calculated their duties and 
performed duties based on legal formulas, who were then asked to reconsider their 
duties and actions based on the supreme authority, Christ, and to forgive.19 When 
Jesus washed the feet of his disciples he proposed a new obligation and then presented 
the example (exemplum). Paul in Ephesians 4-5 suggests an apparent Christian code 
of obligation, similar to the approach that Peter takes in I Peter 2-3. Paul’s letters to 
Titus (3:1) and Philemon (1:17-18) also have Roman obligation background ideas for 
exploration. Finally, while the list is not exhaustive, Hebrews (2:1, 17-18) and 
Revelation (1-3) suggest the competing hierarchical obligation of loyalty to Caesar or 
loyalty to Christ, the saviour. Each of these Scripture passages mentioned appeal to 
obligation, status, social distinction between the strong and the weak, duties, supreme 
loyalty, and good faith.
Ancient sources cast significant light on the New Testament uses of 
obligation, but it is also important to examine New Testament words, phrases, and 
textual elements in light of them. After all, “the New Testament is a veritable case­
book of precept and practice,” and a theory of social obligation can be gleaned by 
investigating New Testament precepts, practices, and conduct in their dynamic social 
contexts.
From this study it is evident that Roman obligation provides a significant 
background for the nature of understanding the power of the new, compelling 
obligation of imitatio Christi in the New Testament for first-century Christians. This 
study merely paves the way for further investigation into obligation in its 
revolutionary and resolute conditions of duty under Christ.
18 Sailer, Personal Patronage, 5.
19 Cicero, On Duties 3.108.
20 Judge, Social Pattern, 72.
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